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AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1982 
I. Political Questions 
1. European security and the evolution of 
the situation in South-West Asia 
2. Problems for European security arising 
from pacifism and neutralism 
II. Defence Questions 
1. State of European security 
2. The Falklands crisis 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
Energy requirements and the security 
of Europe - Norway's contribution to 
meeting these requirements 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1983 
2. Accounts of the administrative expendi-
ture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1981 - The Auditor's report and 
Motion to approve the final accounts 
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for 
the financial year 1982 
V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
Revision of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly 
VI. Relations with Parliaments 
1. Booklet on WEU and its activities 
2. Conditions for improving relations bet-
ween the WEU Assembly and public 
opmwn 
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Report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the 
General Aj{ain Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Blaau\\' on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the 
Cmmmttee on SCientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by ,\fr. Adnaemens on beha(f of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Ad m zn istratwn. 
Report tabled by Jfr. Stainton on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admzms-
tration 
Report whled by Afr. Grieve on beha(f of the 
Comnuttee on Rule~ of Procedure and Privi-
legn· 
Report tabled by Jir. Berchem on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Report tabled by Jfr. Stoj{elen on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Document 925 
Morning 
DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1982 
MONDAY, 29th NOVEMBER 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Opening of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
12th November 1982 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary 
sessiOn. 
5. Revision of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draji resolution. 
6. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
TUESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism: 
Resumed debate. 
11 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence. 
3. Problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism: 
Resumed debate. 
r 'ote on the draji recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
11 
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3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Fioret, Under-Secretary of State to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
3. European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia: 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1983: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the drafi budget. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 - The 
Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1982: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stainton on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft opinion. 
10.30 a.m. 
4. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
5. State of European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. State of European security: 
Resumed del>ate. 
3.15 p.m. 
2. Address by Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of 
the United Kingdom. 
12 
DOCUMENT 925 
3. State of European security: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the dra(i recommendation. 
4. The Falklands crisis: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf on the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to meeting these 
requirements: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Booklet on WEU and its activities: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berchem on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
3. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of West ern European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1981 
General 
1. The following financial statements, toge-
ther with an explanatory memorandum, were 
submitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1981 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 
1981 (Appendix 1). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
exnenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1981 (Appen-
dix II). 
(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Wes-
tern European Union, London, in 
respect of contributions to the 
Assembly of Western European 
Union budget for 1981 (Appendix 
Ill). 
(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1981 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
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Summary of income and expenditure 
(Appendix I) 
(a) General 
3. The budget as revised provided for 
expenditure of F 11,326,000 of which 
F 460,000 was expected to be covered by mis-
cellaneous receipts and the balance by contri-
butions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted 
to F 10,510,643. Income amounted to 
F 11,306,4 70 comprising F 10,866,000 from 
contributions requested and received and 
F 440,4 70 from miscellaneous receipts. There 
was thus a budgetary surplus of F 815,357 (as 
shown in Appendix 11) and a shortfall in mis-
cellaneous receipts of F 19,530 leaving an ex-
cess of income over expenditure ofF 795,825. 
(b) Pension scheme 
5. Under the common pension scheme 
implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated 
organisations, Western European Union, Coun-
cil of Europe, NATO, OECD and the Euro-
pean Space Agency, pension benefits payable 
by the Assembly of WEU are charged to the 
Assembly's budget and staff contributions under 
the scheme are credited to the budget as miscel-
laneous income. In 1981 these staff contribu-
tions amounted to F 286,521 (Appendix 1). 
6. Staff members who had been employed 
before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to 
join the new scheme were required to meet the 
cost of validating their past service through 
surrender of their provident fund holdings. 
Where these were insufficient for that purpose 
because of withdrawals, staff members were 
required to meet the deficiency, plus compound 
interest at four per cent per annum, by pay-
ment over a period of five years from 30th June 
1978. In 1981, payments by staff members 
under these arrangements amounted to 
F 39,983 and were credited to the budget as 
miscellaneous income. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
7. The provident fund continues to operate 
for those members of staff who opted to remain 
affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme 
was introduced. The assets of the provident 
fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the 
assets of the provident funds of the other organs 
'of Western European Union in joint deposits 
administered by the office of the Secretary-
General. The joint deposits were held in 
French francs, sterling, United States dollars 
and German marks and due to variations in the 
exchange rate between the French franc and the 
other currencies a gain ofF 1,785 was made in 
the value of the deposits. This gain has been 
credited to the accounts of the staff members in 
proportion to their deposits. 
8. The balance held in the provident fund 
at 31st December 1981 on the accounts of 
Assembly staff members totalled F 2,096,450. 
9. I have received a certificate from the 
depositary showing the amount of the joint 
deposits held at 31st December 1981 and a 
statement from the office of the Secretary-
General confirming the share of those deposits 
standing to the credit of the Assembly's 
provident fund in the office's books at 31st 
December 1981. 
10. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the 
Assembly during my audit. 
Gordon DowNEY 
(Comptroller and Auditor General. 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
18th June 1982 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the 
Assembly in connection with the financial year 1981) 
I. The statements attached hereto refer to: 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
- financial position as at 31st Decem-
ber 1981 (Appendix I); 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill); 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 815,357 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F 795,827. The difference 
between these two figures, F 19,530, repre-
sents: 
F F 
- Bank interest ..... 74,074 
- Sundry receipts ... 23,564 
- Sale of publications 16,328 
- Contributions 7 % . 286,521 
- Reimbursement of 
loans on validation 39,983 
440,470 
- Receipts for 1981 es-
timated in the bud-
get ............... 460,000 
- Shortfall in receipts 19,530 
Validations of pensions 
3. On 31st December 1981 there remained 
one outstanding loan on validation of pensions 
totalling F 32,140. In accordance with the 
regulations the outstanding loan must be 
cleared in 1983. 
Transfers 
4. Excess expenditure amouting to F 65,676 
has been met by transfers within sub-
heads. 
Contributions 
5. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1981. 
DOCUME:'JT 926 
Provident fund 
6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated 
with those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
7. The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in French francs, sterling, German marks, 
United States dollars with the International 
Westminster Bank Ltd., London. 
8. The Assembly's provident fund on 31st 
December 1981 amounted to F 2,096,450 as 
shown at Appendix IV. At 1st January 1981 
16 
there remained loans to three staff members 
amounting to F 126,000. Repayments of 
F 58,100 reduced the loans outstanding as at 
31st December 1981 to F 67,900. 
9. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
3rd May 1982 
Fred MULLEY 
President of the Assembly 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1981 
(1!1 French francs) 
Per anached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) 
.\11 1cella neou 1 
(A) Sundr) receipts 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts ............................................ . 
Sale of publications ........................................ . 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7 %) 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc) ..... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix 11) ..... . 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1981 
. .J. I I Cl I 
ca~h at bank 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ........................................ . 
L/(//Jiltl!CI 
Accounts payable 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Certi tied correct : 
74,074 
23,564 
16,328 
286,521 
39,983 
1,008,715 
100,910 
148,168 
461,966 
795,827 
DOCUMENT 926 
10,866,000 
440,470 
11,306,470 
10,510,643 
F 795,827 
1,257,793 
F 1,257,793 
Fred MLLLn 
Pre1ident of the A 1semhly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the As.1embly 
Hugo ADRIAENSENS 
Chairman ofthe Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify. a~ the re'>ult of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
18th June 1982 
Signed: Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and A udttor General. 
Umted Klllgdom 
External A udtlor 
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APPE 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AN 
DETAILS 
Total budget for 
1981 I 
HEAD I - ExPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Suh- H cad 1 !a) Salaries of permanent establishment 4,856,000 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
A, 8 and C), including travelling expenses and 
65,000 insurance 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances. social charges, etc. 
(A) Alfoll'anccs 
(a) Household allowance 175,000 
(b) Children's allowance 165,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance 410,000 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 15,000 
(e) Overtime 30,000 
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-
French staff 
(g) Education allowance 70,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses 2,000 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 426,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 163,000 
(c) Provident fund 105,000 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure oj'permanent of(icwls 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates 
not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking 
examination papers 1,600 
(h) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 1,500 
(c) Removal expenses 3,400 
(d) Installation allowance 7,000 
(c) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 10,000 
(f) Medical examination 8,500 
Total of Head I 6,514,000 
I. Documents 851 and 872, Addendum 
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X 11 
~EXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 
Tran:-.fer:-. Total after Total Cnnpended tramfcr-, expenditure cred11'> 
+ -
4,856,000 4,555,880 300,120 
65,000 9,698 55,302 
175,000 155,613 19,387 
165,000 143,320 21,680 
12,596 397,404 347,592 49,812 
15,000 12,465 2,535 
30,000 29,422 578 
70,000 61,475 8,525 
2,000 1,100 900 
12,596 438,596 438,596 -
163,000 161,410 1,590 
105,000 102,586 2,414 
1,600 - 1,600 
1,500 - 1,500 
3,400 - 3,400 
5,041 1,959 - 1,959 
5,041 15,041 15,041 -
8,500 4,466 4,034 
17,637 17,637 6,514,000 6,038,664 475,336 
19 
DOCUMENT 926 
DETAILS 
HEAD 11 - ExPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 1. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. Linguistic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
Total of Head 11 
HEAD Ill - ExPENDITURE oN PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 1. Premises 
2. Work on the building 
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head lll 
20 
Total budget for 
1981 
609,000 
236,000 
230,000 
513,000 
5,000 
270,000 
57,000 
1,920,000 
283,000 
83,000 
17,000 
383,000 
APPENDIX JI 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
609,000 568,372 40,628 
236,000 225,892 10,108 
21,016 251,016 251,016 -
27,794 485,206 472,052 13,154 
5,000 3,515 1,485 
270,000 261,321 8,679 
6,778 63,778 63,778 -
27,794 27,794 1,920,000 1,845,946 74,054 
3,370 279,630 251,039 28,591 
83,000 78,530 4,470 
3,370 20,370 20,370 -
3,370 3,370 383,000 349,939 33,061 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADM!NISTRA T!VE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 
Sub-Head 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, trans-
port of documents 
Office supplies and hire of machines 
Printing and publishing of Assembly docu-
ments 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official cars 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
Travel and subsistence allowances and insu-
rance for the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of 
the Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not else-
where provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(d) Orphans' pension 
(B) Allmmnces 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(d) Relief allowance 
(C) Sel'erance grant 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Total of Head VI 
Total budget for 
1981 
325,000 
210,000 
910,000 
30,000 
67,500 
500 
1,543,000 
85,000 
132,000 
3,000 
215,000 
50,000 
180,000 
180,000 
3,000 
12,000 
860,000 
58,000 
30,600 
15,400 
2,000 
106,000 
I TOTAL I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,326,000 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 3 I st December I 98 I, 
Fred MuLLEY Georg( 
President o(the A.ssemhl1· Clerk of 
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Tramfers Total atler Total Unexpended transfers npendtturc credtts 
+ -
7,I45 3I7,855 3I5,I29 2,726 
7,I45 2I7,I45 2I7,I45 -
9IO,OOO 832,687 77,313 
30,000 26,I05 3,895 
67,500 63,097 4,403 
500 7 493 
7,I45 7,I45 I ,543,000 I,454,I70 88,830 
85,000 68,632 I6,368 
I32,000 100,749 3I ,25I 
4,702 7,702 7,702 -
9,423 205,577 I49,980 55,597 
4,72I 54,72I 54,72I -
I80,000 I44,54I 35,459 
I80,000 I80,000 -
3,000 736 2,264 
I2,000 9,I97 2,803 
9,423 9,423 860,000 7I6,258 I43,742 
2IO 58,2IO 58,210 -
253 30,347 30,347 -
97 I5,497 I5,497 -
54 I,946 I ,6I2 334 
307 307 I06,000 I 05,666 334 
65,676 65,676 II,326,000 I0,5I0,643 8I5,357 
d for up to 31st March 1982, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
)ULJAS Hugo ADRIAEI\ISENS 
4.\.\emhlr Chwrman o(the Commitlcc on 
- Budf{etary Af(airs and Admint.lfration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1981 
Contributions Budget surplus Revised Net Member >late~ 600th<; overpaid budget contributiOn> 
in 1980 1980 for 1981 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 3,087 (-) 35,595 1,068,490 1,029,808 
France 120 (-) 6,279 (-) 72,396 2,173,200 2,094,525 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 6,279 (-) 72,396 2,173,200 2,094,525 
Italy 120 (-) 6,279 (-) 72,396 2,173,200 2,094,525 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 104 (-) 1,207 36,220 34,909 
Netherlands 59 (-) 3,087 (-) 35,595 1,068,490 1,029,808 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 6,279 (-) 72,396 2,173,200 2,094,525 
600 (-) 31,394 (-) 361,981 10,866,000 10,472,625 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1981 
Balance hrought.fimmrd: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1981 
Contributions of staff members and 
Assembly of Western European Union 
Repayments of loans by staff members 
Interest received during the year 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1981 
Fred MULLEY 
President ot'the Assembly 
of the 
F 
1,625,632 
156,849 Withdrawals 
58,100 
268,584 
Accounts of existing 
1,785 December 1981 
2,110,950 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk ofthe Assembly 
F 
14,500 
staff members as at 31st 
2,096,450 
2,110,950 
Hugo ADRIAENSENS 
Chairman ofthe Commlltee on 
Budgetary Affair.s and Admull\'tration 
I have examined the foregoing statement, I have obtained all the information and explanatiOns that I have reqmred. and I certify. as the result of my audit. that m 
my opinion this statement is correct, 
18th June 1982 
Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
< 
0 
0 
r"') 
c: 
:::: 
m 
z 
-l 
'-0 
N 
0\ 
Document 926, Addendum 5th November 1982 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1981 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1981, ·together with 
the Auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
I. Adopted unammousl) by the committee. 
2 .. \Jemben (If the commlllee. Mr. Adnaensens (Alter-
nate: J!l(he!) (Chairman): Mr. Jager (Alternate: Lagorce), 
Lord Hughes (Alternate: Lord Jfci\'uir) (Vtce-Chatrmen), 
MM. Ahren;,, Althammer, Brefnot, Delehedde, Durant 
(Alternate· Atkni\on), Eastham (Alternate: Gnne), Jeam-
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bmn. Kneps (Alternate: Jfurgul:'), Marttno, Mertens (Alter-
nate: run der 11 ·er(/). Orione, Petrilh, Schleller. Schulte, 
Sprung, Stamton (Alternate: Srr Fredenc Bennett), Tripod1. 
Tummer> (Alternate: Mrs. Baal'l'eld-Schlaman). 
N.B. The namn ut tho1c takrng part 111 the rote are 
fJI'lllled 111 11ahn 
Document 927 
European security and the evolution of the -situation in 
South- West Asia 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
15th October 1982 
on European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur 
I. General features of the area 
II. International aspects of the area's problems 
Ill. The conflict between Israel and its neighbours 
IV. The Iraqi-Iranian war 
V. Afghanistan 
VI. The Gulf area 
VII. Developments in the Middle East during summer 1982 
APPENDIX 
Report presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur, on his visit to Jordan and Egypt, 
8th-12th November 1982 
I. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 With 2 absten-
tions. 
2. Members of 1 ommltlee · Szr Frederu Ben nett (Chair-
man): MM. De Po1 (Alternate: Camliere), Urwin (Alter-
nate: Lord Hughe1·) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman. MM. Berrier, Bertile, Del/a Bnotta. 
Cont1 Persini (Alternate: .I made~), De Bondt, van Eekelen 
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(Alternate: Scholtcn), Gnsner, Hardr. Kurt Jung, Lagneau, 
Lagorce, Lord "UcNatr. MM. Mangelschots, van der Sanden, 
Giinther Miiller. Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, 
Thoss, TTaliante. T'eccluettL, Wilquin. 
N.B. The name.\ of those takmg part rn the rote are pnn-
ted 111 ztalics. 
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unity; 
Draft Recommendation 
on European security and the evolution of the situation in South-West Asia 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371 and 386; 
Deploring and condemning the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982; 
Nevertheless welcoming the determination shown by the Lebanese people to restore national 
Welcoming the presence of French, Italian and United States armed forces to protect the civi-
lian population; 
Considering that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it imposs-
ible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there; 
Considering further that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of 
the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East; 
Considering that this settlement implies the application of Resolution 242 of the United 
Nations Security Council, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and recognition of the 
right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and of the right of the 
Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty; 
Considering that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an 
obstacle to the restoration of peace and casts doubt on the will of the Israeli Government to achieve 
this; 
Welcoming the fact that the proposals contained in the final act of the meeting of heads of 
Arab states in Fez on 9th September 1982 show considerable progress towards the application of 
Resolution 242; 
Noting that recent events show more clearly than ever that the Palestinian people needs a 
homeland; 
Considering that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for 
the Palestinian people; 
Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not solve the 
problem but will create unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned; 
Welcoming the declaration by President Reagan on 1st September 1982 as an essential contri-
bution to the restoration of peace in the area; 
Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to the security 
of the whole area; 
Condemning the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a serious violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations, a grave threat to the countries in the area and a negation of Soviet 
proposals for demilitarising the Indian Ocean; 
Reaffirming the close relationship between the security of Europe and the peaceful solution of 
conflicts which upset political balances in the Middle East and South-West Asia, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Reaffirm the support of all its members for any initiative aimed at applying Resolution 242 
and its radical opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank; 
2. Urge the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon except if their presence has 
been requested by the Lebanese Government; 
3. Use all the means available to member countries to support the restoration of the Lebanese 
state; 
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4. Supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people; 
5. Urge the Israeli Government to disclose without delay what it intends to do with those impri-
soned during the occupation of southern Lebanon; 
6. Urge the Israeli Government to allow the International Red Cross immediate and full access to 
those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon and to arrange their earliest possible 
release, to complete the inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the inquiry; 
7. Demonstrate its belief that the question of Palestinian refugees cannot be solved by dispersing 
them but only by the early establishment of a Palestinian homeland; 
8. Urge member countries to refuse any connection with the Afghan Government as long as there 
is Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan; 
9. Increase member countries' financial, non-military technical and food assistance to Afghan 
refugees on Pakistani territory. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur) 
I. General features of the area 
1. South-West Asia is not a well-defined 
geographical area and has hardly any ethnic, 
economic or political unity. The only fact that 
can be stressed. is that Islam is generally predo-
minant although Islamic traditions are nume-
rous and varied. The Islamic revival has been 
felt everywhere in recent decades, although in 
different forms. They range from a reversion 
to very orthodox traditions among the Moslem 
Brothers, whose strength was demonstrated by 
events in Egypt, at the end of 1981, to a more 
liberal development in Turkey, from different 
forms of " Arab socialism " in Iraq and in 
Syria, to forms which are both religious and 
republican, yet still difficult to define, in Iran, 
and to deep-rooted divisions in a number of 
countries. 
2. To this first difficulty of circumscribing 
the area should be added a second stemming 
from the fact that the political form of national 
state which is dominant in the West has not yet 
taken clear shape in part of South-West Asia. 
Admittedly, certain states such as Turkey, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Jordan and Egypt - not to speak 
of Israel, of course - have shown a remarkable 
degree of national cohesion in the twentieth 
century, particularly when they have had to 
face threats from without in recent years. But 
these states themselves include minorities 
whose attachment to the central power is 
uncertain. such as the Kurds in Iran, Turkey 
and Iraq, the Palestinians in Israel, Lebanon, 
Syria and the Gulf countries, the Baluchis in 
Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Arabs 
in Iran. The difficult coexistence between 
ethnic, linguistic and religious communities 
raises problems everywhere and was largely 
contributory to the break up of Lebanon and its 
invasion by armed forces from abroad: Syrian 
in 1976, Israeli in 1982. 
3. As compared with these states. the feeling 
of belonging to an Arab community is still 
strong in the countries lying between the Red 
Sea and Mesopotamia. But this community 
has always had the utmost difficulty in finding 
political expression. The Arab League has 
been insufficiently powerful and although in 
times of particularly acute crises an Arab front 
may have taken shape it has never lasted and 
differences between Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and 
Syria and the Palestinians and Jordan have so 
far prevented any lasting cohesion. In June 
1982, Israel even came to grips with Syria on 
Lebanese territory without arousing serious 
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reactions m the rest of the Arab world. It is 
still impossible to foresee what will become of 
Arabism. Will it bring the Arab countries to-
gether in an alliance or a confederation in the 
foreseeable future ? 
11. International aspects of the area's problems 
4. For a long time, Europe's interests seemed 
relatively clear : some stability had to be main-
tained in existing states so as to protect econo-
mic, cultural or even political ties, some of 
which were of very long standing. The install-
ation of the state of Israel in Palestine in 
1948 raised serious problems but it was hoped 
that the territory could be shared between two 
states, one Jewish, the other Arab, once the 
frontiers were defined. 
5. In 1919, the Jewish community in Pales-
tine numbered only 65,000, but this figure rose 
rapidly during the period of the British man-
date, due in particular to Hitlerian persecu-
tion. In spite of certain restrictions on immi-
gration imposed by the mandatory power as 
from 1936, the community numbered 425,000 
in 1939, i.e. almost a third of the population of 
Palestine. Since 1920, it had had its own poli-
tical organisation. The National Council, res-
ponsible for the administration of the people, 
encouraged the acquisition of land by the 
Jewish community to which it supplied arms 
and a military organisation. Clashes between 
the Jewish and Arab communities, which had 
begun in 1920, therefore increased as from 
1936 and assumed the dimensions of a true 
civil war with the approach of the date fixed by 
the British Government for the end of its 
mandate in Palestine on 14th May 1948. Cer-
tain Jewish organisations, particularly the 
Irgun, were then carrying out terrorist opera-
tions, the best known of which was the blowing 
up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 
22nd July 1946. 
6. With this date in mind, on 29th Novem-
ber 194 7, the United Nations General Assem-
bly for its part adopted by 33 votes to 13 with 
10 abstentions a plan for the partition of Pales-
tine between the two communities, the Jewish 
community being granted 55% of the territory. 
But this plan, accepted by neither of the two 
communities, did not manage to prevent inter-
vention by all Palestine's neighbouring states on 
15th May 1948 and the pursuit of a war bet-
ween the new state of Israel and the Arab coun-
tries. The armistices which put an end to this 
war in spring 1949 allowed Israel to occupy 
78% of the territory of Palestine whereas at 
that time the Jewish community represented 
only about 40 % of the population of the coun-
try. Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and 
Transjordania, the West Bank territory it had 
annexed in 1950. In order to ensure a Jewish 
majority within its frontiers, the state of Israel 
opposed the return of those Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine who had fled the country during the 
war which henceforth gave rise to a refugee 
problem for which the United Nations took res-
ponsibility through the intermediary of UNW-
RA. Most of these refugees were in Jordan. 
7. The situation thus created remained 
highly unstable, on the one hand because no 
peace treaty defined Israel's frontiers and the de 
facto division of Palestine in 1949 was contes-
ted by all the Arab countries and on the other 
because the activities of the Palestinians chased 
off their land meant that permanent insecurity 
reigned over the territory controlled by Israel. 
As a result. there was a series of attacks and 
frontier incidents which on three occasions led 
to generalised conflict: in 1956, 1967 and 
1973. 
8. The war launched by Israel on 5th June 
1967 as a reaction to the closing of the Strait of 
Tiran by Egypt had particularly serious conse-
quences for the area since it allowed Israel in 
the space of six days to vanquish successively 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria, to occupy the whole 
of the Sinai· Peninsula and the Golan Heights, 
taken from Syria, and again to chase away a 
large proportion of the inhabitants of these 
areas and the 1949 refugees living there. A 
large part of them came together again in east-
ern Jordan. 
9. Although on 22nd November 1967 the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 242 proclaiming "the inadmissibi-
lity of the acquisition of territory by war" and 
the right of every state in the area " to live in 
peace within secure and recognised boundaries " 
and calling for "the withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied ", this 
resolution, confirmed on several occasions by 
the United Nations General Assembly and 
endorsed by most western countries, including 
European countries, has never been applied. 
However, as from 196 7, the situation was fur-
ther changed by several new developments : 
10.(i) On 27th June 1967, Israel decided to 
annex eastern Jerusalem which had been left to 
Jordan under the 1949 armistice. In 1981, it 
also annexed the Golan. Finally, pleading 
security requirements, it established numerous 
military and agricultural colonies on the West 
Bank and everything indicates that it is con-
sidering annexing this area, which it calls 
" Galilee " and " Samaria ". 
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11. (ii) Diplomatic activity by the United States 
following the failure of Egypt's attempt in 
October 1973 to free the Sinai" led to the 
conclusion of a separate peace agreement bet-
ween Israel and Egypt on 26th March 1979 fol-
lowing the Camp David negotiations. The 
essential provisions were the progressive hand-
ing back of the Sinai" to Egypt accompanied by 
partial demilitarisation of the area and Israel's 
promise to grant autonomy to the Palestinians 
within five years. However, although Israel 
did in fact complete the evacuation of the Sinai" 
in 1982 its promise to grant the right of self-
determination to the Palestinians is being inter-
preted extremely restrictively since it is not 
considering allowing them any territory. 
12.(iii) Palestinian resistance became organised 
around several movements which soon came 
together in the PLO and caused many mur-
derous incidents between Israel and Jordan, 
to such an extent that the latter was forced in 
September 1970 to dispose of several of these 
movements by force. The most militant ele-
ments of the Palestinian resistance movement 
then took refuge in Syria and above all in 
Lebanon. 
13. (iv) Although the Syrian Government man-
aged to control the activities of Palestinian 
movements on its territory the same was not 
true in Lebanon where the presence of 300,000 
to 400,000 Palestinians endangered the delicate 
balance between the Lebanese communities on 
which the national pact of 11th November 
1943 was based. Intercommunity clashes 
increased, degenerating into civil and religious 
war in 1975. The Syrian army intervened to 
restore order in Lebanon in 1976 but soon 
became involved in the country's internal 
conflicts, where it supported the Palestinian 
and Moslem armed forces while Israel helped 
the Christian militia in the south of the coun-
try. The stationing of a United Nations force 
close to Lebanon's southern frontiers did not 
put a stop to military operations by either side. 
14. (v) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon sought 
new forms for their struggle to make up 
for their military inferiority as compared with 
Israel and they increased their terrorist action 
both on Israeli territory and throughout the 
world, attacking not only Israeli nationals but 
also nationals of many Arab countries accused 
of betraying the Palestinian cause. 
15. (vi) The assassination of an Israeli diplomat 
in London on 4th June 1982 provided a pretext 
for a generalised attack by Israeli forces, helped 
by certain Christian militia forces, against 
southern Lebanon. On 6th June, Syrian forces 
stationed in Lebanon and the United Nations 
force were unable to prevent the Israeli army 
occupying the south of the country and embark-
ing upon a siege of western Beirut, held by 
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Moslem Lebanese and Palestinians, until the 
intervention of Mr. Philip Habib, representing 
the United States, allowed the Palestinian mili-
tants to be evacuated and dispersed among 
several Arab states in Asia and Africa in 
August 1982. 
16. However, since the second world war the 
growth of Soviet strength and the interest 
shown by the Soviet Union in the area have 
made it a stake in the international balance. 
The Soviet foothold in Iran at the end of the 
war was of brief duration but the first sign of an 
active policy. The failure of the Franco-
British expedition in Suez in 19 56 led to a revi-
val of Soviet political activity in the area and 
made the United States in turn intervene during 
the crisis in Lebanon in July 1958. 
17. The growth of the Soviet fleet from 1965 
onwards, including the appearance of aircraft-
carriers in the Mediterranean and then the 
Indian Ocean, followed by the creation of per-
manent bases, emphasised the importance the 
Soviet Union attached to the area and pro-
vided political support for countries or parties 
with which the Soviet Union was in sympathy, 
although Soviet forces have not however inter-
vened directly in the area. Nonetheless, this 
presence brought two new facets to South-West 
Asian problems. First, it considerably increa-
sed the risk of any conflict in the area spreading 
and becoming internationalised and second it 
made it essential for a large-scale American 
fleet to be present in the Indian Ocean and the 
Mediterranean and for the necessary bases to be 
installed if western interests were to be defended. 
18. The trade embargo imposed in October 
1973 by all the Arab oil-producing countries in 
the area following the war between Israel and 
its neighbours had considerable repercussions, 
on the one hand because it gave these countries 
the impression that their oil resources could be 
used as a political weapon against the West and 
on the other hand because it was an oppor-
tunity to start an escalation of oil prices which 
was a major factor behind the economic reces-
sion from which the world has not yet emerged. 
This made it clear that the Gulf area was of 
considerable importance for the whole western 
world as the source of about half of its oil 
consumption. Western Europe at that time 
depended on the Gulf for more than half its 
energy and almost three-quarters of its oil. 
19. Since then, the facts of the problem have 
changed. The discovery and exploitation of 
new gas and oil deposits, the development of 
nuclear energy production, a strict policy of 
energy saving and finally the recession itself 
have considerably reduced the West's depen-
dence on the Gulf countries. 
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20. In 1981, world oil production amounted 
to 2,859 million tonnes of oil. i.e. 58.5 million 
barrels per day, while consumption amounted 
to only 2,705 million tonnes, i.e. 58.3 million 
barrels per day. But while for the eastern 
countries the production of 12.1 million barrels 
per day almost equalled their consumption of 
12.9 million barrels, the same was not the case 
for the OECD countries which consumed 37.7 
million barrels per day while producing only 15 
million. They therefore had to rely on the 
OPEC countries which produced 22.5 million 
barrels per day but consumed only 2.3. mil-
lion. 17.5 million barrels were then produced 
daily by the Middle East countries in spite of 
the cutback in production imposed by Libya, 
Kuwait and Algeria with a view to keeping up 
oil prices and in spite of the considerable 
reduction in exports by Iran and Iraq due to the 
war between them. Because of this overpro-
duction, oil prices had remained at about $3 5 
per barrel after having risen from about $13 to 
$35 between 1978 and 1981. 
21. Thanks to the economic crisis, to the dis-
covery of new resources, particularly in Africa 
and Mexico, to the energy savings made, to the 
development of alternative energy sources and 
to the building up of large stocks it might there-
fore appear that the western countries have to a 
large extent freed themselves of the need to 
acquire Middle East oil at any cost. However, 
this would be an excessively optimistic view. 
In fact. oil is still a source of energy and an 
essential raw material for the western econo-
mies and the resources recently discovered far 
from equal those offered by the Middle East on 
the one hand because very considerable invest-
ment is required for their exploitation and on 
the other because the reserves discovered are 
limited. While they correspond to fifty years' 
output at the present rate in the case of the 
Middle East, they give promise of only forty 
years' output at the same rate in Latin Amer-
ica, twenty-five in the Soviet Union and the 
Far East and less than fifteen in the United 
States and Canada. This means that in the 
event of economic recovery growth in oil 
demand will mainly concern the Middle East, 
and the West's dependence on the Middle East. 
the extent of whose consequences was clear in 
1956 and above all in 1973, is very liable to 
return to its former level. 
22. This observation brings out the full signi-
ficance of two major events in 1980, the Iranian 
revolution followed by the war with Iraq, and 
the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. 
Although this invasion brought Soviet armed 
forces nearer to the Gulf it also considerably 
increased the area's mistrust of the Soviet 
Union. As a result, the latter's political 
influence was weakened. Meanwhile, the rap-
prochement between the United States and 
Egypt allowed one aspect of the conflict bet-
ween Israel and its neighbours to be settled 
through the Camp David agreements. 
23. It is not certain that Europe is always 
~ell placed to make a contribution to problems 
m this area, but there are fields in which it may 
be, and one of the purposes of this report 
should be to define and spell out the action 
Europe might take. Indeed, if differences are 
not solved soon perhaps the conditions might 
arise for Soviet intervention beyond Afghan-
istan and the chances of the development of 
peace and stability in the area would again be 
jeopardised. 
Ill. The conflict between Israel and its 
neighbours 
24. By adopting Recommendation 386 in 
June 1982, the Assembly clearly showed in the 
difficult debate preceding the vote that there 
was a wide degree of consensus between its 
members, on the one hand to condemn the 
Israeli aggression in Lebanon and confirm the 
right of the Palestinians to a homeland, and on 
the other hand to recall Israel's right to security 
within frontiers recognised by the international 
community and to condemn all forms of terror-
ism. Finally, the Assembly expressed its 
attachment to the continued existence of the 
Lebanese state. 
25. It seems plain that the motivation for 
~srael's invasion of the Lebanon was, by crush-
mg the PLO, to reduce the resistance to its 
stated policy of incorporating permanently the 
West Bank into the state of Israel. The PLO 
presented little military danger to Israel and 
had in fact observed the cease-fire introduced in 
1981. It was only following repeated Israeli 
violations of the cease-fire that the PLO them-
selves shelled northern Galilee. The Israeli 
violations must be viewed as provocations 
deliberately designed to give them a justifica-
tion for invasion. 
26. Whether the humiliation of the PLO in 
Lebanon, and its elimination as a military 
force, will produce for Israel the desired result 
will depend on several factors: first, the resis-
tance shown within the West Bank itself, 
second, the unity and persistence shown by 
neighbouring Arab countries on behalf of the 
Palestinians, third, the tolerance of the United 
States toward Israeli policy, fourth, the pressure 
applied by international opinion on behalf of 
the Palestinians, in particular on Israel and on 
the United States. 
27.. It must be recorded that no Arab country 
achieved, and hardly attempted to achieve, any-
thing to help the PLO in its most desperate 
hour of need in Lebanon. However, it would 
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be rash to assume from this that Arab countries 
will never again act on behalf of the Palesti-
nians, singly or in concert, and even militarily. 
Many. ~rab _cou~t.ries have extremely large 
Palestiman mmonties, as may be seen in the 
table hereafter, and several have shown evident 
f~ar of what the effect of the military humilia-
tiOn of the PLO on these minorities may 
be. The first effect on Arab countries appears 
to have been to increase their pressure on the 
West to meet Palestinian aspirations. 
How the Palestinians are scattered' 
Israel (pre-196 7 borders) 
West Bank 
Gaza 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Kuwait 
Syria 
Saudi Arabia 
United States 
Elsewhere 
Total 
530,600 
818,300 
476,700 
1,160,800 
347,000 
278,800 
215,500 
127,000 
110,000 
325,000 
4,389,900 
28. As far as the United States is concerned, 
one of the effects of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and of the predicament of the PLO 
seems to have been a move towards a greater 
degree of recognition of the PLO and a more 
widespread critical attitude towards Israel for its 
actions. Similarly, in the rest of the world, the 
PLO has managed to extract out of the situa-
tion a greater degree of international recog-
nition. 
29. At all events a turning point has prob-
ably been reached in the history of the Palesti-
nian liberation movement. In the past, unable 
to operate militarily from within Palestine, it 
has sought to do so - or at least keep a visible 
military capability alive - from within some 
other country, first Jordan, then Lebanon. Jor-
dan eventually found the presence of the PLO 
as an armed force intolerable, and expelled the 
PLO in 1970. The PLO was only able to estab-
lish and maintain armed camps in Lebanon 
because of the extreme weakness of the Leba-
nese state. It seems unlikely in the future that 
the PLO will be able to find a home for an 
armed force, unless, at least, it is very strictly 
controlled by the host government. 
30. At the moment it is not obvious whether 
this loss of its military arm will in the long run 
strengthen or weaken the Palestinian liberation 
movement. It is clear that the PLO has gained 
I. 1981 figure; from the Palestme Institute of Statistics. 
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very little from its previous tactics. Its military 
aspect has enabled the Israelis to brand the 
PLO, very successfully in the eyes of the Amer-
ican public, as a terrorist organisation. The 
PLO has also been far too slow to accord Israel 
recognition. A conditional recogmt10n of 
Israel could never have done the cause of the 
PLO any harm. Yet it delayed until what it 
used to call its trump card became virtually 
unplayable. Only when in extremis in West 
Beirut did the PLO begin apparently to shift its 
ground. 
31. It is also not at all clear what the future 
holds for Lebanon. The rest of the world 
would welcome a representative Lebanese 
Government with authority over its whole 
national territory. But whether the divisions 
between Christians and Druze and Moslems 
(and between different sects of Moslems) will 
permit this, remains to be seen. There are also 
the ambitions of Israel and Syria to contend 
with. Israel should now withdraw from Leba-
non, together will all other foreign forces. apart 
from any that may be freely invited to remain 
by a legitimate and representative Lebanese 
Government. 
32. This must be considered a grim moment 
as far as the prospects for a long-term peaceful 
settlement in the Middle East are concerned. 
On the one hand stands the Palestinian resis-
tance movement, demanding a home, militarily 
crushed, but certainly not politically dead. in 
fact very possibly growing in political strength. 
Opposed stands Israel refusing on any terms to 
negotiate with the PLO, adamantly opposed to 
the creation of an independent Palestinian state, 
and acting as fast as it can to pre-empt the 
possible use for this purpose of the only suit-
able territory, namely the West Bank. Israel's 
settlement policy is pursued no longer in the 
name of security, but in the name of Greater 
IsraeL of territory for the sake of territory. 
One is sometimes even left to wonder whether 
its ambitions do not also extend in the direction 
of Jordan. 
33. How therefore can peace be reached'? No 
other ideas for a territorial solution exist except 
the West Bank, refused by Israel. Neither the 
Palestinians nor the Jordanians want to create a 
state on Jordanian territor;. Only the United 
States - without which, as Senator Fulbright 
once said, Israel would not now exist as a state -
could possibly force Israel to give up the West 
Bank peacefully against its will. Even then, 
given the rate of expansion of Israeli settle-
ments, and the policy of harassment and expul-
sion which the Israelis can be expected to pur-
sue towards the West Bank Arabs, there can 
only be a very few years left before such a solu-
tion will cease to be diplomatically attainable. 
After then, either the Palestinians' aspirations 
will remain unmet. or there will eventually be 
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further wars at what cost to the West and the 
rest of the world can only be guessed. 
34. No doubt the United States is feeling 
Arab pressure to bring about a settlement. 
The United States may also be growing alar-
med at the extent to which its failure to control 
Israel is costing it all influence in the Arab 
world, and makes the possibility of strategic co-
operation with Arab states, for example over 
the rapid deployment force, a complete dead 
letter. 
35. What should Europe do in these circum-
stances? Plainly the primary role is not going 
to be played by Europe. But Britain and 
France already imposed an arms embargo on 
Israel: this could be followed by other countries 
of Western Europe. The EEC postponed 
implementation of its financial agreement. 
Israel would also be extremely hurt if European 
countries were to ban imports from Israel, 
which come principally to the EEC. If Euro-
pean countries are ever to consider this wea-
pon, now is the time, and it should be linked to 
the question of a final Palestinian settlement, 
not simply withdrawal from Lebanon. 
36. European countries may also be asked to 
take part in a peacekeeping force. Such a 
request would have to be treated on its merits. 
Preferably it should come from a legitimate 
and representative Lebanese Government. 
IV. The Iraqi-Iranian war 
37. On 20th June 1982, the Iraqi Govern-
ment announced that it had had to withdraw its 
forces after eighteen months of fighting on Ira-
nian territory. The stated wish to form a front 
against the Israeli aggression in Lebanon seemed 
to be a pretext to conceal the inexorable effects 
of military defeat. The Iranian authorities for 
their part refused to cease operations as long as 
Mr. Saddam Hussein remained in power in 
Baghdad, and in July Iranian forces invaded 
Iraq. They were soon however in difficulties. 
38. During the invasion of Iran. apart from 
the assistance several Arab states granted Iraq 
and which Israel and Syria, and through Syria 
the Soviet Union, granted Iran, the conflict 
remained localised, possibly due in the main to 
the fact that relations between the United States 
and Iran had seriously deteriorated because of 
American diplomats having been held hostage 
by Iranian revolutionaries for almost a year and 
because the Soviet Union, engaged in a costly 
war in Afghanistan, did not wish to become 
involved in an affair which concerned two 
states where it did not wish to jeopardise its 
interests. 
39. As long as fighting continues, it is hard to 
see how Europe can act. The prospect of a 
summit meeting of representatives of the non-
aligned countries in Baghdad in the autumn is 
in itself a considerable means of pressure for 
the restoration of peace, whereas the means of 
persuasion available to Europe in this matter 
are very limited. But it is to be expected that 
between now and the end of the year events 
will have taken a new turn. 
40. Whatever reservations one may have 
about the methods of the Iranian Government, 
they should not prevent the resumption of nor-
mal relations with the West if Iran so wishes. 
The cohesion demonstrated by the Iranian peo-
ple in face of the Iraqi offensive showed a 
consensus among the population in considering 
the present regime to be representative of the 
Iranian state, and it is not for foreign countries 
to contest a regime recognised by the majority 
of the population as long as it no longer resorts 
to measures contrary to international law, as 
was the case in taking American hostages. 
41. While the future of the Iraqi regime 
seems somewhat threatened at the moment, the 
way it evolves to bring about peace with Iran 
and receive the summit meeting of non-aligned 
countries if it takes place will be a relatively 
clear indication of the kind of economic partner 
it will prove to be for the West in view of the 
fact that, apart from deliveries of military 
equipment, the Western European countries 
continue to have normal relations with Iraq. 
A return to peace should allow them to be 
improved. 
42. What exactly are the limits of Iran's 
ambitions in its invasion of Iraq, and in parti-
cular, whether Iraq will be more successful in 
fighting Iran when it is the invaded country and 
not the invader, what will be the impact of 
Soviet involvement, we will have to wait and 
see. Iran has probably the long-term aim of 
maximising its influence in the Middle East, in 
particular at the expense of Saudi Arabia and 
other conservative or moderate regimes, and no 
doubt using this influence against the United 
States, " The Great Satan ", and its western 
allies. If it achieved this position it would no 
doubt be ruthless in the use of the oil weapon 
against the West. But to acquire this position 
it would have to destroy the influence of Saudi 
Arabia, and to do this it might at first see it in 
its interest to drive the oil price down, simply 
to remove Saudi Arabia's controlling hand on 
the oil price. 
43. In any case the more powerful Iran 
becomes, on present indications, the greater the 
dangers, both economic and political, for the 
West. On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
probably fears a triumphant fundamentalist 
Iran as much as the West does. This is the 
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most stabi!Jsing factor operating in the situa-
tion. All at the moment depends, therefore, 
first on Iraq's capacity to defend itself. and 
second on the Soviet Union's actions to limit 
Iran's victory, both by aiding Iraq and by with-
holding assistance from Iran. 
V. Afghanistan 
44. The Assembly has paid particular atten-
tion to developments in Afghanistan since the 
Soviet invasion, having adopted, in November 
1980 and June 1981, two recommendations 
submitted by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Forni res-
pectively on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. Moreover, the committee has set 
up a sub-committee specially responsible for 
following events in the area. On 18th May 
1982, it was addressed by a representative of 
the Afghan resistance movement. 
45. As far as can be seen, there does not 
seem to have been much change in the situa-
tion in Afghanistan. The number of Soviet 
forces stationed there has remained steady at 
about 90,000. There has been a marked 
increase in the number of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan and the control exercised by govern-
ment forces with Soviet support, at least in the 
principal operations, still seems to be restricted 
to a few towns and the main lines of communi-
cation. It is now estimated that the number of 
refugees has risen to about 3.5 million, or 17% 
of the original population of Afghanistan. 
46. There is little doubt that this trend serves 
the aims of the Soviet Union and the Kabul 
government insofar as, lacking adequate outside 
assistance, the Afghan resistance movement's 
material position is increasingly difficult. It is 
badly armed and is short of munitions which 
can be used in its weapons which are of very 
varied origin. Scorched earth tactics and 
regrouping the population round the towns 
creates supply problems which are increasingly 
difficult to solve. There are ever greater obsta-
cles to frontier crossings by refugees but never-
theless no satisfactory solution can be found 
to the problem of refugees arriving in neigh-
bouring countries, particularly Pakistan. 
Seriously threatened by the presence of Soviet 
forces on its frontiers, frequent frontier inci-
dents and flights over its territory, Pakistan is 
being extremely cautious and will not tolerate 
the transit of armaments for the Afghan resis-
tance movement through its territory. Access 
routes between Afghanistan and China are 
strictly controlled by Soviet forces and cannot be 
used for part of the year because of the wea-
ther. One may wonder what the future holds 
for the Afghan resistance movement, disunited 
politically and increasingly cut off from the 
world outside. 
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4 7. Information about loss of human life, 
battles, the types of weapons used by the Soviet 
Union and in particular chemical weapons and 
the domestic situation is still extremely inaccu-
rate, fragmentary and contradictory. It is 
therefore difficult to make a valid assessment of 
the Afghan resistance movement's ability to 
survive, but it is evident that the West would 
bear very heavy responsibility if it gave verbal 
encouragement without supplying the assistance 
which is increasingly essential for the move-
ment's survival. However, it has to be noted 
that its ability to supply military assistance is 
limited, its humanitarian assistance to the refu-
gees is still negligible and diplomatic assistance 
in the form of a policy of economic sanctions 
against the Soviet Union is hard to envisage 
now because it was not carried out at the time 
of invasion. 
48. The question for Europe is: how active a 
policy can it pursue with respect to Afghanis-
tan? Of course, it must continue to insist on 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the right 
of self-determination for the Afghan people. 
No recognition can ever be given to an Afghan 
Government dependent on an occupying Soviet 
force. On the other hand a more active and 
open policy of supplying weapons to the 
Afghan resistance movement carries great risks 
of provoking Soviet retaliation on Pakistan. 
VI. The Gulf area 
49. The invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's conse-
quent closer presence to the Middle East oil-
fields, the military humiliation of the PLO in 
Lebanon and the consequent risk of inflaming 
the large Palestinian minorities in Gulf coun-
tries, and above all the menacing growth in the 
fortunes of Iran, with its apparently unbridled 
ambitions and its hostility to moderate Arab 
governments and to the West as a whole, are 
the main clouds casting their shadows over the 
Gulf area. And a formidable threat they 
amount to, given the small size and military 
near-impotence of the countries concerned. 
50. Europe has few means of intervening. 
Of the Western European countries, France is 
at present the only one to maintain a significant 
naval force in the Indian Ocean and to have 
permanent naval bases close to the Gulf and at 
present it is difficult to imagine it being joined 
by any other country. No European country 
has land forces in the area, apart from a very 
small French force in Djibouti and units under 
United Nations command in southern Lebanon 
and Sinai'. In other words, Europe now has no 
real means of action in the area. 
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51. It has been suggested, for example in 
"The Uncertain Ally - British defence policy 
1960-1990" by John Wilkinson and Michael 
Chichester, that certain European countries 
could build up forces which could be deployed 
if necessary in the area - in other words along 
the lines of the American rapid deployment 
force. However, it must be stressed that the 
actual use of such a force is· politically difficult 
to imagine. In the first place, it needs to exist 
to support a definite policy; secondly, it could 
only be used at the invitation of a country in 
the area. Its proposed existence also raises the 
controversial question of removing troops from 
the Rhine, and accordingly would call in ques-
tion Protocol No. 11 of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, because all such proposals for the use of 
forces outside the NATO area threaten to draw 
on forces at present committed within the 
NATO area. A reduction in the level of 
troops provided for in Protocol No. 11 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty would require the 
agreement of the majority of members of the 
WEU Council. 
52. As far as the United States rapid deploy-
ment force is concerned, any European partici-
pation carries the risk of Europe being nothing 
more than the instrument of American policy 
in any use which might be made of the force. 
For several reasons Europe could hardly desire 
so close and risky an identification with 
American policy in the Middle East at the pre-
sent time, despite the common national inte-
rests they share. Nevertheless, it seems likely 
that the deployment of the American force 
would imply the withdrawal of American forces 
from Germany, at any rate temporarily. This 
would raise the question of whether conventio-
nal forces of sufficient deterrent value remained 
in Western Europe, and would tend to associate 
European members of the alliance with any use 
of the force in the Middle East, even though 
there was no formal attachment. 
53. Accordingly consultations would seem 
desirable between all members of the NATO 
alliance on the political and military implica-
tions of any use of the United States rapid 
deployment force. The idea behind the rapid 
deployment force was to counter Soviet pene-
tration; but it must be said that even govern-
ments friendly to the West, and afraid of Soviet 
penetration, were equally afraid of the rapid 
deployment force, of the uses to which it might 
be put, and of the domestic and external reac-
tions its use might provoke. 
54. Nevertheless, despite all these difficulties 
and discouraging factors, it cannot be right for 
WEU to shirk the fact that Western Europe has 
a colossal dependence on freedom of access to 
the Gulf, and the threats that are arising to this 
freedom of access. There would surely be cir-
cumstances in which the United States would 
be ready to intervene militarily to protect this 
access. That being the case, and since the inte-
rests to protect are every bit as much European 
as American, if not more so, then WEU should 
not be too squeamish to face up to the possi-
bility of a western intervention taking place, 
and it should be discussed between all partners 
of the western alliance. 
VII. Developments in the Middle East 
during summer 1982 
55. Israeli military action in southern Leba-
non continued in August 1982 with the occupa-
tion of Tyre, Sai"da and Beirut through to the 
Bekaa as far as Syrian lines. The Israelis 
inflicted serious losses on Syrian forces, pushing 
them back to near the Beirut-Damascus road. 
During these operations, shelling and bomb-
ing devastated all towns of any size and many 
more minor localities as well as the Palestinian 
refugee camps. The Israelis used their troops 
for police operations during which several thou-
sand persons were arrested and interned in 
camps in the occupied area or on Israeli ter-
ritory. West Beirut, mainly inhabited by Leba-
nese Moslems and where the Palestine Libera-
tion Organisation had its headquarters, was sur-
rounded and bombed continuously causing 
many victims, particularly among Lebanese 
civilians. 
56. The work of an American mediator 
appointed by Mr. Reagan's government suc-
ceeded, at the end of August, in making repre-
sentatives of Israel and the PLO accept a 
cease-fire and an agreement to evacuate Pales-
tinian guerrillas from West Beirut under the 
supervision of an international buffer force of 
American, French and Italian troops. Only 
combatants with their personal weapons were 
evacuated, not their families, who remained in 
Beirut. Those evacuated were dispersed to 
several Arab countries (the two Yemens, Tuni-
sia, Algeria, Jordan, Syria and Iraq), each of 
which had agreed to receive a limited quota1• 
Once this mission had been accomplished, the 
intervention force withdrew from Beirut on 1st 
September and the Israeli army occupied the 
west of the town, where it arrested and interned 
a large number of persons. 
57. On 16th September, forces either from 
Major Haddad's militia or from the Christian 
Phalangists were instructed by the Israeli forces 
to hunt out Fedayeen from two camps in East 
Beirut, Sabra and Chatila, which were encircled 
by the Israeli army. For two days and two 
nights, these forces conducted a systematic mas-
I. European Security and the Middle East, Brief prepared 
by Lord Reay, December 1982, Map 10. 
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sacre of the inhabitants of the camps, including 
women and children, until the Israeli army 
intervened on 18th September to stop them. 
58. These events provoked strong reactions 
throughout the world and loud protests, even in 
Israel,where the Labour Party, and even appar-
ently certain elements of the government major-
ity, protested vigorously about the methods 
adopted by Mr. Begin, the Prime Minister, and 
Mr. Sharon, Minister of Defence, who on 27th 
September had to agree to set up a commission 
of inquiry into the massacres. 
59. On 21st September, the new President of 
the Lebanese Republic, Amin Gemayel, called 
for the return of the international force to assist 
the Lebanese army in recovering control of the 
whole country. Israeli forces evacuated the 
centre of Beirut on 27th September to allow 
this force to take over. On 28th September, 
President Reagan announced that the force 
would stay until Lebanon had been completely 
evacuated by all foreign forces, but so far, 
although Israel and Syria have always declared 
that the presence of their forces on Lebanese 
territory was purely provisional, neither has 
indicated when it intended to withdraw them, 
which makes the future of Lebanon highly 
uncertain. 
60. It should be added that the measures 
taken against Palestinians in Lebanon are 
inhuman and cannot be allowed to continue. 
Those arrested and interned, as well as those 
evacuated to other Arab countries, are sep-
arated from their families. Furthermore, consi-
deration is apparently being given to expelling 
many of the Palestinians living in Lebanon and 
one may wonder what welcome they will 
receive elsewhere. 
61. Events in Lebanon during the summer 
resulted in a series of major proposals for 
restoring peace between Israel and the Arab 
countries. These proposals clearly show a rap-
prochement between the views of the Arab 
countries and those upheld in recent years by 
the United Nations and the countries of the 
European Community. This can be explained 
by the military defeat of the PLO in Lebanon 
and the fact that countries which had hitherto 
been favourably inclined towards the Israeli 
Government objected to the Israeli offensive. 
62. On the Arab side, a peace plan which 
had been drawn up by the then Crown Prince 
of Saudi Arabia, Emir Fahd1, in August 1981, 
provided the basis for an agreement between 
the Arab countries, except Libya, at the Arab 
summit meeting in Fez on 7th September 
19822 • 
I. Ibid., Document 22. 
2. Ibid.. Document 24. 
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63. On the western side, the invasion of 
Lebanon led President Reagan, on 25th June, to 
issue a warning to Israel against any further 
settlements on the West Bank. The Israeli 
response was immediate: on 28th June, the 
government decided to create twenty-three 
more settlements in the area. On I st Septem-
ber, President Reagan announced a new and 
major peace initiative by the United States in 
the framework of the Camp David agreements 
aimed at guaranteeing at one and the same time 
peace, the security of Israel and the legitimate 
needs of the Palestinian people 1• 
64. There is not a very wide gap between the 
Fez proposals and those of President Reagan, 
and both are close to the positions adopted by 
the EEC countries, particularly in the nine-
power declaration of 18th June 1979. If it is 
borne in mind that on 20th September King 
Hussein of Jordan agreed to the principle of his 
country being associated with Palestinian self-
government and that the Soviet Government 
approved the final act of the Fez summit 
meeting, it can be seen that there is a wide 
I. lb1d. Document 23. 
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international consensus on the bases for nego-
tiations. 
65. The only remaining obstacle to peace 
negotiations is Israel's uncompromising stand in 
opposition to the Fahd Plan, the Fez final act 
and also the Reagan proposals. What then are 
Mr. Begin's true intentions? Putting two and 
two together: the new settlements on the West 
Bank and support for certain communities in 
Lebanon or even Syria, some observers have 
wondered whether the intention is not to break 
up the Arab countries in the area by encour-
aging politico-religious fundamentalism, thus 
leaving the way open for Israeli political and 
military domination and ensuring the perma-
nent annexation of the West Bank after that of 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Good will 
on the part of Israel in evacuating Lebanon, 
abandoning the policy of settlements on the 
West Bank and defining conditions for negotia-
tions and for the independent status which 
Israel is prepared to allow the Palestinians in 
application of the Camp David agreements 
would alone be able to refute these accusations. 
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APPENDIX 
Report presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur, 
on his visit to Jordan and Egypt 
8th-12th No1•ember 1982 
The Rapporteur, in conformity with the 
decision of the WEU Presidential Committee 
taken at its meeting in Paris on 14th October 
1982, visited Jordan and Egypt between 8th and 
12th November. His principal interviews were 
with, in Amman, Crown Prince Hassan, Mr. 
Hassan Ibrahim, Minister for the Occupied 
Territories' Affairs, and Mr. Bahjat Talhouni, 
President of the Senate ; and in Cairo with Mr. 
Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and Dr. Mohamed Abdellah, Chair-
man of the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. He was, in addition, given great assis-
tance in Amman by Mr. Peter Salah, Under-
Secretary at the Ministry of Information, by 
Senator Ahmad Al-Khalil, and by Mr. Shihab 
Madi, Director of Crown Prince Hassan 's politi-
cal office ; and in Cairo by Counsellor Aly 
Maher at the Foreign Office. 
The Rapporteur was impressed by the 
positive and energetic approach of Jordan to 
the peace negotiations. Jordan is engaged in 
an exhaustive process of diplomacy with the 
PLO, on the one hand, and on the other, in 
conjunction with other Arab moderate states, 
with the United States. in an attempt, in the 
first instance, to put together a delegation 
which can be accepted as a party to the nego-
tiations by all other parties. Because of the 
Rabat decision of 1964, which committed the 
Arab states to accept the PLO as the sole legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinians. Jordan 
dare not assume the task of negotiating alone 
on behalf of the Palestinians. The United Sta-
tes refuses to meet the PLO as long as they 
have not recognised the state of Israel. Jordan 
has evidently tried to persuade the PLO to 
make a statement of conditional recognition of 
Israel, or to accept United Nations Resolution 
242, which the PLO never has accepted and 
which includes recognition. The PLO has so 
far refused, not wishing to go any further than 
it has done in the past in case it finds that it 
has played what it considers to be its last card, 
and has gained nothing. Israel insists that the 
PLO is simply a terrorist organisation, and will 
not recognise them. whatever declarations they 
make. 
However. within these apparently forbid-
ding parameters. the Jordanians by no means 
consider that it is impossible to make progress. 
Various permutations can be imagined for a 
negotiating team to represent both Palestinians 
and Jordanians. The present is seen as a 
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period of intense exploratory diplomatic acti-
vity. After the Committee of Seven has 
completed its tour of world capitals (at the time 
of writing it has still to visit Paris, Moscow and 
Peking). King Hussein is due to visit Washing-
ton before Christmas. 
At the same time. both Jordan and Egypt 
are acutely conscious of the limited amount of 
time available. The Jordanians say that they 
were called in at five minutes to midnight. An 
Egyptian spokesman pointed out that, at the 
time of speaking, 71 days had already been 
wasted since the Reagan initiative, which Israel 
had defied without producing any American 
reaction, out of the 500 or so days available 
before the American Presidency is plunged 
once more into an election campaign. After 
that campaign, there will very possibly be a 
new administration requiring a year or so to 
study the problem. But by that time Israel will 
have reached its next target of 100,000 additio-
nal settlers on the West Bank and the area will 
be virtually irrecoverable for the Palestinians. 
The Jordanians also have a fear which 
goes beyond the actual loss of the West Bank 
and the Gaza strip to the Israelis. They are 
concerned at what Israeli intentions may be 
with regard to the Palestinian population, in 
the wake of a de facto annexation of the West 
Bank and the Gaza strip. The Jordanians are 
afraid that the Israelis will expel these Arab 
populations into Jordan - they even fear exist-
ing Palestinian populations in the Lebanon 
will be expelled into Jordan- either directly, or 
indirectly by making life increasingly unplea-
sant for them, thereby threatening the stability 
of Jordan (which already has a population 60% 
Palestinian), and if the result was to be the 
overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty, enabling 
the Israelis to say "' Look, there is your Pales-
tine state ". This would fit in with what Israeli 
Defence Minister Sharon has already said res-
pecting the proper home for the Palestinians. 
Since the Palestinians have no wish to abandon 
claims to their West Bank home, this eventua-
lity is no more appealing to them than to the 
Jordanians, and the fear of it must therefore be 
assumed to have played a part in bringing the 
PLO and Jordan together again. 
The principal goal of Egyptian foreign 
policy is to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab 
world. Events in Lebanon have certainly 
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served to bring Egypt and the rest of the Arab 
world closer together, if only because bellige-
rency lost ground. The Fez declaration also 
renounced violence, and therefore tended to 
have the same effect. The Egyptians can fairly 
claim that beneath the surface of formal diplo-
matic recognition, there is much exchange of 
contacts at many different levels - political, 
military, investment, student - between Egypt 
and other Arab countries. Egypt has devel-
oped a project of integration with Sudan, with a 
common market, a permanent secretariat and a 
joint parliament.. It supplies military material 
to Iraq. Moreover, the government makes a 
point of not entering into disputes with other 
Arab countries, ignoring provocations when 
they are offered. Since Egypt, therefore, will 
seize any opportunity to advance its aim of 
re-establishing its position in the Arab world, it 
is anxious to find a role to play in the peace 
process. It can therefore be expected to take a 
constructive attitude. As the Rapporteur left 
Cairo, it was reported in the newspaper that 
Yasser Arafat had been officially invited to 
Cairo for talks. 
There can be little doubt that the process 
of Arab-Egyptian reconciliation has a lot fur-
ther to go, but at the formal diplomatic level 
reconciliation is probably some way off. It 
would be difficult for other Arab countries to 
have official accreditation to an Arab capital 
where there was an Israeli ambassador. Egypt 
may have withdrawn its ambassador to Israel in 
protest at the massacres in Lebanon, but Israel 
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is not going to oblige Egypt in a hurry by with-
drawing its ambassador from Cairo. 
Internally, the Egyptian Government's 
main problem is probably economic, and in 
particular, the traditional hard choice between 
maintaining evermore expensive subsidies on 
food and other consumer items, including 
petrol, and provoking discontent by an attempt 
to remove or reduce them. 
In conclusion, the Rapporteur would like 
to report his impression that Europe is very 
much seen as having a role to play in the Mid-
dle East peace process. The Arab desire seems 
to be that Europe should understand the facts 
and dangers of the situation, and the just aspira-
tions of the Palestinians, and should continue 
freely to express its own opinions on the mat-
ter, not fearing, but not seeking to confront, the 
United States. It is well understood, at least 
since the V en ice declaration, and the events 
leading up to it, that Europe's position is 
entirely different to that of the United 
States. It seems to be felt that Europe, by 
expressing its own views, may, along with other 
influential sources of opinion, ease the process 
of change in United States policy which is seen 
to be the key to progress. At present they 
should probably see further acts of recognition 
within Europe towards the PLO as the most 
constructive contribution Europe could now 
make towards influencing policy and securing a 
similar recognition in the United States, and 
thereby increasing the chances of a negotiated 
settlement. 
Document 927 
Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South- West Asia 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 91 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
29th November 1982 
1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after " the occupation of 
Lebanon by the" insert "PLO ". 
2. Leave out the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
3. In the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "considerable 
progress towards the application of Resolution 242 " and insert " progress towards the 
re-establishment of peace in the Middle East". 
4. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
5. At the end of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "pro-
vided it abandons its military structure ". 
6. After the fifteenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new para-
graph as follows: 
" Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian popu-
lation in Afghanistan, ". 
7. In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " aimed at " to the end of 
the paragraph and add " solving the problems which now constitute obstacles to the re-establishment 
of lasting peace in the Middle East; ". 
8. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
" Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan; ". 
9. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, after "connection with the Afghan 
Government" insert "and to assist the Afghan resistance movement". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
I. See 9th and I Oth sittings, 30th November and I st December 1982 (amendments I, 2, 4, 5 and 7 negatived; amendment 
3 not moved; amendments 6, 8 and 9 agreed to). 
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Amendments 10, 11 and 12 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South-West Asia 
AMENDMENTS 10, 11 and 121 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin. 
29th November 1982 
10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "applying" insert "United Nations 
resolutions on the Palestinian question, including". 
11. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to complete" to the end of 
the paragraph and insert "and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at 
Sabra and Chatila". 
12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 10 as follows : 
"Should either of the belligerents not agree to negotiations, envisage restrictive measures, if not 
an embargo, on deliveries of military equipment, arms and munitions to either of the bellige-
rents, Iran or Iraq." 
Signed: Dejardin 
I. See 9th and I Oth s1ttmgs. 30th November and I st December 1982 (amendment I 0 not moved; amendment 11 agreed to; 
amendment 12 negatived). 
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Amendments 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South- West Asia 
AMENDMENTS 13, 14, 15, 16 and 111 
tabled by Lord McNair 
29th November 1982 
13. In line 1 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "not" 
insert "finally". 
14. In line 2 of the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from 
"problem" to the end of the paragraph and add "and may meanwhile have disadvantegeous conse-
quences for the host countries;". 
15. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "'people" add "and to all foreign 
minorities in Lebanon which require it". 
16. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"Remind the Lebanese Government of its obligations under the universal declaration of rights 
towards those whom it has arrested or detained;". 
17. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations: 
(i) urgently to study the feasibility of removing from Lebanon all Palestinians who are willing 
to leave and of transporting them, without prejudice to their eventual destination, to any 
countries willing to receive them, and 
(ii) to implement such a plan if found to be possible, 
while nevertheless reaffirming its belief that eventually a Palestinian homeland is both inevit-
able and desirable;". 
Signed: Lord McNair 
1. See 9th and lOth sittmgs, 30th November and I st December 1982 (amendments 13, 14, 16 and I 7 negatived; amendment 
I 5 agreed to). 
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Amendments 18 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South-West Asia 
AMENDMENT 181 
tabled by Mr. Enders 
29th November 1982 
18. Leave out the ninth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in 
Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress 
towards the application of Resolution 242;". 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
44 
Signed: Enders 
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Amendments 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South-West Asia 
AMENDMENTS 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 241 
tabled by Mr. Blaauw 
30th November 1982 
19 In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "unity" to 
the end of the paragraph. 
20. In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "it" insert 
"anyhow". 
21. Leave out the tenth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
22. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out 
"the only" and insert "an". 
23. In line 2 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "the" insert "present, inter-
nationally-recognised". 
24. In line 3 of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add "call on the Lebanese 
Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full report on the 
inquiry". 
Signed: Blaauw 
I. See 9th and lOth sittings, 30th November and 1st December 1982 (amendments 19, 20, 22 and 23 negatived; amendment 
21 not moved; amendment 24 agreed to). 
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Amendments 25 and 26 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South- West Asia 
AMENDMENTS 25 and 26 1 
tabled by Mr. Bassinet 
25. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper. 
30th November 1982 
26. In line 1 of the eleventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out 
"only" and insert "most important". 
I. See 9th and lOth sittings, 30th November and I st December 1982 (amendments negatived). 
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Amendment 27 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South- West Asia 
AMENDMENT 271 
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson and others 
30th November 1982 
27. In line 1 of paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Government" and 
insert "regime". 
Signed: Wilkinson, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mrs. Knight 
See lOth sitting. 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 28 
European security and the evolution of the situation in 
South- West Asia 
AMENDMENT 281 
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson 
30th November 1982 
28. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "financial" to the end of 
the paragraph and add "and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to Afghan refugees". 
I. See lOth sitting, I st December 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Stoffe/en, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
I. The purpose of the present report is to 
examine action taken on the suggestions made 
by the committee in the report on conditions 
for improving relations between the WEU 
Assembly and public opinion (Document 912) 
presented by your Rapporteur at the June 1982 
session. To this end, your Rapporteur has 
drawn up a list of these requests, grouped 
according to the Assembly body to which they 
are addressed, and has endeavoured to review 
action taken and results obtained on each of 
them. Thus, it can be noted that in several 
fields the committee's suggestions have been 
followed up, but much remains to be done. 
2. Inter alia, your Rapporteur presented the 
requests which concern the Presidential Com-
mittee when it met in Paris on 14th October. 
The delay was largely due to the fact that the 
arrangements made had not yet had full effect. 
This is also the reason why your Rapporteur 
was not able to distribute the present document 
earlier. 
I. Proposals to the Presidential Committee 
3. (i) The Assembly has to realise that it will 
be much easier to attract the interest of mem-
bers of national parliaments and of journalists if 
the Assembly debates topical subjects in the 
field of European defence. The Assembly of 
Western European Union is the only parlia-
mentary assembly which is entitled to discuss 
matters of European " foreign " policy and 
European defence. Therefore two conclusions 
can be drawn. For the sake of the credibility 
of the Assembly the committees, when prepar-
ing reports, have to restrict themselves to 
matters strictly connected with the aims and 
content of the Brussels Treaty. The second 
conclusion is that if a report and/or the debate 
on that report does not reveal anything new 
and/or any politically relevant fact we cannot 
expect the press and our colleagues at home to 
be interested. At the same time it is not good 
for the credibility of the Assembly if we do not 
discuss topical subjects. Seen from that point 
of view the Assembly must discuss the twofold 
decision by the North Atlantic CounciL the 
peace movements in the European countries, 
the relations between WEU and the United 
States, and so on. 
4. (ii) Regarding the Assembly's debates, your 
Rapporteur believes they would undoubtedly 
gain a wider hearing and have a greater impact 
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on the parliaments of member countries, thanks 
to the press in particular, if fewer questions 
were debated at each session and if the reports 
dealt with topical matters, which is not the case 
today. 
5. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that 
the number of reports submitted by each com-
mittee be limited and that one subject be left 
open until shortly before each session in order 
to cover any topical question that arises. Ano-
ther solution might be for each committee to 
appoint a Rapporteur who would be given a 
certain possible freedom in the way he handles 
his subject so that his report might be adapted 
to the requirements of the day. 
6. These two suggestions relate to fields not 
covered by rules but which affect committee 
practice when programmes of work are being 
drawn up and Presidential Committee practice 
when agendas of sessions are drawn up. Per-
manent results cannot therefore be expected, 
but there is hope of a de facto improvement. 
7. Several remarks may be made: 
8. The three subjects of reports referred to 
in the first paragraph were agreed upon. Two 
were debated at the June 1982 session on the 
reports of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and the General Affairs Com-
mittee presented by Mr. Mommersteeg and 
Mr. van Eekelen respectively (Documents 918 
and 914 ), and the third is on the agenda of the 
December 1982 session on a report by the 
General Affairs Committee to be presented by 
Mr. Lagorce. 
9. Similarly, by withdrawing from the agen-
da of the December 1982 session two reports 
which had initially been included, the Presiden-
tial Committee acceded to a request by the 
committee. The Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments for its part, by ask-
ing Mr. Blaauw to present a report on the state 
of European security, left him the necessary 
freedom to adapt his report to current ques-
tions. It can but be hoped that this example 
will be followed. 
10. (iii) It happens only too often that debates 
are interrupted by addresses by ministers fol-
lowed - and this is worthwhile - by ques-
tions and answers. Your Rapporteur suggests 
that ministers be invited to address the Assem-
bly in the framework of the debate on specific 
reports. They should speak on the report and 
not only answer questions but take part in the 
debate on the report as a whole. or at least a 
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substantial part of it. There would thus be a 
true exhange of views with a minister or, in any 
event, with the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council on a topical subject of interest to the 
press and public opinion. The minister might 
open the debate after the Rapporteur has pre-
sented the report, and wind it up, as is custo-
mary in the parliaments of member countries. 
Your Rapporteur cannot over-emphasise the 
value of this suggestion. 
11. (iv) A member of the committee stressed 
the value for members of the Assembly and the 
press of taking votes immediately after debates 
and not grouping them since it is difficult for a 
journalist one day to write about a report and 
the relevant debate and the next day or the day 
after give the result of the vote. If he did so, 
he would be neither read nor understood by the 
public. It is for the Assembly to follow up 
this sensible remark. 
12. (v) Special attention should be paid to the 
meetings between representatives of the Assem-
bly and of the Council. It is obvious that there 
is a relationship between the importance of a 
meeting (i.e. the subject of the meeting) and 
who is present at the meeting (i.e. ministers or 
ambassadors). The Rapporteur is inclined to 
believe that if there are hardly any subjects of 
importance to deal with it is preferable not to 
organise such a meeting between Assembly and 
Council representatives. On the other hand 
the Assembly is entitled to expect better " min-
isterial " representation of the Council if more 
important subjects are to be discussed. 
13. (vi) Your Rapporteur thinks that it might 
be worthwhile from every point of view for the 
Assembly, at a forthcoming session, to organise 
a meeting between some of its members and 
journalists who follow sessions in order to 
obtain their opinions on how its methods of 
work might be adapted. The Presidential 
Committee or the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments might be made responsible for this 
contact which could be a friendly meeting with 
broad terms of reference. 
14. All these requests were submitted to the 
Presidential Committee by your Rapporteur at 
its meeting on 14th October 1982, the first 
meeting since the Assembly's June session. 
Although it cannot be said that any formal 
decisions were reached in this connection, it 
was clear that the first two in any event corres-
ponded to concerns of the President of the 
Assembly and that they would encounter no 
objection of principle. Your Rapporteur reser-
ves the right to raise these requests again at the 
earliest opportunity. 
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11. Proposals to the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges 
15. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments plays a very particular kind of role, 
which is defined in a special rule of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 42 bis. This 
rule lays down that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 
39 of the Rules of Procedure on candidatures 
for membership of committees and the compo-
sition of their bureaux shall apply to the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments, thus 
implying that the other rules on committees do 
not apply, particularly Rule 42 on reports of 
committees, Rule 41 on procedure in commit-
tees and Rule 40 on the powers of committees. 
16. On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Rule 
42 bis allows it to invite to its meetings the 
administrative secretaries of national delega-
tions, i.e. non-parliamentarians, and further-
more its composition (two members per mem-
ber country) takes no account of the weighting 
which exists in the composition of other 
committees, thus implying that it cannot adopt 
recommendations for presentation to the 
Assembly. 
1 7. Conversely, it has three duties under 
Rule 42 bis of the Rules of Procedure: 
(i) to select, from the texts adopted by 
the Assembly, those which, in its 
opinion, should be debated in the 
parliaments ; 
(ii) to make all necessary arrangements 
with a view to calling the parlia-
ments' attention to the work of the 
Assembly and inviting them to 
follow up this work ; 
(iii) to submit to the Assembly, twice 
each year, a report on its activities. 
18. These remarks throw light on the content 
of the present report. It is normal and desir-
able for the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments to examine and report to the Assembly 
on how it hopes the Assembly's work might be 
brought more closely to the attention of parlia-
ments. It should be added that several times 
and in various ways it has been brought out at 
recent sessions that the Assembly, and particu-
larly the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments, considered the press's interest in the 
Assembly's work to be an essential factor in its 
effectiveness both as regards public opinion in 
general and also the parliaments of member 
countries. 
19. It is inevitable for the tasks and responsi-
bilities of the committee to be extended in two 
ways: 
(a) the committee should be renamed the 
Committee on Parliamentary and 
Public Relations ; 
(b) the rules should be changed in order 
to enable the committee to present a 
draft recommendation or order to the 
Assembly. 
20. Your Rapporteur communicated this 
request to the Pre.sidential Committee at its 
meeting on 14th October 1982 and the latter 
decided to submit it to the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges so that it might 
report on it at the June 1983 session. It 
appeared that a change in the name of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
should not encounter any major obstacles but 
that the conditions in which that committee 
could take decisions raised delicate problems 
which the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges should examine mosrattentively. 
21. Your Rapporteur wishes to underline 
that the difficulties he has encountered in 
ensuring implementation of the requests of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
contained in the present report strengthen his 
conviction that the committee cannot work 
properly until it is empowered to adopt texts 
upon which the Assembly can vote. The 
adoption of an order including the present 
requests would quite clearly have brought such 
implementation forward by several months. 
The present situation is a source of dissatisfac-
tion because of the time which elapses before 
the committee's requests are transmitted to the 
Assembly and can but help to discourage its 
members from taking initiatives. 
Ill. Proposals to the chairmen 
of national delegations 
22. (i) Each delegation should prepare a report 
on each Assembly session for circulation to all 
members of parliament in the member coun-
tries at the earliest possible date. Most dele-
gations do so, but the practice might be genera-
lised. 
23. (ii) National delegations might organise 
meetings and contacts after each session of the 
Assembly so as to report to the parliamentary 
press of their own countries on what happened 
during the session. It is therefore for the dele-
gations and their secretariats to take such initia-
tives, and too much cannot be done to encou-
rage them in this sense. 
24. While the first of these requests corres-
ponds to increasingly general practice, the 
second requires a new special effort by national 
delegations and your Rapporteur has therefore 
decided to write to the chairmen of delegations, 
sending them the relevant suggestions of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
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IV. Proposals to the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments 
25. (i) It would be desirable for the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments of the WEU 
Assembly to establish and maintain frequent 
contacts with its counterpart in the Council of 
Europe and take advantage of the latter's 
experience. 
26. (ii) The primary function of the committee 
is to select texts from among those adopted by 
the Assembly for transmission to national par-
liaments. In your Rapporteur's opinion the 
committee should limit its selection to those 
texts which contain practical and concise pro-
posals that governments can implement and not 
select any texts drafted in broad terms and deal-
ing only with questions of general principle. 
27. (iii) Your Rapporteur feels that it is worth 
considering whether the committee should 
discuss selections more intensively, determine 
priorities among texts suggested for selection 
and agree on "campaign tactics" with regard 
to their follow-up at national level. 
28. (iv) Discussing such tactics is important, 
since a parliamentary question is not always the 
best way of dealing with a subject. More use 
might be made of direct approaches to govern-
ments. Moreover, in different countries diffe-
rent methods have to be applied. There is 
room for differentiation in proposals for action 
on Assembly texts. 
29. (v)Members of the committee could be 
invited: 
(a) to participate more actively in the 
discussion of proposals concerning 
texts with a view to agreeing on more 
differentiated action at national level; 
(b) to invite to its meetings rapporteurs 
from other committees to enable 
them to give advice about the best 
approach to " selling " the adopted 
texts to national parliaments and to 
the press; 
(c) to discuss whether 
- the number of texts to be selected 
after each part-session should be 
further limited; 
- the material provided by the secre-
tariat is appropriate; 
- further model questions should be 
prepared by the secretariat. 
30. (vi) It is therefore for members of the 
committee to adapt the questions they put in 
the light of their countries' specific problems. 
They have moreover always understood this, 
but they might be asked to make a further effort 
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not to give up the 1dea of puttmg a que~t10n to 
their governments on a recommendation adop-
ted by the WEU Assembly merely because the 
wording proposed by the Chairman of the 
committee seems inappropriate to the situation 
in their countries. 
31. A follow-up procedure should be worked 
out inter alia to consider, for instance once a 
year, whether a continuing action could be 
effective. 
32. (vii) A member of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments suggested that a Rappor-
teur be appointed to compare the replies of the 
various governments to the questions put in 
national parliaments. This suggestion might 
be adopted, and the committee's next Rappor-
teur could be asked to carry out this compari-
son for the recommendations adopted in 1981, 
or at least some of them. 
33. (viii) It would be desirable for the next 
Rapporteur of the committee to bring together 
all the committee's earlier decisions in order to 
see what action was taken on them and what 
results were achieved, so as to select those 
which were not satisfactorily applied and thus 
describe the way in which the committee has 
carried out its duties under Rule 42 bis of the 
Rules of Procedure and what it should do to 
improve the way in which it fulfils its role. 
34. (ix) What use do members of the Assembly 
make of the " Monthly Information Bulletin " 
or the " Monthly Index of Documents " ? 
Your Rapporteur suggests that a questionnaire 
be sent to members of the Assembly to ascer-
tain whether they really wish to receive such 
documents and that, if necessary, the Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments and possibly 
the Presidential Committee re-examine the use-
fulness of publishing them. 
35. (x) Moreover, certain documents are difficult 
to use because the information given reaches 
members of the Assembly in separate parts. 
Your Rapporteur is thinking of the questions 
put by members of the Assembly to their 
governments in the national parliaments and 
the answers received. Instead of distributing 
both questions and answers separately, they 
might be published collectively prior to each 
Assembly session, which is already done, but in 
future they might be grouped so as to make 
them easier to consult in accordance with a 
procedure which will be described below, the 
aim being to give a far clearer picture of the 
policies of the governments of member coun-
tries on matters dealt with by WEU. 
36. The first six requests concern the com-
mittee's work at the meetings it holds at the 
close of each Assembly session. Your Rappor-
teur proposes to recall them at the meeting to 
be held during the December 1982 session. 
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3 7. The requests relating to the committee's 
next report should be implemented on the same 
occasion when the subject of the committee's 
report for June 1983 has to be agreed upon and 
the Rapporteur appointed. 
38. On the second request, a first comment is 
that to date the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly has not received a single question, 
nor a fortiori an answer, relating to recommen-
dations adopted during the June 1982 session. 
39. Conversely, there has been some response 
to several other requests: 
(i) The report submitted by Mr. Ber-
chem on an outline booklet on WEU 
and its activities includes, with regard 
to each chapter, a reminder of the 
principal recommendations made by 
the Assembly to the Council on each 
of the WEU organs and the Council's 
replies. This reference obviously 
enhances the information which the 
booklet gives on WEU and its activi-
ties and fully meets the committee's 
wishes. 
(ii) As an experiment, your Rapporteur 
gives at appendix to the present 
report the answers given to questions 
put in national parliaments on 
Recommendation 3 71 on European 
security and events in the Gulf area. 
This recommendation was chosen 
because of the number of questions 
put and the interest and diversity of 
the answers received. This appendix 
should allow the committee to say 
how it intends to pursue this attempt. 
40. Experience has brought out a difficulty, 
i.e. the time that elapses between the date the 
questions are put and the date on which 
answers are obtained. This means that a col-
lection of questiom 1 and replies cannot be pre-
pared less than one year after the adoption of a 
recommendation by the Assembly, thus detract-
ing considerably from their interest. 
41. Work has also begun on the ninth request 
since the questionnaire referred to has been sent 
to members of the Assembly who have been 
asked to reply before 15th November 1982. 
42. Action on requests (i) to (vi) depends on 
the committee and its members. Your Rap-
porteur wishes them to be as zealous as they 
were in 1981 in putting questions to their 
governments and keeping the committee infor-
med. 
V. Proposals to committee chairmen 
43. A maJor effort should be made to ensure 
that matters dealt \Vith are followed up after 
recommendations are adopted. The Commit-
tee for Relations with Parliaments cannot do 
this alone and each Assembly committee might 
take responsibility for examining action taken 
by the Council or by the governments of mem-
ber countries on the recommendations which it 
submitted to the Assembly. 
44. Each committee might examine ways and 
means of doing this. An appropriate means 
might be the formation of a sub-committee for 
this purpose. This was the solution adopted 
by the General Affairs Committee for following 
problems raised by a recommendation on deve-
lopments in the Middle East which was 
adopted in June 1981. This experience might 
be worthy of closer examination. 
45. It should be added that the General 
Affairs Committee has set up a sub-committee 
to examine action taken on the report submit-
ted by Mr. De Poi in December 1981 on Euro-
pean union and WEU. Your Rapporteur will 
also write to the chairmen of the other commit-
tees informing them of the suggestions of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
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VI. Proposals to the Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly 
46. Between four and ten weeks after each 
session, the Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments for its part issues a booklet giving a 
summary of debates and addresses by minis-
ters together with the texts of recommendations 
adopted. 
47. Your Rapporteur considers that the sum-
mary of debates takes insufficient account of 
the ideas voiced by the various political 
groups. Only speeches by rapporteurs and 
committee chairmen are summarised and the 
amendments tabled are not included. 
48. In future, the Chairman of the committee 
will endeavour to ensure that certain speeches 
and amendments, particularly those made on 
behalf of political groups, are summarised or, in 
the case of amendments, reproduced in the 
booklet on the session. 
49. Your Rapporteur will ensure that the 
booklet on the December 1982 session meets 
this request. 
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APPENDIX I 
Recommendation 37 I 1 on European security and events in the Gulf area 2, 
reply of the Council and questions and answers 
in national parliaments 
RECOMMENDATION 371 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Recommendation 361; 
APPENDIX I 
Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed 
since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse; 
Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern 
Asian countries as well as to peace in the world; 
Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring 
countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East; 
Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran; 
Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension 
throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United 
States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area; 
Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab 
countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the 
Middle Eastern countries; 
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance 
movement; 
3. Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its terri-
tory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that 
country with the defensive armaments it urgently needs for its own security; 
4. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its 
will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area; 
5. Offer active support and help to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collec-
tively their own security; 
6. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and 
Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents; 
7. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose 
consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy 
policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption; 
8. Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the 
United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1981. 
2. Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Document 871 and Addendum. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
1. The Council note that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a detrimental effect on inter-
national relations. They are aware of the threat to the stability of the region of which the Gulf is a 
part and which has developed over the past two years. They are determined to oppose any attempts 
by the Soviet Union to exploit the situation. In this context, they continue to deplore the occupa-
tion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. They welcome the initiatives taken by the Islamic Conference, 
the European Council and the United Nations Secretary-General to promote a political solution in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 14th January 1980 and 20th 
November 1980. The Permanent Council of WEU wish also to recall the recent proposals put for-
ward by the European Council, as expressed in its declaration of 30th June 1981. Indeed, they note 
that these proposals remain on the table and offer a reasonable, practical framework for moving 
towards an internationally-acceptable settlement of this problem. The governments of Western 
European Union await, from the Soviet Union, a positive and constructive response to this initiative. 
They repeat their call for an immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and call 
on all parties to work for a peaceful settlement which would enable Afghanistan to return to its 
traditional independent and non-aligned status. 
2. The Council believe that one of the major elements of the situation in Afghanistan is the exis-
tence of a nationwide movement of resistance to Soviet intervention and to the setting-up of a 
puppet regime in Kabul. The opposition of the Afghan people to the Soviet invasion has also been 
demonstrated by the continuing exodus of Afghan refugees (now numbering considerably more than 2 
million) into Pakistan and Iran. 
The Council regret that the International Red Cross has not been allowed to carry out its 
humanitarian mission in Afghanistan. 
3. In order to alleviate the grave humanitarian problems caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan the Council believe it is essential that states should also give economic aid to Pakistan to help 
provide for the Afghan refugees. The WEU member states express their support and admiration for 
the generosity and humanity with which Pakistan has taken in so many refugees. 
4. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman have recently 
formed the Gulf Co-operation Council, in order to increase their co-operation in many 
spheres. European states, concerned about the maintenance of stability in the Gulf area, have noted 
the wish of the Gulf states to co-operate among themselves without asking for external sup-
port. They therefore heartily welcome the creation of the Gulf Co-operation Council and the objec-
tives which it is pursuing. WEU member states recognise the need for continuous and close 
contacts of every kind between Europe and the Gulf states, as evidenced by the increased number of 
high-level visits between the two regions. European states, moreover, attach much importance 
to the continuation of contacts through such means as the Euro/ Arab dialogue. Europe's greatest 
contribution to the stability of the Gulf can be made by the continuation of the European Council's 
efforts on the Arab/Israel dispute, the core of which is the Palestinian problem and which remains 
the primary concern of all Arab Gulf states. 
5. The Council welcome the efforts being made to solve the Iran/Iraq war by the Islamic Confe-
rence, the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and by the non-aligned 
movement. The Council are ready to support any measures which seem likely to be effective in 
bringing an end to the hostilities and which can command the necessary international approval. The 
Council recall that on 23rd September 1981, immediately after the worsening of the conflict between 
Iran and Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in New York recalled, in a declara-
tion concerning the conflict, the supreme importance that the entire international community atta-
ches to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf which should in no way be impeded. 
6. The WEU member states are concerned to do what they can to maintain and enhance stability 
in the Gulf area. They have in the past expressed their condemnation of all acts of violence in the 
Middle East and would do so again if the need arose. 
7. In view of the sharp increase in the price of oil over the past few years, the countries of WEU 
are all concerned to work for lower energy consumption, whether at European or world level, 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1981. 
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through such bodies as the International Energy Agenc), as regards those states which arc members. 
There is already regular consultation with governments of other states which face the same need. 
All oil-consuming countries share an interest in seeing a stable world energy market. As for the Gulf 
producers, the Council note that certain of them have made significant reductions in their oil 
production. 
Questions and answers in national parliaments 
Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies 
Que\·tion put hy Mr. Prussen on Recommenda-
tion 371 (22nd June 1981) 
What is the government's attitude towards 
this recommendation and is it prepared 
to support and ensure implementation of the 
proposals it contains? 
Reply by Mrs. Flesch. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (6th July 1981) 
The Luxembourg Government has no 
intention of tackling the matters referred to in 
Recommendation 371 communicated to the 
WEU Council. These matters are the subject 
of systematic discussions at every level in the 
framework of political co-operation between the 
ten member countries of the European Commu-
nity. Numerous positions have been adopted 
and made public and there have been confiden-
tial discussions and decisions. 
Very recently, on 29th and 30th June, the 
European Council, bringing together the heads 
of state or of government of the member coun-
tries of the European Community and their 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, discussed all the 
problems raised by the Near and Middle East. 
A copy of the position adopted is attached. In 
this context, particular attention should be paid 
to the formal declaration on Afghanistan. 
European Council declaration 
on Afghanistan 
1. The European Council notes with deep 
concern that the situation in Afghanistan 
remains an important cause of international 
tension, that Soviet troops remain in Afghan-
istan and that the sufferings of the Afghan 
people continue to increase. 
2. The European Council recalls its earlier 
statements, notably those issued at Venice on 
13th June 1980, and Maastricht on 24th March 
1981, which stressed the urgent need to bring 
about a solution which would enable Afghan-
istan to return to its traditional independent 
and non-aligned status free from external inter-
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ference and with the Afghan people having the 
full capacity to exercise their right to self-
determination. In keeping with the resolu-
tions voted by the United Nations, the Islamic 
Conference and the New Delhi Conference of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, the European 
Council has made it clear on several occasions 
that it will support any initiative which could 
lead to the desired result. 
3. The European Council considers that the 
time has come for a fresh attempt to open the 
way to a political solution to the problem of 
Afghanistan. They therefore propose that an 
international conference should be convened as 
soon as possible, for example in October or 
November 1981, and that the conference should 
consist of two stages, each stage being an 
integral part of the conference. 
4. The purpose of stage one would be to work 
out international arrangements designed to 
bring about the cessation of external interven-
tion and the establishment of safeguards to 
prevent such intervention in the future and thus 
to create conditions in which Afghanistan's 
independence and non-alignment can be 
assured. 
5. The European Council proposes that in 
due course the permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, Pakistan, Iran 
and India and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and the Secretary-General of 
the Islamic Conference, or their representatives, 
be invited to participate in stage one of the 
conference. 
6. The purpose of stage two would be to 
reach agreement on the implementation of the 
international arrangements worked out in stage 
one and on all other matters designed to assure 
Afghanistan's future as an independent and 
non-aligned state. 
7. Stage two would be attended by the partici-
pants in stage one together with representatives 
of the Afghan people. 
8. The member states of the European 
Community will be ready at a later stage to 
make further proposals on the detailed arrange-
ments for the proposed conference. 
9. The European Council firmly believes that 
the situation in Afghanistan continues to 
demand the attention of the international 
community. It is convinced that this proposal 
offers a constructive way forward and therefore 
calls on the international community to support 
it fully with the aim of reducing international 
tension and ending human suffering in Afghan-
istan. 
Middle East 
The European Council noted the report of 
the Presidency as well as Mr. van der Klaauw's 
oral comments on his contacts with the parties 
concerned with the Middle East conflict. 
It concluded that the efforts undertaken by 
the Ten to promote the conclusion of a peace-
ful settlement should be continued energetically 
and without respite, taking account of the 
results of the missions decided upon in Venice. 
Accordingly, the European Council deci-
ded, on the basis of the results of the mission 
just completed by the President-in-Office, to 
instruct ministers to elaborate further the prac-
tical possibilities available to Europe to make 
an effective contribution towards a comprehen-
sive peace settlement in the Middle East, 
through internal reflection, appropriate contacts 
being maintained with all parties concerned, 
including the United States. 
As regards the attack by the Israeli air force 
on the Iraqi nuclear plant on 7th June 1981 the 
European Council can only endorse the resolu-
tion adopted unanimously by the United 
Nations Security Council. 
Lebanon 
Recalling its earlier statements concerning 
Lebanon, the European Council noted with 
interest the results of the work of the Arab 
quadripartite committee. The Council earn-
estly hoped that positive results would be 
obtained at the committee's next meeting in 
Beit-ed-Dine, so as to achieve a genuine natio-
nal reconciliation which can give Lebanon 
internal security and foster its stability in peace 
with its neighbours. 
Belgium 
Chamber of Representatives 
Question put by l'vfr. Dejardin on Recommen-
dation 371 (27th July 1981) 
The acts of warlike folly committed 
recently by Israel, both in Iraq with the 
bombing of a nuclear plant and in Lebanon 
with the bombing of civilians and airborne raids 
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and landings, have revived tension in the 
Middle East and further delayed hopes of 
lasting peace in the area. 
However, tension is not confined to the 
action and attitudes of Israel towards its 
neighbours, including the persecution of the 
Palestinian people. The situation in the 
Middle East is also disrupted by the inter-
minable deadlocked war between Iran and Iraq, 
the absurd repression of the Kurds in Eastern 
Turkey and Iran, the real civil war being waged 
by Islamic fundamentalists in Iran against all 
ethnic and religious minorities, including the 
Bahais, etc. 
The political Middle East under tension 
detrimental to peace and a hotbed of serious 
strife now in fact therefore extends from Istan-
bul to Pakistan and from the Caucasus to the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
Does the Minister not consider that the 
steps taken by the ten member countries of the 
European Community to promote the establish-
ment of lasting peace in the Middle East might 
be extended to the Gulf area in order to assure 
countries in that area of Europe's support for 
any measures they may take to ensure their 
collective peace and security? 
Reply by Mr. Nothomb. Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (1st September 1981) 
I have the honour to inform the honour-
able member that, aware of the danger to peace 
constituted by the tension now disrupting the 
Middle East, the Belgian Government takes 
every possible opportunity to demonstrate its 
serious concern about any event which might 
further destabilise an area to whose security and 
integrity it is deeply attached. 
It consequently encourages and supports 
any action and initiative likely to promote the 
restoration of peace and balance in the area. 
The Belgian Government therefore wel-
comed with great satisfaction the formation of a 
council for co-operation between the Gulf 
countries and, in a message published in the 
international press, I conveyed to the heads of 
state and of government of the member 
countries of that council my wishes for the 
success of their undertaking on the occasion of 
their first summit meeting in Abu Dhabi on 
26th May 1981. 
Like Belgium, its partners in the European 
Community, involved in an effort to promote 
the conclusion of a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East, believe that a global settlement of 
the conflict between Israel and the Arab 
countries, of which the Palestinian problem is 
the nucleus, and the consequent calming of the 
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tension which has prevailed for more than 
thirty years, will allow the area as a whole to 
recover its integrity and balance in peace. 
France 
Senate 
Question put by Mr. Jeambrun on Recommen-
dation 371 (24th July 1981) 
Does the Minister for External Relations 
consider that the steps taken by the ten member 
countries of the European Community to pro-
mote the establishment of lasting peace in the 
Middle East might be extended to the Persian 
Gulf area ? Such an attitude would have the 
merit of assuring countries in that area of 
Europe's support for any measures they may 
take to ensure their collective security. 
Reply by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External 
Relations (30th September 1981) 
The situation in the Arab-Persian Gulf 
may effectively be analysed as an element of 
the overall problem of security in the Near and 
Middle East. There are specific aspects to this 
situation, however, which preclude considering 
extending to this area steps taken by the Euro-
pean Community countries specifically to pro-
mote the restoration of peace between Israel 
and its Arab neighbours which implies the 
settlement of the Palestinian question. The 
first condition for the success of possible Euro-
pean action with regard to the Gulf is that it 
must be requested, or at least accepted, by the 
states in the area. But to date no Gulf state 
has asked the Ten to intervene in any 
way. On the contrary, all the countries in the 
area subscribe to the principle that the security 
of the Gulf is their sole responsibility. This 
principle has just been recalled by the confe-
rence of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
member countries of the Gulf Co-operation 
Council held in Taif on 1st and 2nd September 
under Saudi Arabian chairmanship. This 
conference again rejected any foreign inter-
ference or intervention in the area. The 
French Government for its part has stated on 
several occasions that it too considered the 
security of the Gulf to be the responsibility of 
the states of the area, which should acquire the 
necessary means of ensuring this security. 
United Kingdom 
House of Commons 
Question put by Mrs. Knight on Recommenda-
tion 371 (28th October 1981) 
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Mrs. KNIGHT asked the Lord Privy Seal if 
he will propose that the steps taken by the ten 
member countries of the European Community 
to promote peace in the Middle East should be 
extended to the Gulf area in order to assure 
countries in that area of Europe's support for 
any measures they may take to ensure their 
collective security. 
Reply by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office 
At the Council of Ministers meeting in 
Brussels last month, Foreign Ministers of the 
Ten welcomed the increased co-operation 
among the six member states of the newly 
formed Gulf Co-operation Council, with all of 
whom the Ten have close and friendly rela-
tions. They also agreed to establish informal 
contacts with the Gulf Co-operation Council in 
order to consider the scope for possible co-
operation between the Gulf Co-operation 
Council and the Ten. 
We have also welcomed the valuable 
contribution that the formation of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council will make towards 
enhancing regional stability and security. We 
believe that it should be primarily for the Gulf 
states to determine their own security needs, 
and have expressed willingness in principle to 
help should the states of the region ask us 
to do so. 
Questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 
Recommendation 371 and replies by Mr. 
Atkins, Lord Privy Seal (7th December 1981) 
Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy 
Seal if, in the light of Recommendation 922 
(1981) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe on the situation of refugees 
from Afghanistan, Her Majesty's Government 
intends to take any additional measures. 
Mr. ATKINS. - Her Majesty's Government 
continue to play their full part in the 
programme of assistance to the Afghan refu-
gees. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minis-
ter announced in Pakistan on 8th October the 
allocation of a further £2 million for this pur-
pose. The government continue to work for a 
peaceful settlement which will enable the 
Afghan refugees to return to their homes in 
safety and honour. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy 
Seal what is his policy towards the organisation 
of an international conference on the Afghanis-
tan crisis. 
Mr. ATKINS. - Her Majesty's Government 
consider that the European Council proposals 
of 30th June for holding an international confe-
rence on Afghanistan continue to offer a 
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reasonable and practical means of movmg 
towards a political settlement. 
Sir Frederic BENNETT asked the Lord Privy 
Seal if he will publish details in the Official 
Report of the political and financial support the 
government have given to the programmes of 
international organisations involved in the 
assistance of refugees from Afghanistan and for 
the Government of Pakistan's programme of 
assistance. 
Mr. ATKINS. - Since January 1980 Her 
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Majesty's Government have given or pledged 
some £7.8 million for the Afghan refugees, 
including some £4.25 million through the Eur?-
pean Community. This assistance has been m 
cash, emergency supplies, and ~ood aid, ~iv_en 
mainly to the United Nations H1gh CommiSSIO-
ner for Refugees programme. It also includes a 
cash pledge to the Pakistan Government of £1.5 
million, which is subject to Parliamentary 
approval. The Government fully support the 
work of international organisations in giving 
assistance to the Afghan refugees. 
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Recommendations 
adopted in 
1956 ............. 
1957 ............. 
1958 ............. 
1959 ............. 
1960 ............. 
1961 0 •••••••••••• 
1962 ............. 
1963 ............. 
1964 ............. 
1965 ............. 
1966 ............. 
1967 ............. 
1968 ............. 
1969 ............. 
1970 ............. 
1971 ............. 
1972 ............. 
1973 ............. 
1974 ............. 
1975 ............. 
1976 ............. 
1977 ............. 
1978 ............. 
1979 ............. 
1980 ............. 
1981 ••••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0 
Total •• 0 •• 0 0 ••••• 
Annual average ... 
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Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countnes 
Federal 
Belgium France Republic Italy Luxembourg Netherlands 
of 
Germany 
0 0 3 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 5 
2 0 3 0 0 4 
0 0 9 0 0 0 
3 12 2 8 0 3 
0 2 0 3 0 6 
2 4 4 6 2 3 
0 0 13 22 1 2 
4 14 9 11 1 5 
0 11 12 24 0 5 
2 12 12 49 1 4 
14 9 22 29 2 6 
6 14 20 22 1 16 
11 15 17 8 0 4 
3 15 15 7 2 3 
0 4 19 9 0 6 
0 6 2 1 0 1 
0 4 2 6 1 0 
0 1 3 13 2 0 
10 28 8 19 3 11 
16 40 13 14 2 3 
4 18 4 15 1 I 
17 49 12 21 4 10 
9 45 12 10 10 I 
0 32 16 14 12 0 
15 40 12 9 18 2 
122 377 245 320 65 101 
4.69 14.50 9.42 12.31 2.50 3.88 
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United Total Kingdom 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 57 
14 127 
10 97 
8 82 
38 134 
285 1,515 
10.96 8.32 
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Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978 
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64 
Document 930 
Energy requirements and the security of Europe -
Norway's contribution to meeting these requirements 
REPORT I 
4th November 1982 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's contribution to 
meeting these requirements 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
I. General aspects of the Norwegian external political situation 
II. Norwegian research policy 
Ill. The Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
IV. The institute for energy technology 
V. Energy policy 
VI. Europe's energy requirements 
VII. Norsk Data 
VIII. Norwegian law of the sea policy 
IX. Norwegian defence policy 
APPENDICES 
I. European Parliament resolution of 16th September 1982 on the Soviet 
gas pipeline and the extension of the United States embargo to firms 
based in the Community 
II. Imports of Soviet natural gas 
Ill. European oil and gas pipelines 
I Adopted unammou;,ly b) the committee. 
2. Afemhen of the comllllttee Mr. l'allelx (Chairman); 
MM. Len::cr. Wilkmson (Alternate: Jc.\se/) (VIce-Chair-
men); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman), 
Adnaensens (Alternate: B1ejiwt), Amadei. Antoni. Barthe 
(Alternate: Lagorce). Fiandrotti. Forma. Fortier (Alternate: 
65 
Ba1.\met). Fourre, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: S1r 
Rus.1ell Fazrgl'll'\'e). MM. ,\fcGuzre, Manning. Pru1·scn. Spies 
1on Biillesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas. MM. Topmann, 
11 ·orre/1. 
N.B. The namn ol tho1·e taking part 111 the votC' are 
prznted in uahcs. 
DOCUMENT 930 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on energy requirements and the security of Europe - Norway's 
contribution to meeting these requirements 
Considering the need for close relations between Western European countries and Norway on 
such subjects as security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies; 
Considering also the relationship between the Norwegian energy supply and other important 
energy resources outside Western Europe and the fact that before 1990 more Norwegian gas cannot 
be available to replace all or part of Soviet gas ; 
Aware of the risk of all Western European countries importing concurrently their energy 
supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines ; 
Considering that Western Europe and the United States do not always make the same analysis 
and do not always have the same view of East-West economic relations; 
Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so 
as to ensure Europe's energy supplies, particularly natural gas, essential for its security; 
Considering also the need to study the present role of COCOM, the co-ordinating committee of 
the allied countries which supervises high technology and defence exports to Eastern European 
countries, and to update COCOM's list of prohibited items, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe in 
security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies; 
2. Promote studies on: 
(a) European energy requirements m the next decades and the consequent problems for 
Europe's security and defence; 
(b) high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications; 
(c) the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network; 
and report to the Assembly on the results of these studies; 
3. Promote an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate 
supplies of energy to meet their security requirements. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
I. On 15th June 1982 the committee deci-
ded to visit Norway and to submit a report on 
this visit at the December 1982 session. Sub-
sequent political developments induced the 
committee to change the title and content of 
the report from ''European security and tech-
nological developments in Norway " to " energy 
requirements and the security of Europe -
Norway's contribution to meeting these require-
ments". This was considered expedient in 
view of the new situation arising from plans for 
the Siberian pipeline for bringing Soviet gas to 
Western Europe. 
2. Everybody is convinced that to ensure 
the continuity of supplies of energy and raw 
materials the greatest possible diversification of 
sources of supply is desirable for Europe. In 
this context, the question of imports of energy 
from Eastern European countries is to be 
examined. 
3. Oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their 
transportation and markets in which to earn the 
money to pay for them have now become stra-
tegic stakes. 
4. Imports from Eastern European countries 
are composed of 8% machinery, 17% semi-
finished goods and the remainder oiL gas and 
raw materials. Since 1973 Europe has been 
unable to achieve joint action, co-operation and 
the definition of a medium- and long-term 
energy policy. Some common objectives were 
fixed in 1974 and on 22nd and 23rd June 1980 
the energy position was discussed at the summit 
conference in Venice. Guidelines to be imple-
mented by 1990 were drawn up for better use 
of energy, lower oil consumption and the use of 
other energy resources such as coal and nuclear 
means. 
5. No wonder Mr. Fiandrotti said in his 
report of 18th May 1982 (Document 917) that 
the committee was not satisfied with the Coun-
cil's replies as they did not indicate the reasons 
why a common energy policy still could not be 
developed, nor whether the energy policy 
guidelines for the 1990s should be stringent or 
not. 
6. The committee's visit to Norway was 
especially planned to obtain a clear picture of 
the Norwegian Government's policy on energy 
matters and on the possibilities of replacing 
Eastern European by Western European, and 
especially Norwegian, energy sources. This is 
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one of the arguments advanced by the United 
States Government against Western European 
assistance to the Soviet Union for opening up 
the Siberian gasfields. 
7. In the following chapters your Rappor-
teur has given an outline of Norwegian policy 
in general and its energy and research and deve-
lopment policy in particular. Your Rappor-
teur wishes to conclude his report with a 
chapter on new developments in energy require-
ments and the question of the Siberian pipe-
line. 
I. General aspects of the Norwegian 
external political situation 
8. Norway has been an independent country 
for only 77 years and this still seems to influ-
ence its foreign policy. Following a referen-
dum in 1972 Norway refused to join the Euro-
pean Economic Community. Nevertheless, it 
has now established close economic and politi-
cal co-operation with the EEC. Its closest ties 
are of course with its Scandinavian kinsmen 
with whom the Nordic Council was formed. 
In addition, its attitude towards the United 
States and the USSR has an important place in 
Norway's foreign policy. Traditionally, 
contacts with Russia have always been limited 
and their common border has always been a 
peaceful one. However, when the Soviet 
Union became a superpower, geopolitical pres-
sure built up in the northern region of Norway 
and its security problems increased consider-
ably. This does not mean, however, that the 
very large military complex, the Soviet Kola 
base, is directed against Norway, but it is clear 
that the Soviet Union would derive a significant 
strategic advantage if it could control northern 
Norway. It has certainly always shown its will-
ingness to achieve strategic gains whenever 
possible at not too heavy a cost. 
9. Development of oil and gas activities on 
Norway's continental shelf and the prospects of 
new oil and gas discoveries under the seabed off 
northern Norway and in the Barents Sea have 
added to the significance and sensitivity of the 
northern area. 
10. Norway joined the Atlantic Alliance in 
1949, thus allowing Norwegian defences to be 
strengthened in case of emergency. Through 
NATO, the United States is, apart from the 
Scandinavian countries, its most important ally 
in security matters and the relationship with the 
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United States is a lifeline of Norwegian foreign 
policy. Norwegian national security calls for 
the main part of its regular land forces to be 
deployed in northern Norway. These 5,000 
men however can in no way constitute a threat, 
particularly since the three northern provinces, 
although very extensive geographically, are 
inhabited by only some 400,000 people. A 
regional balance of forces is therefore not 
possible. 
11. The alliance fully realises the common 
interest of maintaining the territorial and politi-
cal integrity of Norway. Allied reinforcements 
have to be trained if they are to be credible. 
There has to be sufficient infrastructure to 
receive and support such reinforcements. Com-
bined exercises are therefore held with Ameri-
can, British, Canadian, Danish and Dutch for-
ces. Exercises are not held however in the 
province of Finmark where there is a common 
frontier of some 200 kilometres with the Soviet 
Union. The infrastructure and exercises are 
additionally necessary because of the Norwe-
gian policy of not permitting foreign military 
bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime. Nor does 
the government permit the stationing of nuclear 
or chemical weapons. 
12. In spite of current economic difficulties, 
Norway has met the NATO agreement for 
defence spending with an annual increase of 
3 % in real terms. 
13. Although for reasons of internal policy 
Norway is firmly committed to work for arms 
control and disarmament, it nevertheless sup-
ports the NATO decision of December 1979 
relating to the deployment of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. 
14. In this context, the question of a nuclear-
free zone in the Nordic countries should be 
mentioned. It is public knowledge that the 
only nuclear weapons in the northern area are 
stationed in the Soviet Union. A separate 
agreement between the Soviet Union and the 
Nordic countries whereby the latter would 
relinquish the option to receive and to deploy 
nuclear weapons at any time in return for a 
guarantee from the Soviet Union that nuclear 
weapons would not be used against the area is 
therefore conceivable. But would it be in the 
security interests of Norway ? 
15. On 4th December 1981, the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Svenn Stray, stated in the 
Storting: 
" I should like to emphasise that at no 
time will there be any question of Nor-
way, on its own or together with other 
Nordic countries, taking up negotiations 
with the Soviet Union on this issue. 
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As concerns our immediate vicinity 
otherwise, there is no reason to conceal 
the fact that Norway has the world's lar-
gest naval base as a neighbour on the 
Kola peninsula. Over 500 vessels are 
stationed here. There are no less than 
sixteen airfields, of which eight are oper-
ative. Through transfers from other 
areas, the Soviet air forces in the Kola 
region could thus· be doubled or trebled 
in the course of a short time. " 
16. A very different matter would of course 
be the concept of such a zone as an integral 
part of a broad European disarmament and 
arms control arrangement to be negotiated and 
entered into by the Atlantic Alliance and War-
saw Pact countries. 
17. Norway has not supported proposals to 
extend the geographical area of NATO respon-
sibility but fully appreciates that several mem-
bers of the alliance have security responsibili-
ties outside this area. 
18. Norway is a part of Western Europe, geo-
graphically, politically, economically and cultu-
rally. Although not a member of the Euro-
pean Community, it is following with par-
ticular attention the accelerating political co-
operation among the Ten which also affects 
Norwegian political interests. Contact arrange-
ments have been made with the Presidency of 
the Ten in order to achieve a two-way channel 
of communications. According to the Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Svenn Stray: 
" Our chief problem is not that we know 
too little about the policy decisions, but 
rather that we do not have enough 
opportunity to influence them. In future 
the government will actively assess Nor-
way's relationship to this foreign policy 
co-operation. The aim is to arrive at the 
best possible working procedures so that 
Norwegian interests may be safeguarded ... 
The mutual economic dependence bet-
ween Norway and the Economic Com-
munity is increasing. This applies to 
fields such as oil and gas, industrial estab-
lishments and shipping. In 1980 a good 
70 % of Norwegian exports, including oil 
and gas, went to the Economic Commu-
nity countries and 48 % of our imports 
came from the Economic Community 
area. The Community is accordingly 
our principal trading partner and the 
most important market for our merchant 
shipping services. " 
19. In parallel, Norway tries to maintain a 
bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union 
which in times of tension is not always very 
easy. It has tried to reach a bilateral agree-
ment on the demarcation line in the offshore 
economic zones between the Norwegian and 
Russian islands in the Barents Sea. So far, no 
agreement has been reached and therefore eco-
nomic activities in the area have been halted 1• 
20. A new factor in Norway's relations with 
other countries is the oil and gas discoveries 
which, of course, also influence the Norwegian 
domestic situation. The government recog-
nises its international responsibilities in terms 
of world energy supplies and Norway is already 
a substantial supplier of oil and gas to Western 
Europe. In the abovementioned statement, the 
Foreign Minister declared: 
" Our extensive petroleum operations put 
Norway in a special position compared to 
other western countries: we are in fact 
the only net exporter of petroleum. In 
the first half of the 1980s oil and natural 
gas will constitute approximately 35 % of 
our total exports and between 15 and 
20% of our GNP. It is therefore 
obvious that petroleum operations will 
have consequences for our foreign policy 
and that events in other parts of the 
world will affect this important sector of 
our economy. Petroleum operations 
have increasingly drawn attention to 
Norway abroad. This applies first and 
foremost to our traditional trading part-
ners. As regards Western Europe, we 
have become a very important supplier of 
oil and gas, but also the United States 
and Canada are following developments 
closely. " 
11. Norwegian research policy 
General remarks 
21. Immediately after the second world war, 
the organisation of research in Norway was 
based on the Anglo-Saxon system of sectoral 
research by research councils and institutes 
linked to the various ministries concerned. 
These ministries not only felt an obligation to 
finance research relevant to their fields of 
responsibility but in many cases they have built 
up their own institutional infrastructure to 
handle such research. As from the 1960s, but 
especially after 1976, co-ordinating bodies were 
created. The research councils for industry, 
the humanities, agriculture and fisheries tried to 
co-ordinate the activities and especially the 
budgets of their institutes and a central commit-
tee has been set up to promote co-ordination 
between the sectoral councils and to advise the 
government on science policy issues. 
l. See map at Appendix Ill. 
69 
DOCL:ME:"JT 930 
22. The cabinet research board is now chaired 
by the Minister of Culture and Science and 
the department of science policy of the ministry 
acts as the secretariat for the cabinet research 
board. This secretariat is also directly invol-
ved in the co-ordination of Norwegian particip-
ation in international research co-operation. 
Other members of the cabinet board are the 
Ministers of Finance, Industry, Oil and Energy, 
Social Affairs and Agriculture. An inter-
departmental committee of civil servants repre-
senting all ministries has also been established 
to help and advise the cabinet board and its 
secretariat. 
23. The key task of the cabinet research 
board, which has met five times in 1982, is to 
study the research and development sections of 
the national budget. It also has made a study 
of structural and organisational problems and 
the balancing of diverse interests. 
24. Questions for co-ordination are researcher 
job security, conditions for contract research 
in public institutions, the balance between 
applied research, technological development 
and basic research, international aspects and 
many others. The problems not only require 
discussion but also decisions from the cabinet 
research board. 
25. Since 1977 public funding of research 
and development has been relatively low and 
public institutions have therefore shown greater 
interest in external financing. In addition, new 
laws concerning job security for government 
employees have recently prevented public insti-
tutions from launching new projects with new 
personnel. Public jobs, even temporary, must 
in principle be established by parliament and 
are therefore not created easily, although lat-
terly special arrangements have been made for 
contract research. The private research sec-
tor has been more dynamic in recent years. As 
a result, not only is a growing proportion of 
Norwegian research and development being 
financed privately but more is also being 
carried out in non-government research and 
development organisations and institutes. 
26. Most private financing comes from the 
international oil companies which have been 
encouraged by the Norwegian Government to 
have as much as possible of their research and 
development in connection with the North Sea 
activities carried out in Norway as this would 
help them to obtain future drilling rights. 
27. Total expenditure on research and deve-
lopment in Norway was 3,229 million Nor-
wegian kroner' or 1.39 % of the gross domestic 
product. The biggest share, 49 %, was spent in 
l. One Norwegian kroner equals approximately one 
French franc. 
DOCUMENT 930 
the business enterprise sector. About half of 
the government's funds are spent in the higher 
education sector. Many in Norway fear that 
the rapidly-increasing research and develop-
ment connected with the oil resources on the 
continental shelf will out-grow the research 
effort hitherto made in other fields, especially 
in the universities. In this light the importance 
of science policy organs dealing with the system 
as a whole, like the central committee for 
Norwegian research, will be enhanced and in 
the future greater emphasis might be laid on 
centralised decision-making in research and 
development policy. 
Ill. The Royal Norwegian Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research 
28. This council promotes technical and 
related scientific research and ensures that the 
findings are used for the benefit of Norwegian 
industry as a whole. Council funds are mainly 
granted through the Ministry of Industry which 
is the sponsoring authority. Other funds are 
granted by the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy and to a lesser degree by other minis-
tries. The council supports research in the 
fields of continental shelf activities, manufac-
turing, building and construction, shipping and 
transport. The budget for 1981 was 860 mil-
lion kroner, of which 300 million in income 
from projects commissioned in Norway and 
abroad. 
29. The council consists of 40 representa-
tives, 13 of whom are drawn from business, 
12 from public administration, 12 from 
research institutions and 3 staff representatives. 
The board consists of 8 members and the 
total number of employees is about 3,650. 
Members of the council, the board and the 
committees in charge of different fields are 
prominent leaders of science, business and 
administration and represent a solid contact 
base with the users of research results. This 
guides research towards practical applications 
whether in the field of fishing, environment, 
automation or industry and mining. The 
board is keenly aware of the need to spend 
public money wisely. Its committees are not 
permanent. As soon as objectives have been 
reached the committees are disbanded and their 
personnel reallocated for other tasks. The 
Ministry even appointed a commission of inde-
pendent consultants, including a team from the 
science policy research unit of the University of 
Sussex, to study the organisation of the council 
and its organs. 
30. The council also participates in inter-
national research. For a long time already, 
Norwegian scientists have had contacts with the 
United Kingdom and United States as many 
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Norwegian academics have received their edu-
cation in those countries. Norway is most 
interested in the work of OECD, the NATO 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
and European co-operation in the field of 
scientific and technical research (COST). Nor-
way is currently involved in projects such as 
the development of a network for data trans-
mission between research centres, the develop-
ment of a network of buoys for oceanographic 
and meteorological data collection, studies of 
organic micro-pollutants and the treatment of 
sewers. 
31. In the Nordic framework it participates 
in Nordforsk, a research organisation of the 
Nordic countries. There are also bilateral 
agreements with the United Kingdom and Ger-
many, and Norway is an associate member of 
the European Space Agency. 
Space 
32. The government has entrusted the co-
ordination of space activities to the Royal 
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research. The Council has the benefit of the 
opinions of the Norwegian space activity com-
mittee, which has three sub-committees: one for 
space research, one for space applications and 
one for remote sensing. It has two space facili-
ties: the Andoya rocket range and the Tromso 
telemetry station. The Andoya rocket range 
has been in operation since 1962 and is used 
for launchmg sounding rockets and scientific 
balloons. Many trajectories are possible and a 
large area can thus be covered both in latitude 
and in longitude. The Tromso telemetry sta-
tion is used for national and co-operative pro-
grammes such as the French Arcad-3 satellite 
project, the European incoherent scatter asso-
ciation (Eiscat) in which participate Finland, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Nor-
way, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It 
consists of scatter radars built for ionospheric 
research. Of great interest for the Norwegian 
scientists are studies of the aurora, polar dyna-
mics and magnetic fields. There is an auroral 
observatory in Tromso. 
33. The purpose of Eiscat is to study the 
upper layers of the atmosphere. On 26th 
August 1981, the facility started its activities 
after a planning and construction period lasting 
more than ten years. The natural science 
research councils of Finland, France, West Ger-
many, Norway, Sweden and the United King-
dom contributed to the construction of the faci-
lity and its operating stations at Tromso in 
Norway, Sodankyla in Finland and Kiruna in 
Sweden. The main purpose is to study the 
ionosphere, the upper layers of the earth's 
atmosphere where the aurora borealis origin-
ate. The observing equipment consists of two 
independent radar systems which are estab-
lished at the three abovementioned sites. 
34. The council is also participating in a 
series of satellite systems aimed at, among other 
things, increasing safety in shipping, coastal 
zone surveillance, distress alarm system and 
localisation of distress signals. These are practi-
cal space applications whose interest is at once 
perceptible to everyone and which can be used 
in everyday life. 
35. Norway, and especially Norwegian indus-
try, was never interested in joining the Euro-
pean space organisations but, although it still 
has not joined ESA, it became an associate 
member in 1981 and participates in the 
Marots-Marecs programme, telecommunic-
ations and remote-sensing programmes as well 
as the earth resources research programme. 
Norway is very much interested in the develop-
ment of a maritime satellite system for ship-to-
ship and ship-to-shore communications; off-
shore platforms are also included in the 
system. Other satellite programmes in which 
Norway is interested are those related to im-
proving accuracy in navigation and pollution 
surveillance of the seas. It is also studying 
participation in trials and demonstrations with 
the Canada/France/USSR/U nited States search 
and rescue satellite project (COSPASSARSA T): 
these satellites will be in polar orbit. Norway 
is participating in the European earth resources 
satellite programme because of its interest in 
the synthetic aperture radar. A national aspect 
is the Norwegian remote-sensing experiment 
(Norsex) which will continue until the end of 
1982. With other Scandinavian countries it is 
preparing a communication satellite for tele-
communication and television purposes which 
should come into operation in 1986-87. The 
authority here is the Norwegian telecommuni-
cations administration. 
36. The relationship between Norway and 
ESA will have to be decided upon in four years' 
time. In the association treaty of 1981 it was 
agreed that in 1986 the Norwegian Government 
would take a decision on full membership. 
The Norwegian defence research establishment 
3 7. This is a civilian institute directly res-
ponsible to the Ministry of Defence. It was 
established in 1946 and formed around a 
nucleus of scientists with experience in wartime 
defence research, mainly acquired in the United 
Kingdom. The establishment today has 
approximately 500 employees of whom 180 
have a scientific background from universities 
or mstitutes of technology. Its main missions 
are to promote basic research and advise the 
Ministry of Defence on scientific and technolo-
gical problems. It has no fixed structure and 
for each project there is a responsible project 
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leader who reports to the head of division and 
through him to the director. The aim of the 
missions is to strengthen the defence of 
Norway. 
38. The armed forces are in continuous 
contact with the research activities of the 
establishment through their representatives on 
the board of the establishment. The establish-
ment is particularly interested in research 
related to the geophysical Norwegian environ-
ment, oceanography, terrain, weather, etc., 
which is of importance to military operations; it 
carries out operational research on long-term 
problems of force structure planning, weapon 
research and fundamental research of potential 
military interest. It is also interested in rocket, 
satellite and balloon investigation of the polar 
upper atmosphere. 
39. It is organised in two groups and five 
divisions: the mathematics section, operational 
analysis group and divisions for electronics, 
physics, toxicology, underwater warfare and 
weapons and, finally, equipment. 
40. As an example in the electronics field 
was given the activities in microcomputers, 
inexpensive transistors, fire-control compo-
nents, small radars and cryptographic equip-
ment. Norway has hardly any defence indus-
try, although many of these high technology 
instruments are assembled at the establishment 
itself according to requirements defined by the 
Ministry of Defence or the armed forces. The 
lack of a defence industry is a dominant feature 
of the Norwegian industrial arena. The same 
is true of several European countries of a simi-
lar size. But in the framework of effective 
voluntary co-operation it should be possible for 
Norway to be actively associated with European 
production. Co-operation on broad. truly 
European bases can but strengthen the necess-
ary solidarity. 
IV. The institute for energy technology 
41. The institute was founded in 1948 under 
the name of Institutt for atomenergi. In 19 53, 
by Order in Council the institute was established 
as an independent foundation. Its activities 
are divided geographically between two sites, 
Halden in south-eastern Norway, where the 
international OECD Halden reactor project is 
located, and Kjeller, outside Oslo, as the main 
centre. 
42. The institute with its 510 employees and 
a gross turnover of 130 million kroner (1981 
figures) is one of the major research institutes in 
Norway. The institute changed its name from 
Institutt for atomenergi to Institutt for energi-
teknikk (institute for energy technology - IFE) 
in 1980. 
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43. The following facts are relevant to the 
general orientation of the institute's work: 
Norway is a country whose high production 
costs are still increasing faster than in many 
other industrialised countries; among the indus-
trialised countries, Norway is in a favourable 
energy resource situation. It is a net exporter 
of petroleum products. For many years to 
come, it will be able to use hydropower for 
increased electricity production; furthermore a 
basic research programme in nuclear techno-
logy is maintained at the institute to ensure this 
technology as a possible future option - this 
will also allow the institute to be effectively 
able to advise the Norwegian authorities on the 
national and international implications of 
atomic energy matters. 
44. The present basic aims are: efforts contri-
buting to improving the competitiveness of 
Norwegian industry; efforts to improve under-
standing and solutions of problems connected 
with production and transport of petroleum 
products from the North Sea; maintenance of a 
reliable system for production and distribution 
of radioactive products, including pharmaceuti-
cal products, and other irradiation products 
and services; maintenance of a limited but 
realistic nuclear energy research and develop-
ment programme; energy system analyses; energy 
conservation projects; studies of alternative 
renewable energy sources. 
45. International co-operation has been a 
keyword throughout the history of the insti-
tute. Its first research reactor, Jeep I, was 
started up in 19 51 and was operated through a 
co-operation agreement with the Netherlands 
- an agreement that lasted well into the 
1960s. Scientists from all over the world parti-
cipated in the early nuclear research activities 
at Kjeller. This international co-operation has 
continued through the operation of the Nora 
research reactor in the mid-1960s, the OECD 
Halden project and a number of other research 
projects that the institute has hosted, or in 
which institute staff have actively participated. 
46. The Halden project has been, and is, the 
institute's main international undertaking. It 
was established in 1958 as a joint project of the 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency through an 
agreement between national nuclear centres of 
different OECD countries sponsoring an experi-
mental research programme with the Halden 
boiling water reactor. The institute is the 
owner and operator of the reactor installation. 
Subsequent to the first agreement, which 
covered a five-and-a-half-year period, six 
successive three-year agreements have been 
entered into. Eleven signatory countries part-
icipate in the present three-year agreement 
which started in January 1982. 
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47. The main research and development acti-
vities are in petroleum technology, process 
technology and reactor technology. 
48. The institute's work in petroleum techno-
logy is directed towards central assignments for 
the Norwegian oil industry and the Norwegian 
petroleum directorate. In the field of reservoir 
technology, methods and tools have been deve-
loped for the efficient planning and use of oil 
and gas reserves on the Norwegian continental 
shelf. In the areas of process control and fluid 
flow technique, the institute is working on pro-
jects of significance to the technical, economic 
and safety aspects of shelf activity. The same 
applies to the institute's work in materials tech-
nology where the emphasis is on corrosion 
problems. 
49. The institute's research and development 
activities at Kjeller and Halden are firmly based 
on co-operation with and contracts for Nor-
wegian industry, and the institute has estab-
lished a series of spearhead projects in advanced 
process technology. The central assignment is 
the mathematical simulation of complex pro-
cesses and control systems. The Halden pro-
ject's programme for the development of com-
puter-based control and surveillance systems is 
an open door to international development in 
the field. It is used in a series of development 
contracts for the Norwegian process and com-
puter industry. Within energy-intensive indus-
tries, work is directed in particular towards 
process models which quantify and control 
smelting, rolling and casting processes. The 
institute's research and development activities 
in mathematical physics are an effective back-
ground for research in industrial process tech-
nology. 
50. The institute's hydrometallurgical work is 
at present concentrated on process development 
for the production of aluminium oxide from 
Norwegian raw materials. Several years ago a 
sophisticated chemical separation technique for 
the production of super pure yttrium oxide 
which is used in making colour television 
screens was developed at the institute. An 
industrial-scale plant was built at Kjeller, and it 
is now being operated by Norwegian and 
Japanese interests. 
51. The institute's nuclear energy activity is 
principally based on the international Halden 
project's fuel and safety research programme. 
Activity has been concentrated on studies of the 
behaviour of reactor fuels under normal opera-
tion as well as in certain types of accident. 
Beyond the joint programme, fuel irradiations 
are carried out on a contract basis for partici-
pants, with subsequent laboratory investigations 
at Kjeller. 
52. In the project's other main field of work 
- that of process control and surveillance, sys-
tems are being used to reduce the frequency 
and consequences of irregularities in the opera-
tion of reactor installations and other complex 
systems, with particular stress on installation 
surveillance, alarm management and fault ana-
lysis. 
53. Considerable work is also put into the 
development of a prototype version of an on-
line system for the surveillance of nuclear reac-
tors. Methods are also being developed to 
secure high reliability in computer systems 
where the emphasis is on the man-machine 
communication link. 
54. These activities at Halden also constitute 
a basis for the institute's development work for 
Norwegian industry within the computer pro-
cess field. 
55. One research reactor is in operation at 
Kjeller: Jeep II, which replaced Jeep I in 1967. 
56. Activities directly associated with the 
operation of the reactor revolve around isotope 
production, irradiation services and research in 
physics. 
57. Work in the isotope laboratory includes 
production, control and distribution of radio-
active medical provisions and chemicals, reac-
tor and gamma irradiated materials together 
with the development of new products based on 
radioisotopes and irradiation techniques. 
58. Products are also exported, mainly to 
other Scandinavian countries, and the export 
quota is at present about 25 %. In 1981, the 
annual turnover of products and services was 
13 million kroner, as against 11 million kroner 
in 1980. 
59. Pure research in physics is mainly based 
on the use of the neutron rays from the Jeep II 
research reactor. Emphasis is on studies of 
chemical and magnetic structure, phase transi-
tions and hydrodynamic instabilities. 
60. In general research organisations should 
be able to respond effectively to new demands 
of society and changed priorities in national 
policy. 
V. Energy policy 
61. Norway has by far the largest continental 
shelf area of all European countries. The area 
south of latitude 62° N, which is the area so far 
opened to petroleum activities, represents only 
one-sixth of the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Of this area, only about 20 % is covered by 
exploitation licences. So far, more than 200 
wells have been drilled on the Norwegian conti-
nental shelf of which the main blocks are Eko-
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fisk, Frigg and Statfjord. Production is bet-
ween four and five times the volume consumed 
in Norway. Norway has become the first net 
oil exporting country in Western Europe, and 
oil accounts for 16 % of total exports, whereas 
overall petroleum activities are already contri-
buting 50 % more to the Norwegian gross 
national product than agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries together. 
62. Compared to most other industrialised 
nations Norway's energy situation is considered 
very comfortable. The per capita consumption 
of energy is close to the Western European 
average. The petroleum resources on the 
continental shelf belong to the nation and are 
administered and exploited to provide the 
maximum benefit for Norway. Maintenance of 
national supervision of activities on the Nor-
wegian continental shelf allows an insight into 
these activities. By law Norwegian authorities 
or companies participate directly at all levels of 
operations. For this purpose a state-owned oil 
company, Statoil, was given a central role in all 
petroleum activities. 
63. Foreign oil companies first applied for 
rights to explore for oil on the continental shelf 
in the early sixties. In 1969 the first discovery 
of commercial interest was made at the Ekofisk 
field and regular production started there in 
197 4. The production of oil and gas for sale 
from the Norwegian continental shelf was 48.8 
million tons oil equivalent in 1981. Domestic 
consumption that year was approximately 7 
million tons oil equivalent. At the end of the 
1980s, production will be some 60 million tons 
and thereafter will fall rapidly. Proven recov-
erable reserves south of 62° N are estimated at 
2,500 million tons oil equivalent; 60% of this 
being gas and 40 % oil. 
64. Substantial gas reserves have been estab-
lished in two major gasfields, Sleipner and 
Troll. These fields have not been declared 
commercial but will be so from 1983 onwards. 
The first gas from the Sleipner field could be 
piped in 1990-91. The gas from the Troll field 
will not be piped until later in the 1990s as this 
is technically an extremely difficult field 
because of deep water (250 metres), a soft and 
uneven seabed, severe weather conditions and a 
shallow reservoir of gas with a thin oil layer 
underneath. 
65. Production on the continental shelf north 
of 62° N would be even more difficult and 
involves technological problems for which solu-
tions are not yet available. 
66. Because of substantial experience in 
maritime technology through the shipping and 
shipbuilding industry, Norway had a basis for 
taking a full part in petroleum activities in the 
1960s and 1970s. Special efforts will now have 
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to be made for a substantial increase in research 
activities with regard to exploration and exploi-
tation. 
67. Most of oil production will be distributed 
by the companies. especially the international 
oil companies involved in the operations. As 
indicated earlier, the combined oil and gas 
production will fall as from 1990 in the absence 
of new field developments. There is therefore 
a strong economic and political incentive to 
maintain activities in this sector. All Nor-
wegian gas that could technically be produced 
before 1 990 has already been sold to European 
buyers. Until then Norwegian gas could there-
fore in no case be an alternative for Siberian 
gas. The government has a positive attitude to 
further deliveries of Norwegian natural gas to 
Western Europe in the 1990s provided the 
companies involved in each gasfie1d present 
development plans and gas sales agreements 
that ensure the economic basis for develop-
ment. Deliveries could be 10 to 12 billion 
cubic metres in the mid-1990s and 3 5 billion at 
the turn of the century. 
68. As indicated earlier, hydropower is an 
important sector of Norwegian energy produc-
tion. The construction of small hydroelectric 
power plants started some 100 years ago but in 
the postwar period electricity production from 
hydropower increased considerably. The 
exploitation of low-cost water power resources 
has led to major investment in power-intensive 
industries and some 30.000 persons are directly 
employed in these industries. The develop-
ment of hydropower networks has also provided 
the basis for a mechanical and electro-technical 
industry. for power stations and transmission 
plants, and for the equipment of power-inten-
sive industrial production at home and abroad. 
For Norway hydropower resources represent a 
considerable economic advantage over other 
countries which have to base their power 
production on thermal power stations. Addi-
tional supplies of electricity could in the future 
be provided by hydropower and it is the 
government's policy to promote its develop-
ment, also because of the environmental advan-
tages over electricity production based on oil 
and coal. 
69. Production of coal and coke in Norway is 
relatively small, providing only 6% of total 
energy consumption. The biggest consumer of 
coal is the cement industry and coke is used 
mainly in the iron and steel industry. Coal is 
extracted from the island of West Spitsbergen. 
For the total consumption of 460,000 tons. 
imports from Poland, the United States and the 
United Kingdom are necessary. 
70. In Norway there are no commercial 
nuclear power plants. only two research 
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reactors. Norway is not planning to build 
nuclear power reactors in the near future. 
71. For renewable sources of energy, research 
and development programmes are mainly rela-
ted to biomass, ocean waves, thermal energy 
and wind. Apparently the most promising is 
research on a wind turbine adapted to Nor-
wegian conditions. 
VL Europe's energy requirements 
72. More than half the energy consumed in 
Europe is imported, although the level of 
dependence of each European country on 
imports varies widely. Belgium and Luxem-
bourg import more than 93 %, Italy 83 %, 
France 82 %, the Federal Republic of Germany 
60 %, the United Kingdom only 17% and the 
Netherlands 8 %. The last two countries have 
sufficient energy resources to allow them to 
export to their neighbours. The individual 
policies of these countries for reducing their 
dependence on imports cover a vast spectrum. 
25% of Belgium's electricity depends on 
nuclear energy; France is building up its 
nuclear energy power plants to produce 60% of 
its electricity. Italy is using oil to fuel its 
conventional power plants and the Netherlands 
is using its gas for the same purpose. Germany 
is still largely dependent on coal and the United 
Kingdom. apart from very large coal reserves, 
also has its own North Sea oil. There is a 
clear division between the have and the have-
not countries, the latter asking for common 
policies and supply lines which the haves wish 
to guard jealously for themselves. 
73. The energy question is of great impor-
tance for Western European countries and the 
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of 
Ministers, Mr. Tindemans, even said that it was 
in the energy sector that a return to nationalism 
was probably the most threatening. 
74. The European Community's main sup-
plies come from three countries - Libya, 
Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. Oil accounted for 
51 % of Europe's energy consumption in 1981 
compared to 61 % in 1973. The drop in 
imports was caused by the economic crisis, 
conservation measures, increased domestic pro-
duction, North Sea oil and the use of other 
sources of energy instead of oil. This is clearly 
illustrated by the closing of refineries in Eur-
ope. Since 1973 oil prices have soared twelve-
fold while consumption in western countries 
has dropped about I 0 %. As a result, refining 
capacity in the major industrial countries 
exceeded consumption by about 40 % according 
to OECD statistics and according to the 
International Energy Agency Europe will, in 
the decade to come, need only 60 % of its 
refining capacity. The main oil companies are 
ready to cut their refining capabilities, most of 
the closures being planned to be made in the 
United Kingdom, France and West Germany. 
Important cuts are also expected in Italy and 
the Netherlands where there is a large crude 
processing centre for re-export. 
75. In 1980-81, oil market prices fell as 
world oil consumption dropped. In 1981 the 
reduction was 5 % and at the same time non-
OPEC production of oil increased by 
4 %. The combined effect of these two factors 
reduced OPEC oil production by from one-fifth 
to one-quarter in 1980 and even more in 
1981. The decline in demand has occurred 
not only in Western European countries but 
also in the United States and forced an actual 
reduction in prices from $ 36 to $ 32 per 
barrel. In the end the official dollar price was 
$ 34 but whether this price will hold is 
questionable. An end to the recession might 
well increase oil demand but will also promote 
investments in substitutes for oil, conservation 
and new sources of energy. 
76. Building strategic oil stocks is one of the 
most effective steps the Western European 
countries can take to improve their prepared-
ness to meet a future demand for oil. Reliance 
on other energy resources is of great import-
ance, especially the development of nuclear 
energy. However, the outlook here is not 
bright as many leading countries are hesitant 
about building nuclear power reactors. Even 
in the United States, where the government is 
in favour of nuclear power, no new nuclear 
power plants are being built. Economic and 
financial obstacles have become the largest 
threat to nuclear power. High interest rates, 
escalating construction costs, low electricity 
rates and uncertain construction schedules have 
made the United States utilities extremely cau-
tious. The economic benefits of nuclear power 
over oil are therefore camouflaged and not 
brought into the open. Certain nuclear projects 
have been suspended; elsewhere, except in 
France, no progress has been made. 
77. As far as gas is concerned, there exists a 
sort of European gas market made possible by 
the many pipelines that have been laid during 
the last decade. In the intra-European trade 
there is a gas pipeline from the Netherlands to 
Italy through France. With the completion of 
the trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline from 
Algeria and Tunisia to Italy, the north-south 
connection is completed. Still missing is a 
south-east/north-west pipeline bringing gas 
from the Gulf to Europe. Gas demands for 
domestic, commercial and industrial uses have 
increased very quickly since the early 
1970s. As energy consumers and governments 
had negative expectations about oil availability, 
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major gas projects could bring the necessary 
diversification, reduce oil dependency and 
enhance energy security. The spread of gas 
was also encouraged by the development of new 
pipeline techniques and complex logistical 
systems of gas transportation and distribution. 
78. It is therefore not surprising that Euro-
pean governments and industry looked for an 
east-west pipeline as well. They have so far 
maintained the Soviet pipeline project despite 
American pressure. They are convinced that 
they are securing a relatively cheap and safe 
supply of energy while complying with the oil 
substitution policy adopted at western summit 
conferences and reflected in the Council's reply 
to the Assembly's recommendation. Here your 
Rapporteur might refer again to Mr. Fian-
drotti's report 1 which stated: 
"95. In Siberia, the Soviet Union has 
one of the biggest gas reserves in the 
world and wishes to use this to best 
avail. Its gas exports produce the hard 
currency necessary to buy technologically-
advanced equipment and essential food-
stuffs. Contracts have been concluded 
with five Western European countries to 
construct a double pipeline from the 
Siberian gasfields inte~ alia to Germany, 
France and Italy. The contract covers a 
period of 20-22 years, and gas will be 
delivered within 6-10 years. In econo-
mic terms, there are positive arguments 
to accept such a barter deal: gas against 
pipelines. It is advanta&eous for the West-
ern European countries and the Soviet 
Union. It helps to diversify the energy 
supplies of the countries concerned and 
produces hard currency for the Soviet 
Union. If Western Europe failed to 
conclude or terminated the contracts, its 
exports to the Soviet Union would fail as 
the Soviet Government would have less 
money to pay for them. Third, the 
export of Soviet gas would expand world 
supplies of gas and W<imld thus ease the 
pressure on gas pnces. 
96. A geopolitical argument is that 
opening up Siberia and its gasfields will 
provide the Soviet Union with many new 
minerals and energy resources, thus 
reducing the Soviet Union's need to turn 
to other countries for its energy supplies. 
97. There are also strategic arguments 
for the export of Soviet gas. As men-
tioned by the Council, it is a means of 
diversifying Western Europe's sources of 
supply, making Europe less dependent on 
supplies from the Middle East. The 
I. Document 917, 18th May 1982. 
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manufacturing of pipelines is of great 
importance for the European steel indus-
try which is now in a difficult period. 
To import gas also avoids Western Euro-
pean stocks being depleted. 
98. The United States Government has 
invoked two strategic arguments against 
this reasoning, namely that the western-
financed pipeline system provides the 
Soviet Union with an important strategic 
asset which, in case of crisis or war, it 
can use for its own purposes. Second, if 
the Soviet Union had to build this pipe-
line alone it would be unable to use 
much of its steel production for defence 
purposes, for instance. The United Sta-
tes Government has also emphasised that 
Western European countries should avoid 
economic dependence on the Soviet 
Union. In 1986, the earliest date for the 
finished pipeline, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France would depend on 
Soviet exports for 30 % of their gas 
consumption. For the Federal Republic, 
this would represent about 5 % of its total 
energy consumption. " 
79. Western Europeans are convinced that 
the pipeline is a commercially sound venture 
and that the risk of supply interruptions or cut-
backs is manageable. Some United States 
counter-proposals, such as shipping liquefied 
natural gas from Alaska to Europe in sub-
marine tankers, strike the European ship-
builders as pure science fiction. Since Norweg-
ian production possibilities cannot be exploited 
before the early 1990s there is no solution other 
than to follow through the agreements and 
contracts with the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
the European governments do not see why they 
should be forced to comply with American law 
as opposed to their own laws and interests. 
80. On 18th June 1982, the United States 
Government decided to oppose European pipe-
line exports to the USSR when American 
technology was involved. At the end of 
August the export of United States goods and 
services to two French firms was halted on the 
grounds that they had violated the United 
States embargo on pipeline shipments to the 
Soviet Union. Identical measures were taken 
against British, German and Italian firms. The 
United States Government maintained that the 
ban on the sale of oil and gas technology and 
equipment to the Soviet Union served Ameri-
can interests despite possible harm to American 
firms or firms of allied countries. It considered 
that the pipeline sanction would place a signifi-
cant strain on the Soviet Union in terms of 
time, energy and finance. The French Govern-
ment said that it would not participate in an 
economic war against the Soviet Union. On 
the other hand, it underlined the need to keep 
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Franco-American relations on a friendly basis 
as they were considered much broader and 
more important than the pipeline controversy. 
It was considered more a question of sover-
eignty and free trade, which considerations were 
shared by the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
81. Originally the Soviets had hoped to sell 
as much as 40 billion cubic metres of gas a year 
between 1984 and 2008 ; a quarter of it would 
be sold to West Germany and some 8 billion 
cubic metres to France and about the same 
amount to Italy. The rest would be sold to the 
smaller European countries with which indivi-
dual contracts had been signed. Since 1981 
the total volume has been scaled down for lack 
of demand, diminishing expectations of Soviet 
purchases of equipment and probably also 
because of political implications. When the 
pipeline is fully operational deliveries are not 
likely to exceed two thirds of the originally-
planned volume or some 26 billion cubic 
metres a year. This will also mean a reduction 
of the need for American compressor techno-
logy and the Soviet Union will have to forego 
substantial hard currency earnings since the 
larger volume could have been supplied at low 
marginal cost. Its earnings will therefore be 
closer to $ 5 billion than $ 10 billion. This 
scaling down of the entire programme should 
make it easier for all partners concerned to 
reach an acceptable compromise, particularly 
since the American embargo is not an effective 
sanction on the Soviet Union and might 
seriously jeopardise relations between the 
partners of the Atlantic Alliance and destroy 
America's commercial reliability. 
82. There remains of course the argument 
related to security if Western Europe becomes 
more dependent on Russian energy and there-
fore economically dependent on the Soviet 
Union. Could a cut-off of supplies actually 
cripple Europe's ability to defend itself in case 
of crisis or warfare ? The answer depends on 
how far the European pipeline network can 
replace Soviet gas by gas from other sources in 
that event. 
83. In any event, there seems to be no possi-
bility of finding an alternative source of gas, 
developing the fields and bringing the gas to the 
European market by 1984 - the time Soviet 
deliveries are to start. However, could gas 
from other sources be made available later to 
reduce European dependence on Soviet gas and 
what would be the price ? Would it be econo-
mical to supply gas from the North Sea and the 
new fields off northern Norway for transporta-
tion to Central Europe by pipeline or as lique-
fied natural gas? At the other extreme, could 
offshore fields in the Southern Atlantic, the 
Canadian Arctic and the Gulf area offer alter-
native sources of energy? In the case of Nor-
way, this seems certainly possible after the 
1990s if the Norwegian Government decides to 
move new energy activities to the northern 
regions. The necessary gas reserves and tech-
nology are available. It will be about eight 
years before the implementation of these pro-
jects allows the supply of natural gas from the 
Soviet Union to be supplemented and, above 
all, before resources such as Frigg or Gronin-
gen, which will by then have run out, can be 
replaced. 
84. To have a true network of intra-Euro-
pean gas pipelines, the main thing is to connect 
the British network with the rest of the conti-
nent. Europe would then have a network 
allowing it to face up to a sudden interruption 
of one of its sources of natural gas supplies. 
Such a measure would thus enhance the secu-
rity of European supplies. However, from 
both a commercial and an economic point of 
view, the interconnection can be planned effec-
tively only if accompanied by a meaningful 
policy of large-scale stockpiles representing the 
equivalent of 20 to 25% of annual consump-
tion. However, the present stagnation of energy 
demand, the uncertain trend of energy prices 
and the cost of capital equipment, swollen by 
inflation and burdened by very heavy interest 
rates, make governments and industrialists hesi-
tant about committing themselves to extremely 
expensive long-term projects. 
85. One of the most useful means of reducing 
such risks would be for all the European coun-
tries concerned to take co-ordinated measures, 
particularly the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, energy-exporting countries, which 
should agree "to take part in a general network 
of intra-European gas pipelines. In this res-
pect, the building of new pipelines to bring 
Norwegian gas from such new deposits as Sleip-
ner and Troll to Western Europe should be 
studied. At present, Norwegian natural gas 
from the North Sea is taken by gas pipeline 
from the Frigg area to Scotland and gas from 
Ekofisk to Emden in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Here, the building of a new 
1,300 km pipeline has just been agreed upon to 
take gas from the Statfjord area in the north to 
Emden via Ekofisk. For the future, the stake is 
a big one ; it consists of deciding how to trans-
port the new resources from the Sleipner and 
Troll area situated between Ekofisk and Frigg. 
Use of the pipeline to Scotland seems at 
present to be the solution receiving the greatest 
attention, particularly as supplies for the Frigg-
Scotland pipeline will run out as from 1992-9 3. 
86. Such a solution would allow the arrival 
points of Norwegian gas in Western Europe to 
be diversified and thus help to increase the 
security of Europe's energy supplies. However, 
it assumes that the British and European net-
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works will be connected up by means of an 
extension of the Scottish network towards the 
continent. 
VII. Norsk Data 
87. During its visit to Norway the committee 
was received at Norsk Data, a private firm 
which develops, manufactures and markets 
general-purpose small- and lmedium-size com-
puters and computer systems in the price range 
of 100,000 to 2,500,000 Norwegian kroner. It 
has wholly-owned subsidiaries in eight coun-
tries, mainly Western Europe and America, 
which handle sales and customer support. 
Norsk Data's chief competitors are United 
States computer companies. The computers 
are used for technical and administrative appli-
cations and are sold to public authorities, 
defence agencies, commercial organisations and 
private companies. 
88. From the very outset Norsk Data, which 
was set up by three Norwegian scientists trained 
in the United States at Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, was convinc~d that in order to 
succeed it had to compete with American firms 
which dominated 80 % of the market and even 
in Europe have 66 % of the computer market. 
It was necessary to be tioth cheaper and 
better to beat American firms. Consequently, 
16 % of the staff of Norsk Data work on long-
term research and development. Norsk Data's 
profitability is closely linked to productivity 
which in turn depends on management philo-
sophy and research work. Norsk Data is 
endeavouring to retain and improve its leading 
position in its sector of production. It uses the 
latest technology and is continually renewing 
it. For Norway, its management style is orig-
inal. Its personnel of some 800 are also share-
holders in the company. 
89. Norsk Data holds a special position 
among European computer companies since, 
without protection from the government or 
support for research and development, Norsk 
Data has become a European competitor for 
the American mini-computer companies. As 
to why Norsk Data succeeded where several 
large European companies failed, the main 
reason advanced by its leaders was that the time 
to build a new computer was proportional to 
the size of the company. Norsk Data was able 
to manufacture its first computer in one year, 
its second computer in eight~en months and its 
largest new computer, the ND-500, within three 
years. Continuing rapid technological develop-
ment is a characteristic of the computer indus-
try. 
90. Software will assume increasing import-
ance in the usefulness of computer systems and 
therefore 75% of the research and development 
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staff of Norsk Data is working on the develop-
ment of general software and, with the assist-
ance of consultants and customers, the deve-
lopment of complete systems for specific pur-
poses. 
91. At Norsk Data it was explained that its 
computers are now being used at the OECD 
Halden reactor which is an international centre 
to develop new aids for reactor operators. A 
realistic control room is being built to study the 
behaviour of the operating crews. The signals 
from the reactor plant and in-core instrumenta-
tion are connected to a data acquisition system 
which collects large amounts of data from the 
different experiments on test fuel behaviour in 
various operating conditions. The computers 
and the test fuel data bank system have been 
built by Norsk Data. 
92. At the joint European torus (JET) at 
Culham, England, fifteen computers from 
Norsk Data will be installed in order to provide 
control, diagnostics, test, communications, stor-
age and analysis functions. The resulting data 
will be made available to laboratories and insti-
tutes of the member countries of the European 
Community as well as Sweden and Switzerland 
which are also members of the joint under-
taking. The main objective of JET is to obtain 
and study plasma in conditions which approach 
those needed in a power-producing fusion 
reactor. The JET should constitute a major 
step towards the development of the nuclear 
fusion reactor as a new energy source. 
93. The new Norsk Data 500 computer will 
be the main storage and analysis instrument. 
94. The total cost of the JET will be some 
£ 123 million, 6 % of which is computer costs. 
95. Norsk Data computers are also used for 
F-16 simulator training systems in the United 
States as well as in Europe. Research with 
defence applications has always been a major 
objective of Norsk Data which has also pro-
vided important electronic equipment for F-16 
aircraft. 
96. Norsk Data computers and the new 
ND-500 are also used for Eiscat - the European 
incoherent scatter facility mentioned earlier in 
the report. 
VIII. Norwegian law of the sea policy 
97. On 30th April 1982 the United Nations 
convention on the law of the sea was adopted 
by 130 countries, 1 7 countries abstained and 4 
voted against. The Norwegian delegation led 
by Ambassador Jens Evensen voted in favour of 
the convention as instructed by the government 
which believed that the text was an acceptable 
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compromise between the opinion of some 160 
states and constituted a valuable contribution to 
the future prospects of the developing states. 
Decision-making was by consensus which 
meant that all the 400 articles and the seven or 
eight annexes presented the best possible solu-
tion for all participants concerned. The 
consensus principle did not mean that decisions 
were unanimous but that even if some states 
were not happy about the outcome of one or 
other article they would not vote against it but 
give tacit agreement. It also meant that after 
each agreement there was a cooling-off period 
before voting as a last resort. The cooling-off 
period could then be used to compare the 
effects of different chapters of the convention in 
order to see whether a compromise in one place 
could be offset by a compromise elsewhere. 
The delegates could not, of course, bind their 
states to ratifying the convention and in the end 
the consensus principle was not maintained as 
four countries, although for different reasons, 
voted against the convention. First of all the 
United States because of the mining provisions 
and the review procedure ; Venezuela because 
of the delimitation rules which brought it into 
conflict with Columbia ; Israel because of indi-
rect references to the PLO ; and Turkey because 
of the delimitation rules. Some western coun-
tries which abstained were Belgium, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Some 
western countries which voted in favour were 
the Scandinavian countries, Canada, France, 
Greece and Portugal. Australia and New Zea-
land also voted for it. 
98. The basic difference between the attitudes 
of the western countries was that some of them 
considered the old rules acceptable and some 
that they were antiquated and unable to meet 
the needs of the technological revolution. 
99. Security elements are important but the 
convention has not been drawn up specifically 
with military purposes in mind, nor can the 
convention be considered as a factor in progress 
towards disarmament. It is basically a ruling 
for the peacetime use of the oceans and the 
seas. 
100. Norwegian policy has always been diffe-
rent from the Anglo-American point of view as 
the latter accepted the three-mile limit starting 
at the coast proper, whereas Norway was 
always in favour of a four-mile limit starting 
from a strait baseline between the outer fringe 
of its islands. 
101. In a law suit against the United Kingdom 
at the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague in 1949, the Norwegian views were 
accepted by the court as being correct. This 
gave Norway a legal base for its policy and led 
to subsequent steps with regard to 12-mile 
fishing zones and the continental shelf agree-
ments. The first one was adopted in 1960 and 
in 1963 continental shelf delimitation agree-
ments were concluded with the United King-
dom, Denmark and Sweden. It was also agreed 
then that if an oil-field straddled the delimita-
tion line there would be joint development of 
such a field by the countries concerned. 
102. In the north, in the Barents Sea, however, 
the Soviet Union was not willing to discuss 
such a delimitation agreement. 
103. In 1976 and 1977 the continental shelf 
limit and the 200-mile economic zone were 
adopted, mainly with regard to fishing and 
minerals. The continental shelf and the 
200-mile economic zone became of great 
importance when scientists pointed out that, 
because of over-fishing, herring, cod and had-
dock, plus certain other types of fish were in 
danger of becoming extinct. Talks have been 
started between the EEC, the Soviet Union and 
Iceland on the prohibition of fishing certain 
kinds of fish at certain periods in order to gain 
time to replenish stocks. 
104. There is the so-called "Pip" resolution 
which would allow the Americans and the 
Europeans a free hand in the Clipperton area of 
the Pacific to exploit the nodules. This area is 
for the moment the only exploitable area and 
the main western industrialised countries could 
become concessionaires for the next thirty 
years. 
105. This resolution would enter into force if 
the industrialised countries signed the conven-
tion on the law of the sea. It could be a bridge 
between the developing and developed coun-
tries. Should the convention not be signed 
there would be deep bitterness after so many 
years of work on extremely complicated issues. 
A compromise might also be reached on the 
transfer of technology and the review of the 
convention. 
106. Finally, it will be the task of the coast-
guards of the member countries to enforce the 
EEC fishery convention. 
IX. Norwegian defence policy 
107. Norwegian defence policy is based on a 
national defence effort set in the context of 
NATO. It is of course strongly influenced 
by its geographical position (joint frontier of 
200 km with the Soviet Union) and its history 
(April 1940). In 1948, Norway envisaged a 
Scandinavian defence union, but even with 
Sweden's aid this was not felt to be an accept-
able solution as the resources were not deemed 
sufficient for adequate defence. 
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108. Because of its geographical position Nor-
way comes under two NATO commands: 
SACEUR and SACLANT. SACLANT is espe-
cially responsible for defending the outlying 
islands belonging to Norway and the maritime 
routes between Norway and the American 
continent. Norway proper is part of SACEUR 
and more especially of NATO's Northern 
European Command with headquarters at Kol-
sas, near Oslo. 
109. To facilitate good relations with its 
north-eastern neighbour, the stationing of 
foreign troops and nuclear and chemical wea-
pons is not authorised on Norwegian soil. No 
allied exercises are carried out in the eastern-
most province. If the Norwegian army holds 
exercises in the north-eastern province the 
Soviet Union is notified. This is a confi-
dence-building measure which has now been 
practised for the past thirty years. The Nor-
wegian Government could change these uni-
lateral measures if the need were felt. 
110. On the Kola Peninsula, which is only 
some 10 to 100 km from the north-eastern fron-
tier, the Soviet Government has established the 
biggest naval base in the world with some 400 
warships and 70 % of the Soviet fleet of ballistic 
missile-carrying submarines. Apart from the 
strategic submarines, the Kola base also houses 
a large number of nuclear and conventional 
submarines and 70 % of the missile-launching 
surface vessels. Moreover, the Kola base has a 
large number of frigates, minesweepers, aircraft-
carriers and air reconnaissance, squadrons. The 
army has two divisions and there is a naval 
infantry regiment. 
1 I 1. Total Norwegian forces- army, navy, air 
force and home guard- number some 280,000 
men, of whom about 40,000 are regulars. 
Mobilisation exercises and transportation pos-
sibilities from south to northi are therefore of 
great importance. Some battalions can be 
ready in twenty-four hours and brigades in 
forty-eight hours. Air transportation is extre-
mely important as the refresher training of 
many units is done in the north of Norway 
because of its strategic position. At the same 
time mobilisation arrangements and transport 
facilities by air, sea, rail or road can be tested. 
Weapons and equipment for these units are 
stocked in northern Norway. Norway has 
adopted a total defence concept which means 
that all relevant civilian agencies and man-
power have prearranged tasks ; civil defence 
also plays an important role. 
112. Norwegian peacetime deployment in 
northern Norway includes one brigade in the 
Trams area and two battalion groups near the 
Norwegian-Soviet border. In an emergency, 
two-and-a-half more brigades would be mobil-
ised in the north and three air squadrons are 
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based there permanently. Most Norwegian 
naval units are also assigned to defend northern 
waters and many are deployed there in peace-
time. 
113. In crisis or in war SACEUR's rapid rein-
forcement plan would be implemented and 
external reinforcements from Canada, the Uni-
ted States, United Kingdom and other Euro-
pean countries would be moved into the area. 
To this end, regular combined exercises are 
held and the NATO nations must show their 
determination to act quickly when a deterior-
ating international situation calls for mobilisa-
tion and reinforcement. 
114. During the committee's visit to the head-
quarters of AFNOR TH in Kolsas, it was 
briefed on the general aspects of the headquar-
ters, its composition and subordinate com-
mands and more especially on the new com-
mand and control information system being 
developed and implemented in the northern 
region of NATO. 
115. In the 1970s it had become clear that the 
manual handling of command and control 
could not effectively process the mass of infor-
mation coming to the headquarters. The pur-
pose of the new command and control informa-
tion system is to provide commanders and staff 
with the timely, relevant and accurate informa-
tion necessary to execute command and staff 
functions. The system will provide automated 
support for command centre operations of tacti-
cal air, land and naval operations. The system 
will also be used by the Norwegian national 
command as well as by the AFNORTH subor-
dinate commands. Requirements were ultima-
tely combined into a single procurement for the 
whole of the northern area. Funding authori-
sations were given in 1979 and in January 1980 
a programme management office was estab-
lished with regional responsibility to eo-
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ordinate and harmonise the different aspects. 
The overall system will be installed in 1983-86. 
116. For continuity of operations the system 
built is capable of withstanding the failure of a 
major component. 
11 7. The system includes the following parts: 
a data-processing sub-system, using computers 
and peripheral equipment from Norsk Data, a 
display sub-system with microprocessors and 
the possibility to project the operational situa-
tion against a map background and, thirdly, a 
communications sub-system allowing the flow 
of information from the communication net-
work to interphase with the command and 
control information system and maintain the 
currency of the data base. 
118. The northern region will be the first 
region to have fully-integrated modern auto-
mated management, which will be implemented 
in the mid-1980s and will serve the northern 
region into the next century. Later the system 
will be fully integrated with other systems now 
to be developed in Allied Command Europe. 
119. The committee was further briefed on 
new developments and improvements in com-
munications and electronics. The initial voice-
switched network and the telegraph automatic 
relay equipment will be support systems for the 
new command and control information sys-
tems. The network will be installed at Kolsas 
and subordinate commands during the next 
three or four years. Through the telegraph 
automatic relay equipment, the transmission 
and receipt of messages between major NATO 
commands will then be possible. 
120. The systems are all computer-controlled, 
are part of the NATO networks and will 
modernise the communications capability of 
the Northern European Command and even-
tually the whole of NATO. 
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APPENDIX I 
European Parliament resolution 
of 16th September 1982 on the Soviet gas pipeline 
and the extension of the United States embargo 
to firms based in the Community 
The European Parliament, 
A. Concerned by the danger to American-
European relations of the dispute over the cons-
truction of the gas pipeline ; 
B. Deeply regretting President Reagan's 
decision of 18th June 1982 to extend to foreign 
subsidiaries and licensees of American firms the 
prohibition on exports to the Soviet Union by 
American companies of material in connection 
with the Urengoi pipeline; 
C. Endorsing the rejection by several Euro-
pean governments of this attempt to apply 
extraterritorially and retroactively American 
legislation ; 
D. Considering that Russian gas supplies 
will represent only 4 % of the Community's 
total energy consumption when they reach their 
estimated peak in 1990, and that the purchase 
of natural gas from the USSR could form a part 
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of a European Community pol'icy to increase its 
diversity in energy supplies ; 
E. Whereas compliance with the embargo 
would result in the loss of a European sales 
market, increase unemployment, involve the 
unilateral breach of contracts and damage inter-
national trading confidence, 
1. Asks the Council again to urge the 
American authorities to revoke the embargo 
and to raise the issue at the GATT ministerial 
meeting on 23rd-26th November unless the 
embargo has been revoked ; 
2. Urges the Community institutions to 
establish with the United States and other 
members of the OECD a concerted approach to 
the management of economic relations between 
western countries and state trading countries ; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this 
resolution to the Commission, the Council, the 
Foreign Ministers meeting in political co-oper-
ation and the President and Congress of the 
United States of America. 
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Imports of Soviet natural gas 
On behalf of the EEC Commission, Mr. 
Davignon answered written question 684/82 
put by Mr. Pearce as follows: 
Natural gas from the USSR, which has 
the world's largest reserves, offers a means of 
meeting Community requirements and a mea-
sure of diversification away from the Commu-
nity's much larger dependence on imported oil. 
It is estimated that natural gas from the 
USSR, including the new contracts, would only 
represent 5.4% of the Federal Republic of 
Germany's total energy consumption in 
1990. The figure for the Community as a 
whole would be just under 4 %, assuming the 
quantities of gas currently under negotiation 
were agreed. 
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The Commission nevertheless recognises 
the importance of ensuring the security of 
natural gas supplies to the Community and 
proposed a series of measures in its communi-
cations to the Energy Councils of October 1981 
and March 1982. 
The latter Council noted that the Com-
mission would, after further studies, make more 
specific proposals for measures to reinforce the 
security of supplies. 
This work, now being carried out in 
conjunction with officials of member states, 
should allow some conclusions to be drawn in 
time for the November 1982 Energy Council. 
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Procedure 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman); 
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(Alternate: Delehedde), Mondino, Manfred Schmidt, Senes, 
Spies von Biillesheim, Sterpa, Unland, Vial-Massat, van der 
Werff. 
N.B. The- names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Resolution 
on the revision of Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 
of the Rules of Procedure 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To draft Rules 10, 14, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40 and 43 as follows: 
1. Rule 10 
Paragraph 6 shall read: 
" The six Vice-Presidents shall then be elected on the same ballot paper. Those. who on the first 
ballot obtain the votes of a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the 
number of the Representatives to the Assembly shall be declared elected. If the number of those 
elected is less than the number of vacancies to be filled, a second ballot for the remaining vacan-
cies shall be held following the same procedure. If a third ballot is necessary, those candidates 
who then receive the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected. In the event of a 
tie, the candidates senior in age shall be elected. The Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in 
accordance with the order in which they have been elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. " 
Paragraph 7 shall read: 
" If the number of candidates does not exceed the number of posts to be filled and there are no 
objections, the candidates shall be declared elected. In this case, the Vice-Presidents shall take 
precedence in accordance with their age even if they have not been nominated simultaneously. " 
2. Rule 14 
Paragraph 1 shall read: 
"The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chair-
man ex officio, his predecessors as long as they remain Representatives or Substitutes of the 
Assembly without interruption, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent commit-
tees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the 
Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent committee by a Vice-
Chairman of that committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to 
attend meetings of the Presidential Committee. " 
3. Rule 29 
Paragraph 2 shall read: 
" Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be printed 
and distributed before their consideration by the Assembly. The President shall have the 
power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been 
adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments. " 
Paragraph 3 shall read: 
" Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise 
decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time. " 
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Paragraph 8 shall read: 
" The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be 
obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee. " 
The French text of paragraph 9 shall read: 
"Le renvoi d'un amendement a la commission n'interrompt pas necessairement la discussion. 
L'Assemblee peut impartir a la commission un delai dans lequel elle devra presenter ses conclu-
sions sur les amendements renvoyes. ", the English text not being revised. 
Add a paragraph I 0 as follows: 
" When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides other-
wise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another mem-
ber speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the Rapporteur or the 
Committee Chairman. " 
4. Rule 34 
Rule 34 shall read: 
" I. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or 
secret ballot is required. 
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call: 
(a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, I (a), of the Rules of 
Procedure; 
(b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion consi-
dered as a whole, whenever five or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the 
chamber so desire; 
(c) in other cases, whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes present in the chamber 
so desire. 
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a Representative 
drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by •• Yes ", " No ", or 
"I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes 
cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. 
The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical 
order of Representatives' names. 
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the 
names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the 
purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. " 
5. Rule 35 
Rule 35 shall read: 
•• 1. The majorities required are the following: 
(a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree 
to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for 
urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of Representatives or 
Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly; 
(b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast; 
(c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of 
votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot. 
2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. " 
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6. Rule 36 
Rule 36 shall read: 
" 1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the Represen-
tatives to the Assembly or their Substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in 
Rule 24 above. 
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives 
or Substitutes present, unless, at the request of a Representative or Substitute before the voting 
has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of Representatives or Substitutes who 
have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum. 
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once 
there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the 
part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, 
which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the 
Assembly or referred back to committee. " 
7. Rule 38 
The French text of paragraph 4 shall read: 
"Un groupe ne peut comprendre mains de neufs Representants ou Suppleants ",the English text 
not being revised. 
8. Rule 40 
Paragraph 1 shall read: 
"Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assem-
bly or by the Presidential Committee. " 
9. Rule 43 
Paragraph 6 shall read: 
" Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote 
by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of Representatives or 
Substitutes equal to more than half the number of Representatives to the Assembly. " 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. Rule 10 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 
The purpose of this amendment is to spe-
cify more clearly that if the number of candi-
dates does not exceed the number of posts to be 
filled and there are no objections the order of 
precedence of the Vice-Presidents is determined 
by age only and not by the date of election. 
2. Rule 14 
Paragraph 1 
Provision for former Presidents of the 
Assembly to sit on the Presidential Committee 
was included in Rule 14, paragraph 1, through 
an amendment adopted by the Assembly on 
1Oth Uecember 1969. 
Its purpose was to allow the Presidential 
Committee to benefit from the experience 
gained by former Presidents of the Assembly as 
long as they remained members of the Assem-
bly. 
However, at the December 1981 session 
this provision was criticised. It was in fact 
pointed out that a former President who left the 
WEU Assembly and who then returned to the 
Assembly a few years later would become a de 
jure member of the Presidential Committee 
again although he would have been unable to 
keep in touch will the Assembly's business. 
The committee therefore feels that the 
Rules of Procedure should specify that a break 
in the term of office of a Representative or 
Substitute has the effect of making a former 
President ineligible for de jure membership of 
the Presidential Committee. It therefore pro-
poses to amend paragraph 1 by replacing " for-
mer Presidents of the Assembly who are Repre-
sentatives or Substitutes to the Assembly " by 
" his predecessors as long as they remain 
Representatives or Substitutes of the Assembly 
without interruption ". 
Some committee members, however, would 
have preferred it to be stipulated that only the 
President's immediate predecessor is entitled to 
de jure membership of the Presidential Com-
mittee and that this would be limited to a 
period of one year. 
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3. Rule 19 
Paragraph 2 
Simplified wording. 
Paragraph 3 
In spite of the provisions of this paragraph, 
the President sometimes has to submit to the 
Assembly, with its agreement, amendments 
grouped together. 
It is thus possible, in certain cases, to 
shorten a discussion which an unduly large 
number of amendments would have made 
tedious and to improve the clarity and coher-
ence of debates. 
In order to take account of exceptional 
circumstances which may arise, the committee 
unanimously proposes that the second sentence 
of paragraph 3 be amended. to read: "Unless 
otherwise decided by the President of the 
Assembly, they shall relate to only one para-
graph at a time ". 
Paragraph 8 
It is specified that it is an amendment 
which is referred back. 
Paragraph 9 (French text only) 
The text of this paragraph has been lined 
up on the English text which is more precise. 
Paragraph 10 
This new paragraph incorporates a provi-
sion from the note on the organisation of 
debates and limiting speaking time in the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. However, 
it makes the President and not the Assembly 
responsible for taking a decision to make an 
exception to the rule. 
DOCUMENT 931 
4. Rule 34 
Paragraph 1 
The purpose of this wording is to clarify 
the presentation of all the provisions of the 
rule. 
Paragraph 2 
(a) It seems necessary to show that a roll-call 
is necessary to ascertain that there is an abso-
lute majority. 
(b) It is proposed to bring the rules of the 
WEU Assembly into line with those of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
(c) The present wording of paragraph 2 seems 
to lack precision because it does not indicate 
whether the request for a roll-call vote must be 
made in writing or whether it may be made by 
a Representative or Substitute from the floor. 
It is in fact by counting the number of Repre-
sentatives present in the chamber who endorse 
the request for a roll-call vote that the President 
notes that at least ten Representatives or Substi-
tutes are making the request. 
The wording seems complex insofar as it 
seeks to avert the danger of a manoeuvre by 
which members of the Assembly could request 
a roll-call and then leave the chamber to 
prevent there being a quorum and thus make a 
vote impossible. This fear is unfounded since 
the rules relating to the quorum have been 
revised to make the quorum depend not on the 
number of Representatives or Substitutes taking 
part in the vote but on the number of signa-
tures on the attendance register. 
The committee therefore proposes the 
following wording: 
" (c) whenever ten or more Representatives 
or Substitutes present in the chamber 
so desire. ". 
5. Rule 35 
The purpose of this amendment is to 
separate the paragraphs more logically and to 
delete abso/ue from sub-paragraph (b) of the 
French text. This word does not exist in the 
English text and has no meaning in this 
context. 
Finally, it is proposed to amend Rule 35 
(a) by including the words "a request for urgent 
procedure without prior reference to commit-
tee " so as to take account of the provisions of 
Rule 43, 6, on urgent procedure. 
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6. Rule 36 
The purpose of this drafting is: 
Paragraph 1 
To replace "majority", which may be 
interpreted in several ways, by the more speci-
fic expression " more than half the Representa-
tives to the Assembly or their Substitutes". 
Paragraph 2 
To make clear that the President acts at the 
request of a Representative or Substitute. 
Former paragraph 3 
To delete this paragraph which was applic-
able when voting by roll-call was a means of 
determining whether or not there was a quorum 
but which has become pointless since a quorum 
is determined by the number of signatures on 
the register of attendance. 
New paragraph 3 
By deleting the first part of the paragraph, 
to avoid having to postpone a vote until a sub-
sequent sitting when there might be a quorum 
later in the same sitting. 
7. Rule 38 
Paragraph 4 
The present text of this paragraph is not 
absolutely identical in the two languages since 
the French text seems to refer only to the 
formation of political groups. But the mini-
mum number of Representatives or Substitutes 
required by the Rules of Procedure applies not 
only to the formation of a group but also to its 
continued existence. Any properly-formed 
group whose numbers fall below this threshold 
ceases to exist. 
This is clear in the English text of the rule. 
The French text should therefore be 
brought into line with the English text, which is 
more comprehensive. 
The committee unanimously proposes to 
draft the French text of paragraph 4 as follows: 
"Un groupe ne peut comprendre moins de 
neuf Representants ou Suppleants. " 
8. Rule 40 
Paragraph 1 
Rule 40 was not amended in the general 
revision of the Rules of Procedure. Its wording 
corresponded to that of former Rule 26 which 
provided that unless the Assembly decided 
otherwise the examination of a matter in 
committee should be preceded by a general 
debate. 
But Rule 16, paragraph 2, revised m 
December 1980, now lays down that: 
" Any item referred to a committee by 
decision of the Assembly or of the Presi-
dential Committee shall also be included in 
the Assembly's register. " 
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The committee therefore unanimously pro-
poses to add at the end of Rule 40, paragraph 
1, the words: 
" or by the Presidential Committee. " 
9. Rule 43 
Paragraph 6 
Only a roll-call makes it certain that there 
is an absolute majority as defined in Rule 35, 
1 (a). The new drafting therefore spells out the 
need to resort to a roll-call stemming from the 
conditions for a majority laid down in the 
present paragraph 2. 
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DRAFf BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 19831 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the finan-
cial year 1983 
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Analysis of estimates and expenditure 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 
1983 and the budget for the financial year 1982 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the financial year 1983 
Details Estimate for 1983 F 
Head! Expenditure for staff ................................... 8,262,000 
Headll Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly .......... 2,445,000 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................. 516,000 
Head IV: General administrative costs ............................ 2,015,000 
Head V Other expenditure ..................................... 1,084,000 
Head VI: Pensions .............................................. 240,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ....................... 14,562,000 
ToTAL RECEIPTS ........................... 442,000 
NET TOTAL ............................... 14,120,000 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved 
by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Adriaensens (Alter-
nate: Michel) (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Alternate: Lagorce), 
Lord Hughes (Alternate: Lord McNair) (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Ahrens, Althammer, Biefnot, Delehedde, Durant 
(Alternate: Atkinson), Eastham (Alternate: Grieve), Jeam- . 
brun, Krieps (Alternate: Margue), Martino, Mertens (Alter-
nate: van der Werjj), Orione, Petrilli, Schleiter, Schulte, 
S}'rung, Stainton (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Tripodi, 
Tummers (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman). 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Details 
Head I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment ............. . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances .............................. . 
(B) Social charges ............................ . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival 
and departure of permanent officials ........ . 
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, 
allowances, etc.) .......................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I .•.•..••••.•••••....•. 
Head // - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff ............................ . 
2. Linguistic staff ............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ........ . 
5. Miscellaneou-s expenditure during sessions .... . 
6. Provision for revising emoluments ............ . 
ToTALOFHEADII ••.••.•..•..•.•••..•• 
Head I//- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4: 1. Premises ................................... . 
2. Work on the building (joint areas) ............ . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment ............................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill .................... . 
Head IV- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 : Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of 
documents .................................... . 
Sub-Head 7 : Office supplies and hire of machines ............ . 
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents .. . 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc ...... . 
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .................................. . 
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges ................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV •.••.•••..••.••••.•• 
Head V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of 
Committees and Rapporteurs ................... . 
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ..................... . 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk ........................................ . 
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information .................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for .................................. . 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ......................... . 
ToTAL OF HEAD V ••..•••••••..•..••••• 
Head VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 : (A) Pensions ................................ . 
(B) Allowances .............................. . 
(C) Severance grant .......................... . 
(D) Supplementary insurance ................. . 
TOTALOFHEADVI •·••••·•••·•···•••·• 
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Estimate for 1983 
F 
5,497,300 
1,005,700 
906,000 
112,000 
741,000 
682,500 
1,143,000 
5,000 
350,000 
82,500 
182,000 
396,000 
60,000 
60,000 
420,000 
270,000 
1,250,000 
37,000 
37,500 
500 
110,000 
170,000 
3,000 
264,000 
62,000 
230i,ooo 
230,000 
3,000 
12,000 
221,000 
15,500 
3,500 
8,262,000 
2,445,000 
516,000 
2,015,000 
1,084,000 
240,000 
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Analysis of estimates of expenditure 
Head 1- Expenditure for staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate: F 5,497,300 
Estimate: F 5,422,300 
Rank WEU Grade 
The Clerk ............................................. . Hors cadre 1 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . A6 
Counsellors ............................................ . A5 
First Secretaries ........................................ . A4 
Secretaries ............................................. . A3 2 
Secretaries-Translators/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator .............. . A2 
Chief Accountant ....................................... . B6 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . B4 3 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 
Switchboard Operator ................................... . B3 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . C6 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . C4 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), 
including travelling expenses and insurance 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
5 
5 
1 
1 
2 
28 
Estimate: F 
I. On the basis of Grade A 7, step 6 + 6 % + representation allowance (F 7, 700 per year). 
2. Creation of a new post. 
3. Regrading of a Grade 83. 
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Total 
F 
393,500 
690,900 
970,700 
554,400 
428,100 
567,400 
183,600 
655,400 
555,400 
119,400 
116,300 
187,200 
5,422,300 
75,000 
(a) Household allowance 
Rank 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
Clerk .................................................. . 
Senior Counsellor ...................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................ . 
First Secretary .......................................... . 
Secretaries ............................................. . 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . 
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Estimate: F I,005,700 
Estimate : F I92,400 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
Hors cadre I 23,IOO 
A6 I 20,700 
A5 3 58,300 
A4 I I6,600 
A3 2 25,700 
B4 2 I5,200 
B3 2 I4,300 
C6 I 7,000 
C4 2 II,500 
15 I92,400 
(b) Children's allowance Estimate: F I70,000 
8,450 F per year per child: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F I70,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Rank 
Senior Counsellors ••• 0. 0 0 •• 0 0 0 ••• 0 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 ••• 0. 0 
Counsellors 0 0 0. 0. 0. 0 •• 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0 0 ••• 0 ••• 0. 0. 0. 
First Secretary ........................................... 
Secretaries 0 ••• 0 •••• 0 •• 0 0. 0. 0 •• 0. 0 0. 0. 0 ••• 0 0. 0 •• 0 •••• 0 ••• 
Secretary-Translator/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator ............... 
Personal Assistants •• 0 •• 0. 0 •••••••• 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 •• 0 ••••• 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists 0 0 ••• 0 0 0. 0 0 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0 •• 0. 0. 0 •• 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(j) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
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Estimate : F 468,200 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
A6 2 I24,400 
A5 I 65,400 
A4 I 55,500 
A3 2 85,600 
A2 2 62,IOO 
B4 2 42,200 
B3 2 33,000 
12 468,200 
Estimate: F IO,IOO 
Estimate: F 33,000 
Estimate : F I30,000 
Estimate : F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
Estimate: F 906,000 
(a) Social Security Estimate : F 610,000 
28 officials F 610,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate : F 181 ,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate: F 115,000 
14% of basic salaries x 822,000 F F 115,000 
(for 3 officials who opted to continue with the provident 
fund) 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
Estimate: F 112,000 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews 
and cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and depar-
ture of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate : F 10,000 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 40,000 
Estimate : F 30,000 
Estimate: F 15,000 
if) Medical examination 
Estimate: F 7,000 
(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETc.) 
Estimate : 7 41 ,000 
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Head II- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate: F 2,445,000 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly 
Function 
Heads of the sittings office ............................... . 
Heads of sections ....................................... . 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................. . 
Precis writers ........................................... . 
Verbatim reporters ...................................... . 
Assistants .............................................. . 
Head ushers ............................................ . 
Ushers ................................................. . 
Offset/ Assemblers ...................................... . 
Daily 
remuneration 
F 
665 
8I5 
560 
710 
6I5 
465 
6I5 
465 
6I5 
6I5 
785 
300 
260 
430 
390 
2I5 
I95 
345 
I95 
Paris: 10 days 
No. 
I a 
I b 
2a 
2b 
I b 
3a 
2b 
3a 
3b 
I4 b 
6c 
6a 
lOa 
4b 
27 b 
2a 
I2 a 
3b 
IO a 
II2 
Total 
F 
26,000 
28,300 
7,400 
28,800 
36,IOO 
I60,000 
I9I,OOO 
5,200 
36,000 
23,400 
542,200 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
c. Recruited as free-lance staff. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . F I40,300 
F 682,500 
97 
DOCUMENT 932 
2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function 
No. Total F 
Interpreters ••••••••••• 0 •• 0 0 ••••••••• 0 0 0 •••• 0 0 •• 0 0 ••••••• 12 252,000 
12 252,000 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . F 18,000 
F 270,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions . . . . F 300,000 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Estimate 1 Function remuneration No. F F 
Revisers ••• 0 ••••• 0. 0. 0 •• 0 •••• 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0. 0. 0. 0 ••••• 0. 0. 710 3a 210,000 
1,141 4b 
Translators 0 •• 0 •• 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 •• 570 3a 204,000 
952 5b 
Assistants ••• 0. 0. 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 •• 0. 0 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 •••• 0 0 •••• 0 260 4a 139,000 
300 3a 
430 3b 
390 2b 
27 553,000 
1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a. Recruited locally. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . F 20,000 
F 573,000 
b. Recruited outside France. 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
Estimate: F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
-Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 340,000 
-Installation of telephone booths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F I 0,000 
Estimate: F 350,000 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
-Removal expenses ............................................... . F 5,200 
-Medical service (Doctor and Nurse) ............................... . F 16,000 
-Hire of typewriters, a technician and screens ....................... . F 20,300 
- Servicing of lifts ................................................. . F 16,000 
-Cleaning ....................................................... . F 15,000 
- Overtime for switchboard staff .................................... . F 8,500 
- Snacks for reproduction service ................................... . F 1,500 
Estimate: F 82,500 
6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES) 
Estimate : F 182,000 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate: F 516,000 
Sub-Head 4 
1. PREMISES 
-Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simulta-
neous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
-Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 340,000 
-Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture . . . F 26,000 
-Miscellaneous .................................................... F 15,000 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
Esttmate : F 396,000 
- Work on the building . . .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . F 30,000 
- Changing the switchboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
Estimate: F 60,000 
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Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
- 5 typewriters F 60,000 
Estimate : F 60,000 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimate: F 2,015,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage ................................................ F 268,000 
- Telephone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 132,000 
- Telex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
- Transport of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
- Purchase of duplication paper, headed writing paper and 
other office supplies 
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimate : F 420,000 
Estimate: F 270,000 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of 
debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
- Brochures 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimate : F 1,250,000 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate: F 37,000 
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Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
- Hire of official cars for the President 
- Maintenance, garage, petrol and insurance for the official 
car of the Clerk Estimate: F 37,500 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate : F 500 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Estimate : F 1,084,000 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, 
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate : F 110,000 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate: F 170,000 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate : F 264,000 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR 
Estimate: F 62,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate : F 230,000 
Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate : F 230,000 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND 0'1 HER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHI::.RE PROVIDED FOR 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate: F 12,000 
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Head VI- Pensions 
Estimate : F 240,000 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
Estimate : F 221 ,000 
(a) Retirement pension ..................................... Estimate: F 166,000 
(b) Invalidity pension ...................................... Estimate: pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension ...................................... Estimate: F 36,400 
(d) Orphans' pension . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . Estimate: F 18,600 
(B) Allowances 
Estimate: 15,500 
(a) Household allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: 6,200 
(b) Dependants' allowance .................................. Estimate: 9,300 
(c) Education allowance .................................... Estimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
Estimate : pro mem. 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate: F 3,500 
Income 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Estimate: F 105,000 
(a) Sale of publications . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . F 15,000 
(b) Bank interest ........................................... F 75,000 
(c) Social security reimbursements ........................... F 15,000 
(B) Pensions 
Estimate: F 337,000 
(a) Contributions (7 %) (x F 4,592,644) ....................... Estimate: F 322,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) .. Estimate: F 15,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 14,120,000. The budget for 1982 amounted 
to F 12,282,000. The difference is therefore F 1,838,000 (14.96 %). 
2. Head I- Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 1 ,0 10,000) in the estimate for this head covers : 
(i) the creation of a Grade A.3 post (F 400,000), made up as follows: 
- Salary and allowances 
- Installation allowance, removal and arrival expenses 
F 325,000 
F 75,000 
F 400,000 
(ii) the alignment of the salary of the Clerk with that of the Clerk of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe or the Deputy Secretary-General of WEU, i.e. a Grade 
A.7, step 6, salary, plus 6% (instead of the former 1 %) (F 26,000); 
(iii) the regrading of a Grade B.3 post to B.4 (F 1 ,200) ; 
(iv) annual increments ; 
(v) following a decision by the WEU Council's Budget Committee, the creation of a sub-head 
"Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)". Salaries and allowances 
have been calculated on the basis of those in force on 1st January 1982. The new 
sub-head therefore makes provision for possible adjustments during the period 1st July 
1982 to 31st December 1983. This increase amounts to a total ofF 741,000. 
3. Head//- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1- Temporary staff 
Sub-head 3.2 (A)- Interpretation services 
Sub-head 3.2 (B)- Translation services 
Sub-head 3.6- Provision for revising emoluments 
Salaries for temporary staff (as in the Council of Europe) are calculated on the basis of salary 
scales for permanent staff. The figures given are those in force on 1st January 1982 and a new 
sub-head is included entitled " Provision for revising emoluments (salaries and per diem allow-
ances)". The expected increase amounts to a total ofF 182,000. 
Sub-head 3.4- Installation of equipment for sessions. 
The interpreters' booths have been made to conform with the standards laid down by the 
IACA, which led to an increase in the cost of installations in 1982. The increase ofF 45,000 takes 
account of the expected increase in expenses relating to the two part-sessions to be held in Paris in 
1983. 
4. Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4.2- Work on the building Goint areas) 
This estimate covers the Assembly's share of expenditure on repairs to the building and the 
hire-purchase of a new switchboard over a period of five years. 
Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum ofF 60,000 is for the purchase of five typewriters to replace those purchased in 1971 
and 1975. 
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5. Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-head 6 - Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents 
The increase (F 50,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an expected increase 
in postal rates and telephone charges and the hire of a telex and related expenditure. 
Sub-head 7 - Office supplies and hire of machines 
The increase (F 33,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of 
paper and office supplies. This sub-head also covers the hire of a photocopying machine and of an 
addressograph machine. 
Sub-head 8 - Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase (F 140,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase 
in the cost of printing and of paper. 
Sub-head 10 - Official cars 
An official car having been purchased for the Clerk in 1981, account is taken only of the cost 
of maintenance, garage, insurance, etc., for this car, plus the hire of an official car for the President. 
6. Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-head 12 - Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
The increase (F 14,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes account of the expected 
increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances. 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 20,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 24,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in 
travelling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1983. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 6,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees 
payable to the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
The increase (F 27 ,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase 
in the cost of living. 
Sub-head 18 - Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
The increase (F 27,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase 
in the cost of living. 
7. Head VI- Pensions 
The increase in the estimate for this head corresponds to the payment of a pension of a Grade 
B.4 official who has retired. 
8. Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts in 1983 include: 
(i) sale of publications; 
(ii) bank interest; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund 
and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals. 
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Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 1983 
and the budget for the financial year 1982 
Head 1- Expenditure for staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,422,300 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,388,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 34,300 
1981 expenditure: F 4,555,880 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses 
and insurance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 75,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F----'7c.=2:.J.!,O~O:.!:':O 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
1981 expenditure: F 9,698 
These salary scales are the same as those in force on 1st January 1982. See the explanatory 
memorandum, paragraph 2. 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 155,613 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 143,320 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
192,400 
195,000 
2,600 
170,000 
183,000 
13,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 468,200 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 453,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,200 
1981 expenditure : F 34 7,592 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 12,465 
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This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number 
of officials qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure: F 29,422 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 61,475 
33,000 
33,000 
130,000 
100,000 
30,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure : F 1,100 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 610,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 470,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 140,000 
1981 expenditure : F 438,596 
This takes account of increases in 1982. 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 161,410 
(c) Provident fund 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 102,586 
181,000 
184,000 
3,000 
115,000 
116,000 
1,000 
This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the 
provident fund scheme. 
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(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 1 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F __ 1,_,_,6=0=0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,400 
1981 expenditure: nil. 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1983 . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . F 10,000 1 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F-~1,=50=0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,500 
1981 expenditure : nil. 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 40,000 1 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -=---F----'3"-'-,4..:....::0:....:::.0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 36,600 
1981 expenditure : nil. 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(d) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . .. F 30,000 1 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =-F __ 7.:....>•=-..:50=0 
Net increase F 22,500 
1981 expenditure : nil. 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Budget for 1982 ............................ ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =-F--=1=2=,0=0-=-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
1981 expenditure: F 15,041 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1983. 
(f) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . F 7,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F_...:...lO=,O=O=O 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
1981 expenditure : F 4,466 
(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.) 
Estimate for 1983 . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . F 741,000 
New sub-head. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2 (v). 
1. The increase in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the recruitment outside France of a Grade A3 official, 
married and with two children. 
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Head 11- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Tempory staff required for sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 568,372 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of I 0 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
See Sub-Head 6 
1981 expenditure : F 225,892 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 251,016 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for sessions ofthe Assembly 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 4 72,052 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
682,500 
671,000 
11,500 
270,000 
270,000 
300,000 
267,000 
33,000 
573,000 
560,000 
13,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure: F 3,515 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 261,321 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 82,500 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F-~6~5,~00~0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 17,500 
1981 expenditure: F 63,778 
This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living. 
6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES) 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 182,000 
New sub-head. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
1. PREMISES 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 251,039 
396,000 
356,000 
40,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
the hire of committee rooms. 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
Goint areas) 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 60,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F-~53:::..._,0~0~0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7,000 
1981 expenditure: F 78,530 
This represents the Assembly's share in work to be carried out in the building and for changing 
the switchboard. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . F 60,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .!._F_~2::..!7~,0~0~0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 33,000 
1981 expenditure: F 20,370 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 315,129 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
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Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 217,145 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
270,000 
237,000 
33,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1 ,250,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,110,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 140,000 
1981 expenditure : F 832,687 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 9 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 37,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =--F--=-33:;...1,=00=0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
1981 expenditure : F 26,105 
Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 37,500 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -"--F--=3'-"'5-'-",5'""0"""0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
1981 expenditure : F 63,097 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure : F 7 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 110,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =-F--"9--=-6-'-",0=0-=-0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 14,000 
1981 expenditure : F 68,632 
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Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 100,749 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
170,000 
150,000 
20,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure: F 7,702 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure: F 149,980 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
264,000 
240,000 
24,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 62,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F--"'-56=•.:::..:00=0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
1981 expenditure: F 54,721 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 144,541 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1981 expenditure : F 180,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
230,000 
203,000 
27,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure : F 736 
Sub-Head 20 
NON·RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1981 expenditure: F 9,197 
Head VI- Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
12,000 
12,000 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 166,000 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F----'7'--"0'-'-',0"-"0'""'0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 96,000 
1981 expenditure: F 58,210 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(b) Invalidity pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pro mem. 
1981 expenditure : nil 
(c) Survivors' pension 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 36,400 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F _ _,3~6'-'-',0"""0'""'0 
1981 expenditure: F 30,347 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
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(d) Orphans' pension 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18,600 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~F-~l!o'..>8,~00=0 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 600 
1981 expenditure: F 15,497 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(B) Allowances 
(a} Household allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,200 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F. ___ _ 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,200 
1981 expenditure : nil 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 9,300 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F~---
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 9,300 
1981 expenditure : nil 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(C) Severance grant 
promem. 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,500 
Budget for 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1 ,500 
1981 expenditure : F 1 ,612 
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Amendment 1 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen 
30th November 1982 
I. Under Head 1 - Expenditure for Staff- reduce the total by F 26,000, the sum proposed to 
maintain the salary of the Clerk at its present level of Grade A 7, step 6, plus 1%. 
I. See lOth sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Stoffe/en 
Document 933 5th November 1982 
OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982 1 
submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur 
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I. Table of establishment of Western European Union 
11. Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the 
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(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs ofWEU (1978-82) 
(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1978-82) 
IV. Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1981 by 
countries 
V. Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1982 
The Assembly, 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated except to note that the 
financial provisions for 1982 assume an inflation factor of 8% for the United Kingdom and 13% for 
France and allow for no growth in real terms. However the Assembly still awaits the results of the 
study made by the Council in 1981 on the efficiency of the ministerial organs. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Adriaensens (Alter-
nate: Miche[) (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Alternate: Lagorce), 
Lord Hughes (Alternate: Lord McNair) (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Ahrens, Althammer, Biefnot, Delehedde, Durant 
(Alternate: Atkinson), Eastham (Alternate: Grieve), Jeam-
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brun, Krieps (Alternate: Margue), Martino, Mertens (Alter-
nate: van der Weif]), Orione, Petrilli, Schleiter, Schulte, 
Sprung, Stainton (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Tripodi, 
Tummers (Alternate: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Stainton, Rapporteur) 
1. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the 
Assembly stipulates that " The Assembly shall 
express its views in the form of an opinion or 
recommendation on the annual budget of West-
em European Union as soon as it has been 
communicated". 
2. For many years the Assembly has not 
commented on the budget of the ministerial 
organs but your Rapporteur feels that the pre-
sent report should give consideration to some of 
the financial implications arising from political 
decisions which might affect this budget. 
3. If the budget of the ministerial organs is 
reviewed for the last years, the figures are as 
follows: 
1972 1982 
Secretariat-General £ 245,055 £ 1,113,957 
Standing Arma-
ments Committee F 1,999,290 F 7,696,630 
Agency for the 
Control of Arma-
ments F 4,344,608 F 16,461,940 
A* 
£ 
4. The magnitude of apparent increase is 
entirely illusory however when measured 
against retail price indices in, for example, both 
France and the United Kingdom 1• This 
decade of inflation embraces the two oil price 
crises and underlines the economic and finan-
cial difficulties with which all member coun-
tries have had to wrestle. During this period 
the numerical staffing of the ministerial organs 
has remained constant and no major item of 
capital expenditure has been incurred. 
5. The breakdown of the 1982 budget is 
shown in the table below. 
6. For an assessment of the total cost of 
WEU, the expenditure of the Assembly which, 
in 1982, amounted to F 12,282,000, should 
also be taken into account, giving an overall 
projected expenditure of approximately 
F 49,000,000. 
I. Ref. INSEE: France 287.57 %; United Kingdom 
378.31 %. 
B* c• TOTAL B+C 
Francs Francs Francs 
Salaries and allowances •••• 0 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1,362,452 9,879,000 19,894,300 29,773,300 
Pensions ............................. 104,880 
Travel ............................... 25,860 
Other operating costs •••• 0. 0 0 0. 0 ••• 0 0. 168,905 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 0 •• 0. 0 •••• 0. 0 36,600 
Buildings • 0 •• 0 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 •••••• 0 ••• 0 •••• -
Total expenditure ••• 0. 0 •••• 0 •• 0 •••••• 1,698,697 
WEU tax 0. 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 ••••• 0 ••• 0 0 ••• 505,865 
Other receipts ........................ 46,000 
Pension receipts ...................... 32,875 
Total income •• 0 •••••••• 0 ••••• 0 •••••• 584,740 
NET TOTAL .......................... 1,113,957 
* A - Secretariat General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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1,199,500 2,803,100 4,002,600 
166,300 484,700 651,000 
593,950 855,450 1,449,400 
19,950 43,900 63,850 
44,380 79,890 124,270 
11,903,080 24,161,340 36,064,420 
3,499,950 6,820,900 10,320,850 
440,000 209,000 649,000 
266,500 669,500 936,000 
4,206,450 7,699,400 11,905,850 
7,696,630 16,461,940 24,158,570 
7. The final accounts and the reports of the 
President of the Assembly and the Auditor 1 are 
submitted to the Assembly for approval, and 
thereafter to the Council. As far as the budget 
of the ministerial organs is concerned, it does 
not have access to the final accounts and the 
Auditors' 2 report which is submitted each year 
to the Council at the close of the financial 
year. But it should be recalled that the Assem-
bly is only called upon " to express an opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs ". 
8. The total establishment of the ministerial 
organs is as follows: 
Secretariat-General 48 
Standing Armaments Committee 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 52 
Total 128 J 
9. In 1981, the Council undertook a study 
of the ministerial organs of WEU with the aim 
of achieving greater efficiency. The outcome 
of this report has not been communicated to 
the Assembly and reference was made to this 
fact in the draft opinion on the budget of the 
ministerial organs for the financial year 1981. 
10. In Chapter VI of the twenty-seventh 
annual report of the Council it is stated that : 
" As pointed out by the Council in their 
reply to Recommendation 365, the bud-
get situation in the member countries at 
the present time calls for rigorous econo-
mies. 
The budgets of the WEU ministerial 
bodies for 1981, which were still under 
scrutiny when the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council was transmitted to 
the Assembly, were approved by the 
Council in April; they came within the 
limits of the rates of inflation forecast for 
France and the United Kingdom. Reca-
pitulatory tables for these budgets, as 
adopted and then revised, are annexed to 
this document. 
Also in April 1981, the Council charged 
an ad hoc working group with a study 
aimed at identifying all acceptable 
measures that might be taken to achieve 
economies, together with greater effi-
ciency in the organisation's methods of 
work and use of the staff of the WEU 
1. Parliamentary auditor, currently the United Kingdom 
Comptroller and Auditor General, appointed by the 
Assembly. 
2. Three auditors on a three-year rotating system appoin-
ted by the Council. 
3. See Appendix I. 
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ministerial bodies, without impairing the 
organisation's ability to meet its obliga-
tions under the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the Protocols and the Council's Decision 
of 7th May 1955. 
During this study, it was noted that as a 
result of excellent co-operation, certain 
expenditure effected for the benefit of the 
Assembly was borne by the budgets of 
the two WEU ministerial bodies. 
The recommendations of the ad hoc 
group were taken into account by the 
Council in the detailed discussions which 
they devoted to the preparation of the 
budgets of the WEU ministerial bodies 
for 1982." 
11. It should be noted that the budget for 
1982 does not reflect any modifications to the 
structure of the ministerial organs. 
12. It could be said that the total cost of the 
ministerial organs, which in 1982 represents 
F 37,303,262 (or about 76% of the total cost of 
WEU), and the number of staff employed (128) 
are small compared to other European and 
international organisations. Nevertheless, it is 
only on the basis of functions delegated under 
the terms of the Brussels Treaty that the budget 
and the number of staff can be examined in a 
logical and valid manner. 
13. Both the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and the General Affairs 
Committee, in their replies to the twenty-
seventh annual report of the Council, dealt with 
the subject in detail (Documents 908 and 
913). Whilst it can be argued that it must be 
left to governments to decide whether they 
consider that after more than 25 years of exis-
tence the structure of the organs of WEU is 
satisfactory, such a view must severely curtail 
the effective comment of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
14. Attached for the guidance of members of 
the Assembly is an additional· memorandum on 
certain aspects of WEU staff career prospects. 
Additional memorandum on WEU staff 
Careers and conditions of employment for staff in the 
co-ordinated organisations 
1. For a number of years now the Assembly 
has been drawing the attention of the Council 
to the lack of career prospects for staff in the 
co-ordinated organisations ;:tnd particularly 
within WEU. The situation was last high-
lighted in paragraph 3 of the Assembly's 
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Recommendation 340 adopted on 4th Decem-
ber 1979: 
2. 
" 3. The establishment of a committee 
of senior experts to plan and promote a 
personnel policy and in particular: 
- to review the structure of grades; 
- to study the possibility of introducing a 
dual grading system at every level of 
the hierarchy; 
- to study the type and length of 
contracts; 
- to co-ordinate staff rules; 
- to review the indemnity for loss of job; 
- to study methods of transferring an 
official from one co-ordinated organis-
ation to another; 
- to make clear the financial consequen-
ces of their proposals ; ". 
To which the Council replied as follows: 
" 3. The Council have considered the 
possibility of setting up a committee of 
senior experts, but have come to the 
conclusion that the problems which such 
a group of experts would be qualified to 
consider should be discussed beforehand 
between the co-ordinated organisations 
themselves and, in the framework of 
the Co-ordinating Committee, with 
experts from the member governments. 
Certain co-ordinating agencies are 
looking at the problem and any conclu-
sions which may emerge from this 
consultation should be awaited. 
In these circumstances, the Council 
recognise that the specific problems listed 
by the Assembly in point 1.3. of its 
recommendation should receive the 
attention of the organisation and, in 
particular, of its Secretary-General: 
(a) With regard to the grading system 
and the introduction of a dual grading 
system the problems are still under 
consideration at the administrative level. 
(b) The staff rules of each of the 
organisations contain many provisions, in 
particular regarding types and duration of 
contracts, which all have to take into 
account the specific circumstances of 
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each organisation; nevertheless, those res-
ponsible within the organisation make 
every effort to harmonise these provisions 
wherever possible. 
(c) The Council consider that the 
indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily 
dealt with by the staff rules, particularly 
for staff members with long service in the 
organisation. 
(d) The methods of transferring an offi-
cial from one co-ordinated organisation 
to another are governed by both the staff 
rules and the pension scheme rules of 
each of the organisations concerned; as 
far as the Council are aware, this prob-
lem has given rise to little difficulty; only 
experience will show whether it will 
be possible in the future to consider 
simplifying these rules. " 
3. There have been no developments since. 
The situation is aggravated by the fact that 
because of serious economic problems in mem-
ber countries, governments wish to keep the 
budgets of the co-ordinated organisations at nil 
growth. 
4. It would be to the advantage of Councils 
of the co-ordinated organisations if indeed they 
were to agree on the establishment of a com-
mittee of experts since such a body would be 
obliged to look not only at the grading structure 
of staff but also at the whole problem of 
modernisation within the organisations in the 
context of technological advances. 
5. Sight should not be lost of the fact that 
the permanent staff of the five co-ordinated 
organisations plus two organisations with obser-
ver status represent a total establishment of 
some 11 ,000 officials 1• It is only proper that 
member governments give urgent consideration 
to the careers of these officials in an overall as 
opposed to a merely budgetary sense. 
6. It might be found possible to extend co-
ordination between the organisations. The 
administrative unit which was set up to deal 
with pensions pending the ultimate creation of 
a truly independent body was a step in the right 
direction. It could well be that this example 
points to other areas of co-operation within the 
co-ordinated organisations (e.g. computerised 
facilities) were member governments to take the 
appropriate initiative. 
I. See Appendix IV. 
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Table of establishment 
WESTERN EuROPEAN UNION 
AI B' C' Total A,B,C 
Secretary-General ...... 1 - - 1 
Deputy Secretary-General 1 - - 1 
Director of the Agency .. - - 1 1 
Assistant Secretary-
General •••• 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 1 1 - 2 
A7 0 0 ••• 0 •••••• 0 ••• 0 0 0 - - 1 1 
A6 0. 0 0 0 •• 0 •••••• 0 •••• 1 - 3 4 
A5 ••• 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 0 •••••• 2 1 6 9 
A4 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 •• 0 ••• 0 ••• 0 0 - 4 8 12 
A3 • 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0 ••••••• 3 - 1 4 
A2 0 0 0 •• 0. 0 0 ••••• 0 0 0 0. 0 2 - 2 4 
L5 • 0. 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 0. 1 - - 1 
L4 0 0 0 0. 0 ••••••• 0. 0. 0 0 1 1 - 2 
L3 •• 0 •• 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 0. 0. 1 3 2 6 
L2 0 •• 0 0. 0 •• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 •••• 1 - - 1 
B6 •••••••• 0 0. 0 0 •••••• - - - -
B5 •••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 ••••••••• - - - -
B4 0 0 ••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 0 0 0 •••• 8 4 9 21 
B3 • 0 0 ••• 0 •• 0. 0. 0 0 •••• 0 7 7 6 20 
B2 • 0 0 0 ••••• 0 •••••••• 0. 5 - 3 8 
B1 •••• 0 0 •••••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 2 - - 2 
C6 • 0 •• 0. 0 ••••• 0 •••• 0. - - - -
C5 • 0 0. 0. 0 ••• 0. 0 0 •• 0 0. - - 1 1 
C4 • 0 0 ••••••••• 0 0. 0 0 0 •• 1 4 - 5 
C3 •• 0 0. 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •••• 0 ••• 8 3 9 20 
C2 ••• 0 ••••• 0 ••••••••• 0 2 - - 2 
48 28 52 128 
I. A - Secretariat General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations 
I. Work done 
1. The activities of the joint pensions admi-
nistrative section during the financial year 
1982, and in 1983, may be summarised as fol-
lows: 
A. Pensions study unit 
- The pensions study unit provided the 
secretariat for PACCO and prepared 
the agenda and minutes of seven meet-
ings, and also of two joint sessions with 
t~e CPAPOC Working Party on Pen-
stons. 
- On the basis of studies and research, it 
produced some thirty working papers 
with the object of clarifying the inter-
pretation of a number of provisions in 
the pension scheme rules. In these 
reports, it analysed the situation, set 
forth the various options and made 
proposals which were considered by 
the competent committees and authori-
ties. 
- It helped in amending or supplement-
ing several implementing instructions 
and produced some dozen documents 
clarifying the meaning of certain 
clauses in the rules, where, however, 
no change of wording was required. 
- It took part in the preparation of a 
specific programme for the deductions 
and reductions involved in computing 
pay and recorded on the monthly pay-
slips. 
- The unit's documentation service 
began publication of a series of explan-
atory leaflets on some of the more 
complex provisions of the rules, for the 
use not only of retired staff but 
also of serving staff wishing to learn 
about their future entitlements and 
obligations. 
- The pensions study unit is pursuing 
negotiations with national pension 
schemes or other international organi-
sations with the object of reaching 
reciprocal agreements on the transfer of 
pension rights in application of Article 
12 of the rules. These efforts have 
already been successful in two member 
countries. 
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- Lastly, the pensions study unit has 
taken an active part in the design of a 
new and improved software system 
which it is intended should be shared 
by the two computation units. This 
has involved thoroughly " dissecting " 
the pension scheme rules and com-
pletely revamping the printouts. 
2. Over and above its usual administrative 
and management duties, the pensions study unit 
will endeavour during the coming financial year 
to improve and develop its services to the co-
ordinated organisations, continue its analyses 
and studies on general or specific questions 
concerning the pension scheme rules, further 
extend negotiations with outside bodies con-
cerning the transferability of pension rights 
and lastly, standardise and co-ordinate certain 
administrative procedures for which the five 
organisations continue to be responsible. 
B. Pensions computation unit I 
3. During the 1982 financial year the unit 
has: 
- prepared further computerised files 
concerning pensioned staff; 
- verified basic data supplied by the co-
ordinated organisations; 
- made monthly payments to some 750 
pensioners fully operational; 
- produced " assessments of pension 
entitlement " and pension certificates 
for pensioners; 
- designed and put into operation the 
specific programme for deductions 
(loans, advances, adjustments, contri-
butions to the APSCOD), social secu-
rity contributions and reductions for 
benefits from other sources (invalidity 
pensions, family allowances, etc.); 
- computerised the handling of arrears 
and changes in scales so that they are 
incorporated in pension payments as 
soon as they occur, and with no time-
tag by comparison with payments to 
serving staff; 
- extended the computerisation of calcu-
lations relating to tax adjustments; 
- provided all the data required for pre-
paring annual tax returns as well as for 
APPENDIX 11 
statements required by national tax 
authorities; 
- prepared new printouts for the issue of 
statistics. 
4. The unit's primary task, on which work 
began in 1982 and is scheduled to continue 
through to the end of 1983, is to devise and put 
into operation a new system - one which is 
both more flexible and more sophisticated -
taking into account all the recommendations 
made by PACCO since the section was set up. 
This new computerised system means rede-
signing all the unit's operations and procedures. 
C. Pensions computation unit// (NATO) 
5. The work of pensions computation unit 
11 has been concerned with setting up and ope-
rating the ·~ Pensions " component of the 
PMIS (personnel management information sys-
tem). Data from 26 NATO organisations, cen-
tralised by 16 of them, have been collected and 
processed and the subsequent figures concern-
ing some 500 pensions, worked out on the 
basis of scales expressed in 12 different curren-
cies, have been transmitted to the organisations 
concerned. A comprehensive data file has 
been compiled, and this has meant that the 
retroactive increase in respect of the scales 
applying on 1st July 1981 could be computed 
for these same organisations. 
6. New programmes have been prepared 
with the object of meeting, as far as available 
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resources will allow, the requests from users of 
pensions computation unit 11, namely: 
(i) the production and use of a magnetic 
tape intended as backing store for 
payment by the Banque Bruxelles-
Lambert of pensions from organisa-
tions in Brussels computed in Bel-
gian francs and payable in Belgium; 
(ii) the production of a printout of bank 
transfers for the services of the finan-
cial controller of the international 
secretariat; 
(iii) changes in the computing pro-
gramme so as to incorporate deduc-
tions in respect of contributions to 
the association of pensioned staff; 
(iv) the opening on behalf of the unit of a 
special bank account for payment of 
the tax adjustment; 
(v) the preparation of a supplementary 
file of pensioners' addresses so as 
to permit automatic printing of 
addresses on self-adhesive labels. 
7. During the 1983 financial year, unit 11 is 
planning to draw up payslips, finalise the tax 
adjustment programme and create an indivi-
dual data file of pensions and the different 
printouts required by the organisations using 
unit 11 so as to help them in keeping a check of 
and paying pensioners for whom they are res-
ponsible. 
N 
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1978 
Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget 
total for ratio 
pensions (%) 
£ £ 
Secretariat-
General ........ 666,705 27,425 4.11 
F F 
Standing 
Armaments 
Committee ..... 4,747,625 365,000 7.68 
Agency for 
the Control of 
APPENDIX Ill 
Pensions 
(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEl' (1978-1982) 
1979 1980 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ 
Budget priations budget Budget priations budget Budget 
total for ratio total for ratio total 
pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ £ £ 
786,660 66,420 8.44 895,600 81,500 9.10 1,021,160 
F F F F F 
5,299,865 421,200 7.94 5,975,945 602,000 10.07 7,034,670 
Armaments .... 10,207,655 704,300 6.89 11,928,930 2,007,400 16.82 13,013,155 1,905,000 14.63 14,907,470 
Office of 
the Clerk .••. 0. 7,778,000 62,000 0.79 
1978 
Pensions 
SG ACA SAC OofC Total 
Retirement 4 16 8 1 29 
Survivors' 1 5 1 1 8 
Orphans' 31 
- - 1 4 
Invalidity 1 - - - 1 
Totals .... 9 21 9 3 42 
Total estab-
lishment2 . 45 51 27 26 149 
SG =Secretariat-General. 
ACA =Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
SAC =Standing Armaments Committee. 
0 of C = Office of the Clerk. 
1. Paid in conjuction with a survivor's pension. 
2. Excluding hors cadre officials. 
8,515,000 
SG ACA 
5 17 
1 7 
31 }I 
1 -
10 25 
45 51 
83,000 0.97 9,632,000 91,000 0.94 10,866,000 
(b) /\'umber of pensions paid out by WEL' (1978-1982) 
1979 1980 
SAC OofC Total SG ACA SAC pore Total SG ACA 
8 1 31 7 19 8 1 35 7 17 
2 1 11 1 8 3 1 13 1 10 
- 1 5 }I 21 - 1 4 - 1' 
- - 1 1 - - - 1 1 -
10 3 48 10 29 11 3 53 9 28 
27 26 149 45 51 27 26 149 45 51 
1981 1982 
Appro- Pension/ Appro- Pension/ 
priations budget Budget pnations budget 
for ratio total for ratto 
pensions (%) pensions (%) 
£ £ £ 
104,160 10.20 1,113,957 104,880 9.41 
F F 
861,800 12.25 7,696,630 I, 199,500 15.58 
2,217,100 14.87 16,461,940 2,803,100 17.02 
106,000 0.97 12,282,000 126,000 1.03 
1981 1982 
SAC 0 ofC Total SG ACA SAC 0 ofC Total 
9 1 34 7 18 13 2 40 
3 1 15 1 9 3 1 14 
- 1 2 - 11 - 1 2 
- - 1 1 - - - 1 
12 3 52 9 28 16 4 57 
27 26 149 45 51 27 26 149 
-
-
N 
w 
APPENDIX IV 
Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1981 by countries 
Co-ordinated Organisations 
Countries OECO Council NATO+SHAPE 
of Europe 
A-l B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Germany .... 2 - 2 210 415 625 
Belgium .... 1 1 2 708 1258 1966 
Canada .... - - -
Denmark ... 6 19 25 
Spain ...... 
United States 2 - 2 41 8 49 
France ..... 658 1088 1746 290 551 841 103 189 292 
Italy ....... 153 393 546 
Japan ..• 0. 2 - 2 
Luxembourg . 168 673 841 
Norway .... 19 57 76 
Netherlands . 276 382 658 
Portugal .... 3 4 7 
United Kingdom 9 7 16 
Turkey ..... 42 71 113 
Greece ..... 7 1 8 
Grand total .. 664 1088 1752 291 552 843 1745 3477 5222 
I. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
Observers 
ESA WEU ECMWF1 
A-l B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC A-l 
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
144 95 239 350 
1 - 1 
5 1 6 
5 1 6 
161 152 313 43 61 104 
27 35 62 
510 268 778 508 
12 33 45 82 63 145 
853 552 1405 55 94 149 82 63 145 858 
..... 
< 
EP02 Total 
B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC 
20 21 22 23 24 
318 668 706 828 1534 
710 1259 1969 
- - -
6 19 25 
5 1 6 
48 9 57 
1255 2041 3296 
180 428 608 
2 - 2 
168 673 841 
19 57 76 
356 864 1294 1006 2300 
3 4 7 
103 103 206 
42 71 113 
7 1 8 
674 1532 4548 6500 11048 
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APPENDIX V 
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Co-ordinated organisations 
Member countries Council OECD of Europe NATO 
EUROPE 
Germany ........ X X X 
Austria .......... X X 
Belgium ......... X X X 
Cyprus .......... X 
Denmark ........ X X X 
Spain ............ X X 
Finland .......... X 
France ........... X X X 
Greece ........... X X X 
Ireland .......... X X 
Iceland .......... X X X 
Italy ............. X X X 
Liechtenstein ..... X 
Luxembourg ..... X X X 
Malta ............ X 
Monaco ......... 
Norway .......... X X X 
Netherlands ...... X X X 
Portugal ......... X X X 
United Kingdom .. X X X 
Sweden .......... X X 
Switzerland ...... X X 
Turkey .......... X X X 
Yugoslavia ....... 
AMERICA 
Canada .......... X X 
United States ..... X X 
ASIA 
Japan ............ X 
AUSTRALASIA 
Australia ......... X 
New Zealand ..... X 
TOTAL ........... 24 21 15 
I. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
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ESA 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
II 
WEU 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
7 
APPENDIX V 
Observers 
ECMWFI EP02 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
17 16 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and through-
out the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, defence and 
disarmament policy pursued by the western countries ; 
Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of 
strategic nuclear weapons ; 
Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is encoun-
tering very negative reactions from many citizens of WEU member countries ; 
Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations - including the part of the Geneva 
negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons - and the resumption or revival of other negotiations 
designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere ; 
Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters might cause these negotiations to 
fail and jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security; 
Considering that pacifist movements in East and West are anyhow entitled to call for new ini-
tiatives from the members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial 
progress in the negotiations on disarmament ; 
Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential 
for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets ; 
Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its 
defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and 
strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements ; 
Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires 
close co-ordination of national policies in these fields ; 
Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Follow attentively and encourage participating states to ensure the success of the various 
ongoing negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the 
rest of the world ; 
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the Uni-
ted States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the establish-
ment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such weapons 
on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained ; 
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of 
the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public; 
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and 
strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities ; 
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards disar-
mament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In December 1981, Mr. Lemoine, Secre-
tary of State to the French Minister of Defence, 
stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly 
examining the problems raised by the develop-
ment of pacifist movements and their activities 
and the progress which neutralism seemed to be 
making among European public opinion, parti-
cularly in autumn 1981. This appeal was 
heeded since two Assembly committees took up 
the matter and the Presidential Committee 
decided to include in the agenda for the June 
1982 session a report on this subject by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, postponing until December a report by 
the General Affairs Committee on these ques-
tions. 
2. The report submitted by Mr. Mommer-
steeg on the problem of nuclear weapons in 
Europe at the Assembly's June 1982 session 
(Document 918) made a very full and well-
informed analysis of the spread of movements 
aimed at mobilising public opinion against 
nuclear weapons, and in particular against the 
deployment of American nuclear weapons in 
Europe, in accordance with the dual decision 
taken by the North Atlantic Council in Decem-
ber 1979. This major and interesting work 
will spare your Rapporteur much research and 
allow him to go straight to the political aspects 
of the question, taking due account of any 
information obtained about the evolution of 
pacifist movements in Europe and elsewhere 
since June 1982. 
3. The present report follows up a working 
paper examined by the General Affairs Com-
mittee on 8th July 1982. Your Rapporteur 
wishes to thank all committee members who 
took part in that preliminary discussion which 
was particularly fruitful and interesting. It 
allowed your Rapporteur to pursue his study in 
greater detail and he has willingly incorporated 
many of the remarks made about his initial 
draft. There were others however which he 
could not endorse, but he has endeavoured to 
mention them in this report as objectively as 
possible although expressing his own reserva-
tions. 
II. Neutralism 
4. The first question is what is meant by 
neutralism and pacifism. To the best of your 
Rapporteur's knowledge, the notion of neutra-
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lism emerged in France immediately after the 
first signs of the cold war and is fairly close to 
the notion of non-alignment which subsequently 
spread to other parts of the world, including 
Yugoslavia and many countries which became 
independent following decolonisation, India 
being one of the main champions. 
5. Neutralism then stemmed from the idea 
that the two military blocs which were being 
formed were based on military, political, econo-
mic and ideological domination by the two 
great powers which emerged from the second 
world war, i.e. the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Neutralists considered it necessary for 
their countries to remain outside the systems of 
alliance so as to avoid such domination and in 
particular to be free to determine the course of 
their economic and social development. For 
France, it was a question of choosing a middle 
path between the excessive dirigism of the 
Soviet Union and liberalism, which some also 
considered excessive, of the American type in 
order to be able to carry out ~he economic and 
social programme of the resistance movement. 
The distance between this concern, that of Tito 
at the time of his break with Moscow and that 
of many leaders in the new states, was 
not very great, although these various countries' 
economic and social programmes were far from 
identical. In the political field proper, for 
France it was a question of being able to 
maintain or re-establish a government coalition 
in which the communists, who then had more 
than 25 % of the votes, could have retained a 
place. Finally, in foreign policy, neutralism 
was the refusal if not of the Atlantic Alliance at 
least of any integrated military system, and it 
played a definite role, although the extent was 
difficult to measure, in the adoption of the pre-
vious question which prevented the French 
National Assembly from ratifying the draft 
treaty on the European Defence Community in 
August 1954. It is not impossible that the 
interstate nature of the protocols modifying the 
Brussels Treaty helped to win over those who 
were drawn towards certain aspects of neutra-
lism. 
6. This clearly shows the fundamental differ-
ence between neutralism and a policy of neu-
trality as pursued, each in its own fashion, by 
Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland. 
Neutralism was the rejection of the policy of 
military blocs which might alienate the domes-
tic and foreign policies of states. It did not 
reject the choice of permanent neutrality, or 
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even alliances of free and sovereign states for 
their joint security. 
7. The concept of neutralism has naturally 
evolved considerably since 1954, particularly 
because the Atlantic Alliance has proved to be 
flexible and has respected the right of its mem-
bers to guide their policy as they think fit. 
The way France's withdrawal from the NATO 
integrated military structure, the economic and 
social choices of the government which came to 
power in 1981 and the participation of commu-
nists in that government were accepted by the 
other members of the Atlantic Alliance, even if 
they did not approve, diverted a large fraction 
of French public opinion away from neutra-
lism. Furthermore, the evolution of the Soviet 
Union and its hold on the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, particularly after the events in 
Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
showed that in the eastern bloc self-deter-
mination existed neither for the Soviet people 
nor for its allies and that a western defence 
policy offered the only possible framework for 
protecting the right of the European nations to 
decide on their political and social regime. 
8. Thus, the neutralism of the fifties now no 
longer has at all the same meaning and one 
may wonder whether neutralism still exists in 
Europe other than in the form of anxiety that 
the European countries may, because of the 
existence of two military blocs, become invol-
ved in a war in which there would be a high 
risk of nuclear weapons being used. This form 
of neutralism, which is not very different from a 
refusal to accept any true defence policy, is 
closer to pacifism than to post-war ideological 
neutralism. 
9. Seen in this light, a certain number of 
aspects of neutralism today deserve attention : 
lO.(l) Under the guise of refusing military blocs 
it rejects the Atlantic Alliance, or in any event 
a number of its consequences for Western Europe, 
without accepting the fact, however evident 
it may seem, that the alliance has had beneficial 
effects for Europe. On the one hand, although 
it has not totally eradicated the innumerable 
causes of conflict which for centuries have split 
Western Europe, it has at least reduced them to 
a point of far less gravity. The fact that no 
one any longer considers there is a heriditary or 
even potential enemy among his neighbours 
and that no one any longer thinks of resorting 
to force as a means of settling any problems 
which may arise in relations between states is a 
huge step forward in the history of European 
mankind. A community organisation of West-
ern Europe, in the economic field at least, ~as 
possible only because there was a defensive 
alliance. Moreover, this alliance has allowed a 
relative balance of forces and mutual deterrence 
to be maintained, enabling our continent to 
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avoid armed conflict for thirty-eight years, 
which is unprecedented in its history. There 
is absolutely no guarantee that the dissolution 
of this alliance would not lead to an imbalance 
of forces which would be liable to revive 
dreams of domination and allow dangerous 
speculation about the ability or desire of one or 
other country to resist. The balance of terror 
is certainly not the most desirable form of rela-
tions between states and the dissolution of the 
blocs may be considered as the aim of a collec-
tive security policy. Neutralism makes it a 
means of strengthening peace, which is in any 
case not evident. 
11.(il) It should be noted that the very people 
who are trying within the Warsaw Pact to 
obtain greater freedom or to move away from 
Soviet domination clearly reject any form of 
neutralism and proclaim their loyalty to alli-
ance with the Soviet Union. Such words 
were not enough of course to reassure the 
Soviet Union or to avert the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia and pressure on Poland, probably 
because they were not thought to be sincere. 
However, the liberalisation of the Eastern 
European regimes can be considered only in the 
context of the overall evolution of the eastern 
bloc and not by certain countries breaking away 
and moving towards neutralism. It cannot 
therefore be hoped that the neutralism emerging 
in Western Europe will spread to the East 
through contagion. It is hardly likely and 
probably not very desirable for the peoples of 
the area and for peace in Europe, as proved by 
the Polish affair. 
12.(iil) The consequence of dismantling the 
western defence system in Europe would be to 
leave each Western European country in a posi-
tion of weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
which, without even having to resort to force, 
would be able to impose on them certain con-
straints in their political, economic or social 
lives, their external relations and individual 
freedom. Rightly or wrongly, this process has 
often been called Finlandisation. Finland's 
situation may admittedly not seem intolerable 
to outside observers nor, which is more impor-
tant to the Finns. Nevertheless, Finland's fate larg~ly depends on balances stretching well 
beyond its frontiers, and there is nothing to 
show that, between the Soviet Union and a 
neutralised Europe, Finland would be able to 
protect the freedom it has preserved in more 
favourable circumstances. The picture con-
jured up by the word Finlandisation is extre-
mely vague and is only a very imperfect reflec-
tion of what a neutralised Western Europe's 
fate might be in a Soviet-dominated continent. 
13.(iv) In such conditions, the logic of true n~u­
tralism for Western Europe would be to acquire 
by and for itself sufficient means of deterrence 
to be able to ensure its own security without 
having to take account of interference from out-
side. It is a long way from this and its econo-
mic difficulties since 1973 leave little likelihood 
of it being able to achieve this in the foresee-
able future. Short of that, neutralism for Europe 
would be a weakness, not a force. It would 
not be a guarantee but a threat to its freedom. 
It would not be a factor of peace but a danger 
of war in Europe. 
14.(v} These remarks obviously do not apply to 
Germany as a whole to the same extent as the 
rest of Europe, and it is quite understandable 
that the prospect of reunification for the Ger-
man nation would make it easier to accept the 
idea of Finlandisation as a price of reunifica-
tion, particularly for the citizens of the GDR 
for whom, after all, Finlandisation would not 
mean less freedom. However, certain German 
members of the committee recalled most use-
fully that pacifist or neutralist demonstrations 
in the GDR in 1981 and 1982 were severely 
put down, whereas pacifist or neutralist 
demonstrations in the Federal Republic were 
given wide coverage in the press and other 
media of Eastern European countries. 
15.(vi) All these considerations show clearly 
that although the Soviet Union is not always 
behind neutralism in Western Europe it is 
trying to derive the maximum benefit from it, 
while doing its utmost to stifle neutralism in 
Eastern Europe. Conversely, Western European 
neutralist movements, whether or not inspired, 
assisted or encouraged by the Soviet Union, 
serve Soviet strength, which does not hesitate to 
back their action. Just as the development of a 
form of neutralism in Europe in the years 
preceding the second world war cannot be attri-
buted solely to the influence of Hitlerism, its 
development in present-day Europe cannot be 
attributed solely to Soviet influence. However, 
it has to be recorded that just as the absence of 
cohesion or of the desire of many European 
countries to defend themselves strongly con-
tributed to the general collapse in face of Hit-
lerian aggression, today the development of 
neutralism which refuses to build up the mili-
tary means required for the policy it advocates 
might sorely tempt the Soviet Union and pro-
vide it with opportunities to use its strength to 
impose its will on Europe. 
III. Pacifism 
16. The notion of pacifism has far more 
ancient and varied roots. There were protests 
in the nineteenth century against the use of 
force by states as a means of action for 
promoting their interests. From the very 
outset, the international workers' movement 
denounced such methods and made peace one 
of its major aims. It was joined by other move-
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ments, sometimes Christian, sometimes non-
religious, which multiplied before and particu-
larly after the second world war. 
1 7. The originality of pacifism is not to 
advocate the peaceful settlement of conflicts but 
to place peace before all else and underline that 
no cause is worth the sacrifice of human lives 
implicit in modern warfare. · The first world 
war, whose causes were far removed from the 
vital interests of the European nations but 
which was responsible for the death of more 
than ten million people and nearly five years' 
suffering for almost all the inhabitants of Europe, 
obviously gave considerable impetus to this 
tendency, particularly among the left-wing par-
ties and socialists. It emerged as a fight against 
the militarist tendencies then coming to the fore 
in many European societies, the rejection of 
military budgets, calls to reduce military service 
and unremitting objections to the armaments 
policy pursued before and after the war. 
18. It is evident that the rise of fascism and 
its conquest of Europe were a serious blow to 
pacifism which bore its share of responsibility 
for the weakness shown by the European demo-
cracies towards Hitler. Unlike the first world 
war, the second left little room for pacifism and 
left-wing parties everywhere were in the van-
guard in the anti-fascist struggle throughout 
Europe. 
19. Thus, whereas neutralism is a purely 
political concept based on a certain analysis of 
the world situation, pacifism is based on purely 
moral concerns, passing over political consi-
derations to oppose anything relating to war, 
armaments or armed forces. Conscientious 
objection is one of its traditional forms. 
However, the situation in Europe in the fascist 
era showed the limits of protest which, separat-
ing peace from every other value, risked help-
ing the cause of those who were trying to over-
ride Europe and make war the instrument of 
their domination. This was an experience 
which cannot be forgotten by the generations 
then alive and the facts must be constantly 
recalled for subsequent generations. 
20. For a long time pacifism was merely a 
protest, a refusal of everythjng in modern 
society that might lead to war or hostilities. 
However, at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, pacifists felt they were strong enough to 
consider action which was not just intended to 
impress public opinion by symbolic gestures, 
like German socialists who, after 4th September 
1870, risked imprisonment by organising 
demonstrations against continuing the war 
against France following the fall of Napoleon 
III. Thus, within the international workers' 
movement, a concept of general strike emerged 
with the specific purpose of preventing govern-
ments from resorting to force. But the cir-
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cumstances in which the first world war broke 
out prevented international socialism from unit-
ing to put a halt to the governments' policy of 
conquest and it subsequently paid dearly for the 
helplessness it then showed. 
21. Although the division of the workers' 
movement on the one hand and the rise of fas-
cism on the other considerably weakened the 
possibilities of action of those with pacifist 
leanings between the two wars, new means of 
expression and new strategies have been worked 
out in recent years. Immediately after the 
second world war, the peace movement, very 
clearly dominated by communist parties, endeav-
oured to rally public opinion in Western 
European countries against American policy 
which insisted on the rearmament of the Fede-
ral Republic as a condition for maintaining 
American forces in Europe. The Korean war, 
the Atlantic Pact, the European Defence Com-
munity and later the Vietnam war were step-
ping stones for agitation directed mainly against 
the organisation of western defence although 
the true aim, for those organising it at least, was 
to support Soviet policy. Events in the GDR, 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia progres-
sively undermined any credence there may have 
been in a movement whose true goal, as it 
became increasingly evident, was not peace. 
22. The same cannot be said about the more 
recent shape of the pacifist movement, although 
one may conclude that in the last resort the 
same cause is espoused. Pacifism today is 
based mainly on the particularly inhumane 
nature of any war involving nuclear weapons. 
Hence it is no longer a movement pursuing 
particular political objectives but the expression 
of a profound reaction which is quite under-
standable when it is borne in mind that there 
would be little chance of any war in Europe not 
crossing the nuclear threshold. Thus, the 
Christian churches, or related associations, 
which hitherto had remained aloof from pacifist 
demonstrations, are now prominent, be it the 
catholic church, particularly in the United 
States and to a lesser degree in France, or pro-
testant churches in the Netherlands, Germany, 
the Scandinavian countries and even, more cau-
tiously, the United Kingdom. The same is 
true of many associations of a non-political 
nature, including ecologists. 
. 23. More than its predecessors, this new paci-
fism has sought to make proposals and to define 
concepts of security which are no longer based 
on the accumulation of armaments, particularly 
nuclear arms. It emphasises the waste of 
wealth represented by military expenditure in a 
world where the true problems are the develop-
ment of the third world and the horrors of 
modem warfare. At the same time it points to 
the meagre results obtained in disarmament 
negotiations in whatever framework they may 
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have been held and urges society to bring pres-
sure to bear on the governments by all available 
means to make them take steps, if necessary 
unilaterally, to set the world on a new 
course. Certain pacifist associations such as 
the movement for a non-violent alternative 
bring together persons who are highly respect-
able because of their political impartiality, 
moral and intellectual values and standing 
among young people to work out a possible 
defence policy in which non-violence would no 
longer be merely an objective but also a means 
of action by states and peoples to ensure their 
security. This research is of great interest 
because it is based on a serious analysis of the 
notion of deterrence. Its aim is not to dispense 
with deterrence but to achieve it by means 
which would be unlikely to arouse reactions of 
fear on the part of the potential enemy. 
However, one may wonder how effective such 
deterrence might be and how much impact it 
may have in practice. 
24. Another aspect of the present form of 
pacifism is its partial or total rejection of 
nuclear weapons. Sometimes it totally rejects 
a defence policy based on the balance of terror, 
i.e. any form of nuclear deterrence, or calls for 
a solemn declaration by governments not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons, which is 
almost the same since renouncing first use of 
such weapons would be tantamount to 
renouncing their use to retaliate against a 
conventional attack, thus annulling any deter-
rent effect. At other times there is less radical 
opposition to nuclear weapons, the intention 
being to strengthen their deterrent rOle rather 
than limit it. This is the case of opposition to 
enhanced radiation weapons and, generally 
speaking, to so-called theatre nuclear wea-
pons. Here the basic idea is that only fear of 
massive retaliation has a deterrent effect, 
whereas the possibility of waging a limited 
nuclear war makes it possible for the great 
nuclear powers to envisage winning a war 
without resorting to strategic nuclear wea-
pons. While recognising that only strategic 
nuclear weapons play the essential deterrent 
role, your Rapporteur considers however that 
in present circumstances it would be dangerous 
to give a potential adversary the impression 
that he might have a choice of weapons 
and hence some hope that the West might 
hesitate to use strategic weapons in response to 
a limited attack. 
25. These remarks apply only for pacifism as 
it is known in the West. But it now appears 
that a similar form of pacifism is emerging in 
Eastern Europe, particularly in the GDR and 
the Soviet-Union. This is a welcome sign, not 
because pacifism would weaken these countries 
but because it can provide an area of agreement 
between East and West by encouraging the east-
ern countries, in matters relating to disarma-
ment, to take account of pacifist views and 
hence foster East-West rapprochement on mat-
ters which are essential for peace. It should be 
noted however that pacifist demonstrations are 
still considered seditious in Eastern Europe and 
are therefore fought and repressed, particularly 
in the Soviet Union and the GDR. Thus, at 
its fifth meeting in September 1982 the Central 
Committee of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, the 
youth branch of the SED, decided to conduct a 
vigorous campaign against the effects of the 
pacifist movement on young people in the 
GDR and inter alia against the spread of con-
scientious objection. 
26. It can therefore be seen that the pacifist 
movement is disturbing in both East and West. 
On each side, there is a tendency to attribute 
its influence to manoeuvres by the other side so 
as to evade the highly pertinent questions it 
raises for our societies. But to look just 
beyond suspicion which may stem from its 
opposition to government policies and examine 
the reasons guiding it and the elements of 
society supporting it, one has to note that on 
both sides these reasons are respectable, and 
these social groups are particularly worthy of 
interest since apart from intellectual circles they 
also represent the younger elements of society. 
It would therefore be morally contestable and 
politically imprudent not to take full account of 
its aspirations, to refuse a dialogue with it and 
not to weigh carefully its arguments, even if it 
seems difficult to accept some of its conclu-
sions. 
IV. The revival of agitation since 1980 
27. In recent years, there has been agitation 
in Western Europe which has sometimes hastily 
been qualified as neutralist and pacifist and 
which reached a peak in October 1981. This 
agitation had an echo in the United States and 
in the German Democratic Republic. Having 
been analysed in Mr. Mommersteeg's report 
your Rapporteur will not therefore go back 
over it. He will merely bring out a few fea-
tures in order to draw conclusions. 
28. A first comment concerns the link bet-
ween agitation and nuclear weapons. It is a 
definite fact that the prospect of American 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons being 
deployed in Europe, although not the origin of 
the protest movement, gave the movement, 
which had existed since nuclear weapons came 
into being, particular importance and signifi-
cance. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how 
this weapon of mass destruction, with ill-
controlled side effects, can instil considerable 
horror and fear resulting in the belief that 
anything would be better than nuclear war. 
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The fact that, unlike strategic nuclear weapons 
which are launched from aircraft, submarines 
or silos in the United States or Soviet Union, 
intermediate-range weapons are for deploy-
ment in Europe itself, on permanent sites 
dispersed in many areas, has drawn attention to 
the dangers their presence represents for many 
sections of the population of Europe. Tactical 
nuclear weapons, also deployed in Europe, had 
not provoked such strong reactions because, 
being mobile, they were less in evidence and 
did not form the same kind of target. 
29. Hence it would be a mistake to attribute 
to Soviet propaganda alone a movement whose 
scale was demonstrated in Mr. Mommersteeg's 
report and which affects many circles which 
can hardly be suspected of being influenced by 
Moscow. This obviously does not mean that 
such propaganda has been inactive and it has 
certainly done its utmost to exploit a favourable 
situation in order to weaken the West's deter-
mination to resist and to create a gap between 
the European and American partners of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Certain committee mem-
bers pointed out that the Soviet Union was 
financing some pacifist movements, including 
the World Peace Council. One member recalled 
a remark by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of 
NATO, that $ 15 million are believed to have 
been spent by the Soviet Union on pacifist 
campaigns in Western Europe in 1981. But 
Soviet propaganda would certainly not have 
managed to give the protest movements the 
impetus they gained when directed against the 
NATO dual decision of December 1979 if fer-
tile ground had not been found in Europe and, 
to a certain extent, in the United States where 
the uncompromising policy pursued by Presi-
dent Reagan, especially towards the Soviet 
Union, revived the fear of a nuclear war in 
which the United States might not be spared. 
30. Among today's pacifist movements, there 
is obviously no complete unity of doctrine 
nor even of fundamental motives, insofar as it 
is possible to determine what they are. Several 
trends can be distinguished however: 
31.(i) Opposition to theatre nuclear weapons, 
caused mainly by the NATO dual decision of 
December 1979 and the prospect of the deve-
lopment of enhanced radiation weapons, the 
so-called neutron bomb, which would also be 
theatre weapons. This opposition is largely 
based on a concept of deterrence which corres-
ponded to circumstances twenty or thirty years 
ago but far less to the present situation. In 
fact, true deterrence, exercised by the United 
States, then also by the United Kingdom and 
finally by France, was based on the doctrine of 
massive retaliation, alone capable of diverting a 
potential adversary from aggressive intentions 
by convincing him that any war would bring 
unacceptable destruction to his own territory. 
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This doctrine now seems out of date where 
United States and Soviet strategy in Europe are 
concerned because the existence of short- or 
medium-range weapons which can be used 
against the attacking force makes the immediate 
use of intercontinental-range weapons less cred-
ible: is it imaginable that, when countries are 
able to stop a conventional attack, they will 
risk their own territory being laid waste? But 
it is particularly difficult to make public 
opinion understand the reasoning behind deter-
rence, that a country wishing to avoid war must 
equip itself to fight a war, since what distin-
guishes a deterrent policy from a policy of war 
is not the weapons, which remain the same, but 
the use it is intended to make of them. 
32.(ii) A distinction between the possession of 
nuclear weapons and their use, which has led 
certain pacifists to ask the western governments 
to undertake not to be the first to use such wea-
pons. It is not necessary to underline the 
danger of this idea whose effect, if adopted, 
would be to leave the way open for a potential 
enemy with far more troops and conventional 
weapons to use them without risk of nuclear 
retaliation. This would destroy deterrence and 
make war more probable without even really 
preventing nuclear escalation after the outbreak 
of war. 
33.(iii) The formation of denuclearised zones, 
for long proposed by certain Eastern European 
countries, particularly in the Rapacki plan, is 
again being considered by certain pacifist move-
ments, mainly in Scandinavia. Although such 
proposals might be considered for regions where 
there is no risk of conventional attack by a 
stronger enemy, in Europe they would have the 
same effect as an undertaking not to be the first 
to use nuclear weapons. 
34.(iv)The appeal for western countries to aban-
don completely the possession of nuclear wea-
pons, taken up inter alia by the conference of 
American catholic bishops, is liable to become 
one of the main themes of pacifist movements 
in the next few months. Coming from the 
United States, this call is expected to find a 
wide response in the third world. It is based 
on the full horror of nuclear war but takes no 
account of the fact that conventional war would 
probably be hardly less horrific, at least in 
Europe, nor of the fact that the aim of nuclear 
weapons is not war but deterrence and that 
their disappearance, outside the framework of a 
general agreement on disarmament, would 
make war more likely. 
35.(v) Not far removed from this primarily anti-
nuclear pacifism is the action of ecological 
movements which have spread in the last ten 
years and whose electoral results in certain 
countries are a measure of their strong influ-
ence on public opinion, particularly as clearly 
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many people who do not vote for the ecologists 
are alive to their concerns. Ecologists can 
admittedly be distinguished from pacifists 
because their main concern is the protection of 
the natural surroundings rather than external or 
defence policy. But they are close in their 
more or less radical opposition to any military 
or civil activities which make use of nuclear 
activity. 
36.(vi)The claim for a new balance between 
expenditure on armaments and that for assis-
tance to the third world is based on two consi-
derations, one purely humanitarian which 
underlines the scandal of the extreme poverty 
of a large part of the world population and the 
other, more political, which recalls that poverty 
is a far greater danger to tomorrow's peace than 
any military threat whatever. There is nothing 
to say in answer to these two arguments, which 
are perfectly fair, and if it is considered that the 
requirements of the third world should be given 
priority, there is no excuse for the slender assis-
tance granted by the industrialised countries. 
But this has no direct connection with arma-
ments. If they are useless, there is no excuse 
for accumulating them. But if it is considered 
that there is a real threat from outside, there 
would be no excuse for abandoning them. 
Consequently analysis of the military threat 
must govern armaments policy and analysis of 
the situation of the third world must determine 
assistance policy, there being no grounds for 
linking the two elements. 
3 7 .( vii) In several countries, particularly the 
United Kingdom, pacifist movements are pro-
posing unilateral disarmament measures in the 
hope that such decisions will lead other coun-
tries to follow suit. At its conference in 
September 1982, the Labour Party, while 
confirming its loyalty to NATO, adopted a 
motion calling for such measures in the field of 
nuclear weapons. It must be wondered first 
whether this would effectively be the case and 
then whether such measures would not in the 
long run have the reverse effect of that sought 
because, a priori, they would deprive disarma-
ment negotiations of their content. 
38.(viii) Finally, as your Rapporteur noted 
above, in other countries, including the Nether-
lands, the Federal Republic and the Scandi-
navian countries, pacifist movements have 
adopted a neutralist tone, whereas in others, 
such as France, still-powerful neutralist ten-
dencies have little link with pacifism and in yet 
others, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, pacifism is important but in 
no way associated with neutralism. The com-
mittee pondered on the reasons for these differ-
ences. Some members attributed the lack of 
influence of the peace movement in France to 
its links with communism and underlined the 
difficult position in which events in Poland 
placed this movement. These remarks are 
certainly to the point, but are they adequate 
explanation? What role was played by the fact 
that certain Western European countries have 
nuclear weapons while others have none? 
What part was played by more ancient cultural 
or religious traditions? Whether or not the 
left, closer to the pacifists than the right, is in 
power certainly has some effect. Your Rap-
porteur is convinced that it is impossible to 
reduce to simple and unequivocal elements the 
complex facts which explain the reactions of 
the various peoples of Europe to pacifism 
today. 
39. These protest movements or proposals 
can therefore be assimilated neither to neutra-
lism nor to pacifism in the traditional sense. 
They do not necessarily deny that a Soviet 
threat exists and in general do not refuse the 
means of countering it. The famous slogan 
" Better red than dead " heard in certain 
demonstrations in Germany does not seem to 
take due account of these movements' main 
roots which cannot therefore be confused with 
traditional pacifism. Therefore, while they 
have a neutralist aspect because of their desire 
to take account of political and military facts 
and not allow Western Europe to become over-
dependent on decisions taken in Washington 
and a pacifist aspect because of their absolute 
rejection of certain weapons, they cannot be 
confused with either. 
40. Finally, it must be noted that these are 
worthy reactions, not only because of their 
motives but also because of their scope and the 
determination and moral and intellectual quali-
ties of many of their proponents. Hence, paci-
fism cannot be assimilated to an enemy who 
must be fought, an aberration which must be 
put right at all cost or a blind instrument used 
by an external power. In the United States in 
particular, but in many European countries 
too, it seems to meet deep-rooted national aspi-
rations. It must be taken seriously and a true 
dialogue must be held with the leaders of paci-
fist movements in order to find the means of 
ensuring true European security, due account 
being taken of the nature of the danger from 
without and of the threats which western acti-
vities might also involve for peace. 
V. The imperatives of European security 
41. There are two categories of reasons for 
taking full account of the spread of pacifist and 
neutralist movements in the West. First, the 
intrinsic value of their concerns, proposals and 
claims, second the extent of the movements, 
their ability to mobilise public opinion and the 
influence of those who help them, in short their 
political weight. Democratic regimes cannot 
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turn a blind eye to what a large proportion of 
their citizens want and think. It is therefore 
important to answer their concerns and, 
although the answer cann<J>t always be fully 
positive, it must nevertheless take account of 
the arguments put forward and not merely 
reject requests which a large section of society 
has at heart. One question is how large is this 
section. It is often difficult to assess the num-
ber taking part in big pacifist demonstrations, 
their commitment and their enthusiasm. For 
instance, the fact that in France far fewer peo-
ple take part in such demonstrations than in 
Italy, Germany or the Netherlands may be due 
to political considerations and may not neces-
sarily mean that pacifism has less of a hold on 
French people than on people in neighbouring 
countries. 
42. Still more important is the impact of the 
ideas upheld by pacifist and neutralist move-
ments. It is evident that in the period of crisis 
through which the world is now passing mili-
tary expenditure is a waste of resources which 
could be better used elsewhere, particularly for 
investments in the third world. Similarly, the 
accumulation of nuclear weapons places peace 
on unhealthy foundations and creates dangers, 
whose scale is difficult to assess, of war being 
started by mistake or by accident, or of escala-
tion in the event of hostilities. Moreover, the 
same is true of conventional weapons which, in 
the last decade, have caused millions of victims 
in vast areas of the world and whose improve-
ment, at the same time as the miniaturisation of 
nuclear weapons, makes it increasingly difficult 
to envisage war stopping at the nuclear thres-
hold. 
43. The only way of meeting the challenge of 
pacifism and neutralism is therefore to show a 
genuine will first to limit armaments and forces 
and then to achieve true disarmament. It is 
easy to understand that the meagre results the 
world has achieved in this field have raised 
doubts about the seriousness with which the 
governments have tackled the question of disar-
mament and encouraged considerable scepti-
cism about speeches made on this subject in the 
United Nations and elsewhere. It should be 
added that the American decision not to ratify 
the SALT 11 agreements after the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan rightly or 
wrongly gave the impression that a process of 
limiting armaments by negotiated consent bet-
ween the two great powers had been inter-
rupted. This may help to explain the spread of 
pacifist initiatives in America and in Europe 
since it might be wondered whether, following 
this break in a process already started, there 
was a way of disarming other than by unilateral 
decisions taken in individual countries or 
means of bringing pressure to bear on states 
other than by resorting to demonstrations or 
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strikes, such as a peace movement which is in 
the process of acquiring a European structure 
and strategy seems to be organising throughout 
Europe in 1983. 
44. Your Rapporteur nevertheless remains 
convinced that the only form of disarmament 
which can consolidate peace is one which 
ensures the security of all, i.e. that any unila-
teral initiative would involve serious dangers 
because peace is based on a certain balance of 
forces. Overall security and disarmament can 
be protected by structuring international 
society, by negotiated decisions and by specific 
and controlled measures, whereas unilateral 
decisions would deprive these negotiations of 
meaning and jeopardise their success. 
45. This is particularly true of the western 
countries because in almost every field the 
Atlantic Alliance forces are now in a position 
of inferiority compared with those of the 
Warsaw Pact and any unilateral disarmament 
on their part would increase their inferiority 
and hence the chances of armed conflict. 
While the Warsaw Pact lead seems to have only 
limited implications where strategic nuclear 
weapons are concerned, this is not so for 
conventional weapons, particularly tanks, artil-
lery and combat aircraft and, above all, 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Even the 
United States navy has been caught up by the 
Soviet Union. At the request of the commit-
tee, your Rapporteur has had a comparative 
table of these forces drawn up, which is given at 
appendix. 
46. Furthermore, the relatively small propor-
tion of their gross national product earmarked 
for defence (5.9% in the United States, 5.1% in 
the United Kingdom, 3.9% in France, 3.4% in 
the Netherlands, 3.3 % in Belgium, 3.2 % in the 
Federal Republic and 2.4% in Italy) has pre-
vented the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
from replacing their armaments at the same 
rate as the Soviet Union, which appears to 
spend between 12 and 14% of its GNP on 
defence, while the other members of the 
Warsaw Pact spend about the same proportion 
as the western countries. It is therefore prob-
able that the quantitative inferiority of western 
armaments is no longer offset by qualitative 
superiority as was the case ten years ago. 
4 7. Europe can ensure its security by asso-
ciating a true disarmament policy with a 
defence policy which retains the elements of 
credible deterrence by convincing Europeans 
themselves, then their American partners and 
finally the Soviet Union, that it does not intend 
disarmament to be a renunciation or the begin-
ning of neutralisation, but that it has a place in 
a coherent operation of which it is a major aim. 
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Certain pacifists wish disarmament to be a 
means of achieving detente and peace, but in 
present circumstances it can but be a conse-
quence of this although subsequently it may 
help to consolidate what has been achieved. 
To tackle the problem of disarmament in 
isolation from military necessities and political 
realities would be a threat to the peace and 
freedom of Western Europe. 
48. No more than for its security, there is no 
reason why Europe should rely wholly on the 
United States for everything connected with 
disarmament. It can certainly not act without 
the United States, and a committee member 
recalled that the North Atlantic Council should 
place greater emphasis on the European wish 
to associate defence and disarmament as already 
expressed in the Harmel plan. This would 
require close consultations on disarmament 
matters between the European members of the 
alliance. The WEU Council could and there-
fore should be the framework for such consul-
tations because this is its own particular area of 
responsibility. Faced with the desire of the 
peace movement to adopt a European strategy, 
it is of some importance for the governments of 
Western European countries to concert their 
response, which need not be identical, so as not 
to react according to national or local situations 
and thus disperse Europe's approach to its 
defence and disarmament requirements. Eco-
nomic difficulties in all our countries are strong 
encouragement for such reactions. In a European 
Community economy it is difficult to envisage 
unduly wide differences in the military burden 
on national economies. This does not mean 
that cuts in military expenditure must be 
avoided, but they should perhaps be limited in 
the immediate future with a view to negotiating 
a balanced reduction with the Warsaw Pact. 
49. Such a step will surely find encourage-
ment in the policy pursued by President 
Reagan, who can in no way be accused of being 
unaware of the Soviet threat. This policy is 
highly positive and encouraging since it led to 
the START negotiations being opened in 
Geneva together with negotiations on so-called 
Eurostrategic nuclear weapons on a basis which 
should be satisfactory to pacifists, i.e. the zero 
option or the controlled elimination of all 
medium-range nuclear weapons. This propo-
sal is in the interests of all insofar as the 
deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons 
known as instruments of limited warfare is a 
particularly serious danger because it might 
give the impression that an attack in Europe 
might lead to the total nuclear destruction of 
this area without the two great powers being 
fully involved. It is not by chance that the 
announcement of the deployment of these 
weapons caused the most widespread pacifist 
demonstrations in Europe, and one of the 
lessons to be learned from these demonstrations 
should be to make the destruction of these 
weapons one of the first aims of disarmament, 
which fully conforms to President Reagan's 
proposals. 
50. Moreover, very probably the United 
States Government's determination to adopt 
this approach has shown the green light for a 
whole series of negotiations which appeared to 
be marking time, be it the MBFR talks, the 
conference of the Disarmament Committee or 
the United Nations special session on disar-
mament. Admittedly, no agreement seems 
imminent in any of these frameworks but the 
resumption of diplomatic activity in the disar-
mament field - provided it is not merely a 
question of appeasing the pacifist movements 
but is based on a true will to succeed - will 
presumably show these movements that the 
western countries are determined to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies 
for an effective reduction of armaments or, one 
way or another, they will force the Warsaw 
Pact countries to assume their responsibilities 
towards their own citizens and towards the rest 
of the world by revealing whether they consider 
disarmament to be merely a tactic designed to 
weaken the West or whether it is really a goal. 
51. Another question on which the new paci-
fist movement may be right is probably that 
any war in Europe could well lead to a nuclear 
exchange on its territory. Already a conven-
tional war on this territory would have deadly 
and highly devastating effects because of the 
density of the population and the extreme fragi-
lity of present-day industrial and urban civilisa-
tion. Although military planners now tend to 
think that any war would be short for lack of 
sufficient means to wage a long one, such rea-
soning is no more infallible than the same way 
of thinking was in 1914. Hence it is essential 
for war no longer to be envisaged as a means of 
pursuing a policy but it should be realised that, 
victorious or not, it would lead to the destruc-
tion of all the values upheld by the West. 
52. What is less evident is that the presence 
of nuclear weapons increases the risk of war 
and even of nuclear war. It may even be 
considered that the existence of such weapons 
has removed much of the threat of war from 
the areas they protected, and countries equip-
ped with them have had to find peaceful means 
of ending the many conflicts which have arisen 
between them in the past thirty-five years. 
Conversely, it is in areas where there were no 
nuclear weapons to play a deterrent role that 
armed and often deadly conflicts have increased 
during the period in question. 
53. Where NA TO's dual decision in 1979 
may be called in question is in the extent to 
135 
DOCUMENT 934 
which it would make nuclear weapons an 
instrument of strategic fighting rather than of a 
policy of deterrence. It is on this point that 
the discussions which have been going on in the 
United States for the last twenty years raise a 
problem. While strategic nuclear weapons are 
the ideal instrument of deterrence, the military 
array of the West must not hide such weapons 
or make their use in the event of attack more 
uncertain but, on the contrary, it must enhance 
them and convince a potential aggressor that he 
cannot hope to wage battle and win without 
risk of such weapons being used. 
54. In other words, the aim of the western 
allies should not be a balance of forces and 
weapons at every level but, on the contrary, 
deployment limited to the requirements of 
deterrence. An American force which, as 
everyone knows, is only too small, is essential 
for Europe's security, not so that it may fight 
Soviet forces but because its very inadequacy 
proves that the strategic force of the United 
States will be involved should there be an attack 
on Western Europe. Similarly, short- or inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapQns do not have to 
equal in quantity those deployed by the Soviet 
Union lest they give the impression that the 
West is prepared to accept a conflict limited to 
a given nuclear level. Their presence is neces-
sary to convince the Soviet Union that it 
cannot hope to stop escalation at the level of its 
choice. If Western Europe had no short- or 
intermediate-range nuclear weapons to confront 
the some 350 SS-20 missiles now deployed by 
the Soviet Union in Europe, it would be pos-
sible for a potential aggressor to speculate on 
his superiority in the conventional field and 
confront the United States with the impossible 
choice between abandoning Western Europe to 
its sorry fate or releasing an exchange of strate-
gic nuclear weapons which would ravage Ame-
rican territory. The existence of a limited 
number of such weapons, on the contrary, is 
enough to convince a potential aggressor that a 
conventional attack would lead to escalation 
and hence gives true weight to the American 
deterrent. 
55. This in no way signifies, as certain com-
mittee members thought, that your Rapporteur 
considers the doctrine of. massive retaliation 
should be resuscitated. On the contrary, the 
doctrine of flexible response must be given its 
full deterrent value by not allowing it to 
become just a combat doctrine. But here again 
the main aim should be to reach an agreement 
banning the deployment of medium-range 
nuclear weapons by the West but also obliging 
the Soviet Union to renounce its SS-20 and 
other missiles (SS-4s and SS-Ss). 
56. Because of its limited means, France has 
to base its security on a minimum level of 
deterrence: its conventional forces, its tactical 
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nuclear weapons and its eighteen intermediate-
range missiles are not enough to stop an inva-
sion, but this limited deployment gives full 
deterrent value to strategic nuclear weapons 
which, although also limited, should be enough 
to convince an enemy that he would sustain 
intolerable losses and damage in the event of an 
attack on Western Europe. Consequently, 
French defence policy, whose principles have 
not been modified by the recent change of 
majority, seems to meet security requirements 
quite well, not only those of France but also of 
most Western European countries which admit-
ted, in the North Atlantic Council declaration 
in Ottawa in 1974, that the fact that two 
European members of the alliance " possess 
nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent 
role of their own " contributes to the overall 
strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance. 
This declaration noting the specific deterrent 
role of the French and British nuclear forces 
appears to correspond quite closely to the 
present views of most European members of 
the alliance which in fact no longer have much 
objection to them while the French Govern-
ment for its part has on several occasions, parti-
cularly since May 1981, recalled that it consi-
ders France's security area begins far beyond its 
national frontiers. 
57. But it is not simply a matter of arma-
ments. There is every reason to think that 
pacifist reactions in Europe since December 
1979 also express uneasiness of a political 
nature in view of the fact that the strategy 
implemented in the framework of NATO is in 
fact defined in the United States and adopted 
by the latter's European allies in the North 
Atlantic Council under political, military and 
often economic pressure. The overwhelming 
domination of the United States in the defence 
field indeed makes it almost impossible for its 
partners to oppose the application of measures 
already decided upon by the United States 
Government, even if these partners do not feel 
such measures meet their true interests. The 
threat, explicit or more often implicit, of a 
withdrawal of American forces from Europe, 
whose effect would be to undermine NA TO's 
deterrent strength, is generally enough to win 
over those who might be tempted to oppose 
such decisions. But it is evident that this 
situation is not likely to calm the legitimate 
anxiety of the populations. In this connection, 
one may wonder about the degree of consensus 
reached in the North Atlantic Council in 
December 1979 since several countries that 
took part in reaching this decision seem to be 
having the greatest difficulty in carrying it into 
effect at home. 
58. This problem, raised by American pre-
ponderance in the alliance, is even more serious 
when United States policy seems to waiver. In 
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the last ten years this has often happened, parti-
cularly where nuclear strategy is concerned, and 
the recent article by four leading Americans in 
Foreign Affairs, asking for the development of 
western conventional forces in NATO, was not 
likely to reassure that portion of European 
public opinion which is wondering whether the 
Americans truly wish to place the deterrent 
strength of their strategic nuclear force at the 
service of their allies. 
59. It is certainly not without significance 
that the two European countries with a deter-
rent capability of their own, the United King-
dom and France, have not experienced anti-
nuclear reactions comparable to demonstrations 
in the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and even Italy. Is the reason not to 
be found in the dependence of the latter coun-
tries on American decisions where defence 
policy is concerned? The question is worthy 
of consideration. 
60. Finally, if the message transmitted by the 
1981 demonstrators is taken seriously, it is 
clearly urgent to advance towards disarmament. 
Indeed, if the West does not show it is pre-
pared to embark resolutely on the road to disar-
mament provided its security is ensured, it will 
give the impression that it is not really deter-
mined to succeed. 
61. In your Rapporteur's view, these are the 
main points on which Western Europe can 
satisfy the movements rightly or wrongly called 
pacifist and neutralist, not in order to silence 
them and then calmly resume an arms policy 
but to take account of the requirements of a 
strategy of deterrence based not only on the 
accumulation of armaments but also and above 
all on the desire of nations to defend their 
peace and independence at any cost. By ques-
tioning this desire, the development of pacifism 
and neutralism might weaken European posi-
tions vis-a-vis the United States, ruin the deter-
rent strength of the Atlantic Alliance and 
consequently make war in Europe more conceiv-
able. It cannot therefore be ignored and the 
alliance must answer the questions it raises but 
without jeopardising Europe's security. Indeed, 
there is every indication that the Soviet Union's 
aim, for the moment at least, is probably not 
so much to invade Western Europe as to reduce 
it to a situation in which the European coun-
tries have no choice but to renounce certain 
aspects of their internal and external sove-
reignty in face of Soviet pressure, this being 
currently but probably mistakenly called Fin-
landisation. This would then be a form of 
neutralisation involving a paralysis of external 
policy guaranteed by pro-Soviet political forces 
holding positions of responsibility. Under such 
pressure, democracy based on the free alter-
nation of different majorities in the government 
following the choice of the electorate would be 
likewise jeopardised. The attainment of this 
aim might be actively fostered by pacifist and 
neutralist movements which, on the one hand, 
would give the American partners in the Atlan-
tic Alliance the impression that Europe did not 
wish to defend itself against attack, thus bring-
ing grist to the mill of advocates of the with-
drawal of American forces from Europe, and, 
on the other hand, would make it difficult for 
the European governments, particularly at a 
time of economic difficulties, to pursue the 
effort necessary for ensuring their countries' 
security and gaining the confidence of their 
American allies. 
VI. Conclusions 
62. After the widespread demonstrations in 
autumn 1981, pacifist agitation calmed down 
relatively in 1982, although some observers 
considered it had played a major role in the 
Dutch elections in September. But the signs 
are that agitation will resume on a large scale, 
in Western Europe at least, in 1983 when the 
deployment of American medium-range missiles 
is due to begin. A strategy for 1983 was drawn 
up at a meeting of leaders of the peace 
movement in Paris in September 1982. The 
first action is planned to take place in the 
Federal Republic on 12th December with the 
participation of Americans, Belgians, Dutch 
and Italians to obstruct the twenty-five sites 
where it is planned to install these missiles. A 
second is planned in Sicily in May 1983 and a 
third in all the European capitals on 28th 
October. Other more local demonstrations are 
envisaged. 
63. It is therefore evident that all the prob-
lems raised by the pacifist movement will 
return to the centre of European politics next 
year, which fully justifies the request made by 
Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French 
Minister of Defence, to the WEU Assembly in 
December 1981 that it deal with matters raised 
by neutralism and pacifism. As the Council 
has to reply to Assembly recommendations, it 
was obviously not left out of this proposal. 
Clearly it was not a matter of planning a stra-
tegy to fight the movement but of asking the 
WEU Assembly what it considered should be 
the response to many Western Europeans 
espousing a neutralist or pacifist ideology. As 
this ideology is spread throughout Western 
Europe, European answers must be found. 
64. This is not necessarily easy, since 
although Western European security forms a 
whole not all countries have the same require-
ments. There are various reasons for this, par-
ticularly the nearness of the threat, whether or 
not a country possesses nuclear weapons, and 
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above all the ability to decide! on their use, and 
the extent and nature of a country's overseas 
commitments. These considerations have an 
effect on the size and trend of pacifist move-
ments in each country and are a major obstacle 
to political and military rapprochement, the 
need for which in the interests of overall secu-
rity and real progress towards European poli-
tical union cannot be denied. These are two 
aspects of WEU's main role under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and it is therefore its task to 
work out replies. 
6 5. Your Rapporteur considers these replies 
must be positive on the essential aspect: the 
search for peace and disarmament. But at the 
same time they must take account of a number 
of facts which, in spite of the Afghanistan and 
Polish affairs, seem to have been left on one 
side by the peace movement which is more 
anxious to achieve tangible results as quickly as 
possible than to take account of the complexity 
of the international situation, whereas the role 
of politicians is above all to base peace on the 
security of the people for whom they are res-
ponsible. Your Rapporteur would sum up the 
essential requirements for consolidating peace 
in Europe as follows: 
(i) Disarmament is a true factor of peace 
only if negotiated, balanced and controlled so 
that it does not become an element of imbal-
ance, insecurity and hence tension. 
(ii) Disarmament must not jeopardise a sys-
tem of credible deterrence which ensures peace 
in Europe. It therefore has to be progressive. 
(iii) Medium-range nuclear weapons must be 
deployed in Europe as long as the Soviet Union 
does not follow• up the proposals for a general 
renunciation of such weapons. 
(iv) New impetus should be given to all the 
negotiations on the limitation and progressive 
reduction of the nuclear armaments of the 
United States and the Soviet Union and 
conventional weapons in all countries, particu-
larly in Europe. 
(v) There should be more consultation bet-
ween the European and American members of 
the Atlantic Alliance so as to give Western 
Europe all necessary guarantees about the 
deterrence protecting it. 
(vi) The Western European countries for 
their part should concert their defence and 
disarmament policies with a view to making 
specific disarmament proposals which are not 
liable to jeopardise their security. WEU, at 
both government and Assembly level, is the 
natural framework for this. 
( vii) A special effort should be made to assist 
the development of the third world, whatever 
the results of disarmament negotiations. 
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(viii) Public opinion should be better informed 
about the levels of forces and armaments 
deployed by East and West so as to prevent 
pacifism covering up the defence of certain 
countries' own interests. 
(ix) Representatives of pacifist movements 
should be listened to and their statements dis-
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cussed in each country's debate on internal 
policy, and the Eastern European countries 
should be reminded of the degree of freedom of 
expression they should be granted, particularly 
on the occasion of the CSCE meeting in 
Madrid. 
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APPENDIX 
(a) Comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
NATO Warsaw Pact 
Manpower (thousands) 4,998 4,821 
Reserves (thousands) 5,079 7,138 
Main battle tanks 17,629 27,300 
Artillery 9,829 10,300 
Nuclear warhead launchers 1,662 3,151 
Submarines : 
- with cruise missiles 0 54 
- attack 184 174 
Surface vessels 1,351 1,437 
Combat aircraft 3,543 7,756 
(b) Comparison between the Soviet Union and the United States 
Population (millions) 
GNP (000 million) 
Defence budget 
in 000 million 
as% GNP 
Total armed forces (thousands) 
Army 
Manpower (thousands) 
Tanks 
Nuclear warhead launchers 
Navy 
Major combat vessels 
Attack submarines 
Cruise missile submarines 
Air force 
Combat aircraft 
Strategic nuclear weapon\' 
ICBM 
Submarines : 
- submarines 
- launchers 
Long-range aircraft 
$: 
$: 
United States 
230 
2,925 
216 
6.1% 
2,116 
791 
12,130 
144 
204 
90 
0 
3,650 
1,052 
32 
518 
436 
Soviet Union 
269.6 
Roubles: between 339 
and 614 
Roubles: between 17.5 
and 192 
between 8.4 and 15 % 
3,705 
1,825 
50,000 
1,300 
290 
204 
69 
4,480 
1,398 
83 
989 
150 
Source.· IISS: The Military Balance 1982-83. 
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Nuclear warheads United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,000 5,500 
SLBM 5,000 1,300 
Strategic bomber 2,000 400 
Total strategic 9,000 7,200 
All other 15,000 8,800 
Grand total 24,000 16,000 
Source: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, 13th November 1981, page 17. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7• 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
29th November 1982 
1. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "very" and 
"many". 
2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "designed" and 
insert "intended". 
3. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "might cause 
those negotiations to fail"and insert "would cause those negotiations to fail and would". 
4. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "in East and 
West". 
5. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "third world" 
insert "including the Latin American countries". 
6. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "each Western 
European country" and insert "a few Western European countries". 
7. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add "within the time limit laid 
down in the NATO decision ofDecember 1979". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
1. See 8th and 9th sittings, 30th November 1982 (amendments 1, 3, 4 and 7 agreed to; amendments 2, 5 and 6 negatived). 
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Amendment 8 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 8 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
29th November 1982 
8. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "anyhow". 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 9 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 9 1 
tabled by Mrs. Knight and others 
29th November 1982 
9. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Europe's security" 
insert "and deploring the growing evidence of Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist move-
ments pursuing unilateral disarmament in the West". 
Signed: Mrs. Knight, Spies von Biillesheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, Atkinson, Grant and 
Sir Paul Hawkins 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
143 
Document 934 
Amendments 10, 11 and 12 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENTS 10, 11 and 121 
29th November 1982 
tabled by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim and Mrs. Knight 
10. In line 3 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "level" to the end 
of the paragraph. 
11. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "very". 
12. In the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negative" insert 
"as well as probable". 
Signed: Spies von Biillesheim, Mrs. Knight 
I. See 8th and 9th sittings, 30th November 1982 (amendment 10 withdrawn; amendment 11 not moved; amendment 12 
negatived). 
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Amendment 13 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 131 
tabled by Mr. Smith 
29th November 1982 
13. In line 4 of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "attained" add "within the 
framework of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979". 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment not moved) 
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Amendment 14 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 141 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce 
29th November 1982 
14. Add an eleventh paragraph to the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows : 
"Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its depen-
dent bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council,". 
Signed: Lagorce 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 15 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 15 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
29th November 1982 
15. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Follow attentively and encour-
age participating states" and insert "Demand that participating states strive". 
I. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment 16 
Problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
AMENDMENT 16 1 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce 
29th November 1982 
16. In line 4 of the French text of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "que 
tant que" and insert "qu 'aussi longtemps que". 
Signed: Lagorce 
1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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The Falklands crisis 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
NATO headquarters. Brus,·ef,·: 
13th September 1982 
H. E. Mr. Vincenzo Tometta, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy; Admiral 
Fantoni; 
H. E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom; 
Colonel Lefevre, Delegation to the Military Committee ; 
Admiral R. H. Falls, CN, Chairman of the Military Committee; Rear Admiral H. G. Urbanus, 
Deputy Director, International Military Staff; 
Mr. Stephen Ledogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United 
States; Lt. Colonel D. Mahley, Defence Plans; 
H. E. Dr. H. G. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
14th September 1982 
Captain G. L. Graveson, Deputy SACLANTREPEUR. 
Embassies in Rome: 
15th September 1982: Mr. Charles R. Stout, Political Counsellor; Mr. John Y. Wallett and 
Mr. Robert R. Rackmales, First Secretaries, United States Embassy. 
]]nd Septemher 198]: H. E. Mr. Lcopoldo Bn\\o. Ambassador of :\rgcntina. 
23rd September 1982: H. E. Mr. Jose Maria de la Jara, Ambassador of Peru; Mr. Joaquin Piriz, 
Charge d'Affaires of Uruguay. 
24th Septemher /98] H. E. Mr. Mariano Fontecilla. Ambassador of Chile. 
29th September 1982: H. E. Mr. G. Ghislain Hardy, Ambassador of Canada. 
The committee as a whole met in Paris on 2nd September 1982 when it discussed an 
outline of the present report, was addressed by Mr. Fran~ois Heisbourg, Technical Counsellor in 
the Private Office of the French Minister of Defence, and on 3rd September when it visited the 
command posts of the French Air Defence Forces and of the Strategic Air Forces at Tavemy. 
The committee met in Portugal from 20th to 22nd October 1982 when it discussed a 
draft of the report, visited the Operations Room at Headquarters IBERLANT in Oeiras, and was 
addressed by: 
Vice-Admiral Elias Da Costa, Portuguese Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area; 
Rear Admiral Williams, United States Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic 
Area; 
Commander Peter Lucas, Royal Navy, Chief of Staff, IBERLANT; 
Commander Bums, United States Navy, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander-
in-Chief, IBERLANT; 
Staff; 
General Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Portuguese Air Force Staff, Deputy Chief of Defence 
Admiral Sousa Leitao, Chief of Naval Staff; 
General Lopes Alves, Deputy Chief of Army Staff; 
Mr. Carlos Pardal, Portuguese Secretary of State for Defence. 
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The committee met finally in Paris on 8th November 1982 when it adopted the report as 
a whole. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior 
officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to 
questions. 
The views expressed in this report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the 
committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the Falklands crisis 
The Assembly, 
(i) Firmly condemning the armed_invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 
1982 in flagrant violation of international law and of the statement by the • President of the 
Security Council the previous day; 
(ii) Taking note of the rapid and effective operation of European political coasultation leading 
to the statement of condemnation issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of 
economic sanctions on I Oth April; 
(iii) Taking note of the agreed statement of the President of the United Nations Security 
Council on I st April and of Security Council Resolution 502 of 3rd April 1982, but regretting 
that the Security Council was unable to ensure implementation; 
(iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of 
Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations failed to secure a negotiated withdrawal 
of the Argentine forces; 
(v) Welcoming the position adopted by the United States and by NATO after the failure of the 
attempted negotiations; 
(vi) Regretting that the Council was not convened in application of Article VIII.3 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty; 
(vii) Welcoming the determined and successful action taken by the United Kingdom to restore 
international order in application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council and in conformity 
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; 
(viii) Deploring the loss of life that resulted from the conflict; 
(ix) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic Treaty area following the 
necessary deployment of larger British forces outside the area for the long-term defence of the 
Falkland Islands, and noting that NATO can learn many lessons from the conflict; 
(x) Concerned at the deterioration in relations between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
and Latin America, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to seek agreement m the European Community and in NATO 
on the following objectives: 
I. Measures to be considered by NATO countries within the treaty area to compensate for 
the deployment of British forces outside the area as long as these forces are necessary for the 
defence of the Falklands; 
2. The early restoration of good relations between the countries of the alliance on the one 
hand and of Latin America on the other, and in particular the normalisation of relations between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina; 
3. An urgent study by NATO of the lessons it can learn from the conflict including: 
(a) the need for consultation and decisions not only on developments be~ond the NATO 
area which may threaten vital allied interests, but also on those which may threaten 
national interests in cases of self-defence, even if the Soviet Union is not imvolved; 
(b) the need for proper assessment of voluminous and conflicting information to permit the 
early identification of attack; 
(c) the performance of defence equipment; 
(d) the need for a common and restrictive policy on the export of defence equipment to 
non-allied countries. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Immediately after Argentine forces 
attacked and occupied the Falkland Islands on 
2nd April 1982, the Presidential Committee 
referred the matter to the Defence Committee 
for report. On 20th April, it adopted a draft 
recommendation " firmly condemning the 
armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by 
Argentina on 2nd April 1982 in flagrant 
violation of international law". Subsequently, 
on 19th May 1982, it adopted a first report on 
the Falklands 1 which was submitted to the 
Assembly on 16th June 1982, the day after the 
Argentinian forces surrendered. In view of the 
rapid evolution of events, the Assembly agreed, 
at the request of the committee, to refer the 
report back to the committee without debate. 
1.2. The present revised report takes account 
of the information which has become available 
since the fighting ended but it has obviously not 
been possible to include the results of the 
wide-ranging British inquiries to be concluded 
by the end of the year 2• Inter alia, this report 
examines the lessons which the alliance might 
draw from the conflict and the events which led 
up to it, and also refers to the future of rela-
tions between Europe and Latin America. 
11. European and allied consultations 
and collective defence measures 
2.1. As soon as Argentina's intentions became 
clear with the departure of the invasion fleet 
from Argentine ports on 31st March, the 
United Kingdom undertook urgent consulta-
tions and discussions in three international 
frameworks which should be studied separately: 
- the United Nations Security Council; 
- European political co-operation; and 
-NATO. 
(a) Security Council 
2.2. Article 24 of the United Nations Charter 
provides that members of the organisation 
" confer on the Security Council primary res-
ponsibility for the maintenance of international 
I. Document 907 Revised. 
2. Lord Franks' commission of inquiry; Ministry of 
Defence white paper. 
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peace and security ... ". Following urgent 
consultations with the members of the Security 
Council and before the Argentine attack on the 
Falkland Islands started, the President of the 
Security Council on 1st April made an agreed 
statement 1 on behalf of the Council: 
" The Security Council accordingly calls 
on the Governments of Argentina and the 
United Kingdom to exercise the utmost 
restraint at this time and in particular to 
refrain from the use or threat of force in 
the region and to continue the search for 
a diplomatic solution. " 
2.3. On 3rd April, immediately after confirm-
ation of the Argentine invasion on 2nd April, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 502 2 
with only one vote against (Panama) and four 
abstentions (China, Poland, Soviet Union and 
Spain): 
" Determining that there exists a breach 
of the peace in the region of the Falkland 
Islands (Islas Malvinas), 
1. Demands an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, 
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of 
all Argentine forces from the Falkland 
Islands (Islas Malvinas), 
3. Calls on the Governments of Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom to seek a 
diplomatic solution to their differences 
and to respect fully the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations." 
Coming after Argentina's armed invasion in 
flagrant violation of international law, this text, 
in favour of which France, the United King-
dom, the United States and seven non-aligned 
countries voted, and which neither China nor 
the Soviet Union vetoed, noted that there had 
been a " breach of the peace ", as referred to in 
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, but 
not an " act of aggression " in the terms of the 
same article. However, by calling for the 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces, 
this resolution showed that the great majority of 
world opinion had taken a stand against the 
aggression by Argentina. The only contrary 
vote came from the one Latin American coun-
try represented in the Security Council, 
Panama. 
I. Text at Appendix I (a). 
2. Tc\t at Appcnd1\ I (d). 
2.4. The day after Resolution 502 was adop-
ted, Argentine forces invaded the territory of 
South Georgia and on 5th and 6th April the 
first elements of the British intervention force 
left Portsmouth. A period of attempted media-
tion followed, during which the then United 
States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, the Presi-
dent of Peru and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations endeavoured to negotiate a 
compromise between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom which would lead to the withdrawal 
of Argentine forces in accordance with Resolu-
tion 502. After British forces had landed in 
South Georgia and Argentine forces on that 
territory had capitulated on 25th April, Mr. 
Haig finally renounced his mission and, in his 
statement 1 on 30th April, announced that 
Argentina had rejected the latest United States 
proposals providing for the establishment of an 
interim tripartite British, American and Argen-
tine authority in the islands: 
"In the light of Argentina's failure to 
accept a compromise, we must take 
concrete steps to underscore that the 
United States cannot and will not con-
done the use of unlawful force to resolve 
disputes. " 
After attempts by Peru, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations began to seek a compro-
mise on 7th May. In reply, the British repre-
sentative submitted a draft interim agreement 2 
on 17th May which provided for the with-
drawal of British and Argentine forces to 150 
nautical miles from the islands and the appoint-
ment of a United Nations administrator to 
ensure the administration of the islands in 
consultation with the existing bodies represen-
tative of the local inhabitants. This proposal 
was rejected by Argentina on 19th May, and its 
refusal marked the end of the period of 
attempted mediation. 
2.5. After British forces had landed on the 
islands on 21st May, the Security Council on 
26th May unanimously adopted Resolution 
505 3 on the proposal of six non-aligned 
members of the Council. This text confirmed 
Resolution 502 and urged the Secretary-Gene-
ral to continue his task of mediation and to try 
to negotiate a cease-fire, if necessary sending 
United Nations observers to supervise its appli-
cation. 
2.6. On 4th June, after British forces had 
suffered serious losses but were within days of 
final success, a draft Security Council resolu-
tion 4, tabled by the non-aligned members, was 
finally vetoed by the United Kingdom and the 
I. Text at Appendix ll. 
2. Text at Appendix I(;). 
3. Text at Appendix I (1). 
4. Text at Appendix I(/). 
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United States, although the latter's representa-
tive subsequently delcared that she would have 
abstained if she had received instructions in 
time. This draft provided for an immediate 
cease-fire by both sides and the simultaneous 
application of Resolutions 502 and 505. 
2.7. Although a great majority of the world 
community showed it was opposed to the 
Argentine aggression and called for the with-
drawal of Argentine forces, in the long run the 
majority failed to support the United Kingdom 
in the military action it finally took in the 
exercise of its right of legitimate defence, 
although six weeks had elapsed without Argen-
tina withdrawing its forces as required by Reso-
lution 502. 
(b) European Community 
2.8. Reactions to the Falklands crisis were the 
fastest ever in the framework of European poli-
tical co-operation. The European Community 
countries unanimously condemned the armed 
intervention the very day it happened 1; the 
governments of the ten countries each imposed 
a full embargo on exports of arms to Argentina; 
on lOth April a ten-power declaration 2 called 
for the immediate application of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 502 and announced the prepara-
tion of other measures - subsequently taken in 
the framework of the Rome Treaty with the 
regulation 3 of the Council of the European 
Communities of 14th April banning imports 
from Argentina until 17th May. However, the 
ban did not apply to imports already on the 
way or in the framework of a contract 
concluded before 14th April. 
2.9. This faultless solidarity nevertheless 
showed signs of cracking before the two-and-a-
half-month crisis ended. On 17th May, the 
Ten initially decided to extend the economic 
sanctions for only seven days on a Community 
basis for eight of the ten countries and by 
exclusively national decision in the case of 
Ireland and Italy. These two countries sub-
sequently lifted their own sanctions against 
Argentina but undertook not to undermine the 
embargo decided upon by the other countries 
which, on 24th May, extended Community 
economic sanctions for an indefinite period, 
although Denmark extended sanctions only on 
the basis of a national decision. 
2.10. Three Community countries - France, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom - and one 
country which had applied for membership, 
Spain - are members of the Security Council. 
This shift in the position of the Ten is 
I. Text at Appendix I (b). 
2. Text at Appendix I (e). 
3. Text at Appendix I (f). 
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reflected in the votes expressed in the Security 
Council. Resolution 502 of 2nd April was in 
fact voted for by France and Ireland in addition 
to the United Kingdom; Spain abstained, as did 
China, Poland and the Soviet Union. On 4th 
June, ten days before the final surrender of the 
Argentinian forces, Ireland and Spain voted for 
the draft resolution calling for a cease-fire 
which the United Kingdom and the United 
States vetoed, while France abstained. 
2.11. The embargo on exports of arms decided 
upon by each individual Community country 
remained intact far longer (see Chapter IV). 
(c) NATO 
2.12. Consultations and discussions in NATO 
- particularly in the North Atlantic Council 
where all ten European Community countries 
except Ireland are represented - were different 
from those in the framework of European poli-
tical co-operation for two reasons. First, dur-
ing the period 31st March to 30th April, the 
United States sought to maintain its position as 
mediator and a friend of both sides in the 
conflict, Argentina and the United Kingdom. 
Second, the Falklands conflict was quite clearly 
outside the area defined in Article 6 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, within which an armed 
attack on one party to the treaty is considered 
to be an attack against all the parties. 
2.13. Although the provisions of Articles 3: 
" ... the parties ... by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack " and 4: " The 
parties will consult together whenever, in the 
opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of any of the 
parties is threatened " are not geographically 
limited by the text of the treaty, use of the orga-
nisation for consultations on events " outside 
the area " has developed only very slowly 
because of the reluctance of several alliance 
countries to discuss such matters. The most 
recent statement of the position in this connec-
tion was given in the texts adopted at the Bonn 
NATO summit meeting on 1Oth June 1982 (at 
which Spain was represented for the first 
time). Inter alia, it was stated that: 
" All of us have an interest in peace 
and security in other regions of the 
world. We will consult together as 
appropriate on events in these regions 
which may have implications for our 
security, taking into account our com-
monly identified objectives. Those of us 
who are in a position to do so will 
endeavour to respond to requests for 
assistance from sovereign states whose 
security and independence is threatened. " 
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while the document on integrated defence 
adopted by representatives of the countries 
contributing to the integrated military structure 
contains the following paragraph: 
"Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital inte-
rests, we reaffirm the need to consult 
with a view to sharing assessments and 
identifying common objectives, taking 
full account of the effect on NATO secu-
rity and defence capability, as well as of 
the national interests of member coun-
tries. Recognising that the policies which 
nations adopt in this field are a matter 
for national decision, we agree to exa-
mine collectively in the appropriate 
NATO bodies the requirements which 
may arise for the defence of the NATO 
area as a result of deployments by indivi-
dual member states outside that area. 
Steps which may be taken by individual 
allies in the light of such consultations to 
facilitate possible . military deployments 
beyond the NATO area can represent an 
important contribution to western secu-
rity. , 
2 .14. It is considered in NATO that " develop-
ments beyond the NATO area " which " may 
threaten our vital interests " are only events 
involving a risk of conflict with the Soviet 
Union or its allies. This was not the case of 
the Falklands conflict, during which the Soviet 
Union's actions were cautious although its 
statements showed less moderation. 
2.15. In the circumstances, the consultations in 
the North Atlantic Council were not held in the 
framework of " events outside the area " in the 
now established meaning of the term. In view 
of the initially " neutral " position of the 
United States, the United Kingdom Permanent 
Representative to the North Atlantic Council 
received instructions to " inform " its partners 
in the alliance rather than " consult " them. 
After the first emergency Council meeting, held 
at the request of the United Kingdom on 2nd 
April, and before final confirmation of the 
Argentine invasion was received in Brussels, the 
communique 1 issued by the Secretary-General 
merely noted that " members of the Council 
expressed deep concern at the dispute ... ". 
2.16. It is believed that in the following days 
the United Kingdom.kept its partners informed, 
through the NATO Military Committee, of 
movements of forces due to the intervention 
force being sent to the South Atlantic. The 
position with regard to forces assigned or ear-
marked for assignment to NATO is examined 
below (paragraph 2.25 et seq). 
I. Text at Appendix I (c). 
2.17. On 5th May, the eleven European mem-
bers of NATO, meeting in the framework of 
Eurogroup 1, were the first to " condemn Argen-
tina's armed invasion of the Falkland Islands ", 
and this condemnation was endorsed by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee 2 meeting 
at ministerial level on 7th May, one week after 
the United States had adopted a position 3 on 
30th April in favour of a certain degree of 
support for the United Kingdom's military 
actions. All fifteen NATO countries endorsed 
the condemnation of Argentina in the final 
communique 4 issued after the ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in 
Luxembourg on 17th and 18th May: 
" ... the allies condemn Argentina for its 
aggression against the Falkland Islands 
and Dependencies and deplore the fact 
that after more than six weeks she has 
still not withdrawn her forces in com-
pliance with manadatory Resolution 502 
of the Security Council. " 
2.18. However, in Bonn on lOth June, when 
the conflict was at its height, the NATO heads 
of state and of government, which for the first 
time included a representative of Spain, which 
had acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty since 
the Luxembourg meeting, made no reference to 
the Falklands conflict in the various texts 
adopted. Spain, which has close relations with 
Latin America, would not have endorsed the 
text adopted at the previous meeting. 
2.19. Following the surrender of Argentine 
forces on 15th June 1982, the Deputy Secre-
tary-General of NATO, Mr. Da Rin, issued an 
official statement: 
" This development, to which the solida-
rity of the United Kingdom's allies has 
certainly contributed, will open the way 
for a negotiated solution which has 
always been Britain's basic objective. 
A diplomatic settlement would restore 
international legality and contribute also, 
it is to be hoped, to effacing the deep 
wounds caused by this tragic conflict. " 
(d) Collective defence measures 
2.20. When the North Atlantic Treaty was 
signed in 1949, defence planning was concen-
trated mainly on the European continent and 
the Atlantic sea lanes. At the time, no one 
raised the question of the threat represented by 
the Soviet surface fleet: it was still small in size 
I rext at Appendix I (g). 
2. Text at Appendix I (h). 
3. Mr. Haig's statement at Appendix 11. 
4. Text at Appendix I (k). 
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and at most able to conduct defensive opera-
tions in Soviet home waters. Nearly all the 
NATO plans of the day aimed at warding off a 
ground attack on the European continent and a 
submarine attack in the Atlantic north of the 
Tropic of Cancer. At that ' time, too, the 
United States and the other friendly or allied 
countries controlled the world's key points: 
Panama, Suez, Aden, Singapore, Dakar, Hanoi, 
the Persian Gulf, Luanda, Freetown, Lorenzo 
Marques, Beira and the vital ports and bases of 
South Africa. ' 
2.21. The present situation is very different. 
Although Soviet superiority in troops and 
conventional weapons in Europe has not dimi-
nished, the danger of an attack in Europe is less 
to be feared than a crisis breaking out elsewhere 
in the world. The Soviet fleet has become 
ocean-going where the size ,of its ships is 
concerned and is in the process of becoming so 
in numbers too. 
2.22. In the case of events outside the area 
which . " may threaten our vital interests ", the 
NATO countries are in agreement on " sharing 
assessments and identifying common objec-
tives". They have agreed to examine "the 
requirements which may arise fbr the defence of 
the NATO area as a result of deployments by 
individual member states outside that area. 
Steps which may be taken by individual allies 
in the light of such consultations to facilitate 
possible military deployments beyond the 
NATO area can represent an important contri-
bution to western security" (see paragraph 
2.13 above). 
2.23. NATO is currently examining the steps 
to be taken in the specific case of an American 
intervention force having to be sent to the 
Persian Gulf area. The other allies would have 
to envisage the measures to be, taken inside the 
NATO area to compensate for the withdrawal 
of certain American forces from the area. 
Short of a major increase in the defence effort, 
such compensatory measures might, for inst-
ance, be to make available to NATO at earlier 
notice certain European forces now earmarked 
for later assignment - in other words, an 
improvement in the combat readiness of such 
forces. Other possible measures are the assist-
ance the European countries are able to give in 
facilitating the deployment of the American 
forces: right of navigation and overflight, air-
field and port facilities, refuelling and infra-
structure en route. 
2.24. In the Falklands crisis, these arrange-
ments were not brought up since the vital inte-
rests of the alliance as a whole were not con~i­
dered to be threatened. However, the deploy-
ment of British forces had serious consequences 
for the NATO area's defence capability. 
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2.25. So-called "NATO" forces are in reality 
national forces which can be classed in three 
main categories: 
(i) a very few forces which operate 
under the control of NATO military 
headquarters (and in the last resort 
of the Defence Planning Committee) 
in peacetime. These are mainly air 
defence forces, and also the Standing 
Naval Force Atlantic, STANAV-
FORLANT, consisting of some six 
to eight frigates or destroyers sup-
plied by as many different countries; 
(ii) forces assigned to NATO, whose 
place of deployment is decided upon 
in consultation with the NATO 
military authorities and which come 
under NATO command when the 
Defence Planning Committee 
declares the alert, but which remain 
under national operational 
command in peacetime. These are 
mainly land and air forces stationed 
in forward areas of the mainland of 
Europe; 
(iii) earmarked forces which may come 
under NATO command within a 
period of time ranging from a few 
days to several weeks after the 
alert. Apart from ST ANA VFOR-
LANT, naval forces and land and air 
reserves and forces based in rear 
areas are included in this category. 
2.26. Being naval units and, for the army, units 
of the United Kingdom mobile force based in 
the United Kingdom, British forces sent to the 
Falklands during the hostilities (see Chapter VI) 
were nearly all in the third, earmarked, cate-
gory. The only forces withdrawn from Ger-
many, and probably "assigned", were perhaps 
a few small engineering and ordnance units. 
The weakening of NATO area forces was there-
fore only in the category of forces available to 
NATO after a certain lapse of time. The 
NATO military authorities seem to have been 
kept informed by the United Kingdom each 
time it was no longer possible to respect the 
time limits for making various units available 
and the NATO military commands, particu-
larly SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander 
Atlantic), examined the resulting consequences 
for NATO's defence capability. 
2.27. Compensatory measures by other allies 
might have been considered, or even recom-
mended, by the NATO authorities, such as 
shortening the time required for earmarked 
units other than British units to be made avail-
able, improving combat readiness or bringing 
into the area naval units which were outside it 
at the time. However, there is no sign of the 
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alliance's political authorities having authorised 
such compensatory measures, probably because 
they noted no crisis situation in the area. The 
Soviet Union in fact made no move to benefit 
from the situation through military action or 
preparations. Moreover, the expected duration 
of the conflict was considered too short to war-
rant taking compensatory measures. 
2.28. However, while most of the British units 
used during the conflict have now returned to 
the NATO area, a fairly large garrison will 
probably be kept in the Falklands - 4,000 men 
at present, its size in the long term is not yet 
known. In addition, the large number of ships 
lost will not be made up for several years. 
Consumption of munitions was also high, parti-
cularly missiles which cost far more than a 
simple shell and take longer to replace. 
2.29. The consequences of the conflict were 
not all negative for the alliance - far from 
it. In NATO circles there is much emphasis 
on the fact that apart from the military lessons 
referred to in Chapter VI the level of training 
and preparation of the British forces used in the 
Falklands is now very high and that their ope-
rational experience will spread throughout 
NATO forces not only through hierarchical 
channels but also through personal contacts 
established during joint exercises. Makeshift 
improvisations with the installation, in a few 
days, of landing-decks for STOVL aircraft on 
container and Ro-Ro merchant navy ships, are 
experiments studied with great interest by the 
NATO military authorities, very impressed by 
the availability of 2,000 civilian merchant sea-
men, all of them volunteers. 
2.30. However, the committee feels that two 
aspects have to be examined. It is already 
understood in NATO that compensatory mea-
sures should be taken by other allied countries 
within the NATO area when the forces of a 
member country are moved outside the area 
because the vital interests of the alliance are 
threatened. These compensatory measures 
should also apply when forces of one country 
are moved outside the area because that coun-
try considers its own interests threatened and 
exercises its inherent right of self-defence in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, even when the Soviet Union is 
not involved. Second, the long-term conse-
quences of the reduction in British equipment 
referred to in paragraph 2.28 must be examined 
by the NATO military authorities and appro-
priate compensatory measures envisaged. 
(e) Western European Union 
2.31. The modified Brussels Treaty is entitled 
"Treaty of economic, social and cultural colla-
boration and collective self-defence ": so that its 
Council might also have been considered for 
urgent consultation on the Falklands crisis. 
However, Article I provides that economic co-
operation under the treaty shall not duplicate 
or prejudice the work of other economic organi-
sations; Article IV that the parties will rely on 
NATO military authorities for military matters· 
and Article V limits automatic military assis~ 
tance to cases of armed attack " in Eur-
ope ". WEU bodies would not therefore have 
been appropriate for discussion of economic 
sanctions; of the effects of the crisis on allied 
defence in Europe; or of possible military 
assistance. 
2.32. Nevertheless Article VIII.3 expressly pro-
vides that at the request of any party " the 
Council shall be immediately convened" to 
permit consultation "with regard to any situa-
tion which may constitute a threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat should arise". The 
committee regrets that no member country 
chose to convene the Council in connection 
with the Falklands crisis. 
Ill. The future of European 
and North American relations 
with the Latin American countries 
3.1. The background to the negotiations bet-
ween Argentina and the United Kingdom bet-
ween 1965 and February 1982 is summarised 
briefly in Appendix Ill. 
3.2. During the South Atlantic crisis which 
followed the Argentine attack on the Falkland 
Isl~nds, the Latin American countries, except 
Chile and to a lesser extent Brazil, in general 
sided with Argentina, although recognising the 
principle that international conflicts should be 
solved by peaceful means and not by force. 
3.3. This position was due to their links with 
Argentina, a fellow country, and also to the fact 
that the Falklands conflict was seen as a prob-
lem of decolonisation. 
3.4. Argentina and the other Latin American 
countries reacted strongly to the United States' 
attitude, considering it had betrayed them. 
They felt they could no longer rely on Ameri-
can assistance in the event of difficulties since 
the United States, instead of remaining neutral 
in the conflict, was on the contrary believed to 
have supplied assistance and armaments to the 
British fleet. 
3.5. Venezuela may have kept its distance 
recently,_ feari~g that the United States might 
oppose 1ts clmms to part of the territory of 
Guyana in the event of a conflict similar to that 
over the Falkland Islands breaking out. 
3.6. For all these reasons, and since the OAS 
proved wholly ineffective, thought has been 
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given to setting up a new' associatiOn of 
American states, excluding the United States. 
But this idea seems to have been abandoned 
and there is growing awareness of the need to 
reshape Latin American organisations in order 
to associate their members more closely with 
the North American countries, the EEC and 
Japan. 
3.7. The Latin American col,lntries also have 
grievances against the EEC countries and 
Canada because of the economic sanctions they 
introduced. · 
3.8. The situation is thus dangerous and made 
even more tense because of the seriousness of 
an _economic crisis liable to encourage a perse-
cutiOn complex which would jeopardise rela-
tions with the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
to the advantage of the Soviet Union which 
might cleverly and perseveringly try 'to take 
advantage of the situation to increase its pre-
sence on the continent. 
3.9. It is therefore necessary and urgent to 
resume contacts and to re-establish friendly 
~elati~ns of co-operation, while clearly bearing 
m mmd a new fact: the events which marked 
the Falklands conflict brought out the need first 
to achieve greater political and economic cohe-
sion and unity among the Latin American 
countries, this being essential for tackling rela-
tions with the United States and Western Eur-
ope with which Latin America feels linked at 
ethnic, historical and social levels. 
3.10. Latin America's regional relations with 
the United States and the EEC countries must 
therefore not be governed by a spirit of strategic 
opposition but be based on mutual respect and 
a confrontation of unilateral and regional politi-
cal and economic interests which may prove 
complementary. This concept is illustrated by 
the results of the last meeting of the Latin 
American Economic System (SELA) advocating 
a global agreement with the European Commu-
nity. 
3.11. Following the Anglo-Argentinian conflict 
over the Falklands, regional relations will be 
develoJ?ed insofar as Latin America emerges as 
an active part of the western system. This 
calls for the co-operation of North America and 
the Community for the common good, i.e. 
international political and economic stability. 
3.12. It can also be seen that the future of 
Latin America's relations with the United Sta-
tes and Western Europe is not a matter of 
challenging a defensive military bloc, the Atlan-
tic Alliance, which is even considered to be an 
effe~tive instrument for world peace, just as the 
Latm American continent is important for Eur-
ope's security since strategically it is a very 
sensitive area for world balances. 
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3.13. By re-establishing relations with the Latin 
American countries, the West must take 
account of these new feelings; similarly, it must 
not overlook the fact that the crisis throughout 
these countries is fanned by extreme poverty, 
the economic decline and financial collapse 
which are characteristic of the whole area and 
the destabilising activities of international com-
munism which often finds support due to lack 
of comprehension in North America. 
3.14. This situation implies that the EEC must 
prepare an organised basic plan for assistance to 
all countries without political discrimination, 
aiming first and foremost at financial recovery 
and the application of trade measures guaran-
teeing outlets for local products and industry. 
3.15. The European Community, Japan, 
Canada and the United States should draw up 
an agreement similar to the Lome Convention 
in order to concert action for the recovery of 
the area. 
3.16. In order to re-establish relations in full, 
the talks which the Italian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Colombo, had with the Argenti-
nian, Brazilian and Peruvian authorities proved 
useful; even more useful will be the conference 
to be held by the European Parliament and the 
Latin American Parliament in Brussels in 
spring 1983 with a view to examining relations 
between Europe and Latin America. 
3.17. All Latin American countries attach the 
greatest importance to the normalisation of 
relations between the United Kingdom and 
Argentina on the basis of negotiations with no 
prior conditions. Some go so far as to make 
the acceptance of negotiations an essential 
condition for the development of a profitable, 
co-operative dialogue between the West and 
Latin America. 
3.18. Without concealing the difficulties 
involved in resuming negotiations, the United 
States and Canada also consider them essential, 
as do the EEC countries, this being shown by 
the European political co-operation meeting 
held in Copenhagen on 13th and 14th Septem-
ber 1982. 
3.19. The evolution of world opinion is shown 
in the resolution 1 of the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted on 5th November 
1982 by 90 votes (including the United States 
and Greece) to 12 (including the United King-
dom) with 52 abstentions (including all other 
WEU countries). 
I. Text at Appendix I (m). 
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IV. International transfers 
of military equipment 
4.1. Argentina is an interesting and typical 
case in the history of exports of arms outside 
the alliance. Among the third world countries, 
Argentina is a major arms importer; its policy 
in this connection is dictated by considerations 
which may influence the arms trade in general 
but, like most Latin American countries 1, it 
has not procured Soviet equipment: 
(i) the third world countries seek to 
diversify their arms procurement for 
reasons which are more political 
than economic; 
(ii) they try not to link their military 
procurement with one of the two 
superpowers; 
(iii) the foothold gained by the four 
major European arms producers in 
trade with the third world countries 
has increased the latter's logistic and 
training difficulties; 
(iv) the European countries have made a 
considerable contribution to creating 
national military production capabi-
lities in the third world countries; 
(v) the place taken in the international 
arms market by the exportation of 
the national production of third 
world countries has reduced the 
Europeans' margin of manceuvre. 
4.2. The South Atlantic crisis has had reper-
cussions on almost all the problems of sales of 
arms to the third world, but what has affected 
Europeans most is the lack of prior political 
co-ordination among the allies. Although the 
specific case of the Falklands conflict could not 
be foreseen at the time contracts for the supply 
of military equipment were concluded between 
Argentina and the various alliance countries, a 
conflict in the area could not be excluded, 
given the existence of numerous territorial 
claims. Nevertheless, there seem to have been 
no prior consultations between allied supplier 
countries in spite of the many relevant bodies 
for international consultations in which all the 
WEU countries take part: the CNAD in 
NATO, the SAC in WEU and the IEPG, which 
latter even set up sub-group 5 of Panel 3 to 
handle the very question of exports. In the 
event, Argentine forces equipped with Belgian, 
French, German, Italian, Netherlands and even 
British weapons fought British forces and even 
sank British warships with French missiles 
I. The exceptions being Cuba, Guyana, Nicaragua and 
Peru. 
some of whose components are produced by 
four United Kingdom firms 1• 
4.3. According to SIPRI 2 statistics, Argentina 
is the second Latin American importer of major 
military equipment, after Peru but before Chile 
and Brazil, and the fourteenth of the twenty 
leading third world importers, particularly since 
1977. Prior to that date, Argentine military 
imports never exceeded 3.1 % of total imports. 
In 1978, the figure was 9.3%. According to 
ACDA 3 figures, during the period 1970-79 
Argentina imported $ 1,195 million of arma-
ments (1978 constant prices). These were 
warships, submarines, combat aircraft, helicop-
ters, missiles and armoured vehicles, most of 
them European. During the seventies, it even 
began to export its own military output. 
Unlike the other third world countries which 
re-export arms purchased from the industrial-
ised countries (e.g. Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia), 
Argentina is one of two Latin American coun-
tries (the other being Brazil) which export 
nationally-produced weapons, generally pro-
duced under licence. This is the case of T AM 
tanks and Pucara aircraft. 
4.4. In the seventies, Argentina produced light 
aircraft, including the Pucara IA-58, and the 
OH-6 helicopter, under French and American 
licences respectively. In the eighties it has had 
talks with the German firm Dornier on produc-
ing the Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft. Argentine 
naval shipyards have built destroyers, frigates, 
patrol craft and ocean reconnaissance ships and 
assembled German submarines. Where 
armoured vehicles are concerned, the AMX-13 
was produced under French licence as from 
1969 and the T AM (Tanque Argentina Medi-
ano) tank under German licence. Another 
version of the T AM, the VCTP (infantry 
combat vehicle), went into production in 
1980. In the eighties, the Direccion General de 
Fabricaciones Militares expects to meet most 
national military requirements. These are 
mainly light weapons and new items such as a 
radio-guided supersonic naval missile and a 
fire-and-forget rocket produced by the Armed 
Forces Technical and Scientific Research 
Centre. It is believed that 68 % of anti-tank 
missiles are assembled in Argentina and the rest 
imported from Germany. 
4.5. Argentina has the highest military expen-
diture in Latin America, although it has fewer 
armed forces than Brazil and Mexico. Like 
Chile and Peru, more than 2 % of its GNP 
is earmarked for military expenditure. It is 
I. Da1ly Telegraph. 29th .lul~ 19X2 
2. Stocld10lm International Peace Re-.earch ln-.lltute. 
World Armaments and D1sarmament Yearbook 1982. 
3. United States Arm' Control and D1,armamcnt Agency, 
World military expenditures and arms tramfers 1970-79. 
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therefore among the six leading arms importers 
in Latin America (with Br&zil, Chile, Cuba, 
Peru and Venezuela). It has always turned to 
the western countries for equipment for its 
armed forces: first the United States but also the 
United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, :Italy, Spain, Aus-
tria and even Israel. 
4.6. Between 1950 and 1960, the United 
Kingdom dominated the European market for 
military exports to Argentina. but during the 
sixties France took a share in the market with 
its Mirage V supersonic aircraft. Various Latin 
American countries then asked the United 
States for more sophisticated arms such as the 
F-5 supersonic aircraft, but the idea of the 
Alliance for Progress launched by President 
Kennedy made the United States give priority 
to the economic development of third world 
countries and to refuse to supply them with the 
latest arms. At that time, only France stepped 
into the breach left by the American restric-
tions. In the seventies, its example was fol-
lowed by the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Italy. In 1978, an embargo on new contracts 
for the supply of American military equipment 
to Argentina was decided by the Carter admin-
istration as a reaction against violations of 
human rights committed by the authoritarian 
Argentinian regime. This time, all the Euro-
peans took advantage of it. No new contracts 
for sales of American military equipment to 
Argentina have been signed since 1978, 
although last year Congress authorised the new 
administration to lift the 1978 embargo pro-
vided President Reagan certified that Argentina 
had made progress in the field of human rights 
- which he has not yet done. All the arms 
contracts in force at the beginning of the 
Falklands crisis were signed by European indus-
tries, and the last deliveries of equipment (since 
the 1978 American embargo) prior to the inva-
sion of the Falklands came from Europe. 
4.7. The outbreak of the South Atlantic 
conflict produced immediate reactions in sup-
plier countries. They decided to place an 
embargo on all exports of weapons, spare parts 
and other military equipment to Argentina. 
The first to do so were the members of the EEC 
(on 2nd April 1982), the embargo being expli-
citly mentioned in the ten-power declaration in 
the framework of European political co-opera-
tion on 1Oth April 1982: 
"In this context the Ten 
1
noted that their 
governments have already decided to 
apply a complete embargo on the export 
of arms and military equipment to 
Argentina. " 
This embargo is not included in the regulation 
promulgated by the EEC Council on 14th April 
1982 on economic sanctions against Argentina 
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in view of the fact that, according to Article 
113 of the Rome Treaty, the EEC has no 
defence responsibilities. Consequently, they 
were individual decisions taken by the ten 
countries. On 5th and 13th April respectively, 
Canada and New Zealand and on 30th April 
the United States announced similar embargoes. 
4.8. Once hostilities had ended, however, 
exports were resumed more quickly than the 
United Kingdom might have wished in the 
absence of an explicit declaration by Argentina 
terminating hostilities. After the meeting of 
EEC Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Luxem-
bourg on 20th June 1982, Mr. Cheysson, 
French Minister for External Relations, decla-
red that in spite of the embargo having been 
lifted on products imported from Argentina the 
embargo on arms exports would be maintained 
as long as no juridical solution had been found 
to the South Atlantic conflict. Two months 
later (9th August), the French Ministry of 
Defence spokesman said: 
" Existing contracts 1 between Paris and 
Buenos Aires will be honoured, relations 
between the two countries again being 
normal, and it is not out of the question 
that others will be concluded. " 
On 28th September 1982, the Federal German 
Ministry of Defence spokesman said the Federal 
Republic had decided to lift the embargo on 
military supplies to Argentina. Mainly con-
cerned were three contracts signed in the late 
seventies between the Argentine navy and the 
German Thyssen Nordseewerke, Thyssen 
Rheinstahl and Blohm and Voss shipyards. 
The first was for the construction in Germany 
of two TR-1700 submarines and supplying 
Buenos Aires with components for four further 
submarines of the same type to be built in 
Argentina; delivery of the first (launched at the 
end of 1980) is planned for 1983. The second 
contract provided for the construction in Ger-
many of four Meko-360 destroyers, the first two 
of which (launched in 1981) are to be delivered 
at the end of this year. The third contract 
provided for the construction in Argentina of 
six Meko-140 frigates, the first of which 
(launched at the beginning of 1982) was not yet 
ready at the time of the conflict. These three 
German weapons systems have equipment pro-
duced in Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. The day after the German embargo 
was lifted, the British press revealed that the 
British Government had even authorised Rolls-
Royce to export to Germany turbines intended 
for German vessels built for Argentina. At the 
meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
European Community on 20th September 
I. Additional Super-Etendard aircraft equipped with 
Exocet AM-39 missiles. 
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1982, according to the press 1, the British Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Pym, is said to have told his 
colleagues: 
" The haste shown by France, Germany 
and Holland in resuming arms contracts 
amounted to giving the thief a premium 
after all. " 
4.1 0. Supplies of arms to Argentina are only a 
special instance of the international transfer of 
arms to non-allied countries, particularly Ame-
rican, European and Soviet arms to third world 
countries. Available data show that this trade 
is snowballing for various economic, trade and 
political reasons which encourage exports and 
imports: 
(i) exports are encouraged by the strong 
competition between European 
industries, compelled to amortise the 
cost of armaments research and deve-
lopment by seeking longer produc-
tion runs than required for the 
limited demands of their own armed 
forces; 
(ii) imports are encouraged by the feeling 
of insecurity prevailing in third world 
countries, which claim the right to 
procure the arms they consider 
necessary for their own defence. 
The committee has examined this matter on 
several occasions 2 • 
4.11. The problem has always proved difficult 
to solve. It is difficult for the European pro-
ducer countries to agree on a voluntary limita-
tion of their exports on the one hand because of 
the competition which exists between the Euro-
pean allies and between the latter and the 
Soviet Union, and on the other because any 
policy of denying arms to third world countries 
is strongly resented by them who see it as 
a neo-colonialist move by former colonial 
powers. 
4.12. At present, two types of solution might 
be envisaged, foster coproduction agreements or 
seek regional agreements. (i) Present Euro-
pean coproduction agreements contain special 
provisions relating to exports requiring some-
times the agreement and sometimes the opinion 
of the other partners, each programme being a 
special case. Reduced competition resulting 
from coproduction, the possibility of research 
costs being amortised on longer domestic pro-
duction runs and the need to take the partners' 
export policy into consideration tend to reduce 
I. Daily Telegraph, 24th September 1982. 
2. Particularly m the report on the mternat10nal trade m 
armaments, Document 500, 4th December 1969, Rappor-
teur: Colonel Bourgoin. 
exports 1• (ii) The other means of collabora-
tion which may be envisaged in this connection 
is the signature of regional agreements by the 
importing countries, possibly associated with 
the exporting countries. This has already been 
proposed several times in Latin America and 
Africa to limit all imports of armaments which 
might endanger the existing balance in a given 
area. 
V. Warning and alert 
5.1. The concept of warning of impending 
attack - essential if defence measures are to be 
implemented - cannot be discussed in isolation 
from the whole background of relations bet-
ween parties to a dispute and the various 
signals which, deliberately or at times unwit-
tingly, each party may have been giving to 
the other through its declarations and actions, 
and on which the other party will have made 
its assessment of the situation and based its 
policy. 
(a) Signals 
5.2. Argentina's claim to the Falklands is 
historical, dating back to a Spanish settlement 
on East Falkland for forty-four years up to 
1811, and a small settlement established by 
Buenos Aires from 1820 to 1831, removed by a 
United States vessel, and for four months at the 
end of 1832 until its final removal by British 
forces in January 1833, reasserting a British 
claim to sovereignty dating from 1765. Since 
January 1833, all the Falkland Islands have 
been under British administration and inhabited 
by British settlers. 
5.3. Argentina pressed its claim to sovereignty 
in the United Nations and in December 1965 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
2065 invited Argentina and the United King-
dom to proceed with negotiations to find a 
peaceful solution to the problem of the Falk-
land Islands. Bilateral talks in 1970 and 1971 
led to agreements on social, economic and 
commercial relations which provided for trans-
port between Argentina and the islands by sea 
and by air, and for postal and telecommunica-
tions services. Oil supplies to the island from 
Argentina were agreed in 1974 and Argentina 
developed the Port Stanley airstrip providing an 
air link with the mainland. Throughout, 
Argentina sought to negotiate a transfer of sove-
reignty; while the United Kingdom insisted that 
sovereignty could not be transferred without the 
consent of the inhabitants. 
I. The Chairman of the Matra company told the Defence 
Committee of the French National Assembly on lOth June 
1982 that co-operation led to export markets being limited, 
not extended. 
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5 .4. From the mid-19 70s, such negotiations 
with the military regime in Buenos Aires were 
made difficult for the United Kingdom because 
of the internal policy of repression organised, or 
at least tolerated, by the military authorities 
which led to the assumed deaths of from 6,000 
to 15,000 desaparecidos. During an economic 
survey of the Falklands Islands in 1976, an 
Argentine vessel fired shots across the bows of a 
British research ship, Ambassadors were with-
drawn from London and Buenos Aires, and fuel 
supplies to the islands cut qff by Ar~entina in 
October 1977. Not for the first time there 
were then threats of an invasion in the Argen-
tine press, and intelligence reports reaching the 
British Government in November 1977 led, it 
was disclosed by the then Prime Minister, Mr. 
Callaghan, in a speech following the Argentine 
invasion of 2nd April 1982, to the despatch of a 
nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarine to 
the area of the Falklands accompanied, at a 
distance of some hundreds of miles, by two fri-
gates, essential for communications purposes. 
Reports differ as to whether Argentina was 
privately informed of these precautionary 
defence measures or not, and therefore it is not 
clear whether the despatch of the submarine 
acted as a deterrent or not. Bilateral talks were 
resumed between the two countries in Decem-
ber 1977 but without substantial results. 
5.5. Attention has focused on proposals dis-
cussed with the Falkland Islands inhabitants by 
a British Foreign Office Minister, Mr. Nicholas 
Ridley, in November 1980 when he suggested 
four options: a transfer of sovereignty; a transfer 
of sovereignty with leaseback of administration 
to Britain for a specified period (99 years); a 
freeze on political arrangements pending a 
strengthening of commercial and economic ties 
with Argentina; or the breaking off of negotia-
tions. Large numbers of Argentine journalists 
attended Mr. Ridley's public meetings with the 
islanders who rejected any proposal other than 
a freeze on political negotiations. On 2nd 
December 1980, speakers of all parties in the 
House of Commons were insistent that the 
wishes of the islanders should be paramount. 
At meetings in New York in February 1981, 
between representatives of Argentina, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the inhabitants of the islands, 
the British proposal for a flieeze on political 
negotiations was rejected by Argentina. 
5.6. Decisions announced in the British 
defence white paper of April 1981 and there-
after provided for significant ~reductions in the 
long term of surface vessels in the Royal Navy 
- a reduction of as much as one-third in 
destroyers and frigates - albeit with increased 
emphasis on maritime patrol aircraft and 
hunter-killer submarines. THe ice patrol ship 
Endurance of 3,600 tons, equipped with two 
20 mm guns- the only vessel maintained in the 
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area of the Falkland Islands - was to be 
withdrawn from service in May 1982. 
5.7. In March 1981, a slightly more moderate 
military leader, General Viola, had been instal-
led as president of the Argentine junta but 
following a period of ill health was replaced in 
December 1981 by General Galtieri who, inci-
dentally, retained his position of Chief of Army 
Staff. Prior to becoming president, General 
Galtieri had visited the United States twice in 
1981 and was reported to have been negotiating 
on possible United States military bases in 
Patagonia. Certainly the Reagan administra-
tion had seen in General Viola, and in General 
Galtieri in particular, a useful partner in Latin 
American relations in general, designed prima-
rily to exclude Soviet influence from the area, 
although the administration had not gone as far 
as rescinding the 1978 Carter embargo on the 
conclusion of any further arms supply contracts 
with Argentina. 
5.8. With hindsight it can be seen that the 
combination of these various developments 
may well have led the Argentine junta to 
assume that the British Government was not 
very deeply committed to retaining sovereignty 
over the Falkland Islands; was chiefly hampered 
in negotiations by the obduracy of the inhabit-
ants; and was certainly not planning to defend 
the islands. Unaccustomed to heeding parlia-
ments themselves, the military junta took no 
account of all-party opposition in the House of 
Commons to any transfer of sovereignty. Apart 
from the various British negotiators who had 
met their Argentine counterparts, the United 
Kingdom authorities in London, for their part, 
appear to have remained largely oblivious to 
the strength of Argentine feeling on the issue. 
(b) Diplomatic warning 
5.9. The change in government with the 
appointment of General Galtieri and the new 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Costa Mendez, led to a 
postponement until February 1982 of the next 
round of bilateral talks due to be held in New 
York. Again with hindsight, a number of 
warning signs of impending invasion can now 
be discerned from diplomatic developments. 
5.10. In January, the Argentine paper La 
Prensa, as it had done at times in the past, 
predicted an Argentine invasion of the Falk-
lands, but added that it would occur before the 
150th anniversary of British occupation -
which would be January 1983. The new 
Argentine negotiator, Mr. Ros, was repeatedly 
questioned about the impending invasion by 
Argentine journalists before his departure for 
New York. 
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5.11. In New York in February, the new 
Foreign Office Minister, Mr. Luce, was met 
with a demand from Mr. Ros for urgent nego-
tiations within a fixed timetable to lead to 
Argentine sovereignty by the end of the year. 
However, the communique issued on 26th 
February 1982 spoke of the " cordial and posi-
tive spirit " of the talks at which it was agreed 
to submit to the two governments proposals for 
regular meetings of a negotiating commission 
and an attempt at .least to achieve agreement in 
twelve months. On his return to Buenos Aires, 
however, it was reported that the compromise 
negotiating procedure proposed by Mr. Ros had 
been rejected by the junta. 
5.12. On 19th March, some 60 Argentine 
scrap-metal workers were landed at the port of 
Leith on the South Georgia dependency by an 
Argentine naval transport, and hoisted an 
Argentine flag. They were demolishing an old 
whaling station under commercial agreement 
with the owners, a British firm, and their 
landing in itself does not appear directly linked 
to the subsequent invasion of the Falklands 
although it clearly had the blessing of the 
Argentine navy which supplied the transport. 
Following a British protest and a request that 
the party either comply with immigration for-
malities with the British authorities at the 
neighbouring port of Grytviken( or else leave 
the island, the British Ambassador in Buenos 
Aires was understood to have been assured that 
the party would be removed, and indeed on 
21st March the Argentine flag and all but 
twelve of the workers left. Quite suddenly at 
this point, the situation in South Georgia, some 
I ,500 km from the Falklands, deteriorated 
dramatically. On 25th March, the remaining 
Argentine personnel were resupplied by a 
second Argentine naval transport and two 
Argentine corvettes were reported to be in the 
neighbourhood of the Falklands. The follow-
ing day Mr. Costa Mendez, the Argentine 
Foreign Minister, announced that the naval 
transport had been despatched to South Georgia 
to give " all the diplomatic protection and 
security necessary " to Argentine nationals. 
5.13. The only military force Britain had in the 
area was a small company of fifty marines in 
the Falklands and the ice patrol vessel Endur-
ance. Following the incident on South Geor-
gia, Endurance finally left Port Stanley with 
twenty-one of the marines to enforce the depar-
ture of the illegal Argentine working party, but 
with the arrival of three Argentine warships in 
the area, it was powerless to do so. At this 
time, about forty Royal Marines, flown to Uru-
guay as regular relief for the marines on the 
island, were transported to the Falklands by the 
British Antarctic survey ship, John Biscoe, but 
were left on the islands as reinforcements - only 
twenty-four hours before the invasion. 
(c) Alert 
5.14. Details of intelligence reports reaching 
London are not of course known, nor, although 
it has access to them, are they likely to be 
revealed by Lord Franks's commission which is 
due to report by the end of the year. 
5.15. The highest level of intelligence assess-
ment in the British Government machine is the 
Joint Intelligence Committee composed chiefly 
of a senior Foreign Office official, the head of 
the Cabinet Office Security and Intelligence 
Section, and the head of the Intelligence 
Service. It compiles a weekly report from the 
submissions of its Current Intelligence Groups -
sub-committees dealing with different geogra-
phical areas. The JIC weekly report or " Red 
Book " contains summaries from all sources, 
open and clandestine, of developments in differ-
ent parts of the world and a confidential, more 
detailed appendix with very restricted circula-
tion which may contain vital pieces of intelli-
gence material. It is circulated to ministers on 
the Cabinet Overseas and Defence Committee. 
5 .16. Probably inspired press reports are now 
claiming that the Latin American CIG assess-
ments of Argentine intentions for a few weeks 
prior to the invasion were quite alarmist, but 
that the JIC assessment reaching ministers was 
much blander 1, stressing that invasion threats 
had often been made before. 
5.17. Definite evidence of the impending inva-
sion appears from press reports to have reached 
London only on Monday, 29th March, 
although there is some dispute about the parti-
cular ministerial level that the information 
reached. Uruguay, whose navy had been on 
joint manoeuvres with the Argentine navy the 
previous week, had asked if the inhabitants of 
the Falklands wished to leave the islands before 
the invasion. Hard military evidence of prepa-
rations for the invasion may very well not have 
been evident because a very large opposed 
landing did not have to be attempted. Argen-
tina would have full intelligence on the small 
company of fifty British marines on the island 
who had no artillery or any heavy equipment. 
The Argentine landings at Port Stanley at 
dawn on 2nd April involved only 2,000 men, 
albeit with artillery and some armour ; the 
landing fleet had left Argentine ports only on 
31st March. After the capture of Port Stanley 
on 2nd April, the Argentine garrison and its 
equipment on the Falklands were built up 
steadily by sea and air in the three weeks that 
elapsed between the invasion and the arrival of 
the first British forces in the area. There was, 
of course, no longer any need for secrecy. 
5.18. It is worth asking, with hindsight, what 
measures might have been taken to prevent the 
I. The Economist, 19th June 1982, pages 41 et seq. 
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conflict once the British authorities had finally 
come to believe that an invasion was imminent 
(29th March). 
5.19. As the Falkland Islands are less than two 
days' steaming from Argentine ports, but seve-
ral weeks from British ports, and as the forces 
on the spot were negligible, no military mea-
sures were possible in the time available. 
5.20. The United States was asked to intervene 
diplomatically, and finally President Reagan 
had a direct telephone conversation with Gene-
ral Galtieri on I st April. Coming as it did, 
however, a day after the Argentine invasion 
fleet had sailed, it could have stopped the 
landings only with much loss of face for the 
junta. But even at this stage an unambiguous 
warning that the United States would be 
obliged to side with the United Kingdom if 
Argentina used force to settle a dispute, might 
well have been decisive. To judge from Argen-
tine bitterness when the United States finally 
did take sides on 30th April, such a direct 
warning does not appear to have been given on 
1st April. 
5.21. The emergency consultation in the Secu-
rity Council leading to its president's agreed 
statement of 1st April calling on both parties 
" to refrain from the use or threat of force " has 
been described (paragraph 2.2). This state-
ment should have had considerable deterrent 
effect coming as it did from the world body, but 
in itself carried no threat of sanctions. If the 
functioning of European political co-operation 
described in paragraph 2.8 et seq could have 
been expedited by even twenty-four hours to 
produce a warning communique before the 
Argentine landings that if it used force Argen-
tina would encounter the solidarity of the 
Community countries, would incur economic 
sanctions and certainly an arms embargo, then 
the invasion might have .been averted. A 
similar warning from NATO would have been 
no less effective, but could not have been 
negotiated prior to a decision by the United 
States to side with the United Kingdom. 
(d) Conclusi01t 
5.22. Diplomatic warning of impending attack, 
and even hard intelligence of military prepara-
tion for attack, may very often seem ambiguous 
to democratic governments bent on finding 
peaceful solutions to a dispute, and controlling 
inflationary defence costs at the same time. 
Two measures however will improve the chan-
ces of clear warning being given: first ensuring 
the presence on the spot of reasonable defence 
forces; second pursuing an unambiguous and 
declared policy of not yielding to force, while 
being prepared for reasonable mutual conces-
sions through negotiation. These measures 
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together will impose on any potentially bellige-
rent adversary the need to make deliberate and 
large-scale preparations for any attack which, in 
turn, are more likely to provide clear and more 
timely warning to the threatened party. 
5.23. Urgent consultation in European political 
consultation and where possible NATO, as well 
as in the Security Council, should be used in an 
attempt to avert a conflict, as well as to 
condemn it, and to support an ally after it has 
broken out. 
VI. Military lessons 
(a) Conduct of operations 
6.1. Following the Argentine landings on the 
Falklands on 2nd April, the first elements of a 
British task force left Portsmouth on 5th and 
6th April, sailing via Ascension Island - a 
British island in the South Atlantic containing 
an airfield normally operated by personnel of 
the United States which has satellite communi-
cations facilities on the island. 5,000 miles 
from the United Kingdom and 3,500 from the 
Falklands, Ascension Island served as an 
important staging area throughout the oper-
ations. 
6.2. From announcements made on 9th and 
14th April the naval combat vessels in the task 
force comprised some eighteen vessels including 
the major units shown in Table 1. By the end 
of April, the task force amounted to some 
seventy vessels including thirteen Royal Fleet 
Auxiliary support ships and thirty-nine requisi-
tioned or chartered merchant vessels including 
three passenger liners and the large container 
ship Atlantic Conveyor, some of which were 
fitted with improvised flight decks to carry 
helicopters or, in the case of Atlantic Conveyor, 
Harrier aircraft. The total force eventually 
reached about 100 ships, including a maximum 
of fifty-two merchant vessels. British nuclear-
propelled hunter-killer submarines also took 
part in the operations, but information on their 
numbers and movements was not released. 
Some 13,000 men ofthe Royal Navy (excluding 
Marines) and Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and 2,000 
merchant seamen were involved. 
TABLE 1 
Aircraft-carriers: 
Destroyers: 
Country class { 
Type 42 { 
Frigates: 
Type 21 { 
Type 22 ~ 
Rothesay class 
Assault ships: 
Logistic landing ships: 
Major naval units in the British task force 
Hermes 
Invincible 
Antrim 
Glamorgan 
Sheffield 
Glasgow 
Coventry 
Alacrity 
Antelope 
Arrow 
Ardent 
Broadsword 
Brilliant 
Plymouth 
Yarmouth 
Fearless 
Intrepid 
Sir Galahad 
Sir Tristram 
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(Sea Harrier aircraft ; Sea King, W essex 
helicopters; Sea Cat missiles) 
(Sea Harrier aircraft ; Sea King, W essex 
helicopters; Sea Dart missiles) 
(Exocet, Sea Slug, Sea Cat missiles ; 
W essex helicopters) 
(Lynx helicopters; Sea Dart missiles) 
(Lynx helicopters; Exocet, Sea Cat 
missiles) 
(Lynx helicopters; Exocet, Sea Wolf 
missiles) 
(Wasp helicopters; Sea Cat missiles) 
(Wessex helicopters; Sea Cat missiles) 
6.3. British ground forces taking part in the 
operation totalled about 10,000 including one 
infantry brigade, two parachute battalions and 
some 2,000 to 3,000 Royal Marines. Fourteen 
RAF Harrier GR-3 ground-attack aircraft 
joined the fleet, operating together with twenty-
eight of the naval interceptor version of the 
Harrier normally carried on the aircraft-
carriers. Additional air force units operating 
included a small number of Vulcan bombers; 
Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft ; and Hercules 
and VC-10 transports which lifted large quant-
ities of supplies to Ascension Island. 
6.4. Following the surrender of Argentine 
forces on South Georgia on 25th April, oper-
ations against the Falklands Islands themselves 
began with a bombing attack and naval bom-
bardment of the Port Stanley airfield on 1st 
May, and the sinking of the Argentine cruiser 
General Belgrano by a submarine on 2nd 
May. After a period of air battles, bombard-
ments, and reconnaissance landings on the 
islands, the major British landing was made at 
San Carlos, some 100 km from Port Stanley, on 
21st May and, following subsidiary landings at 
Bluff Cove some 25 km from Port Stanley, the 
Argentine forces, most of which had been 
concentrated in Port Stanley throughout, sur-
rendered on 14th June. The Argentine 
Foreign Minister on 5th July announced that 
there was a "de facto cease-fire on the part of 
Argentina ", but did not confirm that there was 
a final end to hostilities. Speaking in the 
United Nations General Assembly on 3rd Octo-
ber, Mr. Juan Ranon Aguirre Lanari, the new 
Argentine Foreign Minister, said: 
" The hostilities in the area have ceased 
de facto, as everyone knows, and it is not 
the intention of my government to take 
the initiative to change this situation. " 
There has been no more formal statement from 
the Argentine Government. 
6.5. United States forces were not involved in 
the Falklands conflict, but, following Mr. Haig's 
statement1, on 30th April, the United States 
supplied undefined military assistance .. Infor-
mation released in Washington on 24th October 
said that substantial amounts of arms had been 
supplied including Shrike anti-radar missiles ; 
limpet mines to sink ships ; Stinger shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft missiles; Harpoon air-
launched anti-ship missiles and a resupply of 
100 of the latest AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air 
missiles. 
6.6. Following the cessation of hostilities, 
Britain is stationing a substantial garrison on 
the island which at present amounts to 4,000 
men, including 1,000 combat troops, and an 
I. Text at Appendix 11. 
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unspecified number of Phantom air-defence 
fighters. For these the Port Stanley runway 
has been lengthened to 1 ,800 metres, with 
arrester gear, and will be further extended to 
2,160 metres. 
6.7. The casualties in men and material 
suffered by both sides in the conflict are shown 
in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
TABLE 2 
Casualties to personnel 
United Argentina Kingdom 
Dead Wounded Dead or Wounded 
missing 
Army ..... 124 261 883 
Navy ..... 85 430 169 
Marines ... 26 
Air force .. 1 55 -
Other ..... 19 
Total •• 0. 0 255 777 746 1,052 
(b) Particular features of the conflict 
6.8. The British task force was operating at 
very great distances from its only (United 
Kingdom) base although using Ascension Island 
(still 3,000 miles from the Falklands) as a 
staging post, and possibly using South Georgia, 
800 miles from the Falklands, as a sheltered 
anchorage. Air defence for the force were 
shipborne missiles and Harrier aircraft. The 
Argentine air force was land-based, but in its 
turn was operating at the limits of its range. 
The conflict was chiefly a battle between the 
Argentine air force and the Royal Navy in the 
first phase, and between the air force and troops 
on the landing beaches during the last three 
weeks. The Argentine navy remained in port 
after the sinking of the Belgrano. The land 
battle was much more a test of troop training, 
morale and leadership against very difficult 
terrain and weather than a test of equipment 
except the invaluable helicopters. 
6.9. There was no declaration of war between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina; Britain 
has made no demand for reparations despite 
heavy naval losses. Targets in Argentina were 
not attacked by British forces, although it 
appears that small reconnaissance detachments 
may have operated there. The potential air 
threat following the attack 'On Port Stanley 
airfield obliged Argentina to maintain air 
defence on the mainland. 
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TABLE 3 
Aircraft losses 
By type of aircraft: 
Argentina 
A-4 Skyhawk 
Mirage Ill and V 
Canberra 
Pucara 
Mentor T34 
Aeromacchi 339 
Light aircraft 
C-130 
Unidentified aircraft 
Puma 
Chinook 
Huey Bell 
ToTAL 
United Kingdom 
Sea Harrier 
Harrier GR-6 
ToTAL 
31 
26 
1 
15 
4 
1 
2 
1 
19 
7 
1 
1 
-
109 
6 
3 
-
__2 
By weapon system: 
Ground forces: 
Sabotage 11 
Rapier missile 13 
Blowpipe missile 8 
Sea-based forces: 
Sea Dart missile 8 
Sea Wolf missile 5 
Sea Cat missile 6 
Gun 3 
Harrier with Sidewinder missile 31 
ground attack 19 
Other lost on ground: 9 
Fire from Argentine forces: 3 
ToTAL 109 
Accident: 4 
Ground forces: 
Roland missile 1 
Blowpipe missile 1 
AA guns 3 
-
TOTAL __2 
TABLE 4 
Naval vessels sunk 
United Kingdom 
Type 42 destroyer 
Type 21 frigate 
Logistic landing ships 
Container ships 
2 
2 
2 
1 
6.10. For the United Kingdom the problem of 
logistics supply over vast distances became 
supremely important, and without the ability to 
charter and requisition large numbers of mer-
chant ships, without any declaration of emer-
gency, the operation would not have been 
possible. The amount of successful improvisa-
tion in many fields was impressive, enabling 
ships and aircraft designed essentially for oper-
ations in the North Atlantic, where they will 
never be more than 600 miles from a friendly 
shore base, to be adapted for operations over a 
much greater range. Flight decks were fitted to 
merchant ships; in-flight refuelling probes to 
Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and Hercules 
168 
Argentina 
Cruiser 
Submarine 
Patrol boat 
Cargo boat 
Trawler 
C-130 transports ; Sidewinder missiles to RAF 
Harrier aircraft to give them a defence capabi-
lity. 
(c) Performance of equipment 
6.11. The United Kingdom Ministry of 
Defence is to issue a white paper towards the 
end of the year on the Falklands operation 
which will contain more information than that 
currently available. An interim report has, 
however, already been issued on 5th August 
and the following points serve to illustrate some 
of the lessons that NATO may learn from 
performance of weapons systems in the conflict. 
(i) Aircraft 
6.12. The only fixed-wing aircraft accom-
panying the British task force were the two 
versions of the Harrier - the navy interceptor 
and the RAF ground attack. The Harrier is a 
first generation vertical take-off and landing 
(VTOL) aircraft although, because of the reduc-
tion in payload or flying time resulting from a 
completely vertical take-off, in operational 
terms it is more correctly described as " short 
take-off and landing " or " short take-off and 
vertical landing ". It can operate at 5 50 knots 
at sea level although capable of exceeding Mach 
1 in a dive. At first sight this aircraft would 
appear no match for the faster Mirage-Ill, 
Mirage-V and Kfir aircraft of the Argentine air 
force capable of Mach .2 at altitude and 750 
knots at sea level. Operating, however, at 
extreme range from the Argentine mainland, 
the Mirages are unlikely to have flown at super-
sonic speeds in the vicinity of the Falklands 
because of the high fuel consumption involved. 
The Harrier's speed would be closer to that 
of the Skyhawk A-4. In the event, however, 
the air battle was not a contest of speed ; the 
extreme manoeuvrability of the Harrier and the 
high training of its pilots, made it more than a 
match for the other aircraft. A force of 
twenty-eight interceptors shot down thirty-one 
aircraft in air combat, and a further twelve were 
destroyed on the ground. No Harrier was lost 
in combat, although five were lost through 
accident or were destroyed by ground fire. 
6.13. The Vulcan, originally a strategic bomber 
designed to carry nuclear weapons, was pressed 
into service as a conventional bomber and 
made a small number of attacks on Port Stanley 
airfield from Ascension Island, requiring in-
flight refuelling at least twice on each mission. 
While the runway, built on solid rock, was 
cratered in one attack, it was not put out of 
action ; however, aircraft and radar installations 
on the ground were destroyed. 
6.14. Although attention has focused on the 
sinking of two ships by Exocet missiles, most 
damage was done to the vessels of the task force 
by conventional World War 11 pattern bombs 
dropped by the Mirage and Skyhawk aircraft in 
very low-level attacks pressed home with deter-
mination by the Argentine pilots. The lesson 
of World War 11 is demonstrated again that a 
task force, operating within range of land-based 
attack aircraft, is vulnerable. 
6.15. Little information has been made avail-
able about the performance of helicopters. 
They were obviously invaluable to both sides, 
particularly in the amphibious landings of the 
British force and subsequently in support of the 
land battle both to provide fire support and 
transport of troops and equipment in very diffi-
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cult terrain. Those available must always have 
seemed too few. 
(ii) Anti-ship missiles 
6.16. The Argentine forces had a small number 
of Exocet missiles, both shore-based and carried 
in a few Super Etendard aircraft. The Exocet 
is credited with the sinking of the destroyer 
Sheffield and the contaiher-ship Atlantic 
Conveyor. The early success of this sea-
skimming, radar-homing missile is said to have 
modified the tactics of the task force, obliging 
the aircraft-carriers to be maintained during 
most of the daylight hours to the east of the 
Falklands where they were virtually out of 
range of Argentine aircraft. It is not clear, 
however, whether such missiles will in future 
dominate naval warfare as there may have been 
exceptional circumstances in both these 
sinkings. 
6.17. The Sheffield was reported to have been 
taken by surprise with its radar temporarily out 
of action because of interference with its 
satellite communications system in use at the 
time for a transmission to the United King-
dom. The warhead of the Exocet did not 
explode, and the fire which spread rapidly 
throughout the Sheffield was caused by the 
missile's remaining propellant which continued 
to burn. The Sheffield was not fitted with the 
only anti-missile missile with the task force -
the Sea Wolf - only now coming into service, 
and carried by only two frigates among all the 
task force vessels. 
6.18. The Atlantic Conveyor was accidentally 
hit by an Exocet aimed at the destroyer Antrim, 
but deflected by chaff from the latter. A third 
vessel, the destroyer Glamorgan, was hit by a 
shore-based Exocet, but was not sunk. 
6.19. Some defensive measures can therefore be 
effective against Exocet. These include the Sea 
Wolf anti-missile missile and relatively simple 
chaff dispensers which jam the missile's radar. 
Guns with a very high rate of fire, such as the 
United States 3,000 rounds a minute Phalanx, 
are also available with an anti-missile capabi-
lity. 
(iii) Surface-to-air missiles 
6.20. The success of the surface-to-air missiles 
fitted to naval ships is shown in Table 3 above. 
They accounted for fewer aircraft than the 
Harrier. It is understood that some of the 
missile systems functioned better than others, 
but none were completely effective against 
simultaneous attacks by many aircraft. In the 
case of one system, while the missile actually 
on the launcher can be held immediately ready, 
once it is fired the reload from the magazine 
takes more than a minute before it is ready for 
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firing - a long time to wait in the face of air 
attack. 
6.21. The Rapier missile accompanying the 
ground forces was in action for the last three 
weeks following the San Carlos landings. It is 
credited with the destruction of thirteen aircraft 
and undoubtedly provided good air defence of 
the landing beaches and can be fired in close 
proximity to own troops because fused to 
explode only on contact, not in proximity. 
But there are reports that this missile too took 
some time for its guidance system to stabilise 
after coming into action, so it was not always 
available immediately on landing. 
(iv) Aircraft-carriers 
6.22. The two small aircraft-carriers, Hermes 
and Invincible, accompanying the British task 
force, are not capable of operating conventional 
fixed-wing aircraft. The Invincible has a flight 
deck of 168 metres and normally carries ten Sea 
King helicopters and only five Harrier aircraft. 
United States aircraft-carriers of the Kitty-
hawk class by comparison are 320 metres 
overall with 240 metres of angled flight deck, 
still equipped with steam catapults. They 
carry some eighty-five relatively high-perform-
ance fixed-wing aircraft including the F-14 or 
F-4 interceptor capable of a speed in excess of 
Mach 2 ; A-7 and A-6 attack aircraft, electronic 
counter-measures aircraft and four airborne 
early-warning E-2 aircraft. 
6.23. The British task force lacked long-range 
radar warning that airborne radar can give. 
Combined with a high-performance F-14 inter-
ceptor, the E-2 early-warning aircraft are 
claimed to give relative invulnerability to air 
attack to the United States carriers. The large 
carrier concept is, however, extremely expen-
sive compared with a small carrier of the size of 
the Invincible. The success of the Sea Harrier 
as an interceptor could be considerably enhan-
ced, however, if the task force could be 
provided with airborne early warning. 
6.24. The naval argument as to whether the 
large carrier is too expensive and too vulnerable 
to other forms of attack, especially from sea-
skimming and long-range missiles, will con-
tinue, but clearly in the Falklands conflict the 
Invincible was thought to be vulnerable to 
land-based air attack. 
(v) Nuclear-propelled submarines 
6.25. No information was released about the 
numbers or movements of the nuclear-propel-
led hunter-killer submarines employed in the 
Falklands operation. One of them, the 
Conqueror, sank the cruiser General Belgrano 
on 2nd May, and thereafter the whole of the 
Argentine fleet remained in port. On this 
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basis, the British submarines can be held to 
have completely removed the naval threat. 
Capable of submerged speeds as high or higher 
than those of surface vessels, and able to remain 
submerged for weeks at a time if necessary, the 
nuclear-propelled submarine is a formidable 
weapon. However, for communications pur-
poses, it will normally need to be accompanied, 
albeit at a considerable distance, by surface 
vessels ; it is not suitable for navigating in 
shallow waters ; it is noisier, and therefore 
potentially easier to detect, than modern diesel-
electric submarines and is, of course, consider-
ably more expensive than them. 
6.26. As mentioned in paragraph 5.4 above, 
Britain had previously deployed a nuclear-
propelled submarine in the area of the 
Falklands during the potential crisis in 
1977. It may then have acted as a sufficient 
deterrent to Argentine invasion. 
(vi) Design ofwarships 
6.27. One feature revealed in the Falklands 
conflict is the vulnerability of modern design 
warships to fire hazard when struck by bombs 
or missiles. Press reports have attributed this 
variously to the large amounts of plastic mate-
rial in electric cables on modern ships, to the 
use of aluminium in the superstructure to save 
weight, or even to the use of thinner steel sheet 
in the superstructure than hitherto. Naval 
architects will certainly be paying attention to 
the need to improve both fire-fighting equip-
ment and fire-resistant properties in the design 
of ships. 
(vii) To sum up 
6.28. At strictly military level, the events most 
characteristic of the Anglo-Argentine conflict 
for possession of the Falkland Islands clearly 
illustrate the tasks attributable to naval air 
forces, the principles governing the conduct of 
naval warfare and the means required for 
implementing the former and applying the 
latter in an appropriate manner. 
6.29. In particular, and apart from the evolu-
tion of naval air operations which depends 
mainly on political events, the final outcome of 
the conflict was favourable to the British task 
force which managed to obtain sea control of 
the whole area concerned and then the power 
projection of its naval air strength over the 
disputed territory thanks to air support, amphi-
bious landing and supply and reinforcement 
operations. 
6.30. Events in the South Atlantic confirm 
that, even when they have a geographical 
advantage, countries which, when necessary, do 
not have appropriate naval air arrangements are 
not able to provide support for their own air 
and land forces, with the result, even if their 
positions are stronger and deeper, that they 
cannot avoid enemy attacks. In other words, if 
there is not limited sea control of areas of naval 
interest, which can be achieved only with a 
quantitatively and qualitatively appropriate 
naval air force equipped with all the surface, 
submarine and air elements, it is impossible to 
ensure the in-depth defence of the area con-
cerned and to bring in the supplies and 
reinforcements essential for the air and land 
front. 
6.31. Furthermore, the Argentine conflict 
amply demonstrated the fact that air forces, 
even if numerous and wholly available for 
naval air operations, but not trained or spe-
cially equipped, unlike naval forces, are not in 
a position to obtain tangible results, whereas 
naval air forces trained to operate at sea and 
equipped with appropriate weapons systems 
can inflict substantial losses on the enemy, even 
with limited offensives. Thus, British units 
suffered losses due to the Argentine naval 
aviation's Etendards and Skyhawks, which won 
the greatest victories against the Royal Navy. 
6.32. On the other front, the British task force 
showed how, in the framework of a naval force 
composed of surface and submarine units, the 
presence of even a few carrier-based air forces 
with V /STOL aircraft - whose performances 
and equipment may be improved subsequently 
- is one of the main elements on which the 
planning and implementation of any naval 
aviation operation must be based ; this element 
is in fact an irreplaceable weapons system avail-
able to the naval commander for countering a 
threat from afar effectively and at the right 
moment, particularly if it is from missiles. 
6.33. Events also confirmed the effectiveness of 
submarines, coupled with the irreplaceable task 
of surface ships, and in particular those special-
ising in command and control duties and of 
platforms appropriate for carrier-borne air 
forces for accurate air defence and for anti-
submarine and surface combat which must 
however have an appropriate active and passive 
self-defence capability against threats of all 
types. 
6.34. It was in fact clearly shown that certain 
savings made in the formation of naval units 
and, more generally speaking, in the structure 
of the fleet following budgetary restrictions or, 
worse, unforeseen reductions in funds for pro-
grammes already under way, ultimately detract 
from the performance of the equipment and its 
survivability, in the long run leading to losses 
far greater than the savings initially made. 
6.35. Similar considerations also apply to the 
decision-making process which leads to the 
abandonment or postponed procurement of 
equipment and weapons systems needed for 
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fully guaranteeing the in-depth defence of naval 
forces. 
6.36. In this respect, it is significant that the 
British system should be without airborne early 
warning systems and that all:-round and point 
defence are inadequate against attacks from air-
craft and missiles. 
VII. Conclusions 
7 .1. The committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation to 
which the explanatory memorandum relates as 
follows: 
Draft 
recommandation: 
Preamble: 
(i} and (iii) 
(ii) 
(iv) 
(v} 
(vi) 
(vii) 
( viii) 
(ix) 
(x) 
Operative text: 
l 
2 
3 (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
Explanatory memorandum: 
Chapter If, paragraphs 2.1 
to 2.7. 
Chapter I/, paragraphs 2.8 
to 2.11. 
Chapter II, paragraph 2.4. 
Chapter 11, paragraphs 2.12 
to 2.19. 
Chapter Il, paragraphs 2.31 
to 2.32. 
Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.1 
to 6.6. 
Chapter VI. paragraph 6. 7. 
Chapter I/, paragraph 2.26 
et seq. 
Chapter Ill. 
Chapter II, paragraph 2.30. 
Chapter Ill. 
Chapter I!, paragraph 2.30. 
Chapter v; paragraph 5.22. 
Chapter VI, paragraphs 
6.11 to 6.27. 
Chapter IV. 
VIII. Opinion of the minority 
8.1. The report as a whole was adopted in 
committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 absten-
tions. The minority held that the report 
should have laid some of the responsibility for 
the conflict on the United Kingdom and sought 
to include a demand for the immediate applica-
tion of the resolution adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly qn 5th November 
calling for negotiations betwe~n Argentina and 
the United Kingdom. It believed that the 
European Community was not competent to 
consider the points in the operative part of the 
draft recommendation, and was opposed to 
paragraph 1 of that text. 
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Official texts 
(a) Agreed statement by the President 
of the United Nations Security Council, 
Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire 
1st Apri/1982 
After holding consultations with mem-
bers of the Council, I have been authorised to 
make the following statement on behalf of the 
Council: 
" The Security Council has heard state-
ments from the representatives of the United 
Kingdom and Argentina about the tension 
which has recently arisen between the two 
governments. 
The Security Council has taken note of 
the statement issued by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, which reads as follows: 
The Secretary-General, who has already 
seen the representatives of the United 
Kingdom and Argentina earlier today, 
renews his appeal for maximum restraint 
on both sides. He will, of course, return 
to headquarters at any time, if the situa-
tion demands it. 
The Security Council, mindful of its 
primary responsibility under the Charter of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, expresses its 
concern about the tension in the region of the 
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). The Secur-
ity Council accordingly calls on the Govern-
ments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to 
exercise the utmost restraint at this time and in 
particular to refrain from the use or threat of 
force in the region and to continue the search 
for a diplomatic solution. 
The Security Council will remain seized 
of the question. " 
(b) European political co-operation-
Communique issued by the ten Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs 
2nd Apri/1982 
The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Ten 
condemn the armed intervention of the Argen-
tinian Government in the Falkland Islands, 
violating the declaration made on I st April by 
the President of the Security Council of the 
United Nations which is now dealing with the 
matter. They urgently call upon the Argentine 
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Government to wtthdraw its forces immediately 
and to abide by the United Nations Security 
Council appeal asking it to refrain from the use 
of force and to continue efforts towards a diplo-
matic solution. 
(c) Statement by the Secretary-General of 
NATO after the urgent meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council 
2nd Apri/1982 
Members of the Council expressed deep 
concern at the dispute between a member of the 
alliance and a state with which all have 
friendly relations and reiterated the call made 
to the parties by the President of the Security 
Council yesterday to refrain from the use or 
threat of force and to continue the search for a 
diplomatic solution. 
(d) United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 5021 
3rd Apri/1982 
The Security Council, 
Recalling the statement made by the 
President of the Security Council at the 2345th 
meeting of the Security Council on I st April 
1982 (S/ 14944) calling on the Governments of 
Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to refrain from the 
use or threat of force in the region of the 
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), 
Deeply disturbed at reports of an invasion 
on 2nd April 1982 by armed forces of Argen-
tina, 
Determining that there exists a breach of 
the peace in the region of the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas), 
I. Demands an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, 
2. Demands an immediate withdrawal of 
all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas), 
I. Voted for: France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, 
Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Zaire; 
voted against: Panama ; abstained: China, Poland, Soviet 
Union, Spain. 
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3. Calls on the Governments of Argen-
tina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplo-
matic solution to their differences and to 
respect fully the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
(e) European political co-operation-
Declaration by the Ten 
lOth Apri/1982 
1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the 
grave situation resulting from the invasion of 
the Falkland Islands by Argentina. 
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 
2nd April the Ten had already condemned the 
flagrant violation of international law which the 
Argentine military action constituted. 
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the 
continuation of this crisis, which endangers 
international peace and security. They there-
fore attach the greatest importance to the 
immediate and effective implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 502 in all its 
aspects, namely an immediate cessation of hos-
tilities, an immediate withdrawal of all Argen-
tine forces from the Falkland Islands, and a 
search for a diplomatic solution by the Govern-
ments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. 
4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity 
among the member countries of the Commun-
ity, the Ten decide to take a series of measures 
with respect to Argentina which should be put 
into operation as soon as possible. They will 
likewise take the measures necessary to ban all 
imports of Argentine origin into the Commun-
ity. In this context the Ten noted that their 
governments have already decided to apply a 
complete embargo on the export of arms and 
military equipment to Argentina. 
5. With respect to economic measures, these 
will be taken in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Community treaties. 
6. Given that the situation resulting from 
the invasion of the Falkland Islands by the 
Argentine armed forces is a cause of grave 
concern for the entire international community, 
the Ten call on other governments to associate 
themselves with their decisions, so as to ensure 
the full implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 502 with the least possible delay. 
(f) European Communities - Text of the 
regulation promulgated by the Council 
on economic sanctions against Argentina 
14th Apri/1982 
The Council of the European Commun-
ities, 
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Whereas the serious situation resulting 
from the invasion of the Falkland Islands by 
Argentina, which was the subject of Resolution 
502 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations, has given rise to discussions in the 
context of European political co-operation 
which have led in particular to the decision 
that economic measures will be taken with 
regard to Argentina in accordahce with the rele-
vant provisions of the Community treaties ; 
Whereas following the measures already 
taken by the United Kingdom the member 
states have consulted one another pursuant to 
Article 224 of the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community ; 
Whereas in the context bf these consulta-
tions it has proved important to take urgent and 
uniform measures and whereas the memoer 
states have therefore decided to adopt a Council 
regulation pursuant to the treaty ; 
Whereas in these circumstances the inte-
rests of the Community and the member states 
demand the temporary suspen~ion of imports of 
all products originating in Argentina ; 
Whereas import documents issued and 
contracts concluded before the entry into force 
of this regulation should not be affected by it ; 
whereas, however, transitional provisions 
should not be applied to i1mports into the 
United Kingdom which were the subject of 
United Kingdom measures with effect from 7th 
April; 
Having regard to the treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, and in 
particular Article 113 thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the 
Commission, 
Has adopted this regulation: 
Article 1 
Imports of all products originating in 
Argentina for the purpose of putting them into 
free circulation in the Community are hereby 
suspended. 
Article 2 
1. This regulation shall not preclude the 
putting into free circulation of products origin-
ating in Argentina 
- accompanied by import documents 
issued before the datt'l of its entry into 
force which mention Argentina as the 
country of origin, or 
- to be imported in execution of 
contracts concluded before that date, or 
- in course of shipment to the Commun-
ity at that date. 
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2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not 
apply to imports into the United Kingdom of 
products covered by this regulation which were 
the subject of measures adopted by the United 
Kingdom with effect from 7th April. 
Article 3 
This regulation shall enter into force on 
the day of its publication in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities. 
It shall apply until 17th May 1982. 
Before that date, the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall examine 
whether it is appropriate to extend, amend, or, 
if necessary, repeal this regulation. 
This regulation shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all member 
states. 
(g) Eurogroup - Communique issued after the 
meeting of the eleven Defence Ministers 
5th May 1982 
(Extract) 
Ministers condemned Argentina's armed 
invasion of the Falkland Islands and the depen-
dencies as well as her failure to comply with 
Security Council Resolution Number 502. 
Ministers noted the importance of maintaining 
the principle that aggression or occupation of 
territory by force should not be allowed to 
succeed, and urged the need to seek a negotia-
ted solution acceptable to all parties concerned 
on the basis of the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution Number 502 in all its parts. 
(h) NATO Defence Planning Committee-
Communique issued after the meeting 
of Defence Ministers 
7th May 1982 
(Extract) 
Ministers endorsed the statement by 
Eurogroup Ministers, in their communique of 
the previous day, in which they condemned 
Argentina's armed invasion of the Falkland 
Islands and the dependencies as well as her 
failure to comply with Security Council Resolu-
tion Number 502 ; noted the importance of 
maintaining the principle that aggression or 
occupation of territory by force should not be 
allowed to succeed ; and urged the need to seek 
a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties 
concerned on the basis of the implementation 
of Security Council Resolution Number 502 in 
all its parts. 
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(i) United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 505 
26th May 1982 
Following is the text of the resolution on 
the Falklands/Malvinas adopted unanimously 
on 26th May 1982 by the Security Council. 
The text was presented by Guyana, Ireland, 
Jordan, Togo, Uganda and Zaire, members of 
the Security Council: 
" The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its Resolution 502 (1982) of 
3rd April 1982, 
Noting with the deepest concern that the 
situation in the region of the Falkland Islands 
(Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated, 
Having heard the statement made by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council at its 
2360th meeting on 21st May 1982, as well as 
the statements in the debate of the representa-
tives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
Concerned to achieve as a matter of the 
greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an 
end to the present conflict between the armed 
forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
I. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-
General for the efforts which he has already 
made to bring about an agreement between the 
parties, to ensure the implementation of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 502 (1982), and thereby 
to restore peace to the region ; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the 
basis of the present resolution, to undertake a 
renewed mission of good offices bearing in 
mind Security Council Resolution 502 ( 1982) 
and the approach outlined in his statement of 
21st May 1982 ; 
3. Urges the parties to the conflict to co-
operate fully with the Secretary-General in his 
mission with a view to ending the present hosti-
lities in and around the Falkland Islands (lslas 
Malvinas); 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter 
into contact immediately with the parties with 
a view to negotiating mutually-acceptable terms 
for a cease-fire, including if necessary, arrange-
ments for the dispatch of United Nations obser-
vers to monitor compliance with the terms of 
the cease-fire ; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit 
an interim report to the Security Council as 
soon as possible and in any case not later than 
seven days after the adoption of this resolu-
tion. " 
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(j ) British draft interim agreement 
delivered by the British Representative 
at the United Nations, 
Sir Anthony Parsons, to the United Nations 
Secretary-General for communication 
to the Argentine Government 
17th May 1982 
Draft interim agreement 
The Government of the Republic of 
Argentina and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, responding to Security Council Resolution 
502 (1982) adopted on 3rd April 1982 under 
Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Having entered into negotiations through 
the good offices of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations for an interim agreement 
concerning the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvi-
nas), hereinafter referred to as " the islands ", 
Having in mind the obligations with 
regard to non-self-governing territories set out 
in Article 73 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the text of which is annexed hereto, 
Have agreed on the following: 
Article 1 
(I) No provision of this interim agreement 
shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims 
and positions of either party in the ultimate 
peaceful settlement of their dispute over the 
islands. 
(2) No acts or activities taking place whilst 
this interim agreement is in force shall consti-
tute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying 
a claim to territorial sovereignty over the 
islands or create any rights of sovereignty over 
them. 
Article 2 
(1) With effect from a specified time, 24 
hours after signature of this agreement (herein-
after referred to as time " T "), each party 
undertakes to cease and thereafter to refrain 
from all firing and other hostile actions. 
(2) Argentina undertakes: 
(A) to commence withdrawal of its 
armed forces from the islands with 
effect from time " T " ; 
(B) to withdraw half of its armed forces 
to at least 150 nautical miles away 
from any point in the islands by time 
" T " plus 7 days ; and 
(C) to complete its withdrawal to at least 
150 nautical miles away by time 
"T" plus 14 days. 
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(3) The United Kingdom undertakes: 
(A) to commence withdrawal of its 
armed forces from the islands with 
effect from time " T " ; 
(B) to withdraw half of its armed forces 
to at least 150 nautical miles away 
from any point in the islands by time 
" T " plus 7 days ; apd 
(C) to complete its withdrawal to at least 
150 nautical miles away by time 
"T" plus 14 days. 
Article 3 
With effect from time "T ", each party 
undertakes to lift the exclusion zones, warnings 
and similar measures which have been imposed. 
Article 4 
On the completion of the steps for with-
drawal specified in Article 2, each party under-
takes to refrain from reintroclucing any armed 
forces into the islands or within 150 nautical 
miles thereof. 
Article 5 
Each party undertakes to lift with effect 
from time " T " the economic measures it has 
taken against the other and to seek the lifting of 
similar measures taken by third parties. 
Article 6 
(l) Immediately after the signature of the 
present agreement, Argentina and the United 
Kingdom shall jointly sponsor a draft resolution 
in the United Nations under the terms of which 
the Security Council would take note of the 
present agreement, acknowledge the role 
conferred upon the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations therein, and authorise him to 
carry out the tasks entrusted to him therein. 
(2) Immediately after the adoption of the 
resolution referred to in pamgraph (l) of this 
article, a United Nations administrator, being a 
person acceptable to Argentina and the United 
Kingdom, shall be appointed by the Secretary-
General and will be the officer administering 
the government of the islands. 
(3) The United Nations administrator shall 
have the authority under the direction of the 
Secretary-General to ensure the continuing 
administration of the government of the islands 
He shall discharge his functions in consulta-
tion with the representative institutions in the 
islands which have been developed in accord-
ance with the terms of Article 73 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, with the excep-
tion that one representative from the Argentine 
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population normally resident on the islands 
shall be appointed by the administrator to each 
of the two institutions. The administrator 
shall exercise his powers in accordance with the 
terms of this agreement and in conformity with 
the laws and practices traditionally obtaining in 
the islands. 
(4) The United Nations administrator shall 
verify the withdrawal of all armed forces from 
the islands, and shall devise an effective method 
of ensuring their non-reintroduction. 
(5) The United Nations administrator shall 
have such staff as may be agreed by Argentina 
and the United Kingdom to be necessary for the 
performance of his functions under this agree-
ment. 
(6) Each party may have no more than three 
observers in the islands. 
Article 7 
Except as may be otherwise agreed bet-
ween them, the parties shall, during the cur-
rency of this agreement, reactivate the exchange 
of notes of 5th August 1971, together with the 
joint statement on communications between the 
islands and the Argentine mainland referred to 
therein. The parties shall accordingly take 
appropriate steps to establish a special consul-
tative committee to carry out the functions 
entrusted to the special consultative committee 
referred to in the joint statement. 
Article 8 
The parties undertake to enter into nego-
tiations in good faith under the auspices of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for the 
peaceful settlement of their dispute and to seek, 
with a sense of urgency, the completion of these 
negotiations by 31st December 1982. These 
negotiations shall be initiated without prejudice 
to the rights, claims or positions of the parties 
and without prejudgement of the outcome. 
Article 9 
This interim agreement shall enter into 
force on signature and shall remain in force 
until a definitive agreement about the future of 
the islands has been reached and implemented 
by the parties. The Secretary-General will 
immediately communicate its text to the Secu-
rity Council and register it in accordance with 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Done ... in the English and Spanish lan-
guages, in a single copy. 
For the Republic 
of Argentina 
For the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
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(k) Final communique issued after 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in ministerial session, Luxembourg 
18th May 1982 
(Extract) 
14. In view of the fundamental importance 
which they attach to the principle that the use 
of force to resolve international disputes should 
be resolutely opposed by the international com-
munity, the allies condemn Argentina for its 
aggression against the Falkland Islands and 
Dependencies and deplore the fact that after 
more than six weeks she has still not withdrawn 
her forces in compliance with mandatory Reso-
lution 502 of the Security Council. They call 
for a continuation of the efforts to achieve a 
satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance 
with this resolution in its entirety. 
(I) United Nations Security Council 
revised draft resolution proposed by Spain and 
Panama, vetoed' by the United Kingdom 
and the United States 2 
4th June 1982 
The Security Council, reaffirming its 
Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) and the 
need for implementation of all parts thereof, 
1. Requests the parties to the dispute to 
cease fire immediately in the region of the 
Falkland Islands (lslas Malvinas) and to initiate, 
simultaneously with the cease-fire, the imple-
mentation of Resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 
(1982) in their entirety ; 
2. Authorises the Secretary-General to use 
such means as he may deem necessary to verify 
compliance with this resolution ; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit 
an interim report to the Security Council 
within 72 hours and to keep the Council 
informed concerning the implementation of this 
resolution. 
I. The voting was: for: China, Ireland, Japan, Panama, 
Poland, Soviet Union, Spain, Uganda, Zaire (9); against: 
(Veto) Britain, United States (2); abstazned: France, 
Guyana, Jordan, Togo (4). 
2. The United States Representative stated after the vote 
that she would have abstained if she had received her new 
instructions in time. 
APPENDIX I 
(m) United Nations General Assembly 
resolution on the question of 
the Falkland Islands (Is/as Malvinas) 1 
5th November 1982 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the question of the 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas); 
Realising that the maintenance of colo-
nial situations is incompatible with the United 
Nations ideal of universal peace ; 
Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 
14th December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16th 
December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14th 
December 1973 and 31/49 of 1st December 
1976; 
Recalling further Security Council Reso-
lutions 502 (1982) of 3rd April 1982 and 505 
(1982) of 26th May 1982 ; 
Taking into account the existence of a de 
facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlan-
tic and the expressed intention of the parties 
not to renew them ; 
I. The voting was: for: 90 (including Greece, Spain and 
the United States; against: 12 (including the United 
Kingdom); abstained: 52 (including all other WEU coun-
tries). 
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Reaffirming the need for the parties to 
take due account of the interests of the popula-
tion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in 
accordance with the provisions of General 
Assembly Resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 
(XXVIII); 
Likewise reaffirming the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations on the non-use 
of force or the threat of force in international 
relations and the peaceful settlement of inter-
national disputes, 
1. Requests the Governments of Argentina 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in 
order to find as soon as possible a peaceful 
solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to 
the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) ; 
2. Requests the Secretary~General, on the 
basis of this resolution, to undertake a renewed 
mission of good offices in order to assist the 
parties in complying with the request made in 
paragraph 1 above, and to take the necessary 
measures to that end ; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit 
a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-
eighth session on the progress made in the 
implementation of this resolution ; 
4. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item 
entitled " Question of the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) ". 
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APPENDIX II 
Statement by Mr. Haig, United States Secretary of State 
30th Apri/1982 
(Extracts) 
The South Atlantic crisis is about to 
enter a new and dangerous phase, in which 
large-scale military action is likely. I would 
like to bring you up to date on what we have 
done, and why, and what we must no~ 
do. We have made a determined effort to 
restore peace through implementation of Uni-
ted Nations Security Council Resolution 
502. That resolution calls for: 
- an end to hostilities ; 
- the withdrawal of Argentine forces 
from the islands ; and 
- a diplomatic settlement of the funda-
mental dispute. 
The United States made this extraordi-
nary effort because the stakes in human lives 
and international order required it. From the 
outset, the United States has been guided by the 
basic principle of the rule of law and the peace-
ful settlement of disputes. The collapse of that 
principle could only bring chaos and suffering. 
We also made this effort because the 
crisis raised the vital issues of hemispheric 
solidarity at a time when the communist adver-
saries seek positions of influence on the main-
land of the Americas and latent territorial 
disputes in much of the hemisphere call for 
unity and the resolute defence of principle. 
We acted as well because the United 
States has the confidence of the parties. The 
United Kingdom is our closest ally, and Prime 
Minister Thatcher's government looked to us 
to pursue a peaceful solution. We have also 
recently developed a better relationship with 
Argentina, as part of our success in revitalising 
the community of American states. President 
Galtieri also requested our involvement. 
As the prospects for more intense hostili-
ties arose, we put forth an American propo-
sal... It involves: a cessation of hostilities ; 
withdrawal of both Argentine and British for-
ces ; termination of sanctions ; establishment 
of a United States-United Kingdom-Argentine 
interim authority to maintain the agreement ; 
continuation of the traditional local administra-
tion, with Argentine participation; procedures 
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for encouraging co-operation in the develop-
ment of the islands ; and a framework for nego-
tiations on final settlement, taking into account 
the interests of both sides and the wishes of the 
inhabitants. 
We had reason to hope that the United 
Kingdom would consider a settlement along the 
lines of our proposal, but Argentina informed 
us yesterday that it could not accept it. Argen-
tina's position remains that it must receive an 
assurance now of eventual sovereignty, or an 
immediate de facto role in governing the islands 
which would lead to sovereignty. 
For its part, the British Government has 
continued to affirm the need to respect the 
views of the inhabitants in any settlement. 
The United States has thus far refrained 
from adopting measures in response to the 
seizure of the islands that could have interfered 
with our ability to work with both sides in 
the search for peace. The British Government 
has shown complete understanding for this 
position. Now, however, ... the President has 
therefore ordered: 
- the suspension of all military exports to 
Argentina; 
- the withholding of certification of 
Argentine eligibility for military sales ; 
- the suspension of new export-import 
bank credits and guarantees; and 
- the suspension of commodity credit 
corporation guarantees. 
The President has also directed that the 
United States will respond positively to requests 
for materiel support for British forces. There 
will, of course, be no direct United States mili-
tary involvement. 
American policy will continue to be 
guided by our concerns for the rule of law and 
our desire to facilitate an early and fair settle-
ment. The United States remains ready to 
assist the parties in finding the settlement. A 
strictly military outcome cannot endure over 
time. In the end, there will have to be a 
negotiated outcome acceptable to the interested 
parties. Otherwise, we will all face unending 
hostility and insecurity in the South Atlantic. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
(1965-February 1982) 
16th December 1965 
The twentieth session of the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 
2065 (XX) which noted the existence of a 
dispute between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom about sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands: it invited the two governments to nego-
tiate and seek a peaceful solution. (This reso-
lution is one of a series of resolutions on ending 
colonialism.) Argentina voted for the resolu-
tion and the United Kingdom abstained. 
1966 
On 18th July, the two countries started 
preliminary talks in London. For the British, 
there was no question of discussing the question 
of sovereignty. 
On 28th September, there was a symbolic 
invasion of the Falklands by Argentinian 
commandos. The Argentinian Government 
dissociated itself from this invasion and from 
the anti-British demonstrations. 
1967-71 
On 19th December 1967, the twenty-first 
session of the United Nations General Assem-
bly unanimously adopted a resolution urging 
the two countries to continue negotiations and 
find a peaceful solution as soon as possible. 
The negotiations were continued in 
1968 ; the British Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs undertook, in the 
various parliamentary assemblies and during a 
visit to the Falklands (23rd-28th November), 
not to relinquish sovereignty over the islands to 
Argentina against the wishes of their inhabi-
tants. 
On 12th December, Argentina said it 
could not accept this position. The negotia-
tions were continued in 1969 and 1970 with 
more particular attention being paid to the 
problem of communications since in 1969 
Argentina said it was prepared to study ways of 
establishing and improving direct links between 
the continent and the islands. 
On 1st July 1971, the two countries 
reached agreement on measures for establishing 
regular sea and air communications, improving 
postal, cable and telephone connections and 
accepting inhabitants of the Falklands in 
schools and hospitals in Buenos Aires. 
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1973-77 
The return to power of General Juan 
Peron revived the controversy hetween the two 
countries at the end of 1973. On 14th Decem-
ber 1973, the United Nations General Assem-
bly adopted another resolution, No. 3160 
(XXVIII), urging the two parties to find a solu-
tion in order to put an end to the colonial 
situation. Relations deteriorated seriously at 
the end of 1973 when the United Kingdom 
announced its intention of sending an economic 
delegation to the Falklands: the Argentinian 
Ambassador in London was recalled on 28th 
October 1975 and the British Ambassador in 
Buenos Aires on 19th January 1976. In 
December 1976, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted another resolution which 
recalled earlier resolutions " and called upon 
the two parties to refrain from taking decisions 
which would imply introducing unilateral 
modifications in the situation while the islands 
were going through the process recommended 
in the abovementioned resolutions". The 
United Kingdom voted against it. 
The conclusions of the report of the 
economic delegation in 1976, which mentioned 
the need for closer relations with Argentina, led 
the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in 
1977. After a series of consultations with the 
inhabitants of the Falklands and with Argentina 
in February, the two parties issued a memoran-
dum preparing for Anglo-Argentinian negotia-
tions on political relations, including the ques-
tions of sovereignty and economic co-operation 
in the archipelago, the dependencies and the 
South Atlantic as a whole. Two working 
groups were set up to this end, but with no 
concrete result (15th December 1977). 
1978-82 
Negotiations were resumed in February 
1978 and again in April 1979 (inter alia with a 
representative of the islands' legislative council 
present) but without great success. It was not 
until 16th November 1979 that diplomatic rela-
tions were re-established at ambassadorial level. 
In April 1980, a series of preparatory 
talks was organised on very varied subjects. 
On 26th and 27th February 1981, further talks 
were held in New York, two members of the 
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islands' council being present. Argentina 
refused the British proposal to freeze the 
dispute for an agreed period, allowing the two 
countries to co-operate in exploiting the archi-
pelago's resources. In the United Nations, 
Argentina warned the United Kingdom that it 
would not allow the Falklands to continue to 
exist as a British colony and asked for further 
serious negotiations. 
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In February 1982, a second series of 
official talks was held in New York. Argentina 
proposed measures for advancing the negotia-
tions (creation of a standing committee). The 
United Kingdom refused. However, both par-
ties asserted their determination to find a solu-
tion. The joint communique issued on 27th 
February declared that the talks had been held 
"in a cordial and positive spirit ". 
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France 
Combat aircraft: 
Helicopters: 
Air-to-air missiles: 
Air-to-sea missiles: 
Sea-to-sea missiles: 
Surface-to-air missiles: 
Frigates: 
Anti-tank missiles: 
Armoured combat vehicles: 
Mortars: 
APPENDIX IV 
Arms delivered to or ordered by Argentina 
- by exporting country 
Mirage Ill and Super-Etendard 
A-1 03 Alouette, SA-315 Lama, 
SA-330 Puma 
R-530 
Exocet AM-39 
Exocet MM-38 and MM-40, Otomat 
Roland 
Aviso A-69 
SS-11, Hot 
AMX-VIC, VBC-90, ERC-90 
81 mm 
+ licence to produce the Pucara aircraft in Argentina 
+ licence to produce the AMX-13 tank in Argentina 
United Kingdom 
Combat aircraft: 
Transport aircraft: 
Ship-to-air missiles: 
Destroyers: 
Helicopters: 
Aircraft-carriers: 
Minesweepers: 
Armoured vehicles: 
Surface-to-air missiles: 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Anti-tank missiles: 
Submarines: 
Destroyers: 
Fast attack vessels: 
B-62 Canberra 
Short Skyvan 
Sea Cat, Sea Dart 
Type 42 
Lynx 
Colossus (sold by the Netherlands) 
Ton class 
Shorland 
Tigercat, Blowpipe 
Cobra, Mamba 
TR-1400 
Meko-360 
Type TNP-45 
+ licence to build Type 209 Salta-class submarines in Argentina 
+ licence to build TR-1700 submarines in Argentina 
+ licence to build Meko-140 frigates in Argentina 
+ licence to produce the T AM tank in Argentina 
+ licence to produce the T AM VCTP armoured vehicle in Argentina 
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Latest 
orders 
1981 
1981 
1978 
1980-81 
1979 
1981 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
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Italy 
Helicopters: 
Transport aircraft: 
Combat and training aircraft: 
Ship-to-air missiles: 
Naval communications equipment 
and radar: 
Naval guns: 
Netherlands 
Transport aircraft: 
Naval communications equipment 
+ British aircraft-carrier Colossus 
Belgium 
Armoured vehicles: 
European eo-productions 
Anti-tank missiles: 
Anti-tank missiles: 
Helicopters: 
Sea-to-sea missiles: 
A-109 Hirundo 
G-222 
MB-326, MB-339 
Aspide (Albatros system) 
Oto Melara 76/62 and Breda 40/70 
F-27, F-28 
BDX 
Hot (France/Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
Roland (France/Fed. Rep of Germany) 
Lynx, Puma (France/United Kingdom) 
Otomat (France/Italy) 
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Latest 
orders 
1979 
1980 
1979 
1979-80 
1980 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1980-81 
1979 
Sources: Jane's Review, Interavia, Defence Today, International Defence Review, Jane's aircraft, Jane's weapons systems, 
Jane's ships, etc. SIPRI Yearbooks, SIPRI Arms Trade Registers, IISS Military Balance, yearbooks. 
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Argentine military equipment 
Navy 
Type Weapons system On board Country where Laid down 
materiel built 
Submarines 2 Type 209 Argentina 1970 
Salta class (licence Fed. Rep. 
of Germany) 
1 ex-US Guppy United States 1940 
4 TR-1700 Argentina 1980 
(on order) (licence Fed. Rep. 
of Germany) 
2 TR-1400 (on order) Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 1980 
Cruiser 1 ex-US Brooklyn United States 
class SAM Seacat United Kingdom 1930 
Aircraft-carrier 1 ex-NL Colossus 
ex-UK United Kingdom* 1940 
S-2E Tracker 
reconnaissance 
aircraft United States 
A-4Q United States 
Super Etendard France 
strike aircraft 
S-61 D Sea King 
helicopter United States 
A-103 Alouette 
helicopter France 
Destroyers 2 Type 42 United Kingdom 1970 
Lynx United Kingdom/ 
helicopter France 
SSM Exocet France 
MM-38 
SAM Sea Dart United Kingdom 
5 ex-US United States 1940 
Fletcher 
Summer SSM Exocet France 
Gearing class MM-38 
4 Meko 360 
(on order) Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 1980 
SSM Exocet France 
MM-40 
SAM Aspide Italy 
Gun Breda 
40mm Italy 
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Type Weapons system On board 
materiel 
Frigates 3 A-69 Aviso 
SSM Exocet 
MM-38 
6 Meko 140 
(on order) 
Lynx helicopter 
SSM Exocet 
MM-40 
Gun Oto 
Melara/Breda 
Fast attack craft 
(missiles) 2 Type TNC 45 
Otomat 
(on order) 
Fast attack craft 
(torpedo) 2 
Coastal patrol craft 4 
Patrol craft 5 
3 
Minesweepers 6 
Landing craft I 
* Sold to the Netherlands in 1948 and purchased by Argentina in 1969. 
** Built for South Africa but sold to Argentina after the 1976 embargo. 
184 
APPENDIX IV 
Country where Laid down built 
France** 1970 
France 
Argentina 
(licence Fed. 
Rep. of Germany) 1980 
United Kingdom/ 
France 
France 
Italy 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 1970 
Italy/France 
United States 1940 
Israel 1970 
United States 1940 
Argentina 1950 
United Kingdom 1950 
Argentina 1970 
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Air force 
Producing Last Type Weapons system order by 
country Argentina 
Bombers Canberra B-62 United Kingdom 
T-64 United States 
Fighter/Interceptors Mirage Ill France 1978 
Dagger Israel 1981 
Ground attack A-4P Skyhawk United States 
MS-760 Paris Argentina 
(licence France) 
MB-326G/MB-339 Italy 1980 
IA-58A Pucara Argentina 
(licence France) 
ASM Super-Etendard France 1980 
A-4Q Skyhawk United States 
Air-to-air missiles R-530 France 1978 
Air-to-surface missiles Exocet AM-39 France 1981 
AS-11112 France 
Helicopters Bell-206, 212, 47G, 
UH-IH United States 1978 
CH-47 Boeing Vertol United States 
Sikorsky S-610, SH-3D United States 
Hughes 500 M United States 
WG-13 Lynx United Kingdom/ 
France 1980 
A-109 Hirundo Italy 1979 
A-103 Alouette France 1979 
SA-330 Puma United Kingdom/ 
France 1981 
SA-315 Lama France 1978 
Reconnaissance IA-35 Ianquero Argentina 
(licence France) 
S-2E Tracker United States 
SP-2H United States 
P-95 Bandeirante Brazil 
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Army 
Year of 
Type Weapons system Producing country entry into last 
service in 
order by 
country of 
origin Argentina 
Medium tanks M-4 Sherman United States 1940 
TAM (Tanque Argen-
tino Mediano) Argentina 
(licence Fed. Rep. 
of Germany) 1970 
Light tanks M-41 United States 1950 
AMX-13 Argentina 
(licence France) 1950 
Armoured personnel-
carrier Half-track M-3 United States 1940 
M-113 United States 1950 
MOW AG Roland Switzerland 1950 
Shorland United Kingdom 1960 
BOX Belgium 1970 1979 
Armoured cars VBC-90 France 1970 
ERC-90 (on order) France 1970 1971 
Mechanised infantry 
combat vehicles AMX-VCI France 1950 
TAM VCTP Argentina 
(licence Fed. Rep. 
of Germany) 1970 
Anti-tank missiles SS-11 France 1960 
Mathogo (Bantan) Argentina 
(licence Sweden) 1970 
Cobra Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 1960 1969-70 
Mamba Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 1970 
Hot (on order) Fed. Rep. of 
Germany/France 1970 1980 
Anti-aircraft missiles Tigercat United Kingdom 1960 1970 
Blowpipe United Kingdom 1960 1981 
Roland Fed. Rep. of 
Germany/France 1970 1981 
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Amendment 1 
The Falklands crisis 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Caro 
29th December 1982 
1. In the draft recommendation proper, after "Recommends that the Council", add a new para-
graph as follows : 
"Ensure in future the full exercise of the important provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
with particular regard to paragraph 3 of Article VIII, so that the Council of Western European 
Union may act in emergencies by being convened immediately in the event of a threat to peace 
in whatever area this threat should arise;". 
I. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1982 (amendment not put to the Assembly). 
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Signed: Caro 
Document 936 
State of European security 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the state of European security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. Maritime surveillance 
(a) Soviet navy 
(b) NATO surveillance resources 
Ill. Certain national contributions to allied defence 
(a) Iceland 
(b) Canada 
(c) Denmark 
(d) Portugal 
(e) Spain 
IV. Conventional weapons and NATO strategy 
V. Conclusions 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
APPENDICES 
8th November 1982 
I. The overall naval balance- NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels over 500 tons 
full load only, excluding ballistic-missile submarines 
II. Comparative table of defence effort 1977-81 
A. Financial effort 
B. Manpower effort 
III. Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per 
capita- 1981 
I. Adopted in committee by 14 votes to 1 with 
abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); 
MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Bahr 
(Alternate: Ahrens), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, 
Bizet (Alternate: Caro), Bonnel (Alternate: Mrs. Herman-
Michielsens), Cox, Dejardin, Duraffour, Edwards (Alternate: 
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Dr. Miller), Fosson (Alternate: Giust), Grant, Kittelmann, 
Lemmrich, Maravalle, Mayoud, Menard, Pecchioli (Alter-
nate: Amadez), Pignion, Prussen, Hermann Schmidt, Schol-
ten, Smith, Steverlynck, Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
8th February 1982- London 
Vice-Admiral R.J. Hays, Commander-in-Chief, United States Navy, Europe; 
Captain B.R. Outhwaite, Royal Navy, Director of Naval Operations, Ministry of Defence; 
Representative of DS5 and of Air Staff. 
4ih March 1982- Iceland 
Mr. Hannes Hafstein, Political Directory, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Reykjavik; 
Mr. Helgasson, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Lt. Commander Me! Sundin, United States Navy, Headquarters Iceland Defence Force, etc, 
Keflavik; Commander Gwinn; Mr. Magnusson, Civilian Affairs. 
Monday 15th March- Washington 
Mrs. Avis Bohlen, Acting Deputy Director, Office of European Security and Political Affairs; 
Mr. Smith, State Department; 
Mr. Peter B. Swiers, Deputy Director, Office of Theatre Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, State Department; Mr. Dave Schwartz (INF); 
Rear Admiral S. Shapiro, Director of Naval Intelligence, Pentagon ; 
Rear Admiral R.J. Kurth, Director, Political-Military Policy and Current Plans Division, 
Pentagon. 
Tuesday 16th March- Norfolk, Virginia 
Captain P.D. Hoskins, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Commander-in-
Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and briefing staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sanderson, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet. 
Thursday 7th October - Aarhus, Denmark 
Rear Admiral Sven Thiede, Flag Officer Denmark. 
The committee as a whole met in Canada from 8th to 12th March 1982 where it was addressed 
by: 
The Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence; 
Mr. P. de W. Mathewson, Chief, Policy Planning, Department of National Defence; 
Mr. T.C. Hammond, Director, Defence Relations Division, Department of External Affairs; Mr. 
John Legg. 
The committee also met with Mr. Marcel Prud'Homme, Chairman of the Standing Committee 
on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons and members of his 
committee and of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Senate, and with Mr. 
Len Hopkins, Chairman of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, 
and members of his delegation. 
The committee met in Paris on 2nd September 1982 when it was addressed by Mr. Franc;ois 
Heisbourg, Technical Counsellor in the Private Office of the French Minister of Defence, and on 3rd 
September when it visited the command posts of the French Air Defence Forces and of the Strategic 
Air Forces at Taverny. 
189 
DOCUMENT 936 
The committee met in Portugal from 20th to 22nd October 1982 when it discussed an outline of 
the present report, visited the Operations Room at Headquarters IBERLANT in Oeiras, and was 
addressed by: 
Vice-Admiral Elias Da Costa, Portuguese Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic Area; 
Rear Admiral Williams, United States Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Iberian Atlantic 
Area; 
Commander Peter Lucas, Royal Navy, Chief of Staff, IBERLANT; 
Commander Burns, United States Navy, Executive Assistant to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, 
IBERLANT; 
General Lemos Ferreira, Chief of Portuguese Air Force Staff, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; 
Admiral Sousa Leitao, Chief of Naval Staff; 
General Lopes Alves, Deputy Chief of Army Staff; 
Mr. Carlos Pardal, Portuguese Secretary of State for Defence. 
The committee met finally in Paris on 8th November 1982 when it adopted the report as a 
whole. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers 
and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in this report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the state of European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the continued increase in the ocean-going capability of the Soviet navy and concerned 
at the increased opportunity this provides the Soviet Union to project its power, particularly in 
unstable parts of the world; 
(ii) Believing therefore that more attention should be paid to maritime surveillance; 
(iii) Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the 
North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country's democratically-elected parliament, and 
hoping that European security will be strengthened in due course through the integration of Spanish 
forces into the military structure of NATO; 
(iv) Recognising the important special nature of the contribution to allied defence made by many of 
the smaller countries of the alliance through their geographical position as well as through their 
defence effort; 
(v) Noting, however, the small proportion of national product devoted to defence by certain allied 
countries, including those with above average per capita income; 
(vi) Welcoming the increased emphasis being placed on conventional defence but reiterating its 
view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments, acting where appropriate in the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To improve further existing NATO and bilateral co-operative arrangements for NA TO-area 
and world-wide surveillance of Soviet naval vessels, surface and sub-surface, and of other militarily-
significant Soviet vessels, in particular through: 
(a) stressing the need to make use of all surveillance resources - satellite, airborne, surface and 
sub-surface, shore and bottom-based; 
(b) remedying shortages of modern maritime patrol aircraft, and retaining in service adequate 
numbers of diesel-electric submarines and frigates; 
(c) modernising NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres, and improving communications 
links between these centres and between them and national centres; 
2. To co-operate fully with other NATO governments: 
(a) to call for Spanish liaison officers to be appointed forthwith to all appropriate NATO 
command headquarters; 
(b) to plan and adjust command arrangements to accommodate the contribution of Spanish 
forces to NATO; 
3. To urge on all allied countries the need to maintain and improve the defence effort, despite the 
general recession, and at the same time to pursue actively arms control negotiations in all forums. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. This report, in the tradition of many 
earlier reports of the committee of the same 
title, deals with a number of different topical 
subjects of direct interest for European secu-
rity. The growing strength of the Soviet fleet, 
which has now acquired a world-wide ocean-
going capability, has made it desirable to 
examine the problems of maritime surveillance. 
Separate sections deal with the contribution 
to allied defence made by Canada, Portugal, 
Iceland and, more briefly, Denmark following 
the visit by the whole committee to the first 
two countries and by the Rapporteur to Iceland 
and to the Danish naval headquarters. The 
report also welcomes the accession of Spain to 
NATO; the committee had originally intended 
to visit both Spain and Portugal to examine the 
manner in which the new Spanish contribution 
could be integrated into the NATO military 
structure in the light of the existing NATO 
structure in the Iberian and Mediterranean 
area, but the parliamentary elections held in 
Spain on 28th October led the committee to ask 
for its visit to that country to be postponed. 
Lastly, the report draws attention to the 
importance of conventional weapons in the 
defence of Europe, with particular reference to 
the important recent speeches by General 
Rogers. 
11. Maritime surveillance 
(a) Soviet navy 
2.1. Ships of the Soviet navy may now be 
found in any ocean in the world, albeit not fre-
quently in any large numbers except in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and home waters. The 
overall naval balance 1 has not changed signifi-
cantly since the committee reported last year2, 
but construction continues steadily of the new 
classes of ocean-going surface vessel to which 
the committee then drew attention. The Kirov 
nuclear-propelled cruiser of 25,000 tons, which 
started sea trials in May 1980, is now in ser-
vice, a second is being fitted out and a third is 
being built. The new 12,000 ton convention-
ally-propelled cruiser designated by NATO 
"Black-Com-1" is now in service and more are 
being built. The Udaloy guided-missile des-
troyer, which began sea trials in November 
1980, is in service and two more are being 
I. Appendix I. 
2. European security and the South Atlantic, Document 
888, 26th October I 98 I, Rapporteur: Dr. Miller. 
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built. The slightly smaller Sovremenny anti-
surface vessel guided-missile destroyer of 7,000 
to 8,000 tons is in service and more are being 
built. 
2.2. Soviet aircraft-carriers are still limited to 
the Kiev and Minsk, which, like the British 
Invincible, have VTOL aircraft capability only, 
but a third is now on trials and up to two more 
are being built. There are still no confirmed 
reports of a full-size Soviet aircraft-carrier with 
high performance fixed-wing capability like 
those of the United States navy, although one 
may be in the process of being built. 
2.3. Soviet naval superiority continues to 
reside in its submarines. Its cruise-missile sub-
marines in particular find no counterpart in 
western navies. The NATO navies continue to 
be superior in surface vessels, overwhelmingly 
so in aircraft-carriers, but also in destroyers and 
frigates, which are needed to counter the Soviet 
submarine threat. In long-range mantime 
patrol aircraft and anti-submarine warfare air-
craft, NATO countries have some 348 com-
pared with 135 for the Soviet Union. 
2.4. A particular characteristic of the Soviet 
navy is its division into four very distinct fleets: 
Northern; Baltic; Black Sea; and Pacific. Except 
for the subsidiary Pacific base at Petropavlovsk 
on the Kamchatka peninsula, the exits to the 
major seas and oceans for the last three all pass 
through narrow straits bordered by allied coun-
tries. The Northern fleet has access to the 
Norwegian Sea through the 200-mile gap 
between North Cape and Bear Island, and then 
through the Greenland-Iceland-United King-
dom (GIUK) gap to the Atlantic. The number 
of days at sea of Soviet naval units in peacetime 
is less than that of the major ocean-going navies 
of the NATO countries; even the strategic 
ballistic missile submarines spend proportion-
ally less time on permanent patrol than those of 
the United States. Exceptions to this pattern are 
the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean 
numbering about forty vessels of all types o~ 
average, smaller numbers in the Indian Ocean 
and the occasional fleet exercises held in th~ 
open ocean during which a number of vessels 
may transit from one fleet base to another. 
2.5. Because of the two foregoing factors, it is 
likely that if the Soviet Union were planning to 
initiate hostilities it would be obliged to under-
take a " surge " deployment both of ballistic 
missile submarines and of surface fleet units to 
the open oceans beforehand, so as to escape 
their destruction in the allied-held straits and 
narrows through which they have to pass. In 
peacetime, therefore, NATO has a twofold sur-
veillance requirement: (i) to observe continu-
ously the Soviet fleet exits so as to detect 
immediately surge deployment, as well as to 
keep a check on all Soviet surface ships and 
submarines operating away from their bases; (ii) 
to follow in the open ocean vessels known to 
have left their bases, particularly major naval 
units and vessels engaged in particular tasks 
such as the Soviet intelligence-gathering ships 
which are often positioned where they can 
intercept radio communications and radar and 
sonar emissions of NATO forces. 
(b) NATO surveillance resources 
2.6. With the exception of the Standing Naval 
Force Atlantic (ST ANA VFORLANT) and, 
when activated, the Naval On-Call Force Medi-
terranean (NA VOCFORMED), allied naval and 
air force units that might be used for sur-
veillance remain under national command in 
peacetime, although they may periodically 
operate under NATO control during exercises. 
NATO responsibility for maritime surveillance 
in peacetime is essentially a matter of co-
ordinating national surveillance activities with a 
view both to reducing gaps between national 
coverage, and avoiding unnecessary dupli-
cation in other areas. There are a number of 
surveillance co-ordination centres established in 
NATO naval headquarters such as those at 
Norfolk, Virginia (SACLANT); Northwood, 
London (CINCCHAN and CINCEASTLANT); 
Kolsas, Norway (CINCNORTH); Oeiras, near 
Lisbon (IBERLANT) and Naples (COMMAR-
AIRMED). These centres are mostly continu-
ously activated and maintain an updated plot of 
Soviet surface naval vessels from information 
supplied by the various national forces in their 
area. Information is routinely exchanged 
between these centres which need very good 
communications and handle a large volume of 
signals traffic. 
2. 7. In addition to passively receiving inform-
ation from national sources, they can request 
modifications or additions to national surveil-
lance programmes, e.g. request that a maritime 
patrol aircraft cover a slightly different area 
where Soviet vessels are known to be operating, 
or even request a special sortie to cover the 
area. Where a Soviet vessel is being shadowed 
by a vessel from the NATO navy - a tattletail -
through the secs a request can be passed on to 
the next area for a vessel from another NATO 
country to take over as shadow. 
2.8. Surveillance resources available to 
NATO countries include fixed assets such as 
shore-based optical and electronic equipment 
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in observation posts and bottom-based sub-
marine surveillance systems which may cover 
gaps of a few hundred miles. The United 
States SOSUS (sound surveillance system), 
comprising arrays of passive listening devices 
on the bottom, connected by cable to a shore-
based computer, is known to be installed in 
shore stations in a number of allied countries, 
although the precise locations have not been 
officially published. It is reported, for exam-
ple, to cover the North Cape-Bear Island gap to 
the north of Norway 1 and it would be likely to 
cover the GIUK gap further south and probably 
the Straits of Gibraltar from the United States 
base at Rota in Spain. 
2.9. The United States is curre.ntly upgrading 
the SOSUS shore facilities, taking advantage of 
newer technology and is also developing for 
surveillance in the open ocean the surveillance 
towed array sensor system (SUR T ASS). This 
is a very large towed array of submarine 
sensors, perhaps extending a mile or more, to 
be towed by a specially-designed vessel and 
capable of locating and identifying submarines 
in very large ocean areas, perhaps up to 100 
miles or more. Funds for 'the first twelve 
SURT ASS ships are included in the fiscal year 
1984 budget 2• Smaller tactical towed array 
sonars are in operation with some NATO 
navies and under development for others. 
2.10 Some observation satellites, with optical 
and infrared sensors, and electronic surveillance 
equipment, operated by the United States and 
the Soviet Union, have maritime surveillance 
applications. 
2.11. The surface escorts of the navies of 
NATO countries, destroyers and frigates, are at 
times used for surveillance by ~hadowing Soviet 
surface vessels. Hull-mounted, and variable-
depth sonar give them a tactical submarine 
detection capability over a range of ten miles or 
more in favourable water conditions. Towed 
arrays of course increase this :range. Helicop-
ters on ships considerably increase the surveil-
lance range, both for surface ships and, with 
dipping sonars, for submarines. Long-range 
maritime patrol aircraft fitted with surveillance 
radar can locate all vessels in a very large area 
of ocean in one high-level sortie, but positive 
identification of a particular vessel, to distin-
guish it from general maritime traffic, will 
require a closer approach and take more time. 
Equipped with expendable sonar buoys, these 
aircraft have a submarine detection capability 
within tactical ranges from each buoy dropped. 
Shorter-range shore-based reconnaissance air-
I. Report by the North Atlantic Assembly Sub-Commit-
tee on Defence Co-operation (anti-submarine warfare), July 
1982. 
2. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to 
Congress, fiscal year I 983, page III-24. 
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craft have an important role to play in positive 
identification of vessels in straits and narrows. 
2.12. Apart from communications problems, 
submarines themselves have excellent surveil-
lance capabilities. Diesel-electric submarines, 
because they are smaller and quieter than 
nuclear-propelled submarines, can operate in 
comparatively shallow waters, even relatively 
close inshore, when on picket duty and can 
observe ship movements in areas near to naval 
bases. The larger and more expensive nuclear-
propelled submarines of the United States and 
United Kingdom navies (one is shortly to enter 
service with the French navy also) have a sub-
merged speed sufficient to enable them to 
follow surface units at sea. 
2.13. The particular contribution of certain 
NATO countries is described under the country 
headings below. The general conclusion to be 
drawn from the Rapporteur's enquiry into sur-
veillance arrangements is that they are certainly 
successful at present in normal peacetime 
conditions, as far as Soviet surface vessels are 
concerned. As far as submarines are concerned, 
there is a reasonable detection rate but no 
certainty at the point where they pass through 
chokepoints. Once in the open ocean, how-
ever, a good deal of luck is needed to detect any 
submarines. To maintain successful surveil-
lance, a combination of all resources referred to 
above is required; certainly diesel-electric sub-
marines and escort vessels will always be 
required in adequate numbers despite certain 
advantages of maritime patrol aircraft and 
nuclear-propelled submarines. NATO resour-
ces in maritime patrol aircraft in particular are 
already overstretched in covering the normal 
daily operation of Soviet naval forces, and are 
inadequate during major Soviet naval exercises, 
or to meet the requirements of surge deploy-
ment of Soviet naval units in a crisis. 
Ill. Certain national contributions 
to allied defence 
(a) Ice/anti 
3.1. Iceland has no armed forces of its own 
but makes a big contribution to allied defence 
because of its strategic position in the North 
Atlantic between Greenland and the United 
Kingdom. British and subsequently United 
States troops were based in Iceland during the 
war to prevent a German landing and Iceland 
then permitted the construction of an airfield 
and provided a harbour for convoys. After the 
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, some 
consideration was given to the stationing of a 
multilateral force in Iceland for mutual defence 
purposes, but, in view of its satisfactory experi-
ence with the presence of the United States 
during the war, Iceland eventually concluded a 
bilateral agreement with that country on the 
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basis of which the United States maintains its 
units in Iceland today. 
3.2. One of the four political parties - the 
People's Alliance - opposes Iceland's member-
ship of NATO. Formed from the Communist 
Party and some Social Democrats in 1956, the 
People's Alliance is participating with two 
other parties in the present government under 
an agreement which notes its different stance on 
defence policy, with which its ministers do not 
deal in government. A similar situation has 
occurred on a number of occasions in the past, 
and at the present time, following Soviet occu-
pation in Afghanistan and martial law in 
Poland, membership of NATO does not seem 
to be a serious political issue in the country. 
3.3. Iceland's foreign policy is of course 
closely related to its economic interests and 
centres in particular on fishing rights. Mem-
bership of NATO, which provides it with a seat 
on the North Atlantic Council, and the right, 
albeit rarely exercised, to send a representative 
to bodies such as the Military Committee, prob-
ably gives Iceland an insight and a voice in 
more aspects of Atlantic affairs than its other 
diplomatic relations would provide, and is 
therefore particularly welcomed in the Foreign 
Ministry which has a special section dealing 
with relations with NATO and the United 
States base. 
3.4. Iceland is particularly anxious to preserve 
its distinctive language and culture, and the 
agreement with the United States provides that 
nearly all United States military personnel and 
their families reside within the main base 
around the airport of Keflavik, reducing to a 
minimum general contact with the local popu-
lation. 
3.5. United States forces in Iceland come 
under the Commander Iceland Defence Force 
who comes directly under the United States 
national Commander-in-Chief Atlantic. The 
defence force commander has under him island 
defence units proper, which include a squadron 
of twelve F-4 interceptor aircraft, two ground-
based radar stations and two AWACS E-3A 
early warning aircraft. Collectively, these pro-
vide long-range air defence cover around Ice-
land into the Greenland-United Kingdom gap. 
There is a separate detachment of three 
HH-3E helicopters and a tanker for in-flight 
refuelling which provides search and rescue 
capability all round the coast of Iceland and 
regularly prove of great assistance to the Ice-
landic fishing fleet. 
3.6. The island commander acts also as the 
anti-submarine warfare commander for which 
purpose he has a deployed squadron of nine 
P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft which can 
fulfil a surface and sub-surface sur\'eillance 
r 
function throughout the area of the Greenland-
United Kingdom gap and well into the Norwe-
gian Sea. 
3. 7. The air defence force undertakes an 
average of 120 interceptions for identification 
purposes per year, 95% of which concern the 
Soviet Tu-95 Bear, operating as a maritime 
patrol aircraft in international waters outside 
Iceland's sovereign air space of 12 nautical 
miles. The operation of the maritime patrol 
aircraft from Iceland is believed to provide a 
very high level of submarine detection in the 
Greenland-United Kingdom gap, but not in the 
open ocean beyond. France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom 
occasionally arrange for maritime patrol aircraft 
to stage at Keflavik, usually on national surveil-
lance missions which are reported to the Kefla-
vik operations centre for air safety reasons, or 
such planes may occasionally be tasked by the 
Keflavik operations centre itself. 
3.8. Total United States service personnel in 
Iceland are about 3,000, accompanied by 2,000 
dependents, and provide considerable civilian 
assistance to Iceland including maintenance of 
the Keflavik runway used also as Iceland's main 
international airport, as well as the helicopter 
search and rescue facilities. 
(b) Canada 
3.9. With a population of 24 million, Canada 
had a defence budget in 1981 of US $ 5.1 
billion, representing 1.8% of the GDP, and the 
unified Canadian Forces of 83,000 men and 
women represent I % of the work force. These 
percentages are the lowest in NATO after 
Luxembourg (1.3% and 0.8% respectively), 
despite the higher than average Canadian per 
capita income. The Canadian forces are not 
differentiated into a separate army, navy and air 
force, are maintained through voluntary enlist-
ment as are the forces of the other NATO 
countries, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Canada has no tradi-
tion of conscription, except for a period during 
World War 11 although service in Europe was 
then still voluntary. 
3.10. The land forces of 13,000 provide two 
brigade groups in Canada and a mechanised 
brigade group in Europe. Leopard I tanks 
have recently been acquired. 
3.11. The Canadian maritime command oper-
ates three Oberon-class submarines and twenty-
three destroyers and frigates of which four are 
modern vessels of 3,500 tons, about ten years 
old but seventeen of them are more than , .. 
twenty years old. There are three logistic 
support ships with ASW helicopters. The fleet 
is divided with about two-thirds, including the 
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most modern units, on the Atlantic coast based 
at Halifax and the remainder on the Pacific 
coast. 
3.12. The air force has some 200 combat 
aircraft. Interceptor air defence of Canada is 
still largely assured by the twenty-year old 
F-101 Voodoo aircraft but it is to be replaced 
by the F-18, which is on order. The maritime 
air group has nineteen Aur~ra maritime patrol 
aircraft, which is a special versio~ of the P-3 
Orion with different avionics. Air defence of 
Canada is closely linked with that of the United 
States in the North American Aerospace Defence 
Command, for which the distant early warn-
ing line has four radars in Canada, backed up 
by the second line, the pine tree line, in the 
more populated areas of Canada. One of the 
main command posts is sited at North Bay in 
Canada, the other at Coiorado Springs in the 
United States. Canada contributes about 
10 000 service personnel to NORAD and the U~ited States about 46,000. The maritime 
patrol aircraft perform certain civilian functions 
also in Canada ; they are equipped for oper-
ations in the Arctic area, and make a useful 
contribution to NATO capability. 
3.13. Canadian forces in Europe deployed in 
the southern part of the central front under 
CENT AG and 4-A T AF, comprise a mechan-
ised brigade group with Leopard tanks and 
three fighter squadrons with a Canadian version 
of the F-104. There are 5,400 personnel. 
There is, in addition, a Canadian air-sea 
transportable force which is committed for use 
in north Norway in an emergency. 
3 .14. Canada, with its large and sparsely popu-
lated land area, offers valuable training facilities 
to European countries including Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and is 
prepared to welcome further users to its train-
ing facilities. 
3.15. A report of the Canadian Senate Sub-
Committee on National Defence published in 
January 1982, dealing with manpower in 
Canada's armed forces, was critical of many 
aspects of current Canadian defence policy. 
Among sixteen recommendations, it called for a 
reassessment of current defence priorities and 
manpower requirements ; recommended an 
increase in Canadian troop levels in Europe to 
7,800 by 198 5 and subsequently to about 
10,000 by 1987; it called fdr the recruiting of 
6,400 more regular personnel and a review of 
the commitment to provide the air-sea trans-
portable force to north Norway which was not 
considered the best use of Canada's limited 
military manpower and resources. It called for 
no increase in maritime and air command man-
power until such time as their equipment was 
modernised or brought up to strength. 
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(c) Denmark 
3.16. Denmark is another of the smaller coun-
tries of the alliance which, like Iceland and 
Portugal, make a vital contribution to allied 
defence because of their strategic geographical 
location. The Danish islands themselves are 
situated astride the narrow channels leading out 
of the Baltic and the island of Bornholm, some 
100 miles further east, provides a valuable 
observation post to the north of the Polish 
coast. The Danish territories of Greenland and 
the Faroes are both strategically situated form-
ing part of the land obstacles in the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom gap, separating the 
Norwegian Sea from the North Atlantic. 
3.17. Denmark, with a population of 5.1 mil-
lion, has a defence budget of some $ 1.6 billion 
(1980) representing 2.4% of the GDP. The 
armed forces of 32,000 men represent 1.6 % of 
the working population. Danish defence 
policy does not admit the stationing of nuclear 
weapons or the permanent stationing of foreign 
forces on its territory in peacetime, but allied 
troops regularly participate in exercises on 
Danish territory, and one subordinate NATO 
headquarters - Commander, Baltic Approaches 
- is located at Karup on the Jutland penin-
sula. A three-year defence agreement between 
the political parties ensures continuity in 
defence planning despite changes of govern-
ment. Although not providing for a 3 % 
increase in defence spending in real terms, the 
agreement is indexed and provides some 
increase. 
3.18. The commander of the Danish fleet, Flag 
Officer Denmark, who becomes a subordinate 
NATO commander - Commander Naval Forces 
Baltic Approaches - when an alert is declared, 
is responsible to his national authorities in 
peacetime chiefly for continuous surveillance of 
the Danish Straits through which some 60,000 
vessels of all types pass each year which, 
together with a further 50,000 passing through 
the Kiel canal, account for all the traffic in and 
out of the Baltic. The Danish Straits are an 
international waterway but historically passage 
has been regulated by Denmark, the latest ordi-
nance governing the passage of foreign warships 
and military aircraft having been promulgated 
on 27th February 1976. This provides for the 
free passage of surface ships provided there are 
not more than three of them at any one time 
and that they show their national flag ; sub-
marines are required to navigate on the surface 
and again show their flag. The regulations 
provide that military aircraft may not overfly 
the Danish Straits without advance permission, 
and may not carry ammunition or photographic 
film, or operate electronic equipment when 
doing so. Denmark claims territorial waters of 
3 nautical miles with baselines across bays, as 
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do both West and East Germany whereas 
Poland claims 6 nautical miles and is intending 
to increase it to 12 nautical miles, which is 
claimed by Sweden and the Soviet Union. 
3.19. Danish resources for surveillance of the 
straits include nine coastal radars, including one 
on Bornholm, which provide complete cover of 
all the straits but not the whole of the wider 
area of the Baltic around Bornholm, lookout 
stations and sea-bottom sensors to detect sub-
marines. Small naval cutters and fast patrol 
boats are assigned to each naval district cover-
ing the different straits and the area of the 
North Sea adjacent to the Kattegat. Lynx heli-
copters of the naval air wing, shore-based or 
shipborne, are available for identification when 
required and photograph warships passing 
through the straits. Draken reconnaissance air-
craft of the Danish air force can also be tasked 
for maritime surveillance. Danish minelayers 
are used in a surveillance role in the Baltic west 
of Bornholm and the Danish navy also has five 
submarines which operate in the Baltic. 
3.20. In a period of alert, the surveillance 
assets can be increased with more observation 
posts along the coast manned by the home 
guard and with the use of a further thirty-five 
reserve coastal patrol craft. 
3.21. The Danish navy considers that it identi-
fies every foreign warship passing the Danish 
Straits, including all submarines. Submerged 
navigation would be technically very difficult, 
and would almost certainly be detected. Such 
passage has not so far been attempted by 
Warsaw Pact submarines. Warsaw Pact war-
ship movements in and out of the Baltic 
amount to about 100 each year including sub-
marines, with a further 200 auxiliary vessels. 
In the western Baltic off the Polish coast, 
Denmark has been able to undertake extensive 
surveillance of all Warsaw Pact exercises and 
activities. Movements of Soviet vessels in or 
out of the Baltic are reported to neighbouring 
NATO countries and assignment of a tattletail 
surface ship to shadow them is handed over 
from one NATO country to the next as Warsaw 
Pact vessels cross national ocean boundaries. 
3.22. Denmark with limited resources operates 
continuous surveillance night and day every 
day of the year using patrol craft at all times 
and calling out other fleet units as necessary, 
which amounted to 100 unscheduled days at 
sea to the west of Bornholm in 1981. The 
naval war headquarters is being modernised 
with automation of surveillance installations 
and future plans will provide for automatic data 
links with adjoining NATO surveillance 
centres. 
3.23. On the Danish territory of Greenland 
there are two important United States bases 
, 
with an airfield at Thule, surveillance and radar 
installations and a BMEWs (ballistic missile 
early warning station) together with radars 
which extend the DEW (distant early warning) 
line that crosses Canada. There is a Danish air 
force base on the Faroe Islands which co-
operates with United Kingdom air defence, but 
no foreign units. 
(d) Portugal 
3.24. With a population of 10 million, Portu-
gal has a defence budget of $ 841 million, 
representing 3.6% of the GDP. There are 
90,000 men in the armed forces (more than in 
Canada), 2.3 % of the work force, maintained 
through compulsory service of sixteen months 
for the army, and twenty-four months for the 
navy and air force. 
3.25. Portugal again is one of the smaller 
NATO countries whose geographical position 
at the most westerly point on the European 
continental land mass makes it invaluable for 
naval operations and maritime patrol aircraft, 
in close proximity to the dense north-south 
maritime trade route in the Atlantic. With 
NA TO-financed infrastructure, Portugal pro-
vides two airfields for maritime patrol aircraft 
and important naval fuel and ammunition 
storage facilities, magnificent anchorage in the 
large natural harbour at Lisbon, as well as 
major NATO communications facilities, and in 
the Madeira Islands at Porta Santa, the most 
southerly NATO air base - although, with the 
entry of Spain, still more southerly facilities 
may be available in the Canary Islands. 
3.26. NATO headquarters of Commander-in-
Chief Iberian Atlantic Area is based at Oeiras 
near Lisbon. A post that was upgraded from 
commander to commander-in-chief at the time 
of Spain's accession to NATO, it is now held 
by a Portuguese vice-admiral, with a United 
States rear-admiral as deputy commander-in-
chief; there is a British chief-of-staff. The 
previous post of commander was always held 
by a United States admiral with a Portuguese 
deputy. The staff of the NATO headquarters 
is about 200 contributed by Portugal (42 %), the 
United Kingdom (30 %) and the United States 
(28 %). There is a liaison officer from France, 
but not, as yet, from Spain. Equipment in the 
headquarters requires modernisation. 
3.27. IBERLANT is a chiefly naval command 
subordinate to SACLANT. On declaration of 
the alert, it assumes responsibility for maritime 
operations in the sea area between the Tropic 
of Cancer and 42' North, extending from just 
west of the Straits of Gibraltar at 5'55' West to 
the line of longitude 22' West. The area inclu-
des the Madeira Islands. CINCIBERLANT's 
responsibilities would also include air and 
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ground defence of the Portuguese mainland, 
although there is at present no significant 
threat. The adjoining NATO command to the 
east is that of CINCSOUTH covering the 
Mediterranean which extends up to the Straits 
of Gibraltar, but the Mediterranean between 
5'55' West and 0' is declared an area of 
common interest to CINCSOUTH and CINC-
IBERLANT. 
3.28. The Portuguese armed forces have under-
gone considerable reorganisation over the last 
ten years following the independence of its 
former overseas territories and the establish-
ment of a parliamentary democracy in the 
country. The army has undergone the biggest 
transformation, reducing from about 180,000 to 
the present approximately 40,000 men, while 
the navy has been reduced from 18,000 to 
13,400 and the air force from 21 ,000 to 
12,000. Following the committee's previous 
visit to Portugal in 1976, it reported on the 
national military project to reduce the army 
from the then 45,000 to 26,000- a figure which 
has not yet been reached. 
3.29. Portugal now provides one armoured 
brigade for rapid deployment to north-east 
Italy, as well as contributing one battalion to 
ACE Mobile Force. The chief problem of the 
armed forces is one of equipment in view of the 
limited economic base of the country. Portu-
gal will require assistance from other countries 
to re-equip but is anxious to make a significant 
contribution to allied defence with its own 
forces, and not merely to provide a geo-
graphical contribution. The M-47 and M-48 
tanks and the G-91 and A-7 aircraft are largely 
obsolete. Portugal has now no long-range 
maritime patrol aircraft and its navy of three 
submarines and seventeen frigates, although not 
more than ten to fifteen years old, require more 
modem weapons systems. There is a shortage 
of mine counter-warfare vessels. Priority 
should probably be given to equipping 
properly the rapid-deployment armoured bri-
gade and modernising naval weapons. A mari-
time patrol capability could be a valuable asset 
for NATO. The Soviet Union is exhibiting a 
growing interest in the South Atlantic, operat-
ing its maritime patrol aircraft out of Havana in 
Cuba, Conakry in Guinea, and Luanda in 
Angola. 
3.30. An amendment to the Portuguese Consti-
tution of 1976 entered into force on 30th Octo-
ber 1982 ending the " transitional period " of 
the democratic system. The Council of the 
Revolution, composed of members of the armed 
forces under the chairmanship of the President 
of the Republic, under the original constitution 
had certain residual constitutional responsibili-
ties and was responsible for decisions concem-
mg the armed forces, including promotions 
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and aspects of military policy. The amend-
ment to the constitution has dissolved the 
Council of the Revolution and two further laws 
on national defence and on the armed forces 
received parliamentary approval. The amen-
ded constitution took effect on 30th October. 
This legislation defines more clearly the author-
ity of the Ministry of Defence over the armed 
forces, and it is anticipated that reorganisation 
of the army in particular will proceed more 
rapidly to the goal of 26,000 men. 
3.31. The accession of Spain to NATO will 
raise some difficult problems of command 
structure when the Spanish armed forces are 
integrated into the military structure of 
NATO. Portugal is essentially involved in the 
maritime command area of SACLANT and the 
opinion of the Portuguese authorities, both 
military and political, appears very clearly to be 
that Portugal must remain part of the 
SACLANT area, and that Portuguese land and 
air forces must remain under Portuguese com-
mand, and not form part of an integrated 
command for the Iberian peninsula. Portugal 
considers that Spain is essentially a Mediterra-
nean country and should come under 
SACEUR. 
(e) Spain 
3.32. The committee postponed its visit Spain 
following the announcement of Spanish elec-
tions on 28th October, and does not therefore 
comment in detail on Spanish defence policy. 
Arrangements for the integration of Spanish 
armed forces into NATO will no doubt await a 
referendum on the question of Spanish mem-
bership of NATO, which is likely to be held, 
although the principle of Spanish membership 
is not likely to be challenged. Press reports 1 of 
statements by Mr. Alberto Oliart, the Spanish 
Minister of Defence, at SHAPE on 9th June 
1982, said that he was calling for an exclusive 
southern Spanish command within the NATO 
command structure, which would include 
Gibraltar, the Canary Islands in the Atlantic, 
the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean and 
Spain's two small enclaves in Morocco at Ceuta 
opposite Gibraltar and Melilla. 
3.33. Although Article 6 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty as originally drafted in 1949 extended 
the geographical area of the mutual defence 
obligations to include "the Algerian depart-
ments of France", this clause ceased to be 
operative in 1963 by virtue of a unilateral 
French statement which followed the Algerian 
vote on self-determination the previous year. 
The inclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in a NATO 
command would pose political problems for 
I. The Guard1an. I Oth June 1982. 
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many NATO countnes. To tind an etl'ective 
military command structure, some detailed 
negotiations will have to be undertaken but 
there appears to be a strong case for estab-
lishing a Spanish naval command in the 
western Mediterranean, presumably as part of 
AFSOUTH. There is something of a vacuum 
in the subordinate COMEDOC area which was 
formerly the responsibility of France before its 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture of NATO. It would obviously be desir-
able to leave the maritime arrangements of 
IBERLANT largely intact, no doubt with a 
subordinate Spanish island commander on the 
Canaries, but there would be scope for some 
Spanish responsibility in the Biscay area and 
some joint command should be sought espe-
cially for the air defence of the Iberian peninsula. 
3.34. Deployment of Spanish armed forces so 
far has very largely been an aftermath of the 
Franco regime, with a concentration in the area 
of Madrid for internal security purposes. Spain 
could play an important role in NATO 
as a source of mobile reserves, but plans for 
adapting Spanish armed forces to the new 
circumstances will obviously await political 
decision following the elections. 
IV. Conventional weapons 
and NATO strategy 
4.1. In a number of public speeches at his 
headquarters in Casteau and before the Royal 
United Services Institute in London on 28th 
and 29th September, General Bernard Rogers, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has publi-
cised SHAPE planning for the NATO six-year 
goals 1985-90. He has called for a large 
increase in conventional defence equipment 
based on modern technology comprising first 
improved reconnaissance systems using TR-1 
reconnaissance aircraft, radar helicopters, 
AWACS aircraft and satellites, linked to com-
puterised intelligence fusion centres. These 
would be associated secondly with a new 
generation of long-range conventional weapons 
akin to Pershing and air-launched cruise mis-
siles equipped with conventional warheads and 
possibly releasing terminally-guided smart sub-
munitions capable of destroying individual tank 
targets. The object of these combined systems 
would be to permit NATO to strike at the 
second echelon of any Soviet offensive in the 
rear areas where its second wave of forces 
would be building up. The cost of this new 
conventional defence technology is estimated by 
SACEUR to amount to a I % increase on 
defence budgets to the end of the present 
decade, over and above the 3 % increase in real 
terms to which NATO countries are already 
supposed to be committed. On average it is 
, 
said to amount to £ 7 per head of NATO popu-
lation over six years, but the burden would 
have to fall more heavily on some countries 
than on others. General Rogers recognised 
that there would have to be some " sacrifices in 
social benefits". 
4.2. His proposals were designed to reduce 
dependence on nuclear weapons in Europe, 
particularly the shorter-range battlefield nuclear 
weapons in the present 6,000 warheads stock-
pile, which should be used as a counter in 
negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve a 
similar elimination of short-range nuclear 
weapons with Soviet forces. General Rogers 
was not proposing to abolish all nuclear 
weapons - he sought to retain longer-range 
purely retaliatory weapons, together with such 
numbers of cruise and Pershing missiles that 
would be deployed in the light of the INF nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union - nor to 
renounce the option of first use if necessary. 
4.3. It is clear from the publicity attending 
them that these proposals are intended in part 
to answer the demands of some of the non-
nuclear movements of recent years, some of 
which have come from authoritative quarters. 
The committee has already drawn attention 1 
to the article by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. 
George Kennan, Mr. Robert McNamara and 
Mr. Gerard Smith2 calling for a NATO com-
mitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. 
Field Marshal Lord Carver who was United 
Kingdom Chief of Defence Staff from 1973 to 
1976 in his recent book "A policy for peace" 
has written: 
" The urgent need is for NATO to 
abandon the concept that it can avert 
conventional defeat by initiating nuclear 
war: it would only result in an even 
greater defeat... Its politicians and offi-
cials must stop thinking that the exis-
tence of nuclear weapons of any kind 
means that they can economise on 
conventional forces. " 
4.4. The Soviet Union, in the speech deliv-
ered by Mr. Gromyko on behalf of President 
Brezhnev to the second special session on disar-
mament of the United Nations General Assem-
bly in July, gave a unilateral Soviet undertaking 
renouncing the initial use of nuclear weapons -
hitherto Soviet proposals for such a declaration 
had required reciprocity on the part of other 
nuclear powers. 
4.5. In addition to the problem of public atti-
tudes to nuclear weapons, and the danger that 
such attitudes may come to affect public 
I. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Docu-
ment 918, 19th May 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Mommersteeg. 
2. Nuclear weapons and the Atlantic Alliance. Foreign 
Affairs. spnng 19R I. 
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support for the defence ellott in general, there 
is the military problem of the uncertainties 
introduced into planning by nuclear weapons. 
While a military commander can assume that 
he is able to use any of the conventional 
weapons under his command to respond to any 
attack on his forces, because the use of nuclear 
weapons remains subject to political authorisa-
tion in all circumstances a military commander 
does not know in advance whether they will be 
available or not in a particular situation. At 
the end of his briefing referred to above, Gene-
ral Rogers is reported as saying that " the anti-
nuclear groups want the same thing as I do ". 
4.6. At a time when SACEUR is stressing the 
need for improving conventional defence, the 
French Minister of Defence has appeared to 
take the opposite course. " France is the only 
country which has dared to draw all the conclu-
sions of its status as a nuclear power. It is to 
this priority - the nuclear weapons programme -
that we have sacrificed what was secondary, 
where savings should be made", said the 
Minister of Defence, Mr. Hemu, to the parlia-
mentary finance committee on 7th October. 
New plans for a French model army are 
mentioned which may reduce its strength 
somewhat. France has denied a report that a 
decision has already been taken to produce 
enhanced radiation warheads, but is keeping the 
option open. 
4.7. At the latest biannual Franco-German 
summit meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd 
October, held under the 1963 bilateral treaty, 
President Mitterrand stressed that he had 
discussed military and strategic questions with 
Chancellor Kohl, but denied that Germany 
would be associated with French nuclear stra-
tegy or asked to finance it. German sources 
after the meeting stressed that Germany 
remained equally committed to its defence links 
with the United States and NATO. It was, 
however, decided to establish a joint committee 
of officials from the two countries' ministries 
for foreign affairs and of defence which would 
meet quarterly, in the interval between the 
summit meetings. 
4.8. The committee draws attention to these 
various important proposals which it intends to 
examine in more detail in a future report which 
will follow also the progress of current negotia-
tions on nuclear arms control. While it wel-
comes the increased emphasis placed on 
conventional defence, it reiterates its view that 
a balanced security policy must be designed to 
prevent all war, not only nuclear war. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation. 
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5.2. Appendix Ill shows the proportion of 
national product devoted to defence by the 
allied countries, plotted against their per capita 
income ; it reveals little or no correlation 
between the two. The defence effort as a 
proportion of national product varies widely 
from 1.3% for Luxembourg to 5.9% for 
Greece, and is obviously more closely related 
both to historical patterns of defence activity 
and to individual countries' perception of exter-
nal threat, not only from.the Soviet Union. The 
committee comments on the defence efforts of 
Canada and Portugal, countries visited by the 
committee, and more briefly Denmark, in 
Chapter Ill (b), (d) and (c) above. 
5.3. Paragraphs in the draft recommendation 
relate to this explanatory memorandum as 
follows: 
Draft recommendation: Explanatory memorandum: 
Preamble: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
Operative text: 
2 
3 
Chapter 11 (a). 
Chapter 11 (b). 
Chapter Ill, paragraphs 3.32 to 3.34. 
Chapter Ill. 
Chapter Ill and Chapter V, paragraph 5.2. 
Chapter IV. 
Chapter 11 (b). 
Chapter Ill, paragraphs 3.32 to 3.34. 
Chapter IV. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted in the 
committee by 14 votes to I with I abstention. 
The minority held that the report should have 
dealt also with many other topics including 
nuclear and conventional defence, the situation 
in Greece and Turkey, disarmament and arms 
control, and should have dealt more fully with 
the consequences of Spain's accession to 
NATO. 
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APPENDIX I 
The overall naval balance - NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels over 500 tons full load only, 
excluding ballistic-missile submarines 
Country SSGN SSG SSN ss Aircraft-carriers 
Belgium ••••••••••• 0 ••••••••• 0 
Canada 0 ••••••••••••• 0 0 0 •••••• 3 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 o o o o o o o 5 
France ........................ 21 2 
Fed. Rep. of Germany •••• 0 ••••• 24 
Greece I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 10 
Italy .......................... 9 
Netherlands ................... 6 
Norway ....................... 14 
Portugal o 0 o 0 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Spain ......................... 8 I 
Turkey •••• 0 •••••• 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •••••• 14 
United Kingdom •••• 0 •••• 0 0 ••• 11 16 2 
United States ................... 85 5 14 
NATO ••••••••• 0 •••• 0 0 •• 0 ••• 0 - - 96 138 19 
Warsaw Pact .................. 49 20 56 !54 2 
USSR ••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••• 49 20 56 148 21 
East Germany 0. 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 •••• 0 •• 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 o 0 o 4 
Bulgaria • 0 ••• 0. 0. 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 ..... 2 
Romania ••••••••• 0 •• 0 •••••• 0. 
I. A third on trials. 
2. Plus 50 long-range ASW ; plus 80 Backfire naval air force long-range bomber. 
SSGN = nuclear-propelled cruise-missile submarines. 
SSG = conventionally-propelled cruise-missile submarines. 
SSN = nuclear-propelled attack submarines. 
SS = conventionally-propelled attack submarines. 
Cruisers: includes helicopter cruisers. 
(N) = including nuclear-propelled. 
Source:- IISS Military Balance 1982-83. 
- Jane's Fighting Ships 1982-83. 
(4N) 
(4N) 
Over 5 000 t Under 5 000 t I 100 t and over 
cruisers destroy~rs frigates 
4 
4 19 
10 
2 19 23 
7 7 
16 6 
3 5 11 
3 12 
5 
17 
11 20 
15 2 
12 44 
27 (9N) 84 79 
32 (9N) 176 259 
39 (IN) 67 187 
39 (IN) 66 I 183 
I 2 
, I 
1 ' I 
i 2 
-r---
Over 500 t Long-range 
Under I 100 t maritime patrol 
corvettes aircraft 
19 
33 
6 19 
8 14 
6 10 
2 7 
6 
28 
216 
22 352 
37 852 
25 852 
6 
3 
3 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (I) 
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million B. Frs. 
France (c).................. Million F. Frs. 
Germany.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million DM 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Milliard Lire 
Luxembourg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million L. Frs. 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Guilders 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . Million £ Sterling 
------~-
TOTAL WEU ... ,., .. , 
Defence expenditure (national currency) 
current prices 
1977 
(-5) 
89,480 
73,779 
40,184 
4,533 
1,029 
9,092 
6,810 
1978 1979 1980 
(-4) (- 3) (-2) 
99,726 106,472 115,754 
85,175 96,439 111,672 
43,019 45,415 48,518 
5,301 6,468 8,203 
1,154 1,242 1,534 
9,146 10,106 10,476 
7,616 9,029 11,503 
----1----
1981 f 
(-I) 
124,055 
129,365 
52,298 
9,850 
1,727 
11,279 
12,418 
Defence expenditure 
(current prices - US $ million) a 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2,497 3,175 3,632 3,958 
15,016 18,874 22,668 26,425 
17,308 21,417 24,778 26,692 
5,137 6,246 7,785 9,578 
29 37 42 1 52 
3,705 4,228 5,038 5,269 
11,887 14,619 19,155 26,759 
----1----
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1977-1981 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
APPENDIX 11 
GDP in purchasers' values 
(current prices - US $ million) a b Population (thousand) 
Defence expenditure as % of 
GDP in purchasers' values 
Defence expenditure per head 
(current prices - USS) a Defence eKpenditure as % of total WEU 
1981 f 
(5) 
3,341 
23,804 
23,141 
8,665 
47 
4,520 
25,183 
1977 
(6) 
79,341 
383,558 
517,056 
215,419 
2,823 
112,021 
250,552 
1978 
(7) 
97,328 
474,376 
640,427 
261,887 
3,509 
137,291 
315,713 
1979 
(8) 
111,231 
573,377 
760,497 
324,551 
4,164 
156,938 
407,140 
1980 
(9) 
119,114 
651,884 
819,126 
393,955 
4,402 
167,626 
523,373 
----1----
1981 e 
(10) 
100,844 
570,548 
685,026 
350,560 
3,635 
139,170 
505,566 
----1---
1978 
(12) 
9,841 
53,277 
59,409 
56,697 
362 
13,942 
55,902 
1979 
(13) 
9,849 
53,478 
59,454 
56,888 
364 
14,038 
55,946 
1981 e 
(15) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 J 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 J 1977 1978 1979 t980 1981 I 
(16) lT7) (18) (19) (20) (2i) (22) (23) (24) ----c25)1.,----:-;(2'"""6):-- (27) (28) (29) (30) 
------------ ------ --1---1-.c.__:- _.:..._.c __ l----'---1---
1980 
(14) 
9,857 9,871 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 254 323 369 402 338 4.49 4.63 4.37 4.01 3.77 
53,713 53,874 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 283 354 424 492 442 27.02 27.51 27.28 26.76 26.84 
59,669 59,460 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 291 361 417 447 389 31.14 31.22 29.82 27.03 26.09 
57,042 57,247 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 91 110 137 168 151 9.24 9.11 9.37 9.70 9.77 
365 365 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 80 102 115 142 129 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
14,144 14,178 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 267 303 359 373 319 6.67 6.16 6.06 5.34 5.10 
56,010 56,021 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.0 213 262 342 478 450 21.39 21.31 23.05 27.10 28.38 
---1·-- ------------------1----1----
55,579 68,596 83,098 98,733 88,701 1 ,560, 770 1,930,531 2,337,898 2,679,480 2,355,349 248,952 249,430 250,017 250,800 251,016 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 223 275 332 394 353 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
========I====== ===I=== ===1===1== ===1=== ===I=== ------------------ --1===1===1===1=== == 
Canada ................... . 
Denmark ................ .. 
Greece .................. .. 
Norway .................. . 
Portugal .................. . 
Turkey ................... . 
United States .............. . 
TOTAL NON-WEU 
TOTAL NATO ......• 
Million C. S 
Million D. Kr. 
Million Drachmas 
Million N. Kr. 
Million Escudos 
Million L. 
Million US S 
4,124 
6,343 
67,738 
5,934 
22,082 
49,790 
100,925 
4,662 4,825 5,355 
7,250 7,990 9,061 
77,861 89,791 96,975 
6,854 7,362 8,242 
27,354 34,343 43,440 
66,239 93,268 185,656 
109,247 122,279 143,981 
----'--1---'--1 
6,150 
8,408 
125,944 
9,447 
51,774 
313,067 
167,764 
3,878 
1,057 
1,838 
1,ll5 
577 
2,766 
100,925 
112,156 
4,087 4,119 
1,315 1,519 
2,125 2,420 
1,307 1,454 
623 702 
2,728 3,001 
109,247 122,279 
4,579 
1,608 
2,276 
1,669 
868 
2,442 
143,981 
----1----
5,130 
2,273 
1,646 
841 
2,970 
167,764 
199,155 205,845 229,449 255,393 283,580 23,280 23,493 23,690 23,941 24,288 
47,195 56,960 66,224 66,404 57,004 5,088 5,104 5,117 5,125 5,137 
26,157 31,690 38,574 40,410 38,612 9,268 9,360 9,449 9,540 9,608 
35,979 40,647 46,746 57,413 56,359 4,043 4,060 4,073 4,087 4,094 
16,278 17,800 20,381 24,144 23,559 9,773 9,820 9,863 9,966 10,067 
47,937 52,499 69,371 56,873 61,958 42,177 43,123 44,089 45,078 46,110 
1,902,356 2,131,801 2,376,828 2,583,400 2,886,433 220,239 222,585 225,055 227,658 229,821 
121,432 135,494 157,423 182,274e 2,275,057 2,537,242 2,847,573 3,084,037 3.407,505 313,868 317,545 321,336 325,395 329,125 
===1===1 
1.9 
2.2 
7.0 
3.1 
3.5 
5.8 
5.3 
4.9 
2.0 
2.3 
6.7 
3.2 
3.5 
5.2 
5.1 
4.8 
1.8 
2.3 
6.3 
3.1 
3.4 
4.3 
5.1 
4.8 
1.8 
2.4 
5.6 
2.9 
3.6 
4.3 
5.6 
5.1 
1.8 
5.9 
2.9 
3.6 
4.8 
5.8 
5.3e 
167 
208 
198 
276 
59 
66 
458 
357 
174 
258 
227 
322 
63 
63 
491 
382 
174 
297 
256 
357 
71 
68 
543 
422 
191 
314 
239 
408 
87 
54 
632 
211 
237 
402 
84 
64 
730 
484 554e 
167,735 190,028 218,592 256,156 270,975e 3.835,827 4,467,773 5,185,471 5,763,517 5,762,854 562,820 566,975 571,353 576,195 580,141 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.7e 298 335 383 445 467e 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States S at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
For the period 1977-1981 the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US $ per unit Units per US S 
Belgium and Luxembourg Franc 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Canatill 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Den111Qrk 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
France 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Fed. Rep. of Germany 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Greece 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Canadian Dollar 
D. Krone 
Franc 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
0.02790 
0.03184 
0.03411 
0.03420 
0.02693 
0.94034 
0.87664 
0.85371 
0.85523 
0.83409 
0.16658 
0.18134 
0.19008 
0.17743 
0.14038 
0.20352 
0.22159 
0.23505 
0.23663 
0.18401 
0.43070 
0.49785 
0.54559 
0.55016 
0.44248 
0.02714 
0.02729 
0.02696 
0.02347 
0.01805 
35.84100 
31.41000 
29.31860 
29.24260 
37.13101 
1.06345 
1.14073 
1.17136 
1.16928 
1.19891 
6.00319 
5.51462 
5.26097 
5.63593 
7.12337 
4.91343 
4.51276 
4.25445 
4.22604 
5.43458 
2.32178 
2.00863 
1.83288 
1.81767 
2.26000 
36.84435 
36.64843 
37.09694 
42.61666 
55.40842 
Note b: GDP (p.v.) =Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Country 
Italy 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Netherlands 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Norway 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Portugal 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Turkey 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
United Kingdom 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
Unit 
1 , 000 Lire 
Guilder 
N. Krone 
Escudo 
T. Lira 
£ 
US$ per unit 
I. I 3329 
1.17832 
1.20357 
1.16761 
0.87969 
0.40745 
0.46224 
0.49849 
0.50299 
0.40077 
0.18785 
0.19076 
0.19747 
0.20246 
0.17423 
0.02613 
0.02276 
0.02044 
0.01998 
0.01625 
0.05555 
0.04118 
0.03218 
0.01315 
0.00949 
1.74552 
1.91951 
2.12155 
2.32628 
2.02791 
Units per US S 
0.88239 
0.84866 
0.83086 
0.85645 
1.13677 
2.45428 
2.16336 
2.00608 
1.98812 
2.49520 
5.32351 
5.24224 
5.06406 
4.93922 
5.73951 
38.27693 
43.94021 
48.92344 
50.06208 
61.54642 
18.00225 
24.28216 
31.07752 
76.03811 
105.426~9 
0.57290 
0.52097 
0.47135 
0.42987 
0.49312 
Prior to 1977, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
Note c: France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(81)20. 
6.98 
1.90 
3.31 
2.01 
1.04 
4.98 
181.59 
201.80 
301.80 
5.96 
1.92 
3.10 
1.91 
0.91 
3.98 
159.26 
177.02 
== 
277.02 
4.96 4.64 5.78 
1.83 1.63 
2.91 2.31 2.56 
1. 75 1.69 1.86 
0.84 0.88 0.95 
3.61 2.47 3.35 
147.15 145.83 189.13 
---1---
163.05 159.44 205.00e 
263.05 259.44 305.00e 
APPENDIX 11 
B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1981 
Period of compulsory1 Total in armed forces2 
military service military personnel 
(months) (thousands) 
Army Navy Air force (e) 
Belgium 103 103 103 109 
France 12 12 12 575 
Germany 15 15 15 495 
Italy 12 18 12 505 
Luxembourg voluntary I 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 107 
United Kingdom voluntary 331 
TOTAL WEU 2,123 
Canada voluntary 82 
Denmark 9 9 9 32 
Greece 22-32 26 24 186 
Norway 12 15 15 40 
Portugal 16 24 24 90 
Turkey 20 20 20 741 
United States voluntary 2,120 
ToTAL NON-WEU 3,291 
TOTAL NATO 5,414 
Sources: 
1. IISS Military Balance, 1981-82. 
2. NATO press communique, M-DPC-2 (81) 20, 8th December 1981. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
e = estimate. 
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Total armed forces2 
(military and civilian) 
as percentage 
of active population 
(e) 
2.8 
3.0 
2.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.7 
2.1 
2.5 
1.0 
1.6 
6.2 
2.6 
2.3 
4.4 
2.9 
I 3.5 
2.8 
N 
0 
+:> 
APPENDIX Ill 
Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita- 1981 
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Per capita income 1981 Defence expenditur~ $ as% ofGDP 
Belgium 0 •• 0 •• 0 0 0. 0 •• 0. 10,216 3.3 
France 0. 0 ••• 0. 0 0. 0 •••• 10,590 4.2 
Fed. Rep. of Germany .. 11,966 3.4 
Italy 0 •••••• 0 ••• 0 •• 0 ••• 6,115 2.5 I 
Luxembourg • 0 0. 0 0 0 •••• 9,959 1.3 
Netherlands 0 0 •• 0 0. 0 ••• 9,816 3.2 
United Kingdom 0 •• 0 ••• 9,025 5.0 
I 
WEU 0. 0 0 ••••• 0. 0 0. 0 •• 9,384 3.7 
Canada ................ 11,676 1.8 
Denmark •• 0. 0 ••••••••• 11,097 (2.4)* 
Greece 0 0 •• 0 0 •• 0 0 0 •• 0 0 0 4,019 5.9 I 
Norway •• 0 0. 0. 0 0 ••••• 0 13,766 2.9 
Portugal ............... 2,340 3.6 I 
Turkey ................ 1,344 4.8 
United States 0 0 0 0 •••••• 12,559 5.8 
NATO •• 0. 0 •• 0 •••• 0 0 0. 9,934 4.7 
* 1980. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
State of European security 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
29th November 1982 
1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert : 
"Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288 on the accession of Spain to the North 
Atlantic Treaty approved by the majority of the then Spanish Parliament;". 
2. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "despite the general reces-
sion" to the end of the paragraph and insert "by restructuring defence budgets so as to strengthen the 
operational elements of conventional forces without, because of the economic, social, and general 
budgetary recession, having to increase these budgets in real prices, whilst actively pursuing arms 
control negotiations in all forums.". 
I. See 11th sitting, I st December 1982 (amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Dejardin 
Document 936 
Amendment 4 
State of European security 
AMENDMENT 41 
tabled by Mr. Morris and others 
30th November 1982 
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"(a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command 
headquarters;". 
I. See IIth sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment agreed to). 
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Signed: Mo"is, Cox, Miller 
Document 936 
Amendment 5 
State of European security 
AMENDMENT 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Urwin and others 
5. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
30th November 1982 
Signed: Urwin, van den Bergh, Lagorce 
l. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendment not moved). 
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Amendments 6 and 7 
State of European security 
AMENDMENTS 6 and 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Pignion 
1st December 1982 
6. In line 2 of paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "par-
liament" to the end of the paragraph. 
7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "not only" and insert 
"particularly". 
1. See 11th sitting, 1st December 1982 (amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Pignion 
Document 936 
Amendment 8 
State of European security 
AMENDMENT 8 1 
tabled by Mr. Rosch 
1st December 1982 
8. In line 1 of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "satellite". 
l. See 11th sitting, lst December 1982 (amendment negatived). 
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Signed: Rosch 
Document 937 16th November 1982 
Written questions 229, 230 and 231 
and the replies of the Council 
QUESTION 229 
put by Mr. Valleix 
on 5th May 1982 
Two military transport aircraft, the 
Franco-German second-generation Transall and 
the Franco-Italian military version of the regio-
nal transport aircraft ATR-42, are to be built in 
the 1980s. 
Are other member countries being invi-
ted to participate in the construction of one or 
both of these aircraft? 
What will be the consequences of the 
construction of the aircraft for a possible mili-
tary version of the Airbus? 
What consequences will building the 
A TR-42 have for the possible building of a 
150-seat Airbus (A-320)? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st July 1982 
With regard to the aircraft construction 
programmes referred to by the honourable par-
liamentarian, viz. the building of the Franco-
German second-generation Transall and the 
Franco-Italian regional transport aircraft 
A TR-42, no participation other than by the 
three countries mentioned is envisaged at the 
present time. It should however be pointed 
out that the second of these programmes is still 
at the planning stage. It should furthermore be 
noted that the German air force has no plans to 
introduce a second-generation Transall and that 
the Franco-German co-operation is purely an 
industrial co-operation with the aim of intro-
ducing a second-generation Transall into the 
French air force. 
In view of the different type and purpose 
of Transall and A TR-42 on the one hand and 
the Airbus on the other, development of the 
Franco-German and Franco-Italian programmes 
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referred to cannot have any implications for the 
Airbus, for which no military ~ersion is at pre-
sent being considered. 
QUESTION 230 
put by Mr. Giinther Muller 
on 25th June 1982 
Does the Council consider that possible 
consultations in the framework of NATO on 
the negotiations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union for limiting nuclear weapons 
allow the European memberS of the Atlantic 
Alliance to give due prominelllce to their views 
on this question? Does it consider that consul-
tations between European powers, in WEU for 
instance, would further this aim? 
REPLY OF THE CQUNCIL 
communicated to the k4ssembly 
on 27th October ,1982 
Consultations on the issue of nuclear 
arms limitation negotiations between the Uni-
ted States and the Soviet Union have indeed 
taken place within the framework of NATO 
ever since this issue became Vfilid. 
Accordingly, the INF negotiating position 
of the United States and in ~articular the zero 
option proposal, aiming at a total renunciation 
of longer-range INF missiles by the United Sta-
tes and the USSR, were established in close 
consultation and with the active contribution of 
other NATO partners who !are parties to the 
decision of 12th December 1979 on the 
modernisation of longer-range INF and on 
negotiations aiming at the reduction of such 
weapons. A special forum, the special consulta-
tive group (SCG), was estaqlished in order to 
ensure a thorough and regular consultation 
between the United States and these countries, 
a consultation which in fact associates these 
countries to the negotiation. A suitable proce-
dure of consultation on a regular basis has been 
established within the alliance with regard to 
DOCUMENT 9 3 7 
the negotiations on the reduction of strategic 
arms (START). For the above reasons there 
clearly exists no need to have recourse to other 
fora for this kind of consultation. 
QUESTION 231 
put by Mr. Giinther Miiller 
on 25th June 1982 
Did the Council receive prior notification 
of the proposals made by President Reagan in 
Bonn on 9th June 1982 for limiting the num-
bers deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
in Europe to 700,000 each? Does it believe this 
level would leave enough American conven-
tional forces on the mainland of Europe to 
sustain the deterrent effect of American stra-
tegic nuclear weapons which has sheltered 
Europe for more than thirty years? 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 8th October 1982 
The new western proposal for an inte-
grated MBFR agreement announced by Presi-
dent Reagan in Bonn on 9th June 1982 was the 
subject of close consultation within the NATO 
alliance. Those WEU countries who partici-
pate in the MBFR negotiations played a full 
part in developing the new proposal in NATO 
prior to the NATO summit in Bonn. 
They are convinced that common collec-
tive ceilings of 700,000 ground forces and 
900,000 ground and air forces on each side 
would permit sufficient United States and other 
allied conventional forces to remain in the area 
of reductions in Central Europe to guarantee 
the alliance's collective deterrence and defence 
capability. 
Document 938 25th November 1982 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 378 to 387 
RECOMMENDATION 378 1 
on the evolution of the situation in Poland 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370; 
I 
Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference ; 
Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the 
dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression ; 
Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of 
Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship ; 
Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article· VIII of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty to be applied ; 
Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the 
framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe ; 
Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-
establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union ; 
Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on : 
(a) the termination of martial law in Poland ; 
(b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members; 
(c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and t~ Catholic church, 
REcOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American merobers of the North 
Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland 
and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantict Council of 11th 
January 1982 ; 
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy 
towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the 
long and short term ; ' 
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in 
present circumstances ; 
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the 
Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'etat 
on 13th December 1981 ; 
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and .hold a continuing 
dialogue with the Assembly on this question ; 
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the 
conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious exami-
nation of events in Poland. 
' I. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 8th February 1982 in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, paragraph 2, 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL! 
to Recommendation 378 
1. In their reply to Recommendation 378 the Council would like to draw the attention of the 
Assembly to the continuing and intensive consultations which took place within NATO, in the 
European Council and between members of WEU. 
The NATO meeting of 11th January resulted, as the Assembly is aware, in broad agreement on 
an attitude to be adopted towards Poland and the Soviet Union. 
In their reply on 3rd February to the statement by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly 
on 8th January 1982, the Council already stated that the member countries of WEU have remained 
in close contact with their European and Atlantic partners. 
The European Council renewed its call to the Polish authorities to end with the minimum 
delay the state of martial law, release those arrested and restore a genuine dialogue with the Church 
and Solidarity. 
A further exchange of views with the transatlantic partners regarding the western position is en-
sured through consultations in the NATO Council. 
2. Joint policies in the economic field towards the Soviet Union have been worked out in the 
framework of the EEC as is shown e.g. by its decision to restrict imports from the Soviet Union. Wes-
tern countries have decided with regard to Poland that the question of the rescheduling of Poland's 
1982 official debts should for the time being be held in suspense. They also took restrictive mea-
sures concerning officially backed credits, including the decision not to make any new credits avail-
able to Poland at the present time. For the longer term it should be noted that during discussions of 
the European Council on 29th and 30th March 1982, the heads of state and of government discussed 
the basis on which East-West economic and commercial relations had been conducted. The heads of 
state and of government agreed that these questions, including the important and related question of 
credit policy, should be the subject of careful study by the European Community and by their own 
and other governments, both nationally and internationally and in close consultation with other 
members of the OECD. Thus the EEC introduced a proposal in this organisation to upgrade the 
Soviet Union from the intermediate to the relatively rich category for export credits. 
3. Member countries of WEU as well as other NATO countries have suspended economic and 
financial assistance to Poland on the understanding that no basis for the re-establishment of normal 
relations and consequently for continuation of such assistance exists as long as no positive develop-
ment takes place in Poland to end martial law, release those in detention and restore a genuine dia-
logue with the Church and Solidarity. 
4. In their communique on 4th January, Foreign Ministers of the Ten declared their total sympa-
thy with the Polish people and their readiness to continue their direct humanitarian aid to them. 
The NATO Foreign Ministers affirmed during their 11th January meeting their willingness to 
continue and increase humanitarian aid to the Polish people for distribution and monitoring by non-
governmental organisations to ensure that it reaches the people for whom it is intended. Further-
more, EEC Ministers concluded on 27th January that the funds which were released by their deci-
sions should be used to finance humanitarian assistance in the form of gifts. 
It should be noted that both the EEC and NATO countries specifically stipulated that such aid 
should be channelled only through non-governmental organisations and be conditional on it reaching 
the Polish people. 
5. WEU member countries have met regularly and are continuing to do so, either through the 
medium of the WEU Council or in other multilateral fora, to discuss the situation in Poland. The 
Council will not fail to inform the Assembly of further developments. 
6. WEU member countries were represented at ministerial level at the resumption of the CSCE 
meeting in Madrid in February of this year. Regrettably the violations of the principles of the Hel-
sinki final act, of which the repression in Poland constitutes a particularly grave element, had not 
only prevented the Madrid meeting from achieving positive results, but also put at risk the entire 
CSCE process. WEU member countries as well as other member countries of the EEC, which 
remain committed to the continuation of the CSCE process, have expressed the hope that, when the 
Madrid meeting resumes in November, the prevailing circumstances would be more conducive to the 
achievement of a positive outcome. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th May 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 379 1 
on the political activities of the WEU Council-
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council2 
DOCUMENT 938 
Noting the satisfactory aspects of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council; 
Nevertheless deploring the prolongation of the WEU Council's inactivity throughout 1981; 
Drawing attention to the importance of the proposals for reactivating WEU fll,ade in December 
1981 by Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence; 
Stressing that these proposals should be explained and if possible further elaborated by the 
French Government and should elicit a response from its six partners; 
Noting that the dangers to peace and security in Europe are now more serious than ever; 
Recalling that WEU is still the only European organisation with effective responsibilities in 
defence questions and, consequently, disarmament, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Make an in-depth examination of the proposals concerning WEU made by th~ French Govern-
ment with a view to determining the extent of agreement France's partners are able to reach on the 
basis of these proposals and report to the Assembly if possible at the next part-sessi6n or in any event 
within a year; 
2. Extend its consultations to questions raised by the evolution of European public opinion in the 
face of threats to Europe's security; 
3. Inter alia, consider the means available to the governments of member countries for countering 
international terrorism with a view to strengt4ening them through greater co-operat~on; 
4. Extend its discussions to all threats to the security of Western Europe, where~r they arise; 
5. Prepare the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council by consultations in the frame-
work of WEU on European defence and on the development of Soviet-United State~ conversations on 
the limitation of armaments; 
6. Undertake, at meetings of the Permanent Council, frequent and regular exchanges of views on 
topical questions relating to European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance; 
7. Examine how the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be 
used to contribute to the solution of monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on 
disarmament; 
8. Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being 
relieved of its present responsibilities. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 14th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (1st sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Vecchietti on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 913). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 379 
The Council, who are fully aware of the evolution of the international situation and of the 
threat facing Europe, are examining the various problems raised in the present recommendation. 
I. They note, first of all, that Western European Union is the only European organisation which 
by treaty has been given competence in matters of defence. Consequently, its Assembly is of special 
importance, being the only European parliamentary body empowered by statute to discuss defence 
questions, including the control of armaments. 
Proposals which the French Government have put forward take account of this unique position 
of the Assembly, possessing as it does the ability to reach the peoples of WEU member countries. 
Having regard to the questions legitimately voiced by European public opinion and the impor-
tance of democratic dialogue, through which peoples reach a better understanding of the defence 
efforts needed, the Council support the notion expressed in the address to the Assembly on 
1st December 1981 by the State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence that the Assembly 
should extend its debates to all the extremely varied themes which raise the problems relating to the 
security of European countries. 
In this connection, the Council note which great interest that the Assembly General Affairs 
Committee has prepared a report on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and 
neutralism. 
As regards the Standing Armaments Committee, which also was the subject of proposals by the 
State Secretary of the French Ministry of Defence, the Council recall that this body was set up on 
7th May 1955 to promote co-operation in the matter of armaments. If in this respect the internatio-
nal secretariat of the SAC were occasionally to assist the Assembly in the study of clearly-defined 
themes, this could only be done under a procedure involving a case-by-case examination by the 
Council, under whom the SAC is placed. It is clear that such work could not have the effect of 
relieving the SAC of its responsibilities nor could it affect its competence, these being the Council's 
exclusive responsibility. 
11. The WEU Assembly, which is duly qualified to deal with matters of defence and security in 
Europe, is also a parliamentary body in direct touch with public opinion in the various member 
countries. Its elected members are in the best position to know the preoccupations of the peoples 
they represent, their reactions to threats to their security, their resolutions or their doubts about the 
means of meeting them. They are also in a better position to inform these peoples and arouse their 
awareness to matters affecting defence and security in Europe. Consequently, the debates of the 
WEU Assembly undoubtedly make an important contribution to the Council's reflections. The 
Council, for their part, will not fail to follow with the greatest possible attention the movement of 
ideas among European public opinions and their impact. 
Ill. The WEU Council are aware of the various dangers that the increase in terrorism represents for 
Europe. They note that discussion of this question takes place in other European fora. 
IV. Under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty the Council are empowered to examine a 
wide range of questions. In a context which makes their task particularly difficult, they perform 
their functions in such a way that it would not be appropriate to speak of prolonged inactivity on the 
part of the Council. They will continue to exercise the responsibilities incumbent on them, and in 
so doing assert Europe's presence in consultations on security, armaments control and disarmament. 
The WEU Council consider it desirable that in these spheres the provision of information and the 
harmonisation of attitudes should take place in various bodies and at various levels, avoiding as far as 
possible any duplication. The fact that all the WEU member countries are members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and share the conviction that defence of the continent of Europe and global defence are 
inseparable, does not remove the justification for abiding by the mandates and for pursuing specific 
approaches. 
V. The methodology adopted by the Armaments Control Agency undoubtedly offers an example 
to which the Council attach great value. As indicated to the Assembly on several occasions, the 
Council are however aware that such control procedures between allies are very difficult to transfer to 
other circles. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 380 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply there~o; 
(ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamenta~ provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their 
full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instru-
ment of European security; 
(iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve 
any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. 
Ill and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe "; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements ofthe 1980s, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Trt1aty, vary by redu-
cing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill; · 
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not 
already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level 
of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed 
with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties; 
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned fbrces; 
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February. 
1. Adopkd hy the Assembly on 15th June I 982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Expi,!IJ.ttnry memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armament' 1 Document 908). 
217 
DOCUMENT 938 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 380 
The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of 
security. 
1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situa-
tion in Europe. This is why Annex Ill of that protocol has been amended on several occasions 
since 19 58. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV (" Long-range missiles and guided missiles ") and VI 
(" Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ") of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill according to the 
procedure laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, the Council welcome the fact that, 
as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to 
take account of certain legal and political considerations. 
The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem. 
3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of 
which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be 
informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to 
SACEUR for the common defence. 
The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in 11.5 and 6 and IV of the final act 
of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The 
forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the 
basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from 
the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and 
with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces. 
Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral 
declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral 
context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports 
any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given. 
5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
before the end of February. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982. 
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(i) Considering the need to ensure a better place for Europe in industrial and, trade competition 
with the United States and Japan; 
(ii) Considering how fast technology evolves and the difficulty member countries experience in 
keeping abreast with progress in the various fields of advanced technology; 
(iii) Considering the need to develop and produce high technology weapons caJ?able of ensuring a 
balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact; 
(iv) Considering the budgetary difficulties of member states and the problems they consequently 
have to face because of the sharp rise in the cost of research and development of modem weapons; 
(v) Considering that greater harmonisation of the research and development efforts of the member 
countries, in spite of disparities in the relevant budgets, and more intensive European co-operation 
would allow these difficulties to be overcome more easily; 
(vi) Noting the part of the Council's twenty-seventh annual report on scientific, technological and 
aerospace questions and the indications it gives on energy and security on the one hand and space 
activities on the other; 
(vii) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendations 331 and 365 and the statements by 
Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the Assembly on 3rd Decem-
ber 1981, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within 
their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in 
preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high 
technology fields; 
2. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up a list of military research and 
development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might 
be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation and report to the Assembly within 
a year; 
3. Study the possibility of increasing the security and energy interdependence of member 
countries; 
4. Invite the governments of member countries : 
(a) to decide on a choice of projects for European co-operation in fields such as micro-
electronics, biotechnology and maritime, nuclear and space technology; 1 
(b) to implement these projects with the greatest flexibility and also perseverance in bi- or 
multilateral frameworks; 
(c) to make provision for training the corresponding experts; 
(d) to promote exchanges of research workers between European countries, thus enabling the 
setting up of European teams ; 
(e) finally, to ensure the financing of these projects. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fiandrotti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions (Document 917). 
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1. The Council will consider the Assembly's interesting request to invite the Standing Armaments 
Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on 
the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields. 
2. The Council are currently examining a number of proposals concerning the Standing Arma-
ments Committee's activities. In this context, the Council consider as opportune the Assembly's 
proposal that the Standing Armaments Committee draw up a list of military research and develop-
ment programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might be 
worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation. 
3. With regard to the necessity of increasing the security and energy independence of member 
countries, the Council recall that the countries are already studying, within the framework of the 
European Communities and, for those who are members of it, the International Energy Agency (lEA), 
the possibility of increasing supplies through concerted action, to enable each of them to reduce its 
vulnerability to possible sudden crises. 
The Council also point to the measures taken by the member countries to encourage greater 
autonomy in the energy field, through a reduction of the extent of their dependence on oil imports 
and more rational and efficient use of energy, as well as increased use of nuclear energy. 
More particularly, and in accordance with the recommendations of the INFCE (International 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation) study, the value of the use of fast-breeder reactors has been recognised. 
Finally, to ensure greater continuity in energy supplies, the Council believe that sources of sup-
ply should be diversified to the greatest degree possible. 
4. In the field of microelectronics, the Council recall that, on 30th August last, the Esprit project, 
a European strategic research and development programme in the information technology sector, was 
submitted to the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community. Specific pilot pro-
jects for implementing this programme have already been identified for research into: 
(a) advanced microelectronics; 
(b) advanced data processing 
(c) software technology; 
(d) office automation and computer integrated manufacturing. 
As regards co-operation in the space sector, it must be pointed out that WEU member coun-
tries have for several years played an active part in the work of the European Space Agency, whose 
purpose is to promote scientific and applied research in the space field and to make European indus-
try in this sector competitive in world markets. 
ESA is actively involved in many scientific meteorological and earth-observation satellite pro-
jects and also in telecommunications and data-processing systems projects. 
Finally, still in the field of space co-operation, the member countries are considering setting up 
an operational European meteorological satellite system. Negotiations have been in progress since 
January 1981. They are expected shortly to reach a positive conclusion. 
In the field of biotechnology, on 7th December 1981 the EEC launched a five-year (1982-86) 
indirect action programme. This programme, which concentrates on the development of second-
generation enzyme reactors and the improvement of genetic engineering techniques, is designed to 
obtain improved yields in the agricultural and food production sectors. As regards the training of 
experts and exchanges of experts between European countries, a satisfactory level of co-operation has 
been achieved, thanks to the numerous bilateral and multilateral European scientific co-operation 
agreements between member countries and through the international organisations. Among the most 
important initiatives, the Council wish to mention that the EEC, NATO and the MBL (Molecular 
Biology Laboratory) have extensive expert training programmes which also cover the developing 
countries. The Council agree that these projects should be given adequate resources. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 382 1 
on disarmament 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to 
disarmament opened on 7th June 1982 ; 
(ii) Aware that since the first special session in 1978 there is negligible progress to report on arms 
control and none on disarmament ; 
(iii) Aware that in the meantime world military expenditure has increased to more than $ 500 
billion a year ; 
(iv) Recalling its Recommendation 323 of 21st November 1978, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to take concerted action m all appropriate bodies with the 
following objects in view: 
I. To promote disarmament: 
(a) by fostering wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West, and between 
North and South ; 
(b) by investigating the possibility of developing weapons systems that would be manifestly 
defensive; 
(c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in par-
ticular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of secunity and legitimate 
defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination; 
2. To secure a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole, and 
in Europe the " zero option " in the INF talks and the establishment of a substantially-reduced level 
and a proper balance of conventional forces ; 
3. To seek the earliest agreement on the following specific disarmament, arms control and 
confidence-building measures: 
(a) at the world level: 
(i) a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and mycotoxin 
weapons, through a resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the first place ; 
(ii) a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, through a resumption of the trilateral 
talks between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
first place, to conclude an agreement on the terms already agreed in 1980 ; 
(iii) amendment of the 196 7 outer space treaty to ban all weapons for use in or from outer 
space; 
(iv) the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency on the lines of the 
report of the United Nations Secretary-General; 
(v) the establishment of a register to be prepared and published by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations of international transfers of armaments; 
(vi) the appointment of a United Nations working group of experts to examine alternative 
defence systems excluding nuclear weapons; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (3rd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 909). 
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(h) at the European level: 
(viz) a phase one agreement on MBFR together with permanent measures of verification 
to remain operative for the duration of the agreement ; 
(viii) a conference on disarmament in Europe on the lines of the French proposal of 1978 ; 
(ix) enhanced confidence-building measures in Europe; 
4. To secure reductions in armaments in third world countries through the example to be set by 
the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reducing their nuclear and conventional forces and disman-
tling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons, and, when measures of actual disarmament are 
implemented, in diverting to developing countries the funds thus released. 
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1. (a) The Council support efforts to foster wider but balanced commercial relations between East 
and West and between North and South. This can help to intensify mutual relations and hence to 
improve the international atmosphere in general. 
(b) Although some weapons are less suitable for attack than others in certain situations, there 
are no weapons that are suitable exclusively for defence or attack. The Council also draw attention 
to the fact that the defensive character of the western alliance determines its equipment and that the 
development and introduction of weapons systems are effected accordingly. 
(c) The Council take the opportunity of reaffirming their full commitment to support all efforts 
to guarantee respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the 
principle of non-use of force in international relations (Article 2, paragraph 4), the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of 
all peoples to self-determination. The Council share the view that enhanced respect for these princi-
ples contributes to creating favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process. 
2. To the extent that the Assembly refers to the MBFR talks in Vienna in this paragraph the 
reply on this subject is given in the context of paragraph 3 (b) (vii). 
The Council believe that the western initiatives that led to the inception of both START and 
INF negotiations are a major contribution to arms control, stability and peace. 
The Council wish to point out that a " substantial reduction in the level of Q.Uclear weapons ", 
as the Assembly's recommendation reads, can only be attained by balanced agreements. Only 
mutually agreed reductions will promote stability, while unilateral reductions are not necessarily veri-
fiable and can be reversed at will. 
With regard to the INF talks, the Council would like to emphasise strongly its adherence to the 
"global approach" put forward by the United States and supported by the Europ~an allies. A geo-
graphical approach focused exclusively on " Europe ", as referred to in the Assembly's recommenda-
tion, does not take into account the fact that long-range INF can threaten Europe from outside. 
This narrow approach is advocated by the Soviet Union in order to sustain its claim that equality in 
INF force already exists "in Europe"; it is contrary to the West's realistic point of view that, due to 
the range and the mobility of the weapons concerned, only global reductions and limitations can 
serve the desired purpose. 
3. (a) (i) The Council share the Assembly's concern regarding the speedy imposition of a complete 
and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons at universal 
level. In this context, the Council would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that the 
use of chemical and biological weapons including toxins is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925 and, moreover, that under the convention on the prohibition of the development, production 
and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, the mere 
possession of toxins is illegal. 
The Council welcome the decision of the Committee on Disarmament taken in February 1982 
to give a new and enlarged mandate to its chemical weapons ad hoc working group providing for the 
negotiation and elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effeetive prohibition of 
the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. 
Several WEU members have recently taken initiatives aimed at fostering ~d intensifying the 
chemical weapons negotiations, particularly by making feasible proposals on the crucial issue of veri-
fication. The Council regard the Committee on Disarmament as an appropriate negotiating forum. 
(ii) Efforts to reach a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests are currently in progress in 
the Committee on Disarmament which, at its 1982 session, set up a new ad hoc working group to dis-
cuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress 
towards a nuclear test ban. 
(iii) In this context the Council would like to recall the initiative taken by most WEU member 
states that resulted in the United Nations General Assembly adopting at its 36th session a resolution 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1982. 
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on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The goals set forth in this resolution go beyond 
the mere amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty as advocated by the Assembly's recommen-
dation. The Council believe that, in conformity with the abovementioned resolution, special atten-
tion should be given to negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite sys-
tems as an important step in preventing an arms race in outer space. 
(iv) Some WEU member countries have actively participated in the United Nations study on 
the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency. The Council, being 
fully aware of the need for verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements, 
welcome discussion of all serious proposals that would lead to internationally acceptable means of 
verification. · 
(v) The Council hold the view that arms control and disarmament agreements must be based on 
reliable and pertinent data. The collection of such data by the United Nations serves to improve the 
conditions for the worldwide efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament. The organisational 
arrangements for collecting, arranging, processing, making available and publishing such data need to 
be expanded. The proposal to set up registers with the United Nations Secretary-General therefore 
deserves to be supported. One of these registers could be devoted to weapons exports and imports 
throughout the world. 
(vl) No concrete steps have been taken as yet to develop alternative defence systems which 
could adequately ensure western security in the event of a renunciation of nuclear weapons. The 
appointment of a United Nations working group of experts on this subject therefore offers little pros-
pect at present of achieving practical results. 
(b) (vii) The western countries concerned submitted a proposal for an interim phase I agree-
ment in Vienna on 20th December 1979. This initiative was designed to simplify the MBFR nego-
tiations by concentrating in a first phase on reduction of American and Soviet land forces, and thus 
initially requiring agreement only on the size of their land forces in the area of reductions. It was 
hoped that this simplified approach would provide an impetus towards a comprehensive phase II 
agreement involving the forces of other participants in the area of reductions. 
However, the East repeatedly demanded that there should be a firm contractual link between 
the proposed phase I and phase II agreements. In the final analysis, the East's aim was to have all 
participants incorporated in an agreement from the very outset. 
The western countries concerned have complied with this eastern requirement in their draft 
treaty, tabled in Vienna on 8th July 1982. The draft treaty provides for a binding commitment by 
each side from the outset to effectuate the reductions needed to reach the common collective ceiling. 
These reductions would take place in four stages, each of which would of course have to be satis-
factorily verified before progress to the next one. This process would lead to the establishment of 
common collective ceilings of 700,000 land forces and 900,000 combined land and air forces, and 
hence to parity of forces in Central Europe. With this comprehensive proposal the western countries 
concerned are offering a constructive solution to the linkage question resulting from the previous 
approach, with its two separate, phased agreements. 
The WEU member countries concerned consider it essential that before the conclusion of an 
MBFR agreement there be agreement between the two sides on the data concerning the actual level 
of their forces in the area of reductions and that therefore the East join western efforts to clarify the 
discrepancies regarding data for Warsaw Pact forces in the area of reductions. It is also essential that 
an agreement should include measures to verify agreed reductions and. compliance with residual 
ceilings, and to build confidence between participants. The draft treaty submitted by the western 
countries concerned contains the package of such " associated measures " first proposed by NATO 
participants in December 1979 (some of which concern a wider geographical area). These measures 
would be implemented as soon as the agreement became effective so as to perform their function of 
verification and confidence-building. It is hoped that the East will recognise the importance of this 
major concession on the part of the western countries concerned and will themselves show a corres-
ponding readiness to work constructively towards a resolution of the remaining questions of agree-
ment on the data base and "associated measures". 
(viii) and (ix) The Council are convinced that confidence-building measures are not only 
important for security and stability in Europe but also a potential basis for more extensive arms 
control agreements. The Council have therefore strongly supported from the outset the French pro-
posal of 1978 for the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe. 
Since the start of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid it has been the common aim of the 
western participating countries to obtain the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe 
224 
DOCUMENT 9 3 8 
designed to go clearly beyond, in an initial phase, the confidence-building measures set out in the 
Final Act of the CSCE. 
A conference on disarmament in Europe should be a part of the CSCE process. The mandate 
which would set it up would therefore be adopted as part of a substantive and balanced concluding 
document at the Madrid follow-up meeting. The initial objective of the conference should be to 
establish new types of confidence-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe. In intensive 
negotiations conducted since 1980 the thirty-five participating countries have reaahed agreement in 
principle on three of the four basic elements of the mandate for such a conference. There is agree-
ment that confidence- and security-building measures to be negotiated at the conference will have to 
be militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. However, agreement has not been rea-
ched so far on the zone of application of the measures; the Soviet Union is not ;prepared to allow 
them be applied to all of its European territory without a " corresponding " (but unspecified) exten-
sion westwards. ' 
The violation of the Helsinki Final Act caused by developments in Poland resulted in serious 
strains on the negotiations in Madrid. The meeting was suspended by consensus of the thirty-five 
participating countries until 9th November 1982. 
The Council recall the fundamental demands with regard to the situation in Poland (lifting of 
martial law, release of all political detainees, resumption of the dialogue between the government and 
free trade unions) made by the Assembly at its meeting in Paris in June. 
When the Madrid meeting is resumed the WEU member countries will pursue the negotiation 
of a substantial and balanced concluding document including a mandate for a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe, with agreement on the four basic elements referred to above. In its view, the draft 
concluding document RM 39 submitted by the neutral and non-aligned countries ~n December 1981 
could provide a suitable basis for negotiations. 
4. The Council share the Assembly's concern at the volume of world military expenditure. In 
third world countries, too, resources that could serve to promote economic and social development 
are being increasingly used for military purposes. It is therefore important that these countries, too, 
share in the responsibility for reducing armaments worldwide and hence alleviating the financial 
burden posed by them. 
In East-West relations, the WEU member states are in favour of establishing parity and stabi-
lity at the lowest possible level of military forces through balanced and verifiable agreements. Pro-
gress achieved in this manner would at the same time be a major contribution to1 greater stability in 
the world as a whole. Arms control agreements between East and West are important for other 
regions as well because of the example they set and because they demonstrate that stabilising agree-
ments can in fact be achieved. 
Arms control and disarmament measures can lead to more resources being released in all coun-
tries of the world for economic and social development and thus improve the opportunities for assist-
ing other countries through economic co-operation. 
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RECOMMENDATION 383 1 
on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe1 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that 
the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-
range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced; 
(ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security 
policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war; 
(iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces; 
(iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis 
both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased 
by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option; 
(v) Regretting that SALT II remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by 
the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic 
arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further 
progress; 
(vl) Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions 
which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and 
comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those 
statements at the opening of the START negotiations; 
(vir) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks 
should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and 
welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end 
of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons; 
(viil) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations 
which must be conducted in the framework of START; 
(ix) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of 
ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons; 
(x) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Hel-
sinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides; 
(xz) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of 
deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of 
nuclear war; 
(xiz) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements 
which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis 
of the facts in order to negotiate reductions; 
(xiiz) Welcoming the publication of" NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which 
the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by govern-
ments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the 
basis of allied defence and arms control policies; 
(xiv) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to 
discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based, 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 918). 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council, 
1. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an 
agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control; 
2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 
1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions 
previously agreed in the INF talks; · 
3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, 
and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclu-
sion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks; 
4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in 
June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect 
of all SALT limits during the negotiations; 
5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective pro<redures for verifi-
cation, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction; 
6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jacksori's proposal for a 
joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by 
accident or miscalculation; 
7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO 
comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forth-
coming and objective in publishing force comparisons; 
B.l. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public 
opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied 
defence and arms control and reduction policies; · 
B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic 
Council. 
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1. The Council welcome the continued interest of the Assembly in the matter of intermediate 
nuclear forces (INF) and take careful note of the Assembly's views. The Council endorse many of 
the opinions expressed in the recommendation and its preamble, notably the need for arms control 
and defence measures to complement each other in a balanced security policy, and the importance of 
the 1979 double decision as the basis for redressing the imbalance in INF. 
2. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations 
amongst the allies on the subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular 
briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF 
negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the Special Consultative Group for those member 
countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979. 
3. The Council further agree with the Assembly on the importance to be attached to prepara-
tions for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. NATO's 
resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet 
Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and will continue to be crucial to achieving 
concrete results. Members of the Council who participated in the December 1979 decision will 
continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the 
basis of the so-called " zero option " or " zero-level outcome " for American and Soviet longer-range 
land-based INF missiles. They reconfirm that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to these 
systems which constitute the greatest threat. They do not rule out the possibility that in the event of 
agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations may relate to other INF systems. They believe that 
it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-
range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered. 
4. The Council are happy to repeat the welcome which has been given by member governments 
to the renewal of strategic arms control through the opening of the START talks and to the assur-
ances that what has been achieved through existing agreements will not be undercut pending the 
negotiation of a START agreement, subject to reciprocity. The Council endorse the Assembly's 
concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement. 
5. The Council doubt that the United States Government need outside encouragement to keep 
under review the existing measures to prevent any possibility of war by accident or miscalculation 
and in this respect have noted the initiatives outlined by President Reagan in his speech in Berlin in 
June 1982. 
6. The Council agree that the figures published on the forces of the integrated military structure 
of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the NATO force comparisons paper pub-
lished in the spring of 1982 may need to be updated from time to time. They also accept that mem-
ber governments will need to continue their active information policies to ensure that public opinion 
is well informed about alliance security policy, and the threat faced by members of NATO. 
7. As regards a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlan-
tic Council, the European members of the alliance discuss the issues on the agenda of the North 
Atlantic Council with each other as well as with their North Atlantic allies, as part of normal consul-
tations. A number of these subjects are also discussed by the members of the European Community 
as a normal part of the Community's political co-operation procedures. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1982. 
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RECOMMENDATION 384 1 
on the evolution of the situation in Poland2 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Order 53, Recommendations 370 and 378 and the statement by its Presidential 
Committee of 8th January 1982 ; 
Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation ; 
Considering that the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly on the occasion of 
I st May 1982, to alleviate martial law fall far short of meeting the three conditions set by the North 
Atlantic Council on II th January 1982 for re-establishing normal relations with Poland; 
I 
Regretting that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council to back up these 
conditions have not been applied more strictly ; 
Welcoming the fact that participants in the Madrid conference have refused to pursue their 
work in the circumstances created by the crackdown on 13th December 1981 ; · 
Noting that events in Poland at the beginning of May and recourse to fux:ther measures of 
constraint show that the Polish Government has found no means other than force to impose a policy 
rejected by the great majority of the population, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Ensure that consultations between the European and American members of the Atlantic 
Alliance are pursued and strengthened with a view to co-ordinating the measureS taken and to be 
taken in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convip.ce them to meet 
the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations for re-establishing 
normal relations with Poland, i.e.: 1 
(a) the de facto and de jure abolition of the regime imposed by martial law in· Poland; 
(b) liberation of all political prisoners; 
(c) resumption of the dialogue between the government, free trade-unionism as formerly 
embodied by Solidarity and the Catholic church; · 
2. Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measu~es; 
3. Assert that if these conditions are not fulfilled the resumption of the Madrid conference on the 
application of the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be 
seriously imperilled. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary sess,on (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Michel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
915). 
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l. The Council have taken note of the Assembly's Recommendation 384 on the evolution of the 
situation in Poland. 
2. The Council recall that following the communique of 4th January of the ministerial meeting in 
the context of European political co-operation and the declaration of II th January of the Atlantic 
Alliance, there has been continuing close and active consultation within those bodies to co-ordinate 
the policies of member states in respect of Poland. The Council fully expect that this co-ordination 
will be maintained and that the member states involved will continue to keep the situation in Poland 
under careful review. 
3. The Council concur with the Assembly's view that relaxations to martial law in Poland 
announced on lst May and subsequently on 21st July, fall short of the three objectives outlined in 
the communique of the Ten of 4th January and in the declaration of the Atlantic Alliance of 
lith January. The Council deplore the continuation of martial law, the continuing detention of a 
significant number of Poles and the deliberate absence of a dialogue with the church and Solidarity. 
The Council note with deep concern the outlawing of the independent trade union Solidarity 
on 8th October. They believe that this is inconsistent with the Final Act of Helsinki and contrary to 
various statements made by the Polish leadership since 13th December 1981. The Council consider 
the recent outlawing of Solidarity to be a retrograde step which will render more difficult the restora-
tion of normal relations with the West. 
4. The Council assure the Assembly that the member states of WEU will continue their efforts 
within European political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance to persuade the Polish Government 
to honour their undertaking to re-establish civil liberties and the process of reform and to permit the 
revival of a genuinely free trade union movement. The Council believe the events of 31st August 
and the mass protests that have followed the dissolution of Solidarity are further reminders that only 
through genuine dialogue can Poland achieve lasting political and economic stability. 
5. As already stated in the communique of the Ten of 4th January and in the declaration of It th 
January of the Atlantic Alliance, the Council note with concern and disapproval the serious external 
pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR and other eastern countries against the efforts for 
renewal in Poland. 
For its part, the Council will continue to follow closely the effect of measures applied 
to Poland and the Soviet Union by western governmen~. The Council will keep the Assembly 
informed of their considerations. 
6. The Council note the Assembly's views concerning the CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid. 
The decision to resume the Madrid meeting on 9th November was taken by consensus. The WEU 
member countries continue to attach importance to the CSCE process as a useful tool for furthering 
their objectives both with a view to better implementation of the Final Act and in order to develop a 
management of relations in general with the East. 
7. At the Madrid meeting the WEU member countries will express their preoccupation about the 
situation in Poland during the review of implementation. They will continue to strive for a balanced 
and substantial concluding document of the Madrid meeting for which the draft introduced by the 
neutral and non-aligned countries could form the basis. Some essential and reasonable amendments 
are however necessary in order to reflect the situation in Poland in the concluding document. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th November 1982. 
230 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 385 1 
on international aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn 
from the colloquy on 9th and lOth February 19822 
DOCUMENT 938 
(i) Conscious of the political will it has consistently demonstrated through the organisation in the 
last ten years of no less than five symposia so as to promote improved co-operation and collaboration 
in the conception, design, development, production and procurement of high technology defence 
equipment, especially missiles and aircraft; 
(ii) Reaffirming its belief that the ensuing military benefits of such collaboration,, namely enhanced 
co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in equipment of the armed services 
of the western Alliance, would to a large extent offset the advantage of commonaility of armaments 
currently enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw Pact; 
(iii) Aware that the military aircraft, space and guided missile sectors of Europea~ industry play an 
increasingly important social and economic role in many regions of Europe in maintaining employ-
ment and in stimulating new technological developments, especially in times of recession; 
(iv) Recalling that the incentive for international collaboration in the aeronauticaJ industry must be 
not just the economic and political advantages for governments, or the military benefits for armed 
forces but the commercial interests and industrial development of participating aerospace companies; 
(v) Convinced that existing institutions such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD) of NATO, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) of Western European Union and the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) should be made to operate effectively and their 
work harmonised, particularly as many of the same people are involved; 
(vi) Recognising that aeronautical collaboration has taken place within a variety 10f industrial orga-
nisational structures from simple prime and sub-contractor relationships through joint companies to 
complete industrial consortia and that the organisational requirements for one particular aerospace 
project do not necessarily lend themselves to another; 
(vii) Considering that families of aircraft and of military aerospace equipment represent a cost-
effective return on investment, not least for the smaller countries of Europe, and that to this end 
existing consortia such as Airbus Industrie and Panavia offer the basis for further pmjects; 
(viii) Appreciating that the fiscal, legal, and financial environment within wh,ich transnational 
consortia have to operate impose impediments to aeronautical collaboration in Europe not shared by 
competitor aerospace companies in the United States and that the objective for Western Europe 
should be to provide itself with a comparable industrial aeronautical capability; 
(ix) Convinced that the pursuit of a genuinely balanced North Atlantic market f~r high technology 
defence equipment with the United States of America demands not only enhanced collaboration 
among the member states, but also a change in American policy towards a satisfactory opening for 
European production, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Strengthen the effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee as an agency for the pro-
motion of co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in defence equipment of 
the WEU countries by increasing the SAC's establishment of expert staff and enhancing the level of 
political support accorded to its work by the governments of the member nations ofWEU; 
2. Persuade the governments represented in WEU to reinforce the vital function of the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group in harmonising national operational req4irements and re-
equipment timescales on a European scale by assigning the chairmanship of the IEPG to a defence 
minister on a rotational basis and by regular progress reports by the IEPG to the A$sembly of WEU; 
1. Adopted h~ the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions (Document 916). 
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3. Seek to make the most effective use of the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD) since a concomitant to the mutual defence commitments of the Atlantic Alliance must be a 
common approach not just to strategy hut to materiel procurement and logistics; 
4. Reinforce political will within the WEU nations at the highest governmental level to pursue a 
collaborative approach to the re-equipment requirements of the European armed forces of the Atlan-
tic Alliance by placing policies for the achievement of a balanced and equitable European and Atlan-
tic-wide market for armaments firmly on the agenda for heads of government meetings and for the 
more regular and routine meetings of Alliance defence and foreign ministers; 
5. Urge defence ministry staffs of the WEU countries to bear in mind, in addition to the operatio-
nal requirements of their individual national armed forces, criteria such as overseas marketability of 
defence equipment, the need to control costs by avoiding a higher degree of technical sophistication 
than that required to achieve substantial superiority over any likely threat, and the benefits, both 
industrial and military, of securing other Alliance nations to share in the production and procure-
ment of the high technology defence equipment; 
6. Promote the earliest possible involvement of industrial interests including existing European 
consortia in the conception and definition of future aerospace projects either nationally or through 
the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) or preferably both so as to achieve a market and 
commercial orientation of such projects from the design stage, the first and foremost of which should 
be a new European combat aircraft; 
7. Press the national governments within WEU to pursue industrial policies towards the aeronau-
tical sector more favourable to the development of an independent European capability in aerospace 
than to the costly maintenance of purely national aerospace capabilities and to ensure to this end that 
a collaborative strategy within Europe be maintained involving the fullest utilisation of existing 
consortia for the design, development and production of new aeronautical projects; 
8. Invite the member governments of WEU to reaffirm to the European Communities the need 
for carefully-considered proposals to be put to the Council of the EEC for the establishment of a har-
monised framework of company law and of harmonised tax systems so as to facilitate the operation of 
transnational consortia within the EEC; 
9. Emphasise strongly to member governments of WEU the importance of applying the family of 
aircraft concept in the European framework whenever excessive competition is liable to weaken 
Europe's industrial potential; 
10. Impress upon the governments of the member nations the need to make clear to the Govern-
ment of the United States that the evolution of a balanced and equitable Atlantic-wide market in 
military aerospace products is a paramount political necessity, which will also require the support of 
Congress for the lifting of restrictions on European imports such as the Speciality Metals Amend-
ment. 
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The Council welcome the interest that the Assembly, by virtue of its competence in defence 
matters, displays in European aeronautical co-operation. The colloquy on international aeronautical 
consortia held in London on 9th and 1Oth February 1982 under the auspices of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is further evidence of this interest, as is the recom-
mendation on the conclusions of this meeting, which forms the subject of the reply below. 
1. The development of co-operative armaments programmes, particularly in the field of aero-
nautics, is a lengthy task calling for a pragmatic approach and patient efforts. The seeking of 
consensus between industrial, economic, military and political interests explains why progress is diffi-
cult. Nevertheless, as recognised unanimously by the participants in the Lon<Jon colloquy, co-
operation is an absolute necessity. The exorbitant and ever-increasing burden of the research, 
development and production costs of aeronautical programmes is an argument 1for European co-
operation, particularly through suitable consortia, whenever such co-operation, wi~h all the diversity 
required, is possible. Airbus Industrie, Euromissile, and Panavia are illustrations of such an 
approach. 
Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed political will, the various competent international bodies, 
each within the framework of their respective responsibilities, have a particular role to play in this 
co-operation. The machinery available to them for consultation must function as efficiently as 
possible. 
The Standing Armaments Committee was set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing the effi-
ciency of the forces of the countries of WEU by improving their logistics and the use of the resources 
available to them for equipping and supplying their forces and, by sharing, in the best interests of all, 
the research on, development of, and production of armaments. The Standing Armaments Commit-
tee has carried out its task in a variety of ways for many years. It maintains an interest in operatio-
nal research and several technical areas; furthermore, it was instructed by Council to carry out a 
study of the armaments industry of the WEU member states. The completed parts of this study have 
been transmitted to the Council, who have kept the Assembly informed. At the 1974 Conference of 
National Armaments Directors, it emerged that many more countries were interested in co-operation 
than the member states of WEU. As a result of this conference, the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group was set up. That body is now an important instrument of Euro11>ean multinational 
co-operation in the sphere of armaments. The fact that its composition is not identical with that of 
WEU suggests that members of the WEU Assembly should receive progress repdrts on its work by 
way of national procedures. The IEPG is already directed by a high-level political figure. 
The Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance is a body through 
which the countries of the alliance are able to co-operate in the definition and eiXecution of equip-
ment and research projects. It is a forum where information on military requirements, national 
concepts and programmes as well as emerging technology is exchanged in order to promote equip-
ment collaboration and standardisation. Considerable efforts are made, moreover, to rationalise and 
co-ordinate the activity of its subsidiary groups. 
Finally, the military staffs of the WEU member countries are fully aware of,the need to have a 
solid industrial basis for equipping their forces as economically as possible, thereby promoting 
marketable equipment at competitive prices. 
2. Like the European institutions, the governments are fully aware of the emergence of a civil air-
craft industry within Europe and are endeavouring to advance along the difficult path towards harmo-
nising legal and fiscal systems. As regards the armaments industry, and in particular military air-
craft, the security interests of the WEU member countries cannot be ignored. The latter consider, 
therefore, that questions of a structural nature should remain within the province of the bodies 
competent in defence matters. 
3. The governments of the WEU member countries are fully aware of the 1 importance of the 
family of aircraft concept, of which the Airbus is a striking reality. In the military sphere, the appli-
cation of this concept is undoubtedly more difficult, but the variety of prospects that it offers will 
nevertheless be thoroughly explored. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982. 
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4. The governments of the WEU member countries have already made clear to the American 
authorities the importance that they attached to the opening of a balanced and genuine transatlantic 
dialogue. The special metals amendment, if it were to be adopted, would be an obstacle to the 
strengthening of such relations. The approach made to Congress for the lifting of the amendment is 
of course supported by the WEU member countries, which moreover, have sought to achieve this end 
on several occasions. 
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RECOMMENDATION 386 1 
on the situation in the Middle East2 
The Assembly, 
Deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East ; 
Recalling WEU Recommendations 341 and 349 adopted by the Assembly by overwhelming 
majorities; 
Endorsing Resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council; 
Recalling its often-repeated condemnation of acts of terrorism anywhere in the world and 
asserting that retaliatory military actions, especially those involving the maiming and killing of inno-
cent civilian population, are totally unacceptable; 
Noting that the establishment of lasting peace in the area is essential for Europe's security and 
for stability in the world; 
Regretfully noting that the provisions of the Camp David accord relating to the future status of 
the Palestinians have still not been carried into effect ; · 
Considering that the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole 
Lebanese territory is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East ; 
Wishing its General Affairs Committee follow developments in the Middle East and to report 
to it at its next session, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty and to assist in its 
restoration; 
2. Condemn unreservedly the present Israeli aggression and call for the evaduation of all non-
Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon other than the United Nations interim force1in Lebanon which 
should be strengthened; 
3. Recall that the problems of maintaining peace in the Middle East cannot be solved without 
ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and 
recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised 
frontiers. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 17th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Della Briotta on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 923). 
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1. The Council unreservedly condemn the violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and express 
their determination to support all efforts aimed at re-establishing the authority of the Lebanese 
Government over all its national territory. The member countries of WEU affirm their solidarity 
with a friendly country whose population has suffered so cruelly and whose stability is dangerously 
threatened. They strongly hope that after the election of the new President the Lebanese people will 
be able to bring about national reconciliation and they are prepared to assist in the relief and recon-
struction of the country. 
2. The Council strongly condemn the cycle of violence, especially the Israeli invasion of Leba-
non. They express their profound revulsion at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut. 
Following these tragic events, the governments of the WEU countries welcome United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 521, and consider that deployment of multinational forces in Beirut, in 
which forces belonging to France, Italy and the United States are participating, will contribute signifi-
cantly to the security of the civilian population of Beirut. 
The Council are convinced that a return to lasting peace in Lebanon and the restoration of its 
national sovereignty require the rapid and complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country 
except those authorised by the Government of Lebanon whose authority should be fully 
re-established over all its national territory. The Council support all efforts designed to achieve 
these objectives. 
3. The Council are convinced that, looking beyond the solution of the Lebanese problem, the 
Middle East can only enjoy lasting peace and true stability through the participation of all parties in 
a comprehensive settlement which should be based on the principles of security for all states, justice 
for all peoples of the region and renunciation of force by all parties concerned. Such a settlement 
should be founded on mutual recognition by all the parties involved of Israel's right to exist within 
secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and also of the right of self-determination for the 
Palestinians with all that this implies. For such negotiations to be possible, the Council consider 
that the Palestinian people must be represented and the PLO will have to be associated with negotia-
tions. 
In view of the principles mentioned above, the Council welcome President Reagan's new initia-
tive contained in his speech on 1st September 1982, which offers an important opportunity for peace-
ful progress towards a solution of the Palestinian question and the reconciliation of the parties 
involved. In this connection, they underline the importance of the statement adopted by Arab heads 
of state and government at Fez on 9th September, which they see as an expression of the unanimous 
will of the participants, including the PLO, to work for the achievement of a just peace in the Middle 
East encompassing all states in the area, including Israel. Finally, the Council believe that 
discussions of the Franco-Egyptian draft resolution by the Security Council could play a useful part 
in establishing a common basis for a resolution of the problems of the area. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982. 
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Considering that the cohesion of the free world is an essential condition for the maintenance of 
peace, European security and economic recovery; · 
Noting that the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance remain fully 
convinced of this fact; 
Noting that western cohesion is being challenged by increased tensions in international rela-
tions and the present serious economic recession; 
Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood by the public 
and therefore do not receive as much support from public opinion as they might; 
Noting that such reactions and challenges, amplified by modem means of communications, 
give rise to mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic; 
Welcoming the initiatives to improve consultations between Europe and North America within 
the framework of existing institutions; 
Considering that events in Afghanistan and Poland require that any measures aimed at improv-
ing relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact should be the subject 
of close collective examination to prevent the impression that faits accomplis are being accepted; 
Welcoming the intensive consultations within NATO on the INF negotiations at Geneva; 
Expressing support for an early beginning of the START negotiations and vigorous pursuit of 
the other disarmament negotiations; 
Considering the need to arrive at a consensus on the military threat posed to the Alliance and 
on the balance of forces; 
Considering further that public support for armament decisions would increase if these measu-
res were presented as a counterweight to Warsaw Pact programmes and allowed for constraints by 
that side; · 
Considering tha! frequent contacts between parliamentarians from European and North Ameri-
can member countries of NATO are essential for a better understanding of public opinion and should 
be organised as effectively as possible; 
Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn 
which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international 
security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort within the framework of 
NATO on sharing the burden of common defence; 
II. Urge member countries 
1. In agreement with the United States and the other members of NATO, to specify the principles 
to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance should conform in their economic relations with 
the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular regard to those items of strategic or 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 17th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary s~ssion (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Docu-
ment 914). 
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technological sign.ificance whose export is limited, the credit conditions granted and the conclusion of 
long-term contracts; 
2. To make full use of existing machinery for consultations in the political, military and econo-
mic field to allow them to react quickly and in a concordant manner in an emergency or crisis; 
3. To consider ways of improving transatlantic consultation, in particular by informal meetings at 
ministerial and high official levels, thus improving the effectiveness of existing institutions; 
4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the balance of 
forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications ; 
5. To present new decisions in the armaments field against the background of specific Warsaw 
Pact programmes and capabilities in order to discourage new incentives to the arms race; 
6. To support a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for a controlled limitation of 
nuclear weapons ensuring a balance of forces as a prerequisite for the security of Europe and of the 
whole western world. 
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I. The Council welcome the Assembly's interest in the European defence effort, within the NATO 
framework. This is an important question. The member countries of WEU which participate in 
the integrated military structure note in this connection that Eurogroup is at present updating a 
report on this subject. In the view of its authors, this report should help to lessen possible mis-
understandings in North America regarding contributions to the European defence effort within the 
alliance. The United States Government has already given much attention to this matter, in parti-
cular by laying before Congress the Weinberger report on the allies' contributions to common 
defence. 
11.1 As regards their economic relations with the eastern countries, divergent views may have arisen 
between western countries. The Council recall that since the beginning of the year, these countries 
have met in various fora in order to reach a common approach remaining consistent with their poli-
tical and security interests. A concerted, realistic and cautious approach towards the eastern coun-
tries is certainly one of the major concerns of the WEU member countries. 
2. The Council support the idea that consultations should take place in order to respond in an 
effective manner to an emergency or crisis. In this respect the Council attach particular importance 
to the consultations within the framework of existing machinery. They recall that in the event of a 
specific crisis the member countries of the alliance have at their disposal a wide 'variety of facilities 
for adequate consultation enabling them to react accordingly. 
3. The Council are of the opinion that informal meetings at ministerial level can contribute to an 
improvement in transatlantic relations. Such a meeting of the ministers of fo.-eign affairs of the 
alliance took place on 2nd and 3rd October in Canada. 
4 and 5. In spring 1982, NATO published for the first time an official comparison of the forces of 
the NATO integrated military structure and of the Warsaw Pact. This document obtained the full 
support of all the member countries of the alliance participating in the integrated military structure. 
The Council regard it as of great importance that the alliance countries concerned should continue 
to base their public statements about the balance of forces as much as possible on a commonly agreed 
document such as the abovementioned force comparison. Moreover, these coun~ries agree that new 
decisions in the armaments field need to be explained in relation to the threat to which they are 
designed to respond. 
6. The Council fully agree with the Assembly on the importance of a vigorous and determined 
pursuit of arms control negotiations with the aim of achieving a balance at a lower level of forces. 
WEU member countries played an active role in the elaboration of the comprehensive series of 
western initiatives which have been taken only recently. In this respect one may wish to recall the 
initiatives regarding the INF, START and MBFR negotiations as well as the western proposal con-
tinuing the mandate of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. The member countries will, to the 
extent they are involved, do their best to encourage a successful outcome of these negotiations. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th November 1982. 
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MOTION FOR AN ORDER 1 
tabled by Mrs. Knight and others 
2nd December 1982 
That the Presidential Committee should institute a study, as a matter of urgency, into the cost 
and practicability of instituting at the Palais d'Iena a telex wire service, which would be available to 
delegates for the submission of press reports to the Press Association, Reuters, etc. in their home 
countries, with the intention that this might operate as from the summer Assembly in 1983. 
Signed: Knight, Stoffolen, Page, Bohm, Berchem, van der Werf Terpstra, Dejardin, Smith, 
Glesener, Herman-Michielsens, Forma 
l. See 12th sitting, 2nd December 1982 (order agreed to). 
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